On 2016 May 17, Lydia Maniatis commented:
I have a number of issues with this paper, among them that it refers to "perceptual averaging" as though it actually exists, before admitting, at the very end, that it might not. It's an odd situation, since "perceptual;" can an experience be perceptual in the absence of something being actually perceived. (Who are you going to believe, the investigators or your lying eyes?) Apparently, the authors and others they cite have never personally perceived perceptual averages (if they had there would be little doubt of their perceptual existence), but they have purportedly generated a great deal of evidence that other humans do. If, on the other hand, they mean to refer to some type of blindsight, then it is still the case that the term perceptual is not quite right, since the striking thing about blindsight is precisely the lack of a percept.
I've addressed the averaging issue and its existence in other comments, including a comment here on Bauer (2015) and Solomon, May and Tyler (2016).
Another problem I have is that the authors refer to perception in terms of "signal detection," in which the main problem is what to discard, as though "features" were an intrinsic part of the proximal stimulus pre-organization, and we just have to decide what to get rid of or to "summarise." I've criticised the signal detection model in various comments including one on Allard and Faubert (2014). Such descriptions completely miss the point, which is that "features" such as shape and even color are not simply given in the stimulus, which consists of disconnected photons striking the retina. The failure of contemporary "signal detection" and "statistical summary" proponents to understand the fundamental problems of perception, and the tendency to essentially oversimplify the problems, puts them in the same boat with the structuralists, behaviourists and psychophysicists of yore. Of course, what is not simple are the fussy algorithms that are constantly being fitted and adjusted to the data, but this is just a technical not a conceptual complexity. If these activities had heuristic value, rather than being exercises in post hoc data-fitting, then we wouldn't be in a position where, as Bauer (2015) in a review of related research up to 2000, can state that some people continue to doubt the very existence of the assumed processes, or where the present authors could say pretty much the same thing: "Future work will be required to evaluate such claims fully, determining whether what appear to be the effects of perceptual averages might in the end reduce to the effects of memory for fine details of individual stimuli." Even though he's gotten a lot of flack for it, Helmholtz's "unconscious inferences" are basically a description of unconscious processes. Unperceived percepts, on the other hand, are simply paradoxical.
To the failure of the authors to appreciate the subtle but fundamental problems that the Gestaltists were addressing is added the misrepresentation of the latter, who are described as an early version of the former: "As Haberman and Whitney (2012) have noted, the idea that the visual system extracts summary statistics at the expense of individual features is far from a new one, going back at least as far as the writings of first-generation Gestalt psychologists (e.g., Koffka, 1935, pp. 270, 273). Despite the idea's long history and the recent increase in efforts to understand the statistical representations generated by the visual system, the basic structural mechanisms and functional significance of such summary statistics remain unclear." The reference to Koffka is completely off, as in the relevant passages he's discussing binocular vision and the matching or "summarising" of two retinal images to produce the perception of a single one in depth. The Gestaltists would have been acutely sensitive to the inadequacies and contradictions in the arguments in the current literature. They have extensively argued against past incarnations of the same fallacies.
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