On 2021-06-01 17:42:44, user Claudio Tennie wrote:
We have uploaded our response to the main point rasied in Mielke’s 2020 bioRxiv comment on our oranzee MS elsewhere (below his original comment). Due to character limitations of disqus (or in any case upload issues we experienced) we will now answer the remaining points here. Having answered Mielke’s main point, below, we will therefore only answer to Mielke’s additional points where he a) directly claims to critique us beyond a critique of our specifics claims and/or b) where we deemed that Mielke raises points that might appear to readers to apply beyond a critique of our specifics claims. Given that we can show with data how and why these critiques are not relevant (see below), and given that the appropriate literature containing this data is and was already cited in the manuscript, we have not changed our manuscript based on these comments addressed below (although note that we have since worked on the manuscript more generally, and therefore it is likely that these points are now made clearer in the new manuscript). Note that we experienced upload issues again here at disqus when uploading our reply, which is why we spplit our reply. This here is PART 2 of our reply. A third part will follow.
The claim that we deny the ecological importance of ape culture. E.g. Mielke writes “The model, and I would say the theory underlying it, ignore that an ape who fails to learn a skill correctly faces immense costs.”
Answer: We do not ignore the ecological relevance of ape cultures, and never did. As for the implication by Mielke - that copying is necessary for ape cultures - this is a widespread idea, but it is empirically unsupported. Apes do not require copying to acquire even their most complex behaviours (e.g. even nutcracking with hammers can be reinnovated from scratch (shown by Bandini et al. (accepted with minor revisions); available at https://www.biorxiv.org/con.... Therefore, while it is true that apes have to learn, the question we keep on asking is: how do they learn it? We already laid out how they do so (based on the relevant literature) in our original manuscript. In sum, and as reflected already in our original manuscript, the evidence points away from form copying, and supports socially mediated reinnovation of know-how. See more on this below.
The claim that a lack of certain social learning biases in our model renders our model invalid. E.g. Mielke writes “So, if learning probability in the simulations is based on the frequency a behaviour is observed in the population, treating all potential models evenly and not weighting the impact of potential models by their age (e.g. remove infants and juveniles) biases the outcome of the results.”
Answer: Our general results do not depend on such specifics of social learning biases. Specific outcomes (e.g. exact number of cultural traits) do, but we no longer make claims based on such specifics (i.e. we no longer make the ‘specifics claim’, see above). In fact, social learning biases could be easily added to the model, but note that, because of the stochastic nature of some of them (e.g. prestige bias) their addition may even be likely to increase the probability of finding distributional “cultures” without form copying.
The claim that there is an “open-endedness” to ape culture in real-life and which needs to be inbuilt into our model. E.g. Mielke writes “There are hundreds of different ways to groom someone.”.
Answer: In theory, there could be hundreds of ways to groom - thousands even. It is therefore all the more surprising - but only under the assumption that apes regularly copy forms - that, in this case and across cases, apes are nevertheless empirically restricted towards certain forms, and which are few in number. Indeed, in a first, indirect “ballpark-count” it was recently concluded that apes are thus biased towards only a few thousand behavioural forms overall, across all ape species, behavioural domains (incl. grooming) and populations (the wild included; Motes-Rodrigo & Tennie 2021 Bio Rev). This is in heavy contrast to the human case, who have many more behavioural forms; indeed counting not in thousands or even in millions, but in the billions (Motes-Rodrigo & Tennie 2021). Therefore, whilst the theoretical logic proposed by Mielke holds - it only holds for humans in real life, but it does not hold for apes. Across our publications, and all considered, we continue to explain the most parsimonious reason why this is - ultimately, this difference derives from apes not basing their behavioural forms on copying. Instead, they seem to instead trigger forms that they latently possess (latent solutions).
Having a finite number is a simplification for modelling purposes. In our model we consider a finite number - 64 - of forms, but notice the specific number is arbitrary and does not change our main result. And, again, ape culture does not show signs of open-endedness in real life, so, strictly in keeping with Mielke’s call to make models more real-life like, we also do not see the need to implement open-endedness.
The claim that the meaning of social behaviours is equal to their behavioural form. E.g., Mielke writes “Play elements that nobody else knows will not lead to successful play.”
Answer: The question of how apes glean meaning from behaviour is a question that we did not study. We also fail to see the relevance of this comment to the source of behavioural form. Meanings might be related to ‘this or that’ factor, yes. However, none of this determines the behavioural form itself, and which is what our manuscript discusses.
The claim that the available data regarding ape social learning must be interpreted as spontaneous form copying. E.g., Mielke writes “Apes have probably in access of 100 different play elements in each group (Nishida et al 2010; Petru et al 2009), and it can easily be expected that innovation and social transmission occurs in this context (Perry 2011).”
Answer: Apes fail to copy forms under controlled settings (unless this skill is artificially planted via training and/or enculturation), and ape’s behavioural forms are reinnovated across populations and to a large extent, even across ape species (Motes-Rodrigo & Tennie 2021 Bio Rev and references therein). This should be expected, given that apes reinnovate these forms from scratch (and this is including social behavioural forms; e.g. handclasp grooming, mentioned by Mielke, is a nice point in case as its (few) various subforms also emerged across culturally unconnected populations, including in captivity). It is likewise irrelevant for questions of form copying whether a behaviour involves multiple individuals (Mielke: “rain dancing, cannot conceivably be reinnovated by one individual – what would that even look like, given that it is a coordinated action of several individuals with no discernible physical function?”). To show this, let us take the example of bird flight: to form a V formation in the sky cannot be done by a single bird either, but in contrast to Mielke’s claim this specific fact does not answer the question of what leads to this V shape - what leads to this V form. The answer is, perhaps in this case, a large influence of the environment, i.e. aerodynamics in conjunction with socially flying birds. The exact drivers most likely will differ across cases (e.g., sometimes the genetic level may play more of a role than the environment), but the general point does not depend on these details. The main point remains that none of these factors can pinpoint form copying. The fact that the various raindance forms occur elsewhere however speaks against form copying (as we explain here: Tennie & van Schaik 2020, Phil Trans B - compare Motes-Rodrigo & Tennie 2021 Bio Rev)
The claim that our model cannot - but should - capture multi-step behavioural forms. E.g. Mielke writes “Many of the described behaviours in Whiten et al 1999 are not simple behaviours that occur in a vacuum, but action sequences with several elements that have to be fulfilled in the exact right order and are embedded in sequential behaviour patterns; for example leaf clipping.”
Answer: We do not deny that ape behaviour can be complex and composed of multiple steps. Nobody we are aware of denies this. However, this, too, does not pinpoint form copying. To see why, consider this. A spider making a web is (and must be) using multiple steps in the correct order, too. But this does not mean that the spider must have copied this behavioural form [important note: we use the spider example as an illustration of the logical principle, we are not saying that apes learn just like spiders]. Another way of saying it is this: does multi-step behaviour require copying? It does not logically (see the spider example), but is there maybe a reason to assume that multi-step behaviour requires copying in the case of apes? If so, then we would agree. However, instead we know that multi-step behaviours do not require form copying in apes (e.g., see the empirical finding of ape nut-cracking reinnovation from scratch, using hammer sequences; Bandini et al (accepted with minor revisions)). We therefore must reject this notion on both logical and empirical grounds - despite it being intuitive and widespread.
As for the open-ended comment/aspect, If Mielke here refers to the fact that our model does not consider multi-step behavioural forms, again, this is a simplification for modelling purposes (and see also our notes on open-endedness above).
Claims regarding ‘known unknowns’. E.g. Mielke writes “detailed analysis will likely find that there are different ways of dragging a branch, as has been found for other behaviour on the list (e.g. digging for honey Estienne et al 2017).”
Answer: We would not like to engage with claims regarding known unknowns. Yet, note that some previous unknowns have been studied and thus turned into interesting knowns. For example, we recently ran a study on target-naive, unenculturated chimpanzees in which these nevertheless spontaneously developed a whole range of digging behaviours using organic tools - i.e. without the need for form copying. Again, we are not denying that apes show several behaviours - they clearly do (see above) - we are questioning whether any of these require form copying. Our study was designed 8among other things) to test the widespread claim that wild ape cultural patterns per se involve such copying and/or that they must involve such copying. Our study showed that, conversely, they do not. These aspects of ape behaviour do not pinpoint form copying. Another recently published study used a new, dedicated method for its search for ape form copying (the method of local restriction). It likewise demonstrated that most ape behavioural forms essentially auto-repeat. It also showed that the number of ape behaviours that show substantial (indirect) signs of being influenced by form copying in apes is extremely low. It ranges between zero and three (!) cases - across all ape populations, species and behavioural domains (Motes-Rodrigo & Tennie 2021 Bio Rev).
The claim that it matters how well our model states match real ape states. E.g. Mielke writes “Function and context might be specific to one sex or age-group: drumming in juveniles, for example, is often part of play; female chimps will slap the ground in displays rather than drum, even though drumming is sometimes observed.”
Answer: Our general results - and our main message - proved very robust and do not depend on these types of details.
The claim that our simulation was unbound by reality. e.g. Mielke writes “In general, it would be fantastic if there was even a basic description of why any of the simulations was designed as described here”
Answer: These descriptions were already part of the original manuscript, and several colleagues who had read our manuscript understood our approach. However, again, our newest manuscript is generally improved and clarified, so we believe that our new manuscript should be fully understandable (in addition to being replicable, as we lay open its code).
The claim that “‘Innovation probability’ is meaningless for social behaviours”.
Answer: Social behaviours are innovated just like material behaviours are, and so we fail to see a problem here. Indeed, one social behaviour in chimpanzees, handclasp grooming, has clearly been reinnovated multiple times across multiple culturally unconnected populations - including in captivity. More to the point of our manuscript, the source of the forms of these behaviours (in apes, at least) is very unlikely form copying (e.g. Tennie et al. 2020 Bio & Phil). In social and other contexts, apes can be triggered in various ways to reinnovate similar forms as those shown by their social partners.
The claim that the ape form copying assumption is still superior to the assumption of socially mediated reinnovation. E.g. Mielke writes “These seem to completely ignore anything we know about social learning or the life history of animals.”
Answer: We must strongly disagree, and indeed we do so on strictly empirical grounds. There is a long-held assumption of form copying underlying ape cultures, yes - but it has fared very poorly empirically. For some time, it indeed had appeared as if apes are spontaneously copying forms. However, claims for such spontaneous ape copying either had tested enculturated/trained apes (irrelevant for the question at hand as the skill is no longer spontaneous) or had merely tasked apes to seemingly (!) copy behaviours but that they could already do on their own. The problem here is that, clearly, things one can do on one’s own, do not need to be copied. Hence, any “copying” in these situations might have been an illusion of form copying. These results were then indeed proven illusionary in other, controlled studies - in studies that tasked apes with the copying of forms that they would not (!) already develop on their own (note, when human children learn behavioural forms, e.g. the word “laptop”, they are indeed learning forms that they would not otherwise produce). When tested in this way, unenculturated, untrained apes invariably fail to copy such novel forms - of either behavioural type (Clay & Tennie 2017 and references therein) or of artefact/tool type (Tennie et al. 2009 Phil Trans B). Note that we have another manuscript at the ready in which we additionally show that the failure of apes to copy in such situations is also not due to any social learning bias (and even ape mothers are not copied in such situations). Indeed, in stark contrast to human form learning (e.g. of the word “laptop”), ape behavioural forms repeat across populations and even species - and the overall number of ape behavioural forms is very small when compared with (form-copying) humans (Motes-Rodrigo & Tennie 2021 Bio Rev). The perhaps last possible objection that might be raised here, namely that maybe all these forms are still copied in the wild, but go back to some original cultural source population, can also be rejected. Not only would unavoidable copying error have led to a different picture today (Tennie et al. 2016, 2017), but when we test apes whose previous experiences are known and for whom any such cultural connected are effectively severed, they spontaneously reinnovate these forms, too ( including multi-step, complex behavioural forms such as nut-cracking with hammers; Bandini et al. (accepted with minor revisions)). Thus, truly taking into account everything we know about social learning of apes, the only available mechanism that can explain all these findings is that these forms are instead socially mediated, but not copied. Their form requires individual reinnovation (Bandini & Tennie, 2017; 2018). As a side note, Mielke also writes “by the time any chimp starts nut cracking, they will have observed several millions of strikes by their mother and other group members – are we to believe that they did not in any way take this information into account when acting?” Here, there can only be two answers in the light of the available data. First, socially mediated reinnovation happens in such cases, and therefore juveniles do absorb information (e.g. know-what (nuts), know-where (these trees) etc.; see Bandini et al. 2020, Biol Lett; Tennie et al. 2020 (Bio & Phil), Motes-Rodrigo & Tennie (2021)). Second, the idea that form copying is responsible for the similarities in behavioural forms between mother and offspring is strong and widespread, but it is - everything considered - most likely an illusion. relevant here is, again, that when tested at a later age, in the absence of demonstrations (note that orangutans do not crack nuts in the wild even), older, and therefore more individually (bodily) capable orangutans reinnovate the nutcracking form from scratch (Bandini et al) - and they can do so fast (for more and in-depth details on this comparison, please consult Bandini et al. (accepted w. minor corrections)).
The claim that an absence of evidence for form copying does not mean evidence of absence for form copying. E.g. Mielke then continues:“That reinnovation [of nut-cracking] is potentially possible does not rule out that most individuals in a community do not, in fact, reinnovate”
Answer: We have been very explicit in our manuscript from the start that our model does not allow for this claim. Instead, we did and do point to additional findings - for example, that apes do not copy novel forms, and that they spontaneously reinnovate the ones shown elsewhere (see also above). And so, the possibility of ape form copying playing any large role is rendered unparsimonious by that other, relevant, data. We merely apply Occam's razor across the available, relevant data. However, our model adds to this evidence as well. It helps triangulate the question by disproving one claim about what the method of exclusion can pinpoint.
The claim that innovation has no long-lasting effects in our model. E.g. Mielke writes “They don’t ‘reinnovate’ nut-cracking every time they are hungry, this renders the idea of innovation meaningless.”
Answer: This is simply a misunderstanding, as it is not how innovation is implemented in our model. Sensibly, innovation does lead to long-term consequences in our model. In particular, it does so by changing the “state” of our agents, i.e. when the agents innovate in a particular domain they (probabilistically) do not innovate any more within that domain.
The claim that our results do not provide relevant information. E.g. Mielke writes “However, the same thing is also true the other way round” in response to our claim that individual level mechanisms cannot be identified through population level outcomes.
Answer: This might have been true if our results existed in a vacuum. Yet there are many other, relevant types of data (cited above, and also in our manuscript), which in turn allow us to determine with high likelihood (using parsimony as our guide) the types of social learning mechanisms used by apes. The most parsimonious interpretation is that apes produce and maintain their cultures not via form copying, but via individual reinnovation of these forms which however is very often socially mediated (the latter bit renders these very clearly cultural, yes, but just not cumulative cultural in their forms).