- Mar 2018
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Therefore, as far as Canada was concerned, he was not aware that they could say that the principle of an elective Legislative Council had proved in any degree a failure. There was no doubt that, in some respects, the elective principle was attended with difficulties and objections. It had been found that complaint was made that the expense connected with the elections in many districts was such as to debar many able men from attempting to come forward as candidates. There was no doubt that to canvass a district composed of three constituencies, each sending a member to the Lower House, was a most formidable undertaking, and one from which many excellent and worthy men naturally shrank. An election for one was bad enough, but to have an election for three constituencies, certainly must be three times as bad.
§.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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He did not think that in Canada they had any cause to regret the change which had been made from the nominative to the elective plan. The circumstances under which that change took place were probably familiar to most of them. The Leg. Council had, from one cause or another, under the nominative system, fallen into public discredit.
§.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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In the constitution of the Legislative Council it would be observed that the principle which now obtained in Canada, of electing be members of that branch, was proposed to be done away with and that we would again revert to nomination by the Crown.
§.24 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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to the form of government which should be adopted for the administration of the general affairs of the whole union, and that form was copied almost literally from the system existing in the several Provinces.
Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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having decided that the Federative plan, as he had briefly endeavored to explain it, was the one which ought to be adopted, was whether they ought to adopt the mode of government which they now saw in use in the United States, or whether they should endeavor to incorporate in the Union the principles under which the British Constitution had been for so many years happily administered ; and upon this point no difference of opinion arose in the Conference. They all preferred that system which they had enjoyed for the last eighteen years, by which the Crown was allowed to choose its own advisers ; but those advisers must be in harmony with the well understood wishes of the country as expressed by its representatives in Parliament.
Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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It was therefore proposed, that in the Federation of the British North American Provinces the system of government best adapted under existing circumstances to protect the diversified interests of the several Provinces and secure efficiency, harmony and permanency in the working of the Union, would be a General Government charged with matters of common interest to the whole country, and Local Governments for each of the Canadas and for the Provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, charged with the control of local matters in their respective sections, provision being made for the admission into the Union on equitable terms of Newfoundland, the North-west Territory, British Columbia, and Vancouver.
Preamble, §§. 91, 92 and 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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a Governor General, who should be appointed by our Gracious Sovereign.
§.10 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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They were unanimously of the opinion that this system was more likely to operate for the benefit of the people than any attempt to introduce the American system of Government. They certainly believed that they enjoyed more practical freedom under the British Sovereign than they could under a dictator who was chosen for only four years. He believed that the administration of the country could be carried on with more advantage to the people and more in harmony with their wishes if that administration was obliged constantly to retain the confidence of the people ; and if the moment the people ceased to have confidence in those in power, they must give place to others who would be able to govern the country more in harmony with their wishes. The secret of the freedom of the British nation from revolution and disturbance was that the people had at any time the power of making the Government harmonise with their wishes, —it was, in fact, the greatest safeguard the British Constitution gave. No government In Canada could venture to set public opinion at defiance. No government could exist, except for a few short months, unless they had the people at their back ; for although parliamentary majorities could be preserved for a short time against the wishes of the majority of the people still it was impossible to deny that public opinion was, in a complete sense, represented by the opinion or the members of the Legislature. They all knew perfectly well that their representatives were chosen from amongst themselves, and he trusted that we should never in this country lose that control which had been so happily exercised by the people over the government of the day. It was, therefore, concluded that in forming an Union of these Provinces it was desirable, in the interest of the people at large, that the system of responsible government now in force should be maintained.
Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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each Legislature, and especially each Local Legislature—acting within the bounds prescribed by the Imperial Parliament and kept within these bounds by the Courts of Law if necessity should arise for their interference—would find in the working of the plan of Federation a check sufficient to prevent it from transcending its legitimate authority.
Preamble, §§. 91, 92 and 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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in laying a basis for the union of these Provinces, it was not proposed that the General Government should have merely a delegation of powers from the Local Governments, but it was proposed to go back to the fountain head, from which all our legislative powers were derived—the Imperial Parliament—and seek at their hands a measure which should designate as far as possible the general powers to be exercised by the General Legislature, and also those to be exercised by the Local Legislatures, reserving to the General Legislature all subjects not directly committed to the control of the Local bodies.
Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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that the reservation of what were popularly known as State rights had been to a great extent the cause of the difficulties which were now agitating that great country.
Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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liar. But it must not be supposed, on account of the use of that term, that in the Union now proposed to be established it was intended to imitate the Federal Union which we had seen existing in the United States. In the United States, the general Government exercised only such powers as were delegated to it by the State Governments at the time the Union was formed. Each State was regarded as a sovereign power, and it chose for the common interest to delegate to the general Government the right of deciding upon certain questions, which were expressly stated All the undefined powers, all the sovereign rights, remained with the Governments of the several States
Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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having unfortunately for our common interests comparatively little intercourse with each other, the difficulty was felt that, if we attempted to make a Legislative Union of these Provinces in the first instance, the dread, in the case of the Lower Provinces and probably of many among ourselves that peculiar interests might be swamped and certain feelings and prejudices outraged and trampled upon, was so great that such a measure could not be entertained and we were compelled to look for what was sought in a form of government that would commit all subjects of general interest to a general Government and Legislature, reserving for local Legislatures and Governments such subjects as from their nature required to been trusted to those bodies. (Cheers.) The term Federation was used with reference to the proposed Union, because it was that with which the public mind was most fami
Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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to determine whether it should be a Federal or a Legislative Union. A Legislative Union, as they were all aware, had certain advantages over one based on the Federal system. It was a more complete union, and implied a more direct action and control of the government over the interests of the people at large. And, where a people were homogeneous, and their interests of such a character as to admit of – niformity of action with regard to them, it could not be doubted that a government on the principle of a Legislative Union was the one which probably operated most beneficially for all
Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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the Hon. Mr. Brown and two other gentlemen representing the Liberal party of Upper Canada had entered, to address themselves to the preparation of a measure that would partake of a federal character as far as necessary with respect to local measures, while it would preserve the existing union in respect to measures common to all ; that they would endeavor, if necessary, to strike out a federal union for Canada alone, but that at the same time they would attempt, in considering a change in the Constitution of this country, to bring the Lower Provinces in under the same bond, as they were already under the same Sovereign. It was highly proper that, before touching the edifice of Government that had been raised in Canada they should address the statesmen of the Lower Provinces, and try to induce them to form a common system If it were found impossible to have a legislative union of all the British American Provinces, then they could reserve to the local governments of the several Provinces the control of such subjects as concerned them, while the rest should be committed to the cue of the General Government
Preamble, §§. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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should have been a concession to Upper Canada, of additional members in proportion to its population, but that concession would, as be had already remarked, have been an invasion of the Federal principle, contained in the Union Act, and would unquestionably have been represented to the uttermost by a large proportion if not by the whole of Lower Canada.
§§. 3 and 12 of the Union Act, 1840; §§. 51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
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indeed, extend them in such a way as to promote the peace contentment, and prosperity of the people, at the same time preserving in the new constitution those rights they were afraid would be subjected to injustice.
Preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867.
Tags
- Section 12 of the Union Act 1840
- Section 92 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 51 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 3 of the Union Act 1840
- Section 10 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Preamble of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 101 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 52 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 24 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 146 of the Constitution Act 1867
- Section 91 of the Constitution Act 1867
Annotators
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primarydocuments.ca/speech-on-the-proposed-union-of-the-british-north-american-provinces-sherbrooke/ -