38 Matching Annotations
  1. Sep 2018
    1. It is true that the House of Lords, Conservative though it be, finds itself removed from all popular influence; but its numbers may be increased upon the recommendation of the responsible advisers of the Crown, if such a measure were to become necessary to obtain the concurrence of both Houses, or to prevent a collision between them. The position which its members occupy in it establishes a sort of compromise between the Crown and the popular element. But this new House, after Confederation, will be a perfectly independent body; its members will be nominated for life, and their number cannot be increased. How long will this system work without bringing about a collision between the two branches of the Legislature? Let us suppose the Lower House composed in a great part of Liberals, for how long a time would it submit to an Upper House named by Government? Be kind enough to observe, Mr. SPEAKER, that under the old system, the Legislative Council possessed the same elements of existence as the House of Lords, and that the Crown could increase its numbers at need; it augmented it in 1849, as it threatened to augment the House of Lords in 1832. Observe, again, that it is precisely this control exercised by the Crown over the Upper House that the hon. gentleman found so fatal to legislation previous to 1856. But there is a more rational manner of appreciating the part sustained by the House of Lords in the British Constitution. No one denies to the Sovereign the abstract right of increasing at will the House of Lords; but such right has never been exercised but for the purpose of rewarding men distinguished for great national services and when, in 1832, WILLIAM IV. granted Earl GREY the tremendous power to swamp the representative body of the great landed nobility, it was because the country was moving with rapid strides towards revolution, and because there remained to the Sovereign but two alternatives, either to lessen the moral weight of the House of Lords, or to see his own throne knocked to pieces from under his feet.

      §§.22, 24, 26, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. It must then have been a real revolution, this nomination of one hundred new peers, a revolution as real as that which menaced the Throne; and do we not feel persuaded that if one day our Federal Legislative Council were to place itself obstinately and systematically in opposition to popular will, matured and strengthened by ordeals, it would not be swept away by a revolutionary torrent such as threatened to sweep away the House of Lords in 1832? This Council, limited as to numbers , because the provinces insist on maintaining in it an equilibrium without which they would never have consented to a union, this Council, sprung from the people—having the same wants, hopes and even passions, would resist less the popular will in America, where it is so prompt and active, than could the House of Lords in England, where the masses are inert because they have not political rights; reason tells us thus because they would be a less powerful body socially or politically.

      §§.22, 24, 26, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. We have accorded the principle of representation based upon population in the House of Commons of the Federal Government, and that is without doubt a great sacrifice; but we ought only to make so important a concession on the condition that we shall have equality of representation in the Legislative Council, and the right reserved to ourselves to appoint our twenty-four legislative councillors, in order that they may be responsible to the public opinion of the province and independent of the Federal Government.—Without this essential guarantee I affirm that the rights of Lower Canada are in danger. For my part I am ready, on behalf of Lower Canada, to give up her right to elect directly her twenty-four legislative councillors, although the retention of the elective principle might perhaps be the surest means of preserving our institutions; but I am anxious that the new Constitution now proposed should give us adequate guarantees that the legislative councillors to be appointed for life should, at all events, be selected by the Local Government of Lower Canada, which would be responsible to the people. These not ill-grounded sources of anxiety I should like to see removed.

      §§.22, 24, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. It appears therefore that the only alternative which now offers itself to the inhabitants of Lower Canada is a choice between dissolution pure and simple, or Confederation on one side, and representation by population on the other. And however opposed Lower Canada may be to representation by population, is there not imminent danger that it may be finally imposed upon it, if it resist all measures of reform, the object of which is to leave to the local authorities of each section the control of its own interests and institutions. We should not forget that the same authority which imposed on us the Act of Union, or which altered it without our consent, by repealing the clause which required the concurrence of two thirds of the members of both Houses in order to change the representation respecting the two sections, may again intervene to impose upon us this new change.

      Preamble, Part V, §§.51, 52, 91, 91(1), 92, and 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. The honorable member for Brockville, the Postmaster General, the Speaker, and other members representing Lower Canadian counties, in the present Parliament, have already voted for representation by population. Before long, it will become impossible to resist the demand of Upper Canada in this respect. If representation by population be not granted now, it will infallibly obtain it later, but then without any guarantee for the protection of the French Canadians.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    6. Representation “based upon population was one of the least causes of this project. [And further on] : But, as soon as the Government found itself, after its defeat, obliged either to resign or to appeal to the people, gentlemen on the other side of the House, without there being the slightest agitation on this question, prepared to embrace their most violent adversaries, and said to themselves: ” We are going to forget our past differences, provided we can preserve our portfolios. “

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    7. Necessarily, I do not mean to say that I shall always be opposed to Confederation. The population may extend itself, and cover the virgin forests which exist between Canada and the Maritime Provinces, and commercial relations may increase in such a manner as to render Confederation necessary.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    8. Mr. DORION argued that when Lower Canada had the preponderance of population, complaints were of the inequality of the representation of that section. The union of Belgium and Holland, which was somewhat similar to that at present existing between Upper and Lower Canada was dissolved when it was found it did not work advantageously to both countries. He instanced a number of questions on which it was impossible for Upper and Lower Canada to agree; public feeling being quite dissimilar— subjects popular in one section being the reverse in the other. He warned Lower Canada members, that when the time came that the whole of the representatives from the western portion of the province would be banded together on the question, they would obtain representation by population, and secure the assistance of the Eastern Township members in so doing. He regarded a Federal union of Upper and Lower Canada as a nucleus of the great Confederation of the North American Provinces to which all looked forward. He concluded by saying he would vote for the resolution, as the only mode by which the two sections of the province could get out of the difficulties in which they now are. He thought the union ought to be dissolved, and a Federal union of the provinces would in due time follow.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    9. The honorable member for Brockville, the Honorable Postmaster General, the Speaker, and other members representing Lower Canadian counties in the present Parliament, have voted for representation by population. Before long, it will be impossible to resist the demands of Upper Canada in this respect. If representation by population is not granted now, it will infallibly obtain it at a later period, but then without any guarantees for the protection of the French- Canadians. The repeal of the union, a Federal union, representation based on population, or some other great change must in all necessity take place, and for my part I am disposed to consider the question of representation by population, in order to see if it may not be conceded with guarantees for the protection of the religion, the language, and the laws of Lower Canadians. I am equally ready to take into consideration the project of a Confederation of the provinces, leaving to each section the administration of its local affairs, as for example the power of regulating its own civil, municipal and educational laws; and to the General Government the administration of the public works, the public lands, the post-office department, and commerce.

      §§.51, 52, 91, and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    10. The Conservative party has always opposed representation by population under the present union, because under this union we are face to face with the population of a country of which the products are different from ours, and of which the interests are not always identical with ours. This question was strongly agitated. The whole people of Lower Canada resisted that demand, and the whole Conservative party firmly refused to consent to it, while the other party—the Opposition party—held out hopes to those who demanded that measure, and allied themselves with them.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. any injustice to Upper Canada could arise. And then my honorable friend will see how it is to be distributed afterwards in the way of population, so that although there might be a little loss in the first instance, there would be an immense gain in the end.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. We find a section of the people in Lower Canada opposing the work on the ground that it will tend to destroy their language and nationality ; and we find also the British element in Lower Canada complain that in the arrangement for the Local Legislature their rights and privileges will be swept away. (Hear, hear.) On the other hand, Upper Canadians are opposing the scheme as injurious to their true interests, and asserting that the financial difficulties likely to arise under it will be detrimental to the welfare of the west ; so that where there is such great diversity of opinion, it was impossible to mature a scheme which should be in all respects perfect and satisfactory. No doubt Upper Canada has some cause to complain. For instance, the eighty cents per head for carrying on the local governments appears unfair in principle to Upper Canada, and as such they have reason to feel dissatisfied. This apportionment is on the present basis of population, and whatever may be the increase in numbers of the western section of the province, if even we increase during the next ten years in the same ratio that we have been increasing for the past ten years ; if we double our population we shall still only get the eighty cents per head for the present population. There is no doubt this is an objectionable feature. HON. MR. BROWN—Will my honorable friend allow me to assure him that he is slightly in error, and to show him how he is so ? Supposing we increase in population, the other provinces will increase also, and the only unfairness that could possibly exist in the case supposed would be in so far as the population of Upper Canada was relatively greater than that of the other provinces. HON. MR. HOLTON—It is a matter of ratio. HON. MR. BROWN—Yes, it is simply a question of ratio. My honorable friend will see how the principle works. At the rate we are proceeding now, some 2 1/2, 3, or 4 per cent., it would take a great many years before

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. But I have failed to see, and I yet fail to see, that the Liberal party of Upper Canada have ever given up the advocacy of representation by population. We found all parties in Lower Canada—both the English-speaking population and French-speaking population —refusing to concede to us what we conceived to be this just and proper principle; and when the opportunity was offered to us of relieving the country from its difficulties, we felt that no party considerations or party ties should be allowed to interfere with what we conceived to be our sacred duty to our constituents and our country.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. At the time of the formation of the MACDONALD-SICOTTE Government, I was, with many others, strongly blamed, because we allowed that Government to come into existence at all. It is quite possible we were wrong; but I think after all it was fortunate that the hon. member for Cornwall (Hon. J . S. MACDONALD) had a fair opportunity to try his favourite remedy for our constitutional difficulties—the ” double majority principle.” That principle had been pressed on the attention of the country for ten years as one amply sufficient as a remedial measure, under which the existing political system could be harmoniously worked. In the MACDONALD-SICOTTE Government it had a fair trial and a speedy death. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) The existence of that Government, if it served no other purpose, showed the utter impracticability of the one means, by which my hon. friend hoped to accomplish what he, in common with ourselves, had long aimed at (Hear, hear. Now, supposing the Liberal party of the west had refused the terms offered by the present Administration— if we had declined to support a government which was really giving us nearly all we demanded—I do think we would have been fairly chargeable with creating if not advocating a state of anarchy. I think it would have been a most suicidal thing, if, having obtained—if not to the full extent, yet to a very great extent— the concession of the principle we had contended for so long, we had refused to accept the settlement offered, merely because a certain number of gentlemen, to whom we had been strongly opposed before, were among the leaders of the new movement.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. He had looked at it in this way. The time had been when the people of Upper Canada imagined that the Lower Canadians were afraid to grant representation by population lest western reformers should interfere with their religious institutions. He was fully satisfied that that idea was entirely erroneous—that the French people never had the slightest fear of the kind, because they knew it would be political suicide, it would be absolute ruin to any political party having the administration of affairs in their hands, to perpetrate injustice on any section of the people, to whatever church they belonged. (Cheers.) There was one element, however, which always entered largely into the discussion of all our national questions, and that was that the French people were a people entirely different from ourselves in origin, and largely in feeling. We all had a certain pride in our native country, and gloried in the deeds of our ancestors. The French people had that feeling quite as strongly as any of us ; this reason, and also because they were a conquered people, they felt it necessary to maintain a strong national spirit, and to resist all attempts to procure justice by the people of the west, lest that national existence should be broken down. He (Mr. MACKENZIE) felt for one that mere representation by population, under such circumstances, would perhaps scarcely meet the expectations formed of it, because although Upper Canada would have seventeen more members than Lower Canada, it would be an easy thing for the fifty or fifty-five members representing French constituencies to unite with a minority from Upper Canada, and thus secure an Administration subservient to their views.

      Preamble, §§.51, 52, and 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. We felt that it was not fair—that it could not be just—that four men in Lower Canada should be equal, politically, to five men in Upper Canada. We complained that an eastern majority, in spite of our protestations, framed our laws.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. reform of the representation on the basis of population as one remedy I believe to be an effective one.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. I am not myself bound down to representation by population as the only possible measure. If the opponents of that measure can suggest any other remedy, I am quite willing to give it a candid consideration ; and I am quite sure that the large constituency I represent will support me in considering any measure which will place it out of the power of the Government of the day to perpetrate sectional injustice ; but until such a remedy is suggested, I feel bound to advocate

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. I wish to know what share of representation the English-speaking population of Lower Canada will have in the Federal Legislature, and whether it will be in the same proportion as their representation in this Parliament ? This is one point in which I think the English inhabitants of Lower Canada are strongly interested.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. whatever the increase of the population in the other provinces, the part from Lower Canada is fixed and known. Thus, for instance, if the population of Upper Canada should increase more than that of Lower Canada, the latter will always have sixty-five members, the other provinces receiving such increased number of representatives as their increased population would entitle them to. But the resolutions do not prevent Lower Canada from having more than sixty-five representatives, if its population should increase faster than that of the other provinces. The French translation of these resolutions is erroneous, for it says that ” for the purpose of determining the number of representatives from each province at the end of every decennial census, Lower Canada shall never have either more or less than sixty-five representatives,” whereas the English version of the resolutions, which is the official version, says : ” Lower Canada shall always be assigned sixty-five members.” This does not mean that Lower Canada can never have more than sixty-five members, but that it can not have less than sixty-five members.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. In 1856, when Parliament was sitting at Toronto, I first suggested that one means of surmounting our difficulties would be the substitution of a Confederation of the two Canadas in place of a legislative union. By that arrangement local questions would be debated in the local legislatures, and the Central Government would have the control of commercial and other questions of general interest. I said that considering the differences of race, religion and laws now existing between the two sections of the country, it would be the best means of surmounting them. That is to say, I would leave to a central government questions regarding commerce, banking, the currency, public works of a general character, &c., and to the local legislatures all local questions. At the same time I said that if these views were not accepted, I should certainly be in favor at representation based on population, with conditions and guarantees which would secure the interests of Lower Canada, and preserve to Lower Canada the institutions which are so dear to her. Well, we see that in 1856, the hon. member for Hochelaga was desirous of forming a new Constitution for the express purpose of stifling the cry for representation based on population. In 1858 he formed, together with the present Hon. President of the Count- coil (Hon. Mr. BROWN), the BROWN-DORION Government; and again, he stipulated that the question of representation based on population should be taken into consideration, and that the Government should consider the means of settling the difficulties which it involved. In 1859 he signed a document, which also bore the signatures of Hon. Mr. DRUMMON, Hon. Mr. DESSAULLES, and Hon. Mr. MCGEE, in which he said with his colleagues, that a change in the Constitution of the country was necessary :— If Lower Canada insists on maintaining the union intact ; if she will neither consent to a dissolution of the union, nor consider the project of a Federation, it is difficult to conceive on what reasonable grounds the demand for representation according to population can be resisted. The plea for such resistance has hitherto been that danger might arise to some of her peculiar and most cherished institutions ; but that ground will be no longer tenable if she rejects a proposition, the effect of which would be to leave to her own people the sole and absolute custody of those institutions, and to surround them by the most stringent of all possible safeguards, the provisions of the fundamental law of the land, unalterable save by the action of the people affected by them. The logical alternative now presented to the people of Lower Canada would, therefore, seem to be dissolution or federation on the one hand, and representation according to population on the other. Here, again, he intended to stifle the cry of representation based on population, and intended to do it by founding a new Confederation. In 1861 it was just the same ; he declared that he was desirous of settling that question of the representation ; that it was not expedient that it should remain an open question ; that it was a difficulty to be got rid of one way or another. In 1862, also, he went into the Government with the same object in view but how did he set about carrying it out ? He made it a close question, and adopted, with his colleagues, the plan of the double majority. The hon. member doubtless had forgotten that in 1859, when he penned the manifesto which I have just quoted, he had condemned the double majority. Here is, in fact, what he said in that document :— In each section there would still be minority and majority parties, and unless the principle of the double majority could be enacted as a fundamental law, we should be exposed to an endless round of the same complaints that we now hear, of one section ruling the other contrary to its well known public opinion, and to see reproduced in our politics the same passions, the same intrigues, the same corruption and insincerity. The enactment of the double majority is not advocated in any quarter. The impossibility of clearly defining the cases to which it should apply, and of distinguishing them from those to which it should not, is felt by all ; but were it even possible, it would only lead to new phases of difficulty, by compelling majorities professing opinions and principles diametrically opposed to each other, to unite, and thereby effectually to extinguish the influence

      §§.51, 52, 91, and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. HON. SOL. GEN. LANGEVIN—That Administ rat ion had no very long existence, and I rejoice that I did my part in upsetting it, for it is probable that , if it had stood, representation based on population would have been forced upon us, and we should not be now in our present position—in a position to make our own terms as freely as Upper Canada, and take part, on a footing of equality, in negotiating a treaty with the Lower Provinces.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. Representation by population would have left us, Lower Canadians, in an inferior position relatively to that of Upper Canada—would have conferred on the latter the privilege of legislating for us, not only in general, but in local matters. The hon. member for Hochelaga ought to have been the last to reproach the present Government with having, by this measure of Confederation, stopped the cry for representation based on population. In 1854, the hon. member admitted, as he himself acknowledges, that representation based on population was just in principle, and the consequence of that admission was fatal.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. there will be no reduction in the number of their representatives, in accordance with the provisions of this 21st clause. It is the interest of Lower Canada, more than of any other province, to watch with a jealous eye over the mechanism adopted for the organization of the Federal Legislature. In case of a vital question arising, we should have to counteract the votes of these five members (who ought, in justice, to be deducted from the representation of the other provinces) by those of five of our members, whose votes would thus be lost to us, as would also be the weight which their five united counties, with a total population of 114,480 (or 22,896 for each county), would throw into the scale. Other combinations of circumstances might arise which might prove even more disadvantageous to us. This subject naturally leads me to address myself to my French Canadian colleagues ; I fear that my remarks may not be well received by all, but I hope that honorable members will be good enough to excuse my frankness in consideration of the great importance of the question. I have no right to maintain that all those who are favorably disposed towards Confederation are not acting in good faith; it is not my wish to reproach them for acting according to their convictions, but in so acting they should not forget the duties which their charge imposes on them. It a well known fact that when the scheme of Confederation was laid before the public, all the newspapers, and most of the members who support the Administration, declared themselves in favor of the scheme, but, in nearly every instance, with an express reservation of the right to introduce certain amendments which they considered indispensable. But the Honorable Attorney General for Upper Canada declared, some days ago, that the Government would accept no amendment, and that the resolutions must be adopted exactly in the shape in which they were brought down. Are honorable members going to submit to this decree ? Is it not their intention at least to make an effort to have those amendments, which they looked upon as indispensable, adopted ? Their position in relation to the Government confers upon them an influence which they can never exert more usefully than at present ; it is their duty to exert that influence ; they are responsible for the results of this measure, which cannot be adopted without their concurrence. Their principal argument in support of Confederation is that we have now an excellent opportunity of obtaining; favorable conditions—an opportunity which will probably never occur again, and one of which it is their duty to avail themselves. But have the honorable members made those conditions ? Have they taken as great precautions to preserve intact the interests of nearly a million French Canadians entrusted to their care, as they would have taken in making an agreement for the sale of a farm, or even the purchase of a horse ? Have they made any conditions at all ? If they have made no conditions, do they at least know what the fate is that is reserved for us ? Do they know the nature of the form of Government which will be imposed on Lower Canada? Can they say whether we shall have Responsible Government ?

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. I object to the 21st clause, because it contains provisions which are unjust to Lower Canada. The full scope of that clause is not generally understood ; that proportion of five per cent, appears to be a very small affair, and yet, under certain circumstances, it might produce considerable results, which are not taken into consideration in the explanations given on that subject in the work written by the Honorable Mr. CAUCHON, which the Government has caused to be distributed (pages 72 to 87). It is difficult to foretell what the exact numerical increase of the several provinces will be from the present time to the next census in 1871. The Honorable Mr. CAUCHON assumes, as the basis of his calculations, a rate of thirty per cent. Let us suppose the case to prove that in all the provinces (with the exception of Lower Canada) the population increases, by thirty per cent, between 1861 and 1871, and that that of Lower Canada increases by thirty-four per cent. It may, perhaps, be objected to this that it is improbable. My reply is, that when we are discussing a scheme of such importance as that which is now under our consideration, we should provide for all possible contingencies; but this one is far from being impossible if the predictions of the Minister of Finance and the Attorney General, who promise to Lower Canada so brilliant a future under the Federal system, are fulfilled. If Lower Canada becomes the heart of the commercial life of the Confederation ; if the mines of copper, lead, silver, and gold which we have lately discovered should produce the same results that they produce everywhere else, that of attracting a great influx of population, I cannot be accused of any very great exaggeration in supposing that the population of Lower Canada may, between the years 1861 and 1871, increase by four per cent, more than the population of the other provinces. In the case which I have supposed the increase would be as follows :— Upper Canada 418,827 Lower Canada 377,625 Nova Scotia 99,257 New Brunswick 75,614 Newfoundland 39,000 Prince Edward Island 24,227 ——– Total increase 1,034,550 According to this calculation, Lower Canada would have, in 1871, a population of 1,488,- 289 souls, which would have to be divided by 65, that being the invariable number of representatives assigned to Lower Canada, in order to ascertain what will be the number of constituents for each representative in the Federal Parliament ; the result will be found to be 22,896. Upper Canada would have a population of 1,814,918 souls, which, divided by 22,896, would give her seventy-nine representatives instead of eighty-two. Nova Scotia would have a population of 430,114 souls, which would give her nineteen representatives as at present (eighteen and a fraction over the half). New Brunswick would have a population of 327,661 souls, which would give her fourteen representatives instead of fifteen. Newfoundland would have a population of 169,000 souls, which would give her seven representatives instead of eight. Prince Edward Island would have a population of 104,984 souls, which would give her five members as at present (four and a fraction over the half). It will be seen that if the five other provinces were represented on the same scale as Lower Canada, they would, in 1871, lose among them five members ; but as the total population of each will not have decreased by five per cent., relatively to the total population of the Confederated Provinces,

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. the Speech from the Throne, which expresses ” thankfulness to a beneficent Providence for the general contentment of the people of this province,” or the address voted by the Legislature in answer to the Speech from the Throne, which is the faithful echo of this grateful sentiment ! What would the members of the Ministry have said, if a member had risen to move an amendment to the Address in the words made use of by the Hon. Premier, ” That the country is bordering on civil strife, and that therefore the House cannot admit that there is general contentment among the people?” It is on reasons widely differing from these that the Speech from the Throne takes ground in recommending the adoption of the scheme of Confederation. But are we really bordering on civil strife ? Of course it is representation based on population which is the exciting cause. Do the people of Upper Canada demand representation based on population as a condition sine qua non of the continuation of our peaceful relations with them ? Has this desire to obtain representation based on population taken such deep root in the bosom of Upper Canada, that it is ready to plunge us and itself into the horrors of civil war in order to achieve it ? Or is not representation by population rather one of those political clap-traps which ambitious men, who can catch them no other way, set to catch the heedless multitude? We, Lower Canadians, who at this distance cannot judge of the sentiments of Upper Canadians by our own observation, must depend for the formation of our opinions respecting them on the Upper Canada newspapers, and on the speeches of their members in this House. They are the only sources of information which we possess. Well, in 1862, we saw the Upper Canada leaders, except the President of the Council, who was wise enough to keep aloof, who are at the same time connected with the principal newspapers there, either as proprietors, editors or co-editors, accept office under the MACDONALD-SICOTTE Government, the fundamental principle of which was equal representation of the two sections, a principle which entitled it to the cordial support of Lower Canada. These gentlemen we saw re-elected, notwithstanding their abandonment of their principles, and we found them voting against representation by population. From this I conclude that Upper Canada is much more indifferent, and its leaders much less sincere touching this question of the representation, than they would have us believe. Were it otherwise, Upper Canada would have taken the opportunity, afforded by the election, of punishing the men who had betrayed her. But who are those two men who now pitch their voices in harmony (formerly so discordant) to predict civil war, if we do not vote for Confederation ? They are the Attorney General for Lower Canada, and the President of the Council (Hon. Messrs. CARTIER and BROWN !)—the one demanding representation by population, the other refusing it : both took their stand as the champions of their sections, and became their chieftains respectively.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. Yet representation by population was a question of such political importance, that its satisfactory solution would justify the bringing about such a change as this. That was a sufficient motive to induce statesmen to join together and seek some way of escape from it. I think the scheme now submitted is perhaps the best that could have been found attainable, and I give its framers all credit for it.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    1. position—I am sure it was not pressed upon him by the delegates from the Maritime Provinces— comes forward and says, ” I will give you ten members as a set-off against the twenty-one members who are now members for life in the Canadian Legislative Council.” If I am not wrong in my arithmetic, ten are not a third of twenty-one. If the honorable gentleman had given seven members to the Lower Provinces as a set-off against the life memo. ers of this House he would have acted with strict justice, but he is generous enough to give them three more—ten, or nearly one half.

      §§.22, 24. 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. I have just said the agreement was that there should be equality in the representation in the Legislative Council. But the honorable gentleman has moved that the elective members as they now stand should form the Legislative Council in the Federal Government, and that also the life members should continue for the remainder of their days ; and, as a set-off against the life members, he proposes to allow the other provinces a certain number of new members who should have the right to sit in the Legislative Council of the Federal Government. But what does he do ? Does he preserve the proportion as laid down at the Convention ? Not a bit of it. The proportion agreed upon at the Convention was one-third to the Maritime Provinces ; the Lower Provinces grouped together had a right to send one-third of the representatives. The honorable gentleman, however, I suppose out of the fullness of his good dis-

      §§.22, 24. 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. When the gentlemen who composed the Conference met, they had to lay down a broad basis, as it were, for the foundation of their superstructure. Well, it so happened that the corner-stone was that which concerned the representation in both Houses. It was agreed on the one hand that in the House of Commons of the Confederate Government representation should be according to numbers, and that in the other branch of the Legislature it should be fixed that this representation should be equal for all the provinces—that is to say, Upper Canada, and Lower Canada, and the Maritime Provinces, grouped into one, should each be allowed to send the same number of representatives, so as to secure to each province its rights, its privileges, and its liberties. We acted upon this principle, because we felt that if the House of Commons’ representation was based upon population, equality should be secured in the other branch of the Legislature.

      §§.22, 24. 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    4. It will secure to the people of Upper Canada the entire control of their local affairs, which I regard as being of the utmost importance. It will put an end to the system of duplicating in one section of the province large amounts of money granted to the other for colonization roads and other local objects, on which vast sums have been squandered. It will secure to the people of Upper Canada representation by population in that branch of the Federal Legislature which controls the purse-strings. It will also give to them all the unsold Crown lands in the western section of the province. And I trust the promises made with reference to the widening and deepening of our canals, and the opening up of the North-West Territory will be carried out in good faith.

      §§.51, 52. 91, 92, and 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    5. I need hardly remind honorable gentlemen that nothing could be more unsatisfactory than the state of our public affairs for a long time past. The Legislature has been called together year after year, and the usual sessional expenditure incurred—which is always very large—but the sectional majorities arrayed against each other in the other Chamber, rendered useful legislation almost, if not altogether, impossible. Whatever government was in power lived, as it were, by the day, and being engaged in a constant struggle for existence, the very natural desire to obtain increased strength frequently led to the distribution of patronage and the expenditure of public money in a way that could not be justified.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

  2. Aug 2018
    1. The hon. member also stated that he did not want to make a backward step in relation to the election of the members of the Legislative Council. In reply to that, I would state that the elective principle, as applied to the Legislative Council, becomes unnecessary in view of the numerical strength of Lower Canada in the Federal Parliament, for the House of Commons is the body that will make and unmake ministers. Why have the elective principle for the Legislative Council, since we shall have it for the House of Commons, since we shall have a responsible Government and a Federal Government, composed of members elected by the people ? The hon. member has stated that he desired to advance with the intellect of the people, and not to take a backward step. These are great words—the intellect of the people ! progress ! But for my part, I do not hesitate to assert, that the people will gladly sacrifice the election of the members of the Legislative Council, in view of the control of all the matters I mentioned before. The hon. member has said that the elective principle would have been the safe-guard of Lower Canada. I can understand this to be the case in a House which is able to make and unmake administrations, but in a House which is indissoluble, I cannot discover its importance. The safety of Lower Canada depends, not on the elective principle, but on the responsibility of the members of the Executive to the House of Commons. I may be permitted to say one word on the subject of the elective right, as it is the grand panacea for all the ills incident to humanity. We must not shut our eyes against evidence. Have we, since the union of several counties to form electoral divisions, seen persons of independent fortune and character, who do not seek to make a gainful pursuit of politics, offer themselves for election to the Legislative Council ? I acknowledge that the elections to seats in the Legislative Council which have taken place so far have had excellent results : the members sent hither by their constituencies have added new lustre to the body ; but has it not now become almost impossible to get an independent man to stand ? The contested elections in the large divisions have disgusted many who would do honor to the country, but who will not risk their fortune in an election ; and if we see such a result already, what is it likely to be hereafter ? We shall see political intriguers making their own of the electoral divisions as a living—living by politics and for politics only. We shall see what has been seen in other countries—people embracing political life as a shield against their creditors, sheltering themselves under its segis against the law. Such men will fill this House, to the exclusion of honor and honesty. I say again, those who now compose this House are honorable men, who are a credit to their country — in time, their seats will be filled by political intriguers.

      §§.24, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. Legislative Council of the Federal Parliament, the appointed members to remain for life, and the elective members for eight years from the date of their election, unless removed by death or other cause ; their successors to be elected by the same divisions and electors as have elected them.

      §§.25, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. This is the resolution which he proposes in amendment: Upper Canada to be represented in the Legislative Council by twenty-four elective members, and Lower Canada by twenty-four elective members, and the Maritime Provinces by twenty-four members, corresponding with the twenty-four elective members in each section of Canada, of which Nova Scotia shall have ten, New Brunswick ten, and Prince Edward Island shall have four, and the present members of the Legislative Council of Canada, as well life members as elective members, shall be members of the first

      §§.25, 51, and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

  3. Mar 2018
    1. The House would never have lees than 194 members, but it would increase at a very slow rate, as it would only be the greater increase of any Province over that of Lower Canada which would entitle it to additional representation, while, if the agricultural resources of Lower Canada became developed, and its mineral wealth explored, so that it increased faster than Upper Canada, then the number of representatives for Upper Canada would be diminished, not those for Lower Canada increased. Of course, to provide for the settlement of the remote portions of the country which might be brought in from time to time, power was reserved to increase the number of members ; but such members could only be increased preserving the relative proportions. One advantage which would flow from this was that white 194 or 300 members were certainly sufficient to carry on the business of the country, we should be spared the enormous expense which would be entailed upon us if the representatives were rapidly to grow up to 300 or perhaps 400 members.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    2. Population was made the basis, and to prevent any undue augmentation in the numbers of the Lower House as population increased, it was settled that there should be a fixed standard on which the numbers of the House should be calculated, and Lower Canada was selected as affording the proper basis.

      §§.51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

    3. should have been a concession to Upper Canada, of additional members in proportion to its population, but that concession would, as be had already remarked, have been an invasion of the Federal principle, contained in the Union Act, and would unquestionably have been represented to the uttermost by a large proportion if not by the whole of Lower Canada.

      §§. 3 and 12 of the Union Act, 1840; §§. 51 and 52 of the Constitution Act, 1867.