1 Matching Annotations
- Feb 2017
-
static1.squarespace.com static1.squarespace.com
-
lt so very considerable, as s apt to imagine; that this, operation of the intellect, :akness incident to all our insepamblc from our na-. take an opportunity par-:111d Origin of Experience ,i<.lcr the principal tribes 1e general name of moral !ry difficulty may be re-·etard our progress in the will be necessary, in the ! more accurately those ·hich give being to experi-, to all those attainments, that are derived from it. • sense and memory. The 1d internal, are the original ,cy inform the mind of the escnt instant are situated !ir activity, and no sooner in any particular instance rmation exhibited by them emory. Remembrance in-1tion, insomuch that the sole repository of the form sense; knowledge pository, would be as in-is gotten, and could be of Our sensations would be ing pictures of a moving cura, which leave not the :m. Memory, therefore, is er extant of those past re• ad once the evidence of 1s it were, the prints that ,le impression~. But from Jnsidered in themselves, 1owledge only of individ-1ch facts as either hereto-·esent do come, under the :Jer this knowledge useful :! nature of things, and in a further process of the h deserves to be carefully e thus illustrated. I have ohscrved :1 stone fall to the ground when nothing intervened to impede its motion. This single fact produce:; little or no effect on the mind beyond a bare remembrance. At another time, I observe the fall of a tile, at another of an apple, and so of al-most every kind of body in the like situation. Thus my sense first, and then my memory, fur-nish me with numerous examples, which, though different in every other particular, arc similar in this, that they present a body moving down-ward!>, till obstructed either by the ground or by some intcrvcnient object. Hence by first notion of gravitation. For, with regard to the similar cir· cumstam:cs of different facts, as by the repetition such circumstances arc more deeply imprinted, the mind acquires a habit of retaining them, omit-ting those circumstances peculiar to each wherein their differences consiM. Hence, if ob-jects of any kind, in a particular manner circum-stanced, arc remembered to have been usually, and still more if uniformly, succeeded by certain particular consequences, the idea of the former, in the supposed circumstance introduced into the mind, immediately associates the idea of the lat-ter; aml if the object itself, so circumstanced, be presented to the senses, the mind instantly antici-pates the appearnncc of the customary conse-quence.
Aha! But then we come across the Inductions Fallacy once again. Assuming that an object will fall to the ground based upon memory is presumptive and has the potential to halt further progress in the area.
-