Choices are to be derivatively assessed, in terms of the states of affairs they bring about. Consequentialists thus must specify the states of affairs that are intrinsically valuable—often called, collectively, “the Good.”

They then are in a position to assert that whatever choices increase the Good, that is, bring about more of it, are the choices that it is morally right to make and to execute. (The Good in that sense is said to be prior to “the Right.”)

There are quite a few varieties of threshold deontology (Kagan 2019) but two that are particularly worth distinguishing. On the simple version, there is some fixed threshold of awfulness beyond which morality’s categorical norms no longer have their overriding force. Such a threshold is fixed in the sense that it does not vary with the stringency of the categorical duty being violated. The alternative is what might be called “sliding scale threshold deontology.” On this version, the threshold varies in proportion to the degree of wrong being done—the wrongness of stepping on a snail has a lower threshold (over which the wrong can be justified) than does the wrong of stepping on a baby.

A threshold deontologist holds that deontological norms govern up to a point despite adverse consequences; but when the consequences become so dire that they cross the stipulated threshold, consequentialism takes over

apart from the impact these cruel practices have on human beings and their morality, such acts are inherently wrong and evil, since they cause unnecessary harm and pain to sentient beings who, although not rational, have the capacity to feel pleasure and pain

it is prima facie wrong to perform an act which has an expected amount of harm greater than another easily available alternative

there is a duty not to be complicit in a process that cannot be justified to others

even if I lower my use of fossil fuels, energy companies have an incentive to use up that nonrenewable energy source and will encourage others to do so. My actions will therefore make no difference to the causation of climate change because even if I abstain from an action that emits greenhouse gases, someone else will certainly use that fossil fuel instead of me.

Alexander, Larry and Michael Moore, "Deontological Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2025 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2025/entries/ethics-deontological/>.

Humans who adopt an ethic of restraint, on the other hand, resist the temptation to exploit the natural environment, instead acting as a steward and a member of the biotic community

The best we can accomplish for posterity is to transmit unimpaired and with some increment of meaning the environment that makes it possible to maintain the habits of a decent and refined life

changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for fellow members and also respect for the community as such

Ralston, Shane J. "Engineering an artful and ethical solution to the problem of global warming." The Review of Policy Research, vol. 26, no. 6, Nov. 2009, pp. 821+. Gale In Context: Global Issues, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A214999235/GPS?u=moun43602&sid=bookmark-GPS&xid=c2f650d2. Accessed 26 Feb. 2026.

several consequences of climate change, such as sea-level rise and ocean warming, will be irreversible for up to thousands of years

The three years leading up to 2025 saw the largest glacier mass losses ever recorded, and in 2024 only two of approximately 160 glaciers showed a positive mass balance

"Climate Change." Gale Global Issues Online Collection, Gale, 2025. Gale In Context: Global Issues, link.gale.com/apps/doc/CP3208520156/GPS?u=moun43602&sid=bookmark-GPS&xid=39916f1b. Accessed 24 Feb. 2026.

Climate scientists have determined that climate change alters precipitation patterns, increasing the likelihood, duration, and intensity of lethal heat waves, and the frequency and intensity of precipitation. Climate change induces the conditions that cause drought and fan uncontrollable wildfires, threatening public health through extreme weather events such as intense storms, floods, and heat waves. Climatologists also link changes in the jet stream to persistent weather extremes such as heat domes and polar vortices. The phenomenon disrupts natural ecosystems, heightens the risk of endangerment or extinction of some species; increases the likelihood of vector-borne diseases spreading over greater areas; and compromises agriculture, water resources, and infrastructure. Climate activists argue that the effects of climate change have been felt most acutely by the world's most vulnerable nations, which are responsible for generating only a small fraction of total cumulative GHG emissions. Climate-related disasters and conflict contribute to mass migration worldwide. Migrants displaced by climate change are often referred to as climate refugees or as "persons displaced in the context of disasters and climate change."

Weather data confirmed 2024 as the hottest year on record since 1850, with the ten warmest years ever recorded occurring in the previous ten years.

On the other hand, while Kant accepts killing animals—perhaps thinking of our food, although he doesn't explicitly say so—he imposes two very "human" restrictions: their death must be quick and painless (90). In this sense, our author would condemn the deplorable conditions in which animals are kept today on factory farms and the way they die to satisfy the market demand for meat. Kant would even oppose the slaughter of animals to please carnivorous humans, since, as we have already seen, no human desire justifies animal suffering. For this reason, we agree with Matthew Altman when he states that the ultimate consequence of Kant's stance against the cruel death of animals would be to adopt a vegetarian diet (91).

As Federica Basaglia explains, "nothing changes the binding nature of duty: if an action is commanded—directly or indirectly—it must be carried out

violent and cruel treatment of animals is much more intimately opposed to man's duty to himself, because it dulls man's compassion for their suffering, thus weakening and gradually destroying a natural predisposition very useful to morality in relation to other men" (53)

Chapsal Escudero, Mauricio. "Kant y el rol de la sensibilidad humana en el bienestar animal." Areté, vol. 36, no. 2, July 2024, pp. 231+. Gale In Context: Global Issues, dx.doi.org/10.18800/arete.202402.002. Accessed 12 Feb. 2026.

legislators in a realm of ends, made possible by the freedom of the will

Tyler, Sarah K. "Deontological ethics: although it is a popular topic, particularly at A2, answers on deontological ethics are often limited in scope. Sarah K. Tyler addresses the broader issues for you to develop in your exam essays." RS Review, vol. 2, no. 2, Jan. 2006, pp. 30+. Gale In Context: High School, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A173101252/GPS?u=moun43602&sid=bookmark-GPS&xid=41e86388. Accessed 12 Feb. 2026.

Morality must not lower herself. Her own nature must be her recommendation. All else, even divine reward, is as nothing beside her ... Moral grounds of impulse ought to be presented by themselves and for themselves

Somewhat orthogonal to the distinction between agent-centered versus patient-centered deontological theories are contractualist deontological theories. Morally wrong acts are, on such accounts, those acts that would be forbidden by principles that people in a suitably described social contract would accept (e.g., Rawls 1971; Gauthier 1986), or that would be forbidden only by principles that such people could not “reasonably reject” (Scanlon 2003). In deontology, as elsewhere in ethics, it is not entirely clear whether a contractualist account is really normative as opposed to metaethical. If such account is a first order normative account, it is probably best construed as a patient-centered deontology; for the central obligation would be to do onto others only that to which they have consented. But so construed, modern contractualist accounts would share the problems that have long bedeviled historical social contract theories: how plausible is it that the “moral magic” of consent is the first principle of morality? And how much of what is commonly regarded as permissible to do to people can (in any realistic sense of the word) be said to be actually consented to by them, expressly or even implicitly? In fact modern contractualisms look meta-ethical, and not normative. Thomas Scanlon’s contractualism, for example, which posits at its core those norms of action that we can justify to each other, is best construed as an ontological and epistemological account of moral notions. The same may be said of David Gauthier’s contractualism. Yet so construed, metaethical contractualism as a method for deriving moral norms does not necessarily lead to deontology as a first order ethics. John Harsanyi, for example, argues that parties to the social contract would choose utilitarianism over the principles John Rawls argues would be chosen (Harsanyi 1973). Nor is it clear that meta-ethical contractualism, when it does generate a deontological ethic, favors either an agent centered or a patient centered version of such an ethic.

According to agent-centered theories, we each have both permissions and obligations that give us agent-relative reasons for action. An agent-relative reason is an objective reason, just as are agent neutral reasons; neither is to be confused with either the relativistic reasons of a relativist meta-ethics, nor with the subjective reasons that form the nerve of psychological explanations of human action

A second group of deontological moral theories can be classified as patient-centered, not agent-centered. These theories are rights-based rather than duty-based; and some versions purport to be quite agent-neutral in the reasons they give moral agents. All patient-centered deontological theories are properly characterized as theories premised on people’s rights. An influential version posits, as its core right (often described by “the Means Principle”), the right against being used only as means for producing good consequences without one’s consent. Such a core right is not to be confused with more discrete rights, such as the right against being killed, or being killed intentionally. It is a right against being used by another for the user’s or others’ benefit. More specifically, this version of patient-centered deontological theories proscribes the using of another’s body, labor, and talent without the latter’s consent. One finds this notion expressed, albeit in different ways, in the work of the so-called Right Libertarians (e.g., Nozick 1974, Mack 2000), but also in the works of the Left-Libertarians as well (e.g., Steiner 1994; Vallentyne and Steiner 2000; Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka 2005). On this view, the scope of strong moral duties—those that are the correlatives of others’ rights—is jurisdictionally limited and does not extend to resources for producing the Good that would not exist in the absence of those intruded upon—that is, their bodies, labors, and talents. In addition to the Libertarians, others whose views include this prohibition on using others include Quinn, Kamm, Alexander, Ferzan, Gauthier, and Walen (Quinn 1989; Kamm 1996; Alexander 2016; Alexander and Ferzan 2009, 2012; Gauthier 1986; Walen 2014, 2016).