"It only uses lesser sciences to make clearer it's teachings, due to the defect of the human intellect."

"That which is more certain in itself isn't per se so to us. The authority propagating sacred scripture as true far surpasses that of the sciences." * To give an example, our science of sociology for instance may be completely false & based on a fundamental misunderstanding, even if highly unlikely- this is because our human intellects are so very dark, & though authoritative, can't be called a maximum. Now sacred doctrine is literally revealed by the infallible God, which is to say that it's very certain, the authority behind its certainty is much more great. * Certainty doesn't here refer to how easy to believe a truth is, or how demonstrable it seems.

Aquinas considers sacred doctrine inasmuch as it is speculative, & inasmuch as it is practical seperately. * A speculative science is more noble depending on its certainty, & on its subject matter. While the other sciences by light of human reason seek to understand that which is within the grasp of man, whereas sacred doctrine treats that which can't be grasped by human reason as it has been revealed by God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. * Practical sciences are less noble by directing itself toward the good of another (the good of the military is for the good of the state, but not necessarily vice versa; this applies to their sciences), & thereby more noble by having other sciences directed towards it's good. Sacred doctrine according to its practicality is ordered towards the final cause of man, which the other sciences can not achieve, but can at best aid in.

Attempt: A sign is not sufficient to demonstrate it less noble. One science may check its work on another (even if the second is less definite & trustworthy.)

Attempt: Unfamiliar with the sciences, if I had to take a guess, the nobler science defends the principles, wheras the less noble science is defended by a higher science. Otherwise, I might say that the object of a noble science is noble, wheras the object of a less noble science is less noble; the object of sacred doctrine is God's speech which is very noble, moreso than most other sciences.

"Sacred doctrine primarily treats divine things which are speculative, so it is more properly speculative- but still does it include practical sciences secondarily."

"While practical sciences investigate truth as the means to human action, sacred doctrine investigates the truth of God for its own sake."

Attempt: As established earlier, sacred doctrine is one science; but different laws being different practical sciences splits sacred doctrine up. Furthermore, old & new law" merely describe different stages in salvation history.

Attempt: Any science can be used practically, but that doesn't make it a practical science. For instance, building off of what Aquinas says earlier, mathematics defends the principles of music for instance, & music is a practical science; mathematics is applied practically without being practical.

They're all treated under revelation. Though consciousness is one faculty, it extends to five senses- likewise, though the treatment of angels, ethics, & corporeal creatures are subjects of different sciences, they are all treated in Sacred doctrine insofar as they are found in revalation.

"Sacred Doctrine treats God as its subject primarily, & all the other things treated are only in reference to God."

Attempt: Sacred doctrine treats sacred scripture as its class of subjects.

"Sacred Doctrine is the science of that which is revealed. Therefor if many things are revealed, no matter how unrelated, these as written in scripture will be the object of sacred science."

Attempt: Can it not be said that these are subsets of this science, just as the science of math also has induction?

History is in sacred science not necessarily, but rather: * 1.) It may give us example of how to live our lives * 2.) In order to establish authority of the original legates of revelation

Not even close. Sacred doctrine is a science since it is the kind of science which is defended by a higher science.

There are two types of science * 1.) those which can be know naturally though intelligence * 2.) those which are defended, suppose, & build off of higher principles

Sacred science is the latter kind; its principles are defended from that which is known through the science of God & his blessed

Attempt: I recall reading this & a few articles a while ago, so if I recall correctly: sacred doctrine proceeds from the preambles of faith, rather than articles of faith.

Attempt: Sacred science deals with these per accidens: they are examples & rolemodels.

Sciences are differentiated by how they get knowledge. Furthermore, these different means of attaining knowledge can still come to the same knowledge. Thus theology of sacred doctrine is different to the theology of philosophy, due to the different means of coming to truth.

Attempt: philosophical science doesn't treat all that is, since there are things which are, & are also above our understanding. Furthermore, there may be things which are, but may not be known by philosophical science; the essence of God for instance.

He adds onto what I say; once they are revealed by God they must be accepted by faith. Faith simply is a trust in something that can't been demonstrated like how 1+1=2 can be.

It is necessary for salvation that God reveals that which wasn't built up by human reason. * 1.) Mans end is God, & Gods essence can't be grasped by man- but you need to know what your end is in order to reach it. * 2.) Even what you can discover about God through natural reason will be known after a while by few with admixture of many errors.

<3

Attempt: the verse is cut off. "Reflect upon what has been assigned to you, for you do not need what is hidden." & sacred scripture is not hidden to us.

Note that these get you certain qualities of something. Aquinas in the following questions will show you what these qualities mean for the being.

• There are multiple different interpretations of what St. Thomas Aquinas means here. The following will be the more common interpretation which is (I believe) taught by those such as the Thomistic Institute. Rob Koons has recently written a book reconstruction the five ways, however I do not have access to it, & from publicly available material I'm afraid that I can't infer the argument, so this shall be the only interpretation I will give. Note that the first will assume a general understanding of per se vs per accidens motion, & that the person understands that this argument refers to per se motion.
• P1.) Things change. Things in the world go from potentially having some attribute, to actually having some attribute. Even the thought of reading this is an example of this change.
• P2.) Only actual things can cause change. The only way to get something from potentially to actually having some attribute is with another actual thing. An potential cause will not yield an actual effect since the cause itself doesn't actually exist.
• P3.) Nothing can change itself/Whatever is put in motion is put in motion by another A thing's attribute can't be potential, & actual in the same way & in the same respect: this is the axiomatic law of noncontradiction & denying this leads an objector to more turmoil than God. One may object to a person walking, however in this instance, his parts move other parts, as opposed to the parts moving themselves.
• P4.)There can't be an infinite regression. This is one of the most common modern objections. To give an analogy to rebutt this, imagine two infinitely long array of mirrors going from left to right, so as to bounce any light to the next mirror in front of it, into infinity. Now imagine seeing a laser beam in the system. It would be completely ridiculous to posit that the existence of the laser comes about by having enough mirrors- there is obviously a light giver; since mirrors by themselves have no power to emit such a light, there must be something which has the power in itself to produce such a life. Denying that what we see needs an actual reason brings one to denying the principle of sufficient reason, which ( I understand that) Rob Koons rebuts in essence by saying that it is an epistemological hell: "If things can happen for no reason, then there is no rational justification to explain why your experience, beliefs, & all your knowledge of the world haven't just begun as they are as such for no reason: You have no sufficient reason to believe that what you experience is actually what's true."
• C.) There is an unmoved mover, which everyone understands to be God. To put it all together: Things change. Only actual things, aside from that which is being changed, can cause this change. Since there can not be an infinite regress in this type of causal chain, there must be a first which causes the change without being changed (& thereby unchangeable, since that which is without change can not change) in itself: An unmoved mover.

Necessity here refers to incorruptibility.

In this case

In one case

IN EVERY CASE. Translating the Latin this way destroys the argument. If I say "sometimes virtues are like this, sometimes they are like that" I do not mean that the nature of a virtue changes, but rather it is like this in some cases & like that in others. This is true with the latin, & it can be translated to mean "at some times" literally rather than in the sense mentioned.

Not always existing

In some case

In this world

In one case

Same general principle from the first way applied in a different context.

The efficient cause in this instance seems to be referring to: that which is giving existence to the effect.

W potency & Whatnot

This defines motion. Simply put: potentiality is how a thing can be, & actuality is how a thing is.

He essentially says "Actually God is necessary. For demonstration of this you may refer to the five demonstrations above." Demonstrating that God is necessary of course does completely away with the belief that the natural world doesn't need God to explain anything.

Fourth way

First way

Third way

Second way

Fifth way

An effect doesn't need to be exactly proportionate to a cause if you want to demonstrate only some qualities or at least the existence of the cause- rather than every single thing about the thing.

My attempt was rather accurate, so I will just elaborate & rebut the misunderstanding of the other commenter, doug_keiller. Firstly he misunderstands what Aquinas means here by 'evil'. Aquinas doesn't mean malice; Aquinas means all deprivations in what should be. To use his example, all the suffering in the world, lacking the food, shelter, protection & joy: this is all evil that God only permits so that he can bring about an even greater good from it. He supposes that this is all for nothing, which can't be demonstrated; Aquinas merely needs to make the point that there is a logical explanation for how an infinite good can coexist with evil.

• The main misunderstanding of this argument that I know if that is of autocorrecting it to the watchmaker analogy which says: "Look at how fine-tuned the universe is, in every respect this can't be by chance!" Rather, saint Thomas Aquinas argues here something much humbler & more efficacious. This strikes an especially vital jugular in modern thought given its presuppositions. I will use the example of gravity & physics in the following, but what I say should be applicable to every other natural science.
• To put it as simply as I can: Aquinas argues that 1.) objects act for ends. This is obvious. A ball you drop will always fall to the ground at the exact same speed. 2.) Aquinas then continues by saying that there is an obvious pattern here. The objector must too agree here: the Earth-ball will fall down with an acceleration of exactly 9.8 meters per second 100% of the time. One would be ridiculous to posit that this tendency which we know as gravity happens by chance, that this is a coin flip, & that: the ball could fall with an acceleration of 11.9 meters per second, or even that it may fall up- that it could fall sideways or that it could fall not at all. The modern for instance would agree & appeal to the laws of physics, saying that it conflicts with this. To simplify his point: irrational objects doing something the exact same way 100% of the time is a tendency, rather than pure chance. 3.) Since all these things do not do the exact same thing every time by pure chance, there must be a person which gave order to this intentionally, since objecting that there was a lawgiver by chance only kicks the can up the road. The only objection that I know that a modern-day objector to give is to appeal to for instance the laws of physics: "the ball falls down because of the force of gravity/general relativity." This fails to realize something fundamental about science as a whole, which is that it merely assign patterns to observation. 1.) In regard to a less specific appeal to physics, the science only tells you where we can predict the ball, or how much energy it will have when hitting the ground- but it will NOT tell you why the ball falls down; science presupposes the tendency that we observe & makes predictions using the tendency, but it doesn't explain why we see that tendency in specific. If the prior tendency is explained by something else which can be scientifically known, such as with the various intricacies in psychology, the can is only kicked down the road on how that tendency can be explained. I chose physics specifically because of how simply it can be considered. 2.) By this point the objector may want to upgrade to specifically Einsteins theory of general relativity, or the likes. This too kicks the can down the road; this truly explains why the ball specifically falls down, but to get into particulars with the theory, it doesn't explain why spacetime specifically condenses in the way that it does, with the order that it does. I'm not much of a physicist so if my application of the fifth way to general relativity isn't sufficient, I ask that the reader may take the formerly established principle & apply it themselves. Take an element of general relativity & ask why it behaves this way in specific & not another way.

In the ancient Nearest, & even into antiquity, names denoted nature. Classically known, Abraham meant father of multitude. Or more polemically known, Peter was literally the word rock in Aramaic. Other points in scripture will point out that X was named X because they will Y. Rather than being an exception as it is today, this was the sturdy norm, especially during the Exodus when this is spoken. To go further, it can be said that these peoples would leave completely unnamed/unnoticed that which served no purpose whatever, or at least this final fact is what I've heard. With this audience's cultural fact in mind, God saying "my name is..." should immediately get one's ear to perk up, since the mentioned audience understood "Who am I" to be completely inseparable from the nature of the person. "I am..." needs not annotation: God is about to reveal who his is. "... Who am." To break this down, who refers to a person, & am refers most generally to being something, & when not connected with a particular something that it is being, "am" refers generally to existing. "I am the one who is existing." Recalling the who-nature principle: God is here upon being asked what he is responds by saying that he by his nature is existing.

This seems to be essentially arguing "we don't need God to explain anything, & if anything there is a simpler of an explanation from nature alone."

Attempt: Aquinas will go on to demonstrate that certain things in the world do not get accounted for by their own principles, like causality. I don't think that Aquinas refers to his previous arguments in this way, so furthermore: "For all natural things..." wouldn't explain miraculous signs, like Pio's Stigmata, Fatima, the 5 Eucharistic Miracles, the countless healing miracles, so on & so fourth.

Quiet part out loud

Occams razor

Attempt: Perhaps this is the case if the evil is permanently such. But it is written "I will wipe away all tears", & likewise it seems that the infinite goodness will indeed render all evil undiscoverable, & that he permitted it as a means to create a greater good that would've otherwise been impossible. For instance a snowball effect in which an adulterous woman brings into the world a new image bearer of God.

"When proving a cause exists from its effects, the effects are what you will know the existence by."

"Articles of faith aren't knowable by nature alone, since they are known only by God revealing, meaning that this isn't an article of faith. In addition, somebody who doesn't understand the demonstrations for God can still accept it by faith."

"You can demonstrate the existence of something through the effects of that thing."

• A priori: From the armchair. This is something you can do with zero data from the real world. This isn't to say whatever you imagine; you're still trying to reason here.
• A posteriori: From what we sense. Here you incorporate data from what we see in the real world.

"Gods qualities are knowable through creation"

Attempt: All that one needs to do is demonstrate that the cause isn't finite. Since you can't have an infinite regress of finite things it seems that one would just need to demonstrate some bedrock.

• Attempt: "you do not tell God's nature but only the qualities of His nature." as Damascene says in the citation. I know that Aquinas goes on to demonstrate qualities of God in the 5 ways, so I reject his first premise insofar as one can demonstrate the existence of something that can be none other than God, or "what everybody knows to be God."

1. This seems to be a syllogism. Major: Faith can't be demonstrated. Minor: Gods existence is a matter of faith. C: God's existence can't be demonstrated. The major premise seems sound, so the minor premise seems to be the only place to rebut.
2. Attempt: If I had to take a guess as to how Aquinas will better define article of faith, he'll say something like "an article of faith is that which we believe by the authority of God revealing/his legate."

"The idea of something that necessarily exists doesn't necessarily correspond with a real thing that necessarily exists." To give a similar rebuttal to Anselm(the originator of this argument)'s critics: I can imagine an island that necessarily exists, however this doesn't mean that what I've imagined corresponds with anything in reality,"

"That doesn't mean that the idea of something that exists [that which there is no greater] corresponds with anything in reality."

Since the previous point shows that the argument is only semantic, he has to start from square one on the existence of God. The previous point unravels the entire argument, & this last sentence finishes the blow by elaborating why the argument can't prove God as self evident to us: "Since this doesn't show God's existence, one would have to presuppose his existence for this to work."

Can also be translated as "furthermore [what is] not..."

"That truth is, this is self evident to us. What the full extent of truth is, this is not.

"Objection 2 says once the terms are understood, but this assumes that the terms will even be understood. The greatest possible thing won't be physical, yet some believe this to be so"

God is his existence, meaning that his existence is self-evident. However, in order to say that it is fully self-evident, self-evident to us, one must be able to comprehend the essence of both terms. We do not know the essence of God (defended later), which means that it is not self evident to us.

If the terms are all understood without additional reasoning leading one to this conclusion

"A thing is self-evident because the attribute being considered is by its nature apart of the essence being considered. It can firstly be self-evident to us if the human mind can comprehend the terms, generally because they are in some way built off of what we can sense. It can be self evident but not to us if one of the terms can't be comprehended by the human mind (at least not in this life)." Note that comprehend here would mean to know everything that there is to know about something's essence.

"That we seek the completion which only God can give is implanted within us, however this is separate from knowledge of God, or how we can be completed."

"Something is self evident if it is naturally implanted within us, & God is." Attempt: It can be said that the existence of God is self-evident to some degree, since God is truth, & the existence of truth is self-evident (didn't realize that he made this point in the third objection). However, from the perspective on mankind, there seems to be a distinction between truth, God, since the next objection defines God as "that which no greater can exist." (I will soon rebut this too) The aforementioned definition when compared with truth doesn't lead to any immediate corollaries- even if they do exist- meaning that the existence of God isn't self evident .This is to say that God is self-evident, but not to mankind.

"The objections misunderstand self-evidence, it is true that things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, but in addition, one mustn't be able to lie himself out of it." He then quotes sacred scripture as a prooftext to demonstrate that one can indeed lie to himself about this.

"Self-evidence is when everything is known from the terms. God is 'that which no greater can be conceived'. Something actually existing is better than a mere thought, so since God must be the greatest, he can't just exist in thought, but also in reality." ----Attempt: This is a very cheeky argument that I see atheists write off as self-evidently stupid. I'd say that one can conceive of "that which no greater can be conceived" in the same way that one conceives of a square circle- which is just according to it's words & not actually; the person describing God does not actually conceive of him. Since this can't even be conceived mentally by us, it isn't necessarily true that it can exist physically, since it isn't even definitely conceived mentally. In other words, the only rebuttal that I could conceive is rebutting the conceivability of God- though I mean to do this according to his essence, not to say that he is inconceivable in every respect.

I believe that this is an example of the formerly established principle.