The new neoliberal sexual politics of the igf might be termed the new homo-normativity—it is a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormativeassumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains them while promising thepossibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gayculture anchored in domesticity and consumption.Ω

Extending civil marriage to same-sex couples reinforces the importance of marriage toindividuals and communities

This was in conflict with the Full Faith and Credit Clause of ArticleIV in the United States Constitution, which obligates states to, among other things, honorcontracts made in other states

There were no clear differences in overall opinion of the movementby race/ethnicity.

Parolin (2021) found that economically marginalized Black families, as compared to theirWhite counterparts, are more likely to receive assistance via Healthy Marriage Initiatives thanreceive cash payments to help them meet their basic needs (Parolin, 2021). Disparities in TANFadministration are estimated to account for about 15% of the Black–White child poverty gap inthe United States (Parolin, 2021).

For example, southern states with the largestpercentages of Black families—and where the legacy of slavery is entrenched (Baker &O’Connell, 2022)—tend to spend a significantly higher share of TANF funds on marriage pro-motion programming (e.g., counseling about marriage, healthy relationships) than providingdirect cash assistance to families (Floyd et al., 2021; Monnat, 2010; Parolin, 2021).

Indeed, writing as an AEI fellowin 1993, Charles Murray, who is characterized by the Southern Poverty Law Center (n.d.) as aWhite nationalist for “using racist pseudoscience and misleading statistics to argue that socialinequality is caused by the genetic inferiority of the black and Latino communities, women andthe poor” (para 1), contended that illegitimacy or having a child outside of marriage was themost important social problem facing the country. To solve this “socially horrific act,” Murray(1993) advocated for ending economic support for single mothers as punishment for their badchoices.

To qualify forMedicaid Part A insurance without paying a premium, an individual mustbe sixty-five years of age and must have worked for forty quarters (i.e., tenyears).2I

acknowledgement of paternity, or a "¥AP." A ¥AP is a form signed by boththe man and the woman declaring that the man is the child's father.'^' Ifboth pardes sign the ¥AP and the rescission period elapses, "theacknowledgement is treated as a judicial adjudicadon of parentage, andstates are required to give full faith and credit to this determinadon."'^" Noparty is required to undergo genedc tesdng prior to signing a ¥AP, and, infact, a ¥AP is intended to be an alternadve to genedc tesdng.'^3 A number ofcourts have held that a ¥AP is a valid determinadon of parentage even if theman knew he was not a genedc parent when he signed the ¥AP.

Because tbe 1939 amendments failed "toexpand coverage to include agricultural workers, domesdc servants, andemployees of nonprofit organizadons,"'°5 tbey excluded many lower-incomefamilies and many families of color. Tbe exclusions "were deliberate andmainly racially modvated."'

unstable

"an orderly society requires some mechanism for coping withthe fact that sexual intercourse [between a man and a woman] commonlyresults in pregnancy and childbirth. The insdtudon of marriage is thatmechanism.

Part I¥ exposes the truenormadve underpinnings of marriage equality opponents' position—theirbelief that lesbian and gay individuals and same-sex couples are inberendyless worthy of respect and dignity

Like many other arguments in favor of retaining exclusionary marriagelaws, responsible procreadon's "authority derives primarily from thecontendon that it is deeply rooted in the American legal tradidon."=4

More recendy, same-sex marriage opponents shifted their focus toclaims that (at least superficially) sound agnosdc with respect to lesbians'and gays' relative worth or parental ableness. Enter: responsible procreadon.Responsible procreadon is attracdve to same-sex marriage opponents (andto some courts) because it seems neutral with respect to the inherent dignityor worth of lesbian or gay idenddes.^

The introduction of work requirements to Medicaid is relatively new, withfour states successfully securing waivers to develop work requirements while oth-ers have applications pending (Garfield, Rudowitz, Musumeci, & Damico, 2018)

In addition, when prohibiting same-sex marriageis seen as a form of discrimination on the basis of sex, the analogy to Loving v.Virginia 72 is powerful. In Loving, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Virginia'slaw limiting marriage to people of the same race violated the Equal ProtectionClause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 73

The State argued that "the fact that homosexual ... partners cannot form astate-licensed marriage [was] not the product of impermissible discriminationimplicating equal protection considerations, but rather a function of theirbiologic inability as a couple to satisfy the definition of the status to which theyaspire[ d]." 70

The State asserted that marriage was about procreation,but eight years earlier, the Hawai'i Legislature eliminated the requirement thatmarriage applicants demonstrate that they were capable of reproduction. 37

In 1989, Tom Stoddard, then-executive director of Lambda Legal,and legal director Paula Ettelbrick debated whether the gay community shouldmake marriage equality a priority issue. 12 Stoddard offered practical and moralarguments in support of an aggressive effort to promote marriage equality. 13Ettelbrick responded by noting the patriarchal nature of marriage and thedangers of looking to the state to legitimate intimate relations. 14

In 1986, the Supreme Court held in Bowersv. Hardwick that, as applied to homosexual people, federal constitutional normsof privacy and liberty did not bar the state from imposing criminal punishmenton adult consensual sexual conduct in the home. 9 Bowers was not overruleduntil 2003. 10

Employers, including public employers, openly discriminated againstgay persons. 5

Most Americans reportedthat they did not personally know a homosexual person and condemned sexbetween gay couples, whatever the circumstances, while less than a third ofAmericans thought that heterosexual sex between unmarried people was alwayswrong. 4

Thepatriarchal model of women’s participation in a revolution assumes a gender-baseddivision of labor within a revolutionary movement, reinforcing preexisting patriarchalnorms in society.

In response, pro-marriage equality groups, such as the Williams Institute,launched studies to demonstrate how same-sex marriage legalization would pro-duce net positive economic benefits for their heterosexual counterparts.222

Revolution is social upheaval meant to produce striking, broad,meaningful change in the material and ideological conditions of people’s everydaylives.

or both) in the name of social justice, to create new political institutions” (Goldstone,2014: 4).

oday’s wave of emergent authoritarian revanchism maysimply mean the time and place for more revolutions is drawing nigh, if not todayor tomorrow, soon and for many years to come as people struggle to seize control ofthe material and ideological conditions of their everyday lives.

and their minions.

When LGBT people are only visible in the marketplace,non-white, non-middle-class, non-gender normative queer and trans people are shut out orrendered invisible; when LGBT politics is fonnulated around the desires of the consumingcitizen, the neoliberal policies that keep so many LGBT I queer people precarious remain inplace.

In a neoliberal world, "freedom is reduced to choice: choiceof commodities, oflifeways, and, most of all, of identities"

depends on the regulationand policing of others-often the reproductive futurity of poor, queer, people of color.

In this context, the LGBTmovement's emphasis on same-sex marriage must be viewed as the success ofneoliberal policiesthat offer marriage as a privatized solution to peoples' needs for childcare, healthcare, economicstability, and social recognition.

In this most recent instantiation, the neoliberal withdrawal of public socialsupport serves as an incentive to seek marriage as the source of care, support, and resourceprotection. As Cohen writes, "Same-sex marriage, far from ending 'marriage as we know it,'preserves a narrow system for the distribution of benefits that is tied to heteronormativeunderstandings of the family. It allows the state to continue to shift its responsibility for thewell being ofits citizens to some private forn, we label the family. " 10

Neoliberalism offers "freedom" as the core political goal, and the market as the site where thatfreedom might be realized.

The only strategy we havehad is to try to hide our gender differences orsexual orientation, to keep our heads down andour erotic desires distant enough from oursupervisor’s gaze to stay employed, to try tosurvive in any way that we can because wehave to eat and pay the rent. But whatever hap-pens, every day is dangerous. Fifty-two percentof LGBT people live in states that do not pro-hibit employment discrimination based on sex-ual orientation or gender identity.2

By the time of its first major ballot-boxsuccess — the passage of California’s Proposition 13 in 1978 — themovement was almost exclusively associated with white suburbanhomeowners in revolt against income transfers to the poor.

differs from that of Pik-etty in that it attributes the reassertion of inherited wealth to politicalprocesses (that could have unfolded otherwise)

The fact that mar-riage and family formation have become the overriding concern ofqueer politics; the claim, axiomatic among American social policy the-orists, that marriage is now a marker of class and a means to socialmobility;12 the fact that the recreation of the private family unit hasbecome a key ambition of welfare policy — all of these trends point tothe resurgence of the family as the essential vector for the distributionof wealth and status.

Paradoxically, perhaps, the presumption of meritocracy has flourishedin the neoliberal era where popular economics celebrates the virtuesof individual risk-taking, the accumulation of fortunes from lever-aged debt, and extravagant returns to investments in skilled labor orhuman capital. Yet the empirical data on wealth distribution suggeststhat inheritance is almost as decisive at the beginning of the twenty-first century as it was in the nineteenth.

Thomas Piketty is only themost prominent of theorists to have observed that private, inheritedwealth has reemerged as a decisive factor in the shaping of social class,after a relative but significant period of decline in the postwar era.

Its various actuarial programs identified the white,male industrial worker as the standard wage earner and demographicnorm around which all income redistribution was to be statisticallycalibrated.

a change she sawreflected in the diminishing impact of inheritance in shaping socialmobility

co-opted intothe regime (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Yom and Gaus2012; Gerschewski 2013)

Interest rates on that and other US loans issued byLondon banks were lower than those issued on Latin American bondsbecause of the racist assumptions that Anglo-Saxons were better equippedto repay their loans.

Outlined in the 1805 Constitution, a person was determined to be Blackif they rejected slavery, renounced French colonialism, and accepted Haitianlaw.

While grain grewplentifully, it was kept in reserve for British trade, even during times offamine

Consequently, the taking ofchips was transformed from longstanding custom into criminalized act.

In a related endeavor, former US vice presidentand infamous dualist Aaron Burr

For Bentham and his contemporaries like JohnStuart Mill, freedom was equivalent to the freedom of British trade.

They put the questions of knowledge for what, for whom and withwhom at the centre of social movement research.

Here we share some snippets from our own experience which we hope willencourage readers to see social movement research as a possibility for them

This is the opposite of positioninga particular language as containing a magic value, be it intelligence or cultural status (for aca-demic language), or moral worth and activist practice (for political language).

We aim to helppeople learn the ideas they need to do good research, rather than writing as if they alreadyknew our own, local (disciplinary, intellectual, political) language.

Similarly, but less blatantly, a piece of student or professional academic research which is onlyintended to be read by an examiner or a handful of colleagues, and to help the researcher’scareer – while drawing on knowledge produced by activists and demanding their time andengagement – arguably represents an exploitative and ultimately unethical form of research.

the logical con-clusion that no revolution has ever taken place in America.

We shall still have ample opportunity to discuss the influence,or rather the non·influence, of the American Revolution uponthe course of modern revolutions.

IlEta~oA.ai

WEare not concerned here with the war question

The latter, an ex-communist apparatchik, was depicted by the former's partisans as a nopportunist and a populist demagogue, whose only real concern and objective is to place his cohorts – th eold communist nomenklatura – in positions of power .

Research consistently shows that individuals withhigher levels of education and more socio-economic resources are more likely to votebecause they are more comfortable dealing with public institutions and feelempowered to engage the political process (Verba et al. 1995).

note lack of any retweets in relevant column)

but is instead viewed in terms of diseases and ofthe alleged biological difference of immigrants.

It has resulted in manydomestic political conflicts including, most notably, PiS’ attempts to first take overcontrol over and later eradicate Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal or to radicalise manyliberal (incl. abortion) laws and take over the national public media.

The first sign of PiS’ likely return to power came with the Polish presidential electionsin May 2015 won by PiS candidate Andrzej Duda.

Among the aforementioned (and only) 348persons who received refugee status in Poland in 2015, the main group were thecitizens of Syria (203) followed by refugees from Iraq (24), Russians (21) as well as

Altogether only 12325 applications forrefugee status were submitted in Poland in 2015 while only 637 (i.e. ca. 5%) of thoseresulted in a decision on refugee status recognition incl. 348 along the rules ofGeneva Convention refugee protection (UDSC 2016a). Interestingly, Russians (6556in total) constituted the main national group of applicants for protection status inPoland in 2015, followed by citizens of Ukraine (764), Tajikistan (498) and Georgia(348). This shows that, as such, the refugee status was sought in Poland mainly bycitizens of the East European neighbouring countries

forced upon them.

EuropeanDutch from the former Indies who were more affluent often faced far easier returns thanthose of mixed descent, who were less likely to have families in the metropole or sufficient financial resources to aid their transition.

Brooding over the Holocaust and Jews disturbs this black and white image of the war and can divide Poles.

The Jews’ situation during German oc-cupation was much harder than the situation of the majority of Poles. Although the Nazis made the lives of both Jews and Poles hell, Jews were placed in its lowest circles, in an atmosphere of contempt, helplessness and loneliness. Such a situation did not in the least bring the two nations closer, but rather extended the distance between them. As Zygmunt Bauman notes, while “equality in suf-fering unites and heals”, “‘singling out’ part of the sufferers for special treat-ment leaves hatred and moral terror”.

“the extermination of the Jewish nation taking place before Poles’ eyes” probably did not change anything about “the stereotype of a Jew as a threat which perpetuated in the col-lective imagination.”

Poland’s complicated geographical history—astory of shifting borders and tyrannical neighbors—makes plausible thepresence of defensive nationalist ideologies

Free market values, never high in Poland, continue to decline, especiallysince 1997; by 2005, 90 percent of Poles preferred that the governmentundertake income redistribution.

A simpler and more reasonable explanation is that certain actors enteredthe postsocialist period with more resources than others, and were able toreproduce these resources for themselves and their children, creating thesystem of material relationships we would expect in a bourgeois capitalistsociety.

When market liberalism is presented as the only successfuleconomic program, social problems that arise will merely be attributed to itsinadequate application or to other ‘‘scapegoat’’ sources.

nly recently

the Solidarity movement during democratization fostered openness,civic freedom, and pluralist democracy, without negating the Catholic el-ement of Polishness

96 percent of Poles identifythemselves as Catholic, and religion is by far the most respected and trustedinstitution in Polish life, considered more important than education, pa-triotism, friendship, freedom of speech, or wealth (Polish Public OpinionResearch Center, 2006).

Ideological constructions of identity must intuitively resonate with actors’understandings of their situations.

On the one hand, Ost (2005) arguesthat the Right has been more resonant among economic ‘‘losers’’—workerswho had steady jobs under socialism, but have been outcompeted in themarket economy that rewards education and human capital. Because theirformer champion, the Left, has been unwilling or ineffective in securingsocial protections against the market, labor and its castoffs have embracedthe Right’s ideology of exclusion and defensiveness, which has successfullychanneled unorganized economic anger into issues of identity

the global economic crisis did not affect the Polish economy on the same scale as many other countriesin Europe.

Overall, younger voters have been displaying right-wing preferences more than their parents. Clearly, socio-economic issues play an important role in the current rise of nationalism among Polish youth, but purely economicproblems seem insufficient as an explanation.

Public opinion proved susceptible to manipulation by the political class, and public attitudes on the refugee issuechanged dramatically. Previously, Poles had been generally sympathetic to refugees (xenophobic attacks against tensof thousands of Chechen refugees who came to Poland in the late 1990s and early 2000s were relatively rare, and thePiS at the time was the most pro-refugee political party in the parliament),

The Polish government showed more enthusiasm towardsaccepting the more desirable Christian refugees, however.

gners, antiracist

, the democratization ofPoland after the fall of the communist system has been crucial for thisprocess.

Together with the Catholic Church, they have become the bearersof the struggle against “gender ideology”, which now serves in anti-gender cam-paigns as a term for everything which threatens Polish children, the model of tra-ditional Polish family, Christian civilisation, and consequently, the Polish nation.Anti-gender campaigns have mobilised thousands of people for demonstrations andcivic initiatives, and created a network of various associations and groups that fightagainst a common enemy – “gender ideology”.

Since the promotion of traditional values was the main program of the radicalright in that time, they presented the demands of the feminist and LGBT movementsas the main threat to Polish families and nation.

All of this points to the conclusion that Polish civil society is strong, justnot liberally-oriented.

who demonstrated that the rise of the radical right in Poland was not theresult of the economic crisis, but their ability to become part of civil society and toimpose their topics in public (according to Platek and Plucienniczak, 2017: 292)

“grievance theory” cannot explain whythe rise of the radical right did not happen in the first ten years of transition.

Theisolation from the Others strengthens the homogeneity within the group as well asthe belief of its members in their own righteousness.

These groups can be structured as civil society organisations,which means they act independently of political parties or social movements.

This is an issue of liberal values being proclaimed as some kind of leftovers fromcommunism. Similar ideas are also advocated by the Croatian radical right (Cipek,2017).

I argue that in Poland otherness is symbolically deployed to reaffirm the national self-definition as‘Western’, which is destabilised by the spatial liminality of the country's cultural, economic and geopolitical suspen-sion between ‘East’ and ‘West’

In cases when regime change, state-creationand nation-building coincide, the confrontation with the past becomes particularly acute

The politicizing and instrumentalizing of history usually pursues two main objectives:first is the construction of a maximally cohesive national identity and rallying the societyaround the powers that be; second is eschewing the problem of guilt.

There are two main ways of approaching the study of revolution in the contemporaryworld – and they are both wrong.

In the massive tent city that arose in Tahrir, women undertook keyorganizational roles, setting up makeshift kitchens and distributing food,water, blankets and medical supplies.

generation, stating: "If I wasn't pregnant, I would've just stayed home. Iwent out because of my baby. I owe this to him."'

But when the state acts in the “public” interest, meaning in the interest of nonmarket forces or disadvan- taged populations, that can be intrusive, coercive, and bad.

all white, with the exception of one African American man)

These modes correspond with, respectively,revolutions from below, revolutions from above, and revolutions from within.

lternatively, the actor could be viewed as illegitimate because theinstitution through which the actor achieved authority is itself illegitmate. An illegitimateinstitution is a set of formal and/or informal rules that are morally inappropriate, improper, andunjust.

6creation new bureaucratic agencies that oversee the implementation of new packages of policies.Political revolutions shift the prerogatives and resources available to targeted social groups,which may include social groups (e.g., particular ethnoracial categories of people; religious andcommunity organizations) and/or economic actors (e.g., landed elites, urban workers). Politicalrevolutions shift the relative power of these groups, but these revolutions lack precisely the class-based revolts from below needed to generate fundamental changes in class structures, leaving theexisting economic elite mostly intact.Political revolutions can vary both in the way in which the revolutionaries obtain statepower and the way in which they use state power once in government. Based on the modethrough which the revolutionary government comes to office, it is useful to distinguish betweenpolitical revolutions from within (i.e., the revolutionary government arrives in power via normalpolitical channels); political revolutions from above (i.e., the revolutionary government arrives inpower via a military coup); and political revolutions from below (i.e., the revolutionarygovernment arrives in power via an insurrection).

At the regime level, political revolutions typically involve a transition from ademobilizational political system to a mobilizational one or the reverse. I use the expressionmobilizational revolution to describe revolutions in which the regime rules shift fromdemobilizational to mobilizational; the reverse regime transition corresponds to ademobilizational revolution

Reddyanalyzes how fastening the NDAA to the Shepard-Byrd Act crystallized anemergent neoliberal formation within the United States, one that suturesrights-based initiatives around race and sexuality to state and military expan-sion.

Bolivia is a nation of notable diversities and stark contradictions, including geo-graphical conditions that range between the arid, rugged Andean highlands and

People still matter; governmentsand states derive their legitimacy and hence authority from them

Even if they flare up rapidly, fail to catch fire or burnbrightly, and fade away just as quickly, they remain in people’s individual memoriesand perhaps more importantly in the memory and consciousness of peoples

Caution is in order: revolutionary multi-plicities extending infinitely in every possible direction and dimension all at oncerisks rendering the concept an empty signifier.

But few people are academics. Revolutions are ‘social facts’ dependent onhuman consensus and consciousness to imbue them with meaning.

Why do they protest, and not the poor of the global South?

to understand the relationship between feminism and revolution is it enough toonly get the women's side ofthe story? Why did the author choose not tointerview any men, or at least a few, to understand the way they viewed therelationship between revolution and feminism?

A second factor in this strategy shift was internal movement fragmentation, which meantthat there was insufficient cohesion to sustain nonviolent action

Yet some Irish nationalistswanted full independence

Queer studies, though putatively antiheteronorma-tive, sometimes fails to acknowledge that same-sex object choice is not the only way to differ fromheterosexist cultural norms, that transgender phenomena can also be antiheteronormative, or thattransgender phenomena constitute an axis of difference that cannot be subsumed to an object-choicemodel of antiheteronormativity. A