As a practicing lawyer, what concerns me is, first of all, as the provision stands now it comes pretty close to being a tautology. Obviously, in any parliamentary system Parliament is sovereign and fully capable at any one moment of over-riding any other previous enactments. We are not like the Americans who can enshrine a bill of rights and move it up into a kind of platonic heaven and then refer to it for refuge and security. We have to live with the institutions that we are very happy to live with. So it strikes me that if we do not accept it as a tautology, then we are in fact enshrining a rather dangerous precedent that we, as an immigrant group, has experienced in World War I; that the Japanese have experienced in World War II; and as our French Canadian kin have experienced as recently as October 1970; the ease with which a government can, if it [Page 60] feels that an emergency is upon them, exercise their parliamentary society. Our preference would be to see these rights enshrined absolutely; and then there would be, at least, an onus on the part of the government of the day to explain to its electorate why it feels the emergency is present. In other words, this seems to be legitimizing a kind of understood, common usage which, I think, has no place when one is speaking of very fundamental liberties. We are speaking about liberties which are, in a sense, prior to later cultural development. I think Professor Tarnopolsky and some of the other spokesmen expressed their anxiety that this be tacitly accepted as a kind of legitimization of the government, perhaps, being too willing to lean to the opinion of its own day at the time when an apprehended emergency occurs. As I say, we have a bit of historical experience to bear this out.
§1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Referenced in Adam Dodek, The Charter Debates (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), pp. 99-100.