he front waspushed back forty miles in some areas, but neither had the BEF and the Frencharmy permanently been separated nor had Amiens with its important railwayhub been taken.3
The lack of a strategic goal left German forces with a large territorial gain but with little intrinsic or strategic value to the land. It merely created a salient which would be difficult to defend
he opposition of Haig and Pétain against aunified High Command was finally overcome.
Crisis finally forced the appointment of a generalissimo
aw the chance to drive a wedge between the BEF and the Frencharmy and inflict the deadly blow on the Allies he had hoped for.
In doing so he fundamentally redefined his strategic goal
stiff resistance of the British Third Army, but Ludendorff alsoseemed to believe that the BEF had been beaten and that it was now time toturn against the French army to prevent reinforcements being sent to theBritish.
Ludendorff ambition and confidence ultimately betrayed him as he overstretched his strategic goal
Operation Michael had succeeded on one section of the front where astrategic victory was beyond the possibilities of the German army.Ludendorff, however, had the Eighteenth Army push on, not, as planned, ina north-westerly direction but south and south-west
Ludendorff decided to take advantage of a local success which compromised his strategic vision
As the Britishhad just taken over part of the front from the French army, the principles ofdeep defence had not yet been fully applied
British 5th was undermanned and not properly dug in
EF held on to the strategically crucial Vimy Ridge andprevented the German troops from reaching their objectives. Progress wasmade but casualties on the German side were high
The BEF was able to extract a heavy toll on the Germans weakening their advance as it progressed
Ludendorff referred to his experience on the Eastern Front: attack, find theweak spots, use the momentum and push forward. This gave the offensive ahigh degree of flexibility but the inherent flaw of this plan was that the attackcould splinter into a number of advances without achieving a decisivevictory.
Ludendorff did not have a strategic objective in mind beside destroying the British army making him far more likely to pivot away from his original plan
Here the German troops would have to cross the old Somme battlefield.This was also very difficult terrain but not as muddy as ‘Flanders fields’
Somme battlefields were possible to traverse but the extensive destruction made it difficult to exploit gains
the morale of the British soldiers after the costly offensives of1917 would be low, and decided to attack the BEF first.
Ludendorff saw the defeat of the British as the key to defeating the Allied alliance
The German High Command hadexperienced the resilience of French soldiers and shrank back from taking onthe French army at Verdun, the logical point for an offensive
Resilience of the French helped dissuade an attack on their lines
developed a new method ofdirecting fire without ranging shots. The artillery aimed its fire at the enemy’sbatteries, Headquarters and lines of communication.
Firing on these targets would sow confusion throughout an enemies battleline and essential basis for the stormtrooper tactics
brief period of artillery preparation before attacks usinghurricane bombardment with the aim of preventing the Allies from learning earlyon where the major blow would fall.
Short and intense bombardments meant to take advantage of maximum firepower and surprise
The German army used combined-arms and infiltration tactics, which hadbeen successfully applied by General Oskar von Hutier in the Battle of Riga andwhich were later tested at Caporetto and during the counter-attack at Cambrai.
Stormtrooper tactics
etter fightingefficiency
Germans had learned an effective style of war based on the Battle of Riga known as stormtrooper tactics
The troops lived off the country and tried to extract more resources(especially food) from Ukraine. This led to local uprisings which were crushedby German and Austrian troops, generating even more disaffection.
German exctraction policy led to greater dissatisfaction in their occupied territories
he defeat of the Russian Empire wasthe precondition for the independence of half a dozen nations.
The disintegration of the empire system started with Russia
negotiations should begin without conditions and be based on the principleof no annexations or reparations. The offer of peace also included the right ofself-determination of nations which – as later became clear – opened up thepossibility for manipulation.
Soviet idea of revolutionary diplomacy
y 1918 Czechs and Slovaks were also hoping for an independent state. Thevague promise of more autonomy if the Central Powers won the war wasundercut by the very real possibility of independence in the event of an Alliedvictory.
Allied promises thus undercut Central Powers vague appeals to the stateless
Wilson did not demand the dissolution of both empires but proposedautonomy for their nationalities.
His idea of self determination was quite limiting
right of self-determination of all nations.
Key to Versailles treaty
He took a gamble, placing all his hopes on thesuccess of the spring offensive
This gamble proved disastrous
German ambitions and thevolatile situation in the former Russian Empire prevented the full weight ofGerman military power from being directed to the Western Front.
Germany did not take full advantage of the release of resources from the Eastern Front.
Ludendorff shared the imperialist dreams of some of the military, political andeconomic elite, and wanted to fully exploit the collapse of the Russian Empireand the power vacuum it created by expanding borders, promoting colonisa-tion and securing German dominance in Eastern Europe for the foreseeablefuture.
Ludendorff's ambition eventually doomed the German army
There are two important teachings pertaining to governance in10Confucianism: respect for and maintenance of the (hierarchical) social order, and ethical rule
Basis of Confucian Governance
The East Asian International Society itself can trace its intellectual origins back to China. As theregional hegemon, China set the rules of diplomatic conduct with foreign polities, and also assumednormative supremacy within the order.
China set the parameters of diplomatic conduct and assumed supremacy
The constitutive6norms of the East Asian International Society were hegemonic constructs that originated from China,and were premised on Confucianism and the assumption of Chinese supremacy
East Asian International Society predicated on Chinese culture and supremacy
This hypothetical argument highlights the openness of China’srelations with foreign powers created by its frontier expansion, and pointsto the possibility of more fluid geopolitical alliances, each of which had ef-fects on military balances, technological reform, and the political economyof trade.
Openness of Chinas relations to foreign powers could have been maintained had China been forced to continue its expansionism
Merchant elitescould benefit from cooperation with state officials in the development ofthe new regions.
Frontier expansion helped prevent commercial escape from the state
inally, frontier expansion offeredan outlet for peasant farmers, relieving pressure on the land in the core re-gions while granting them greater freedom from state burdens.
Relief of the land was essential in a burgeoning population
ising regional powers rivaled theclaims of the central state apparatus
Commercialization allowed regional powers to challenge the state by diversfying the means of economic growth
Bayly’s argument points to the corrosive impact of commercialization onsocial solidarity. The cash nexus challenged bonds based on military loy-alty, religious devotion, or kinship, replacing them with considerations ofprivate interest.
Commercialization replaced imperial loyalty with private interest. This fundamentally challenged the imperial state as the military service state collapsed and was replaced by commercial interest
state then had to gain the loyalty of its military and of-ficial servitors not through appeals to unity but through contractual rela-tionships
The need to then commercially negotiate with the military and government left the state weak and extremely vulnerable in times of crisis
his should be seen not as the “decline” of Ottomancivilization but as a reorientation of political power toward regions in re-sponse to new commercial sources of wealth.
The new commercialization of wealth meant that local empires lost their mandate of power, as local powers increased in stature
commercialization challenged the presupposi-tions on which the empires based their right to rule, which were fundamen-tally the maintenance of social order and the upholding of moral norms.
Commercialization fundamentally eroded empires right to rule
hese empires failed “becausewealthy and prideful men found less and less reason to support the myth ofempire to the disadvantage of their own real local interests.”
Local players decided to put commercial interests ahead of Empire
Flexible, negotiated local admin-istration, a feature of imperial rule everywhere, revealed itself more openlyon the frontier than elsewhere.
Flexible and local administration helped create the Qing state
was a negoti-ated state in its interior, somewhat like the Ottoman empire, but its peoplehad much stronger local social institutions and a greater ability to resist thestate when they chose.
China was a negotiated state but its people were more able to resist the state
If coopera-tion benefited both sides, local government could be carried out smoothlyby flexible interpretation of regulations.18 But when the state was weak orabusive, or local elites held the balance of power, conflict flared up.
Cooperation was possible but state weakness allowed local association to attempt to break out of the regulations imposed against it
Hence a great deal of authority was dele-gated to local associations to carry out tasks that served the state.
Qing helped turn these associations into state tools
he Ottomans created a centralized state by very different meansfrom western European states like France because they negotiated withtheir rivals instead of trying to suppress them.
Negotiation rather than repression
Westerners, of course, equally divided among themselves but willingto follow British leadership, included “most-favored nation” clauses inthe unequal treaties precisely to prevent this well-known Chinese strategy
Westerners thus learned to get around this Qing tactic
s-sence of Qing frontier policy was to keep the Mongols divided by con-stant diplomacy, drawing in allies against other, more dangerous rivals.
Qing divide and conquer against the Mongols
In each case, Mongol leaders gained official rank, salaries, gifts,and guarantees of subsistence in return for surrendering the right to moveor freely designate their successors.
Mongols thus used tribute to induce loyalty
The Qing rulers, however, realized that negotiation, with coercion heldin reserve, could work just as well on distant frontiers as in domestic con-texts.
Qing rulers effectively used negotiation to pacify the Mongols
Even in the relatively peaceful mid-Ming, local control depended precari-ously on compromises between civil officials and those who controlled mil-itary force.
Dependence on compromise with strongmen weakened imperial control
hese so-called banditshad powerful patrons, reaching as far as the eunuchs in the imperial courtitself.
These men of force exercised influence throughout China outside imperial control
Furthermore, although there wassubstantial private trade across both frontiers, the unregulated smugglingthat developed along the south coast, with its many small harbors and fastships, was far harder to control than the narrow choice of routes across thedeser
The Qing were unable to control the Canton trade due to greater commercial interests and lack of presence
he much larger torrent of silver and credit flowing intothe south drew Canton merchants into close dependence on their Britishcounterparts
The larger torrent of trade in Canton lead to dependence on British traders
All the foreigners astutely took ad-vantage of local flexibility to push their own commercial interests as far aspossible, but if they pushed too far, the Qing shut down the trade to bringthem in line
Qing flexed regulations but also brought the hammer down
he frontier served as an experimental zone for adapting prece-dents to local circumstances.
Frontier became a key reference point for dealing with the Westerners
esignatedHan merchant groups obtained monopoly licenses to trade with foreigners;regulations strictly controlled access to ports, times of stay, and goods to betraded.
Northwestern trade was remarkably similar to Southern practices
he kind of military and diplomatic experience gained on the northwesternfrontier generated inappropriate responses for the new challenges on differ-ent terrain.
Qing officials so schooled in the Northwest did not adapt to changing geographical circumstances
Yet the flexibility of the empire, its ability to react to ex-ternal shocks and take advantage of new opportunities, seems to have de-clined, so that while Japan could react rapidly to the appearance of Westernsteamships in its harbor in 1854, Chinese officials could not mount a uni-fied response to the Opium War of 1839–1842.
Qing did not react as quickly to the threat as did other Asian nations
Chinese rulers, in theirown eyes, had finished their project by 1760
The goals of centralization, homogenization, and simplification
n each case the in-novations arose from the demand of the frontier regions for security andthe needs of the military commanders for adequate supplies.
Demand of frontier expansion necessitated innovation
innovations that built an increasingly centralized and coordinated bureau-cracy which used mercantile and agrarian resources actively for economicdevelopment to serve its security needs
During this expansionist period, the Qing built an innovative and extensive bureacracy which effcetively used resources
the Qing em-pire also engaged in a competitive state-building process as it pushed itsborders outward
Competitive state building due to expansionism
competitive European state systemestablished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries generated the processof state building, military mobilization, and commercial growth that fueledimperial expansion.
Competition and its pressures motivated states to innovate and not to allow weakness or corruption
hese endemic weaknesses of the granary system wouldundermine the entire effectiveness of famine relief, allowing severe out-breaks of peasant revolt.
The corruption and neglect of agricultural projects thus made Qing agriculture extremely unstable
The end of this expansion in the mid-eighteenth century, and the end ofthe frontier wars, meant that both the incentives for innovation and themeans of control slackened
The lack of expansionist pressures led to a lessening desire for innovation and control
Many of its projects were de-signed to ensure the security of poor regions so that severe attacks of fam-ine would not touch off revolts, and so that military forces could obtainsubsistence from local markets
Need for public projects based on border security and military movement
ncentive to reform itself declined,and the will to control abuses slackened.
The pressures of expansion created a strong state, the lack of these pressures led to a loosening of imperial power
end to military challenges on the frontier let much dy-namism ebb out of the bureaucracy.
Dynamism was leeched out of the empire due to the end of expansion. The need to reform to meet expansionist challenges was slowly degraded
Despite extensive controls, the enormous paper flow of the bureaucracy byits very nature obstructed clear lines of communication and control, leavingthe way open for abuse.
The corruption of the bureaucracy due to its extensive mobilization led to a slow wastage of imperial resources
This frontier expansion project stimulated official mobilization of theempire’s economic resources.
The empire's expansion effectively mobilized resources from the empire
A language of civilization defined the identity of these peo-ples and the treatment they received.
Civilization could be given and taken away based on submission or rebellion
Balancing coercive, monetary, and cultural appeals was thekey to preserving the state and maintaining social order.
Balance between monetary, cultural, and coercive
When preaching harmony failed or harvests collapsed in a drought,officials had to summon up whatever police forces they had to prevent ban-ditry or revolt.
Thus coercive force was necessary in the maintenance of the empire
the Manchu rulers organized theirsociety to make war. The Manchu people were created in 1616 as part ofthe state formation in Manchuria dedicated to unifying through force thetribes of the Northeast. D
Manchu warfare was essential in the creation of the Qing state
hus the "Western conquest" proved abortive. Instead of being takenover by the new invaders, the Chinese world order finally disintegrated.
The West did not conquer China, China merely destroyed itself
The power structure, the establishment,by any definition came to include a large Western element.
Power structure came to include the west
The Ch'ing officials control them througha personal relationship, which is the essence of control in the Chinesebureaucracy.
Essence of control via personal relationship. Western forces subsumed into the Chinese state
"If you can't lick 'em, join 'em," had its Peking counterpart: barbarianstoo strong to defeat can be pacified by concessions, letting them participatein Chinese life
Treaty system was a way to pacify the West and subsume them into the Chinese system
on-Chinese Manchus had conqueredthe Ming state and taken on Chinese ways. In ruling they used Chinesecultural forms and Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese personnel. To thisstructure additional non-Chinese could now be added.
Manchus had taken on the culture of the Chinese while ruling jointly between Manchus and Han. This structure would later be added the west
Westerners could and did par-ticipate in the Ch'ing power structure but were quite incapable of takingon Chinese culture as previous barbarian invaders had done.
Westerners participated in the system but deliberately aschewed its cultural boundaries. But the joint participation in the system did give the Westerners an incentive in keeping the Qing Empire alive.
culture,on the other hand, included the ideology of imperial Confucianism, theunderlying classical philosophy of social order, and the ritual observancesand ceremonial forms which all together legitimized and sanctioned theruling authority.
Culture helped legitimize the authority of the empire via ritual, philosophy, and social order
power structurewas based on military capacity, force held in reserve, and included theadministrative capacity of emperor, magistrates, censors, and officialdomgenerally to maintain control of the functions of governmen
Power structure based on military force and administrative capacity.
gain the imperialedict makes the point that if a British officer is to be given the command hemust, like Ward, become enrolled as a Chinese subject and accept Ch'ingcontrol.
Assimilation of foreign mercenaries into the ranks of the Middle Kingdom
This was part of a general effortto extend the interval between tribute missions, perhaps a symptom of theweakening of the institution
Weakening of the institution due to the slowing of tribute missions
He extended [his control] over them by means of regulation
Control via imperial regulation
These statements assume a Sinocentric world in which theSon of Heaven at the apex treats the rulers of peripheral peoples with anoverwhelming benevolence (Jen) and thereby ensures their allegiance andsubordination.
The westerners were thus treated with benevolence afforded to them by Chinese tradition
hey had not become dependencies or vassals(fan), yet they had been generally pacified, and the Ch'ing dynasty stillruled. From "outer barbarians" they had become "inside barbarians,"fitting into certain traditional institutions to a considerable degree. Aftermaking raids on the coastal frontier, they had been induced to ceasehostilities.
The Westerners had become subsumed into China but their external pressure would soon transition to internal ones
This point could not impress culture-bound " realists" who saw the growingwealth and power of the West and thought only how to foster the wealthand power of China.
Thus opportunism led to the growing descent of China into the unequal treaties
hus the early treaties in themselves did not remake the Chinese view ofthe world. To China they represented the supremacy of Western power,but this did not convey the Western idea of the supremacy of law.
Western strength was expressed via power not law
Bythese material interests they would be motivated, it was hoped, to keep thepeace
Treaty was meant to motivate the foreigners to keep the peace or risk losing their commercial priviledges
By this the materialistic foreigners were granted certain benefits and privi-leges that would grow into vested interests, for which they would dependupon the emperor and by which he might therefore control them
Treaty system was meant to create a vested interest which could then be exploited by the emperor
The traditional model of tribute-and-trade was already con-siderably distorted.
The tribute system had already begun to deteriorate prior t the Treaty system
The treaty system emerged from a long transitional order in Sino-Western relations which may be called the Canton system
Treaty system based on the Canton System
The result was that the treaty system, which gleamed so new in the eyesof British consuls, was actually from the Chinese point of view little morethan a refurbishing of the traditional tribute system,
Treaty system was merely an adaptation of the tribute system
Yet this conventional picture of Ch'ing passivity and collapse in theface of Western vigor and expansion fits the end of the century better thanits middle decades.
It was only later in the century that Qing resistance fully collapsed
The Westernpowers, coming from outside the tradition, intent on their own aims, didnot realize how closely the treaty system was built within the frameworkof Chinese tradition
The treaty system was built within the framework of Chinese tributary system
early treaty period down to the1880's was seen as only the latest phase in this tradition of "management"{ch'ou-pan) of barbarian affairs
Management and not full resistance
Thus the treaty system in its early decades from the 1840's to the 1880'swas not merely a Western device for bringing China into the Westernworld; it may equally well be viewed as a Ch'ing device for accommodatingthe West and giving it a place within the Chinese world
Treaty System was a method for Western incorporation
another twenty yearsbefore the Chinese Empire entered the Europocentric family of nationsdiplomatically1 and began to show symptoms of modern nationalism.
During the years between 1840-1860, China remained wedded to the traditional system
And so the Opium War and the first treaties, in Peking today and aroundthe world, are viewed as the dawn of the New. This essay, per contra,suggests that they only began the twilight of the Old.
Opium Wars were merely the twilight of the old system
However, the extent of diversity that can result from divergent nationalpolitical developments may well prove to be limited in practice by abidingvalues, elite accommodations, or practical realities such as those inherent inthe nature of world problems or the structures of government and society
These divergences can be limited by traditional institutions
Unless some new strait-jacket arises to replace the role of social cleavages in limiting the diversity ofpolitical structures, it is not unreasonable to expect the particularization ofvoting choice at the individual level to be echoed at the national level byincreasing divergence in party systems.
Increasing divergence followed by the breakdown of traditional cleavages and the rise of particularization
he particularization of issue concernsprovides a plethora of possibilities from which to pick and choose whenputting together a policy agenda.
The particularization of issue provided opportunity both negatively and positively for older parties
These new associations further contribute to theirrelevance of former social cleavages.
New associations needed to keep former parties relevant cut the bonds of former cleavages
may be seen by many as more salient than the problems of socialjustice that were the bread and butter of socialist party platforms in earlieryears
The new problems arising cut across the old cleavages especially from the left
‘The establishmentof regular channels for the expression of conflicting interests ... helped tostabilize the structure of a great number of nation-states.’
Expression of group based interests and conflicts
universalpart involves the presence o f ‘classic’ democratic rights such as freedom ofspeech, freedom of association, and freedom of the press, all of which help toguarantee the free expression of interests.
Expression of interests is the key
What we are suggesting is that declining cleavage politics can be regardedas a consequence of the successful resolution by political systems of deep-seated conflicts of social interests
Declining cleavage politics rely on the dissipation of previous conflicts which traditional cleavages had relied on
evelopments will have resulted in growing numbers of persons who cannotunequivocally be located in terms of the simple schemata which arecommonly used to describe social structure and its cleavage
Certain characteristics which used to define cleavages will have less relevance
In the process, previous linkagesbetween occupation and political and social identification will have losttheir simplicity to the point where the distinction between capital andlabour may have retained little relevance for distinguishing people’s politicalorientations.
The growing diversification within society makes their linkage far weaker
Formerly dominantcleavages cease to be relevant in a different kind of society and cannot butlose some of their determining power on individual behaviour.
The degradation of older cleavages lead to a loosening of their power over the individual
Ifa small number of cognitive and evaluative dimensions is of great importancefor most voters, if parties are sufficiently homogeneous, if the party systemoffers sufficient diversity to express the different viewpoints along dimensionswhich are the important ones in the minds of the electorate, and if thosedimensions are relatively stable over time, what this will amount to is asystem of ideological or value alignments which will effectively anchorvoters and parties, and which will constrain the net amount of volatilityfrom election to election.
The necessary bounds of particularization
Few parties,and particularly the limiting case of only two parties, tend to restrict therange of policy positions from which voters can choose
Institutional restrictions may also prevent particularization
To attain (or maintain) such ideological or value coherence, it matterswhether political parties and other relevant elites offer to media and votersa ‘model’ of political coherence
Model of political coherence to counter the particularization of the electorate
Does the developmental process of particularization, leading to erosion oftraditional group loyalties, imply that voters and party systems are losingtheir moorings and will drift in whatever direction they are propelled byunpredictable events
Particularization process is eroding political loyalties
A quite different kind of ‘new’ cleavage relates to the emergence of asupposed distinction between persons with materialist and those with postmaterialist values
Materialism vs Postmaterialism
Certainly, there has been an enormous increase in issue diversification inpolitical life, with the emergence of ‘new politics’ issues such as feminism,ecology, nuclear disarmament, and rights for ethnic and sexual minorities,as well as right-wing concerns such as those of the survivalists, antiabortionists, libertarians, and others that were not on the political agenda oftraditional cleavage politics
Increasing diversification of political issues and of individuals categorization
This is in contrast to earlier decades, whenvarious aspects of a person’s social identity were more homogeneous in termsof their implications for political preferences.
Social identity was more homogenous in the past in terms of political preference
n modern societies peoplederive many identities from their social position, from each of which politicalorientations may arise, not all pointing in the same directio
People derive many identities from social position and this leads them in many different political directions
individual’s attachment to larger social groups is in the process of breakingdown
The individuals growing desire for specialization is breaking down the appeal of larger social groups
in which individual citizens relate themselvesincreasingly to small and specialized networks of more direct concern totheir own individual interests and needs rather than to groups defined byphysical proximity
The public are becoming far more specialized in their opinions
society is in the process of disappearing
Homogenized society is disintegrating
The major thrust of Toffler’s thesis is that, even as we move into an era ofworld politics and growing economic and political interdependence betweendifferent countries, the specifics of political concerns are becoming lessglobal.
The specifics of political concern are becoming far more domesticized
Even though the linkages they posited havedeclined almost everywhere, the record of past linkages is clear to read.
Development thus began with parties based on social cleavages but has evolved to see lesser impact
breakdown of traditional linkages involves nothing less than the disintegration of cleavage politics, which, in turn, makes it possible for otherfactors to play an increasing role in influencing voter choice
Disintegration of the linkage between political parties and the social cleavages they previously represented
the politicalemancipation of individual citizens who can now choose, rather than bepredestined by social position
Political emancipation
the most frequently found cleavages concerned social differencesin terms of class and religion, whose impact on party choice was both strongand enduring.
Cleavages based on class and religion
linkages ensuredthat deeply rooted social distinctions existing at this formative period weremirrored in the divisions between parties.
Divisions between parties were deeply linked to cleavages and social distinctions within society
that the interests and preferencesof core party constituencies predispose Left governmentsto pursue relatively expansive policies intended to raisegrowth and lower unemployment and Right governmentsto pursue relatively restrictive policies designed to containinflation
Partisan politics does have a major effect on macroeconomic variables
partisan effects on macroeconomicvariables are commonplace, whereas election calendareffects are sporadic
Importance of partisan elements
ess concernedwith measuring power precisely than with understanding howstrategic disadvantage is perpetuated, but might neverthelessbe overcome.
What is strategic disadvantage?
By treating inequality as a centralproblem, Bachrach and Baratz asked not only “who getswhat and how” but also “who gets left out and how”
Central point of the exclusivity of power
Bachrach and Baratz treat politics as a dramain which no foregone conclusion is played out and a richmixture of elements is manipulated by the players
Players do not seek merely to promote ideas but to scale politics toward their advantage
Actors not only expend energy promot-ing and opposing discrete policy decisions (the first face ofpower) but also invest resources in arrangements throughwhich strategic advantages are secured (the second face ofpower).
Promotion of policy (first face) and then an arrangement of strategic advantage (second face)
heyurge scholars to step back and assess the flow of the deci-sion process in order to fathom the constraints within whichdecisions are made.
How are political actions constrained?
international attitudes in general still did notregard war as an absolute evil
The mood of 1914 thus tipped towards war
Bethmann Hollweg remained set in his habitual pessimism and held suddenlyto a single idea: to do everything to convince the Social Democrats and thenation that Germany was in a defensive situation
Bethman Hollweg thus became set on war, he merely needed to convince the German people of its validity
‘There had been no “loss ofcontrol”, only an abdication of control.’
The military leadership thus took control due to the apathy of the civilian leaders
nce he had been informed of theRussian decision to proceed to general mobilisation, Bethmann Hollweg hadno further cards to play, and that he was completely resigned to the situation.
Russian mobilization thus forced Bethman's hand
It was thatGermany depended entirely on such an inflexible military plan and had givenpriority to strictly military considerations
The need of militaries thus overshadowed the diplomatic needs to prevent war
uccess of the Schlieffen Plan, as is known, dependedon Russian tardiness in mobilisation, which explains very well the anxiety ofthe German generals.
The Schlieffen Plan thus motivated German anxieties
For this reason, our militarysituation can be seen day by day in a less advantageous light, which couldhave harmful consequences if our potential enemies are in a position to maketheir preparations in tranquillity.
Germany thus could not waste a day before preparing for war
If Germany mobilised,however, Russia would mobilise completely, alleging its own defence, whichwould bring in French support.
Moltke thus predicted remarkably the alliance chain ganging which would occur
ussia had chosen ‘to take the part of this criminalnation’, which had disturbed the situation in Europe
Moltke thus saw Serbia and Russia as the causes of general European tensions.
theTsar then cancelled the order – and reconfirmed it on 30 July. At this point,Headquarters acted to cut communications, to avoid any possible furtherchange.
Military leaders thus were involved fatefully in a general war
The leaders of these armies were warriors by trade, forthis was still the period when making war was in the natural order of things,and from the moment when they felt it was their turn to speak, they leaned onthe civilian governments as heavily as possible.
Military leaders motivated by warrior origins thus pushed for the fulfillment of their origins and leaned heaviy on civilian leaders
not to be left behind by any potential adver-sary.
Being ahead of the curve motivated many military leaders to push for war
‘Again and again, in the crisis of July 1914, we are confronted bymen who suddenly felt themselves caught in a trap and from it called for adestiny that they were incapable of controlling.’4
Leaders entrapped by fear thus made the inescapable march towards war
this did not apply to German opinion: in taking the initiative,Germany felt, it was simply acting in self-defence, and indeed young Germansoldiers set off for the war with the conviction that they were defending theircountry.
The nationalistic idea of defending ones country thus played a role in assuring German support for war
the idea of the inevitable war developed in Germany’
This idea made the prospect of war not disastrous
There would have beengeneral stupefaction if the Belgians had been told that they would soon bedrawn into a European war, and the same applies to the British
Many nations were not eager to participate in any war
no statesmen energetic or capable enough to find the means toblock or delay the mechanism which led to the war, not least because theorigin of the crisis seemed marginal.
The leaders did not work hard enough to prevent war
Great War had no Hitler figure; virtually none of theEuropean leaders, monarchs or civil governments wished to go to war
None of the European leaders wanted war but all eventually accepted it
after 28 July the behaviour of the British government was less equivocal: on29 July it refused to accept Bethmann Hollweg’s demand that Britain shouldremain neutral in the case of war if Germany promised not to touch Frenchpossessions
Britain thus shifted wildly towards a firmer stance
firmer attitude from Britain could have led Germany towards negotiation
A stronger British position could have turned Germany away from such aggresive action
In reality it was not,properly speaking, for Belgium that Britain was to go to war, but because aGerman victory in Western Europe implied a disturbance in the Europeanequilibrium which would be unacceptable to the British, and because such avictory would put Germany in control of the Channel ports
German victory was unacceptable to the British due to the balance of power. In effect another reason for alliance making
general mobilisation in France began at approximately the same timeas in Germany; the German ‘aggression’ had left France no option
The alliance chain ganging in affect
n 2 August, German troops crossedthe frontier into Luxembourg, while Belgium was summoned to allow themfree passage. On 3 August, Germany declared war on France.
The needs of the military and its speed thus thrusted France into the war
t has by nomeans been shown that Germany would indeed have mobilised if Russia hadnot made the first move, if only because Bethmann Hollweg was convinced ofthe importance of national consensus for ‘national defence’.
The need for national consensus thus could have prevented mobilization if Russia had not acted first
for general mobilisation to take place immediatelyin Austria-Hungary – a move which would force the German government tofollow suit.3
Alliance chain ganging
Undoubtedly at this moment Moltke wished to impose the military pointof view. On 30 July he demanded urgently to proceed to mobilisation, whileBethmann Hollweg wanted at any price to wait for the Russian generalmobilisation.
Moltke pressures thus forced Germany into the inevitability of war
Wilhelm II and the civil powers, still hesitant, were insistently driven by thegenerals who had hitherto remained reserved. The generals considered –rightly – that in order to carry out the Schlieffen Plan, this very bold planwhich was designed to finish with France before turning to deal with Russia,every day counted.
The demands of the Schieliffen Plan and teh Generals thus overcame any governmental or diplomatic menas
Didthe Russian general mobilisation render war inevitable? Certainly, yes.’3
Russian mobilization forced the hand of every other power as the alliance structure took its fatal course
t was of course known that in the case of war the German plans were basedon the Russian army mobilising slowly, and that Germany could not acceptbeing caught out by speed of action.
The military plans (motivated by insecurity) thus played into the rapid mobilizations of the remaining powers
what would have been felt as a new national humiliation would be unaccept-able to the army leaders and public opinion alike (urban opinion at least – thevast mass of peasants remained indifferent to all of this)
The loss of prestige suffered by Russia in the preceding decades could not suffer again in 1914
The effects of the defeat againstJapan and the events of 1905 were fading, and Raymond Poincaré, France’sPrésident du Conseil at the time of the Balkan wars and now President of theRepublic, had held back from restraining Russia’s action out of fear of losingthe alliance.
The Allies thus also proved to weak to challenge the alliance structure
localisation was a test of whatRussia and its allies wanted. The conviction of Russian aggressive intent, andthe prospect of its military superiority within a few years was such thatthis fear had overwhelmed calmer and more balanced political reasoning.
The fear of Russian aggressiveness thus persuaded the Central Powers to adopt an all or nothing scheme
deliberately high-risk ‘all or nothing’ scheme – but with the genuine riskof plunging into major catastrophe.
The risk taking by both sides of the conflict was exttraodinary for nations that wished to avoid a general war
Because of the rigidity of the system of alliances, and purely through theiroperation, the risk would exist in the continuing situation of being led into aEuropean war.
The alliance structure thus made the prospect of localisation unlikely as each nation would need to support its allies or risk its alliance falling apart.
Overall, the German rulers were convinced that rapid action would preventthe other powers from intervening in the conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary.
Austria would have to strike quickly in order to preserve a localization
if war comes, it will be the consequenceof a Russian mobilisation undertaken in the heat of the moment, that is, aheadof any preliminary negotiations. In that case negotiations would hardly bepossible, because we would have to attack immediately
Germany thus saw Russian mobilization as a starting gun that Germany would need to respond to.
Russia’s military strength was growingrapidly; Austria was increasingly weakened by pressures from north andsouth, and would be incapable of following Germany into a war.
The need to engage while Germany and its Ally were strong and while Russia was still not at its peak strength
Before July 1914 Bethmann Hollweg wasincreasingly convinced that the encirclement so much feared by the Germanssince the Franco-British treaty of 1904, the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911, theexchange of letters of support between Grey (the British Minister for ForeignAffairs) and Paul Cambon (French ambassador in the United Kingdom) at theend of 1912, had now become reality.2
Fear of encirclement thus intensified Bethamn's anxiety and began to turn him towards preventative war especially due its support for Austrai
maintaining European peace, he consid-ered that it would be useful, and possible, to ‘localise’ the conflict – to preventit from spreading beyond the single point at issue between Austria-Hungaryand Serbia
Germany supported Austria but on the periphery in order to localise the conflict.
Austria-Hungary would be supported by Germany in whatever actionthey decided on; but he also repeated the advice to take action quicklyagainst Serbia.
Germany thus became deeply involved in any action Austria took
demanded a response from thedouble monarchy, to achieve a decisive break in the threads which theadversaries were in the course of ‘weaving into a web around them’
Encirclememt and insecurity
nterest of the two powers to strike down agitations ‘system-atically conceived and nourished by Russia’.
The Balkan league was deemed a useful threat for Russian weakening of Austrian control
What is striking about the“blank cheque” is not that it was issued but that it was indeed blank.’16Certainly what happened at this moment was an unexpected ‘extraordinaryabdication of responsibility’17 on the part of the German government.
The German government blank cheque left Austria no restrictions in its actions towards Serbia.
If Austria-Hungry were to remain an important ally it must not be weakened.
The need to keep fellow alliance members strong thus motivated many nations to become involved in the general war
the opportunity offered by the assassination attack must beused to tame Serbia – the affair must also remain the work of the doublemonarchy alone and, if the Austro-Hungarian action were to fail, Germanymust not be held responsible for this fresh setback suffered by its Austrianallies.
Germany did not wish to stop Austria's actions but did not seek to become involved in the conflict either
Austria-Hungary must finish with Serbia, and finish soon
Kaiser Wilhelm thus supported Austria's punitive action against Serbia
The eventual outcome of events therefore depended on Germany
Germany thus had a chance to end any prospect of war
Austria-Hungary would have liked to take further advant-age of these circumstances to eliminate the Serb danger once and for all, butGermany had restrained them from acting to do so.
Austria could not act without German support in the face of potential Russian action (chain ganging)
success of a purely diplomatic naturewould be without value, even if it led to dazzling humiliation for Serbia. Itwould thus be necessary to bring Serbia face to face with claims so consid-erable that rejection could be expected and a radical military intervention canbe undertaken.
Austrian officials thus accepted the need for war and completely abandoned diplomatic means
eize the occasion to settle thequestion of Serbia once and for all.
War as an acceptable means to decide policy.
incident must be put to gooduse to tame Serbia, whose aggressive behaviour, and indeed its very existence,were a danger to the stability of the ‘multi-national’ Empire.
The incident at Sarajevo became a clearly crafted argument for Serbian aggressiveness and supported the preventative war the Austrian leadership had sought for
thevery different attitude taken by other members of the government wasechoed in the press, which represented the nationalist and pan-Serb oppo-sition. It exulted whole-heartedly and congratulated Princip and his com-panions, who were raised to hero status, even martyrs, in the ‘Yugoslav’cause
The nationalistic demands of the public thus undermined its government.
was above all a means ofapplying pressure to the Prime Minister, Nikola Pašic ́; having personifiedthe Serb nationalist current, Pašic ́ was now accused of passivity and com-plaisancy towards Austria-Hungary
Domestic Nationalistic means thus were at the front of mind of the Serbian plotters
Russia, protector of the Slavs, was unable to respond to this situation: ithad been weakened by the combination of its defeat against Japan in 1905and the revolutionary movements of 1905
Russian humiliation led to Russia refusing to backdown in fear of losing further prestige
Hadnot Conrad demanded, at least three times since December 1912, that thisdisturbing neighbour be disposed of by means of a preventive war?
Demand for preventative war to prevent any further challenge of Austrian power by Serbia
Using all the documentation known at that time, he accused theGerman government of having intended and prepared for this war since 1912 as aconflict from which Germany was to emerge as a world power – in other words,a power of world supremacy.
War of world supremacy
when historians of thedifferent nationalities agreed that none of the Great Powers could be consid-ered entirely free from some degree of responsibility.
All nations had a part to play in the war
need to justify to public opinion thedeaths of the 10 million soldiers who were killed in the war.
Needs of justification thus lead to the great historiography of the outbreak of war
From the very beginning of a European war such as had not been seen fornearly a century, it was impossible to compare it to any other conflict: byreason of the general mobilisations at its outbreak, and the call for massvolunteers in Britain, this time millions of men would be involved in thewar.
A true people's war had become possible.
On 28 July 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. On 30 July, Russiaordered general mobilisation. During the night of 30–31 July, Austria-Hungarydecided to mobilise, followed on 1 August by Germany and France atapproximately the same time. Also on 1 August, Germany declared waron Russia, and on France on 3 August. On 4 August the United Kingdomdeclared war on Germany, and on 6 August Austria-Hungary declared waron Russia
The progression of war
these shares will be secondary in comparison to the aggressivediplomacy and armament policies that the German monarchy, with Viennaincreasingly in its wake, pursued from the turn of the century, and that forthe reasons examined here, culminated in the idea of the Central Powerslaunching a preventive war in 1914.
The aggresive policies of Germany plunged the world into war
Only when it became absolutely clear that the main thrust ofthe German invasion was head on through Belgium and not further southagainst France, was he able to sway his Cabinet colleagues. Like London,Paris similarly took a more ‘attentiste’ position and not the proactive one ofthe decision-makers in Berlin and Vienna
France and Britain were not proactively involved in the outbreak of the war
it seems that for their own profession’s sakethey wanted to make great wars fightable and winnable again. Hence theyadopted Schlieffen’s idea of annihilation and added to it the notion of alightning war.
The need to justify the profession of war, thus forced military leaders to adopt the Short War Illusion
Pondering in his years of retirement the lessons of the Franco-Prussian Warin which he had led Prussia to victory against Napoleon III, he came to theconclusion that a future war could no longer be fought among the GreatPowers of Europe. Such a war, he was convinced, would be a Volkskrieg, apeople’s war, that no belligerent could hope to win. Everything shouldtherefore be done to avoid a major European war.3
The growing nationalization of the conflict and growing technological efforts thus made it possible for countries to mobilize such a great amount of technological but more importantly human resources that war became total
Brilliant mood. The government has succeeded very well inmaking us appear as the attacked.’
The need to appeal the lower classes (social appeasement) thus factored into nations war plans
These demonstrations made Reich Chancellor Theobald von BethmannHollweg realise that Germany could not possibly join an Austro-Hungarianwar, unless the population could be convinced that they were being calledup to defend the fatherland against the autocratic tsarist juggernau
The need for nationalistic calls for patriotism thus fed a greater call to war.
The prospects of the future seriously worried him [Moltke]. Russia will havecompleted her armaments in 2 to 3 years. The military superiority of ourenemies would be so great then that he did not know how we might copewith them.
German pessimism thus fed her own insecurities and desire to go to war
oltke was by now firmly convinced that ‘to waitany longer meant a diminishing of our chances; as far as manpower wasconcerned, one cannot enter into a competition with Russia
Insecurity over the arms race thus fed ineviatbility
Having summarised his worries, in particular about the size of the Russianarmament programme
The arms races made it more convenient for each nation to launch preventative war