This secret wartime pact between the British and French governments to allocate defined spheres of influence across the Middle East once the Ottoman Empire had been defeated was not disclosed to Hussein
Thus revolution was sparked in service of imperialist ambitions
The British reaction was to dismiss this extensive claim to represent the Arab ‘nation’, but there was some sympathy for the idea of an Arab revolt which might potentially tie down thousands of Ottoman troops.
Nationalist demands were encouraged for revolt
alliance with Great Britain, to provide military and naval protection, and accepted the principle of economic preference for the British Empire
New Empire with support of the British
Yet they were reassured by news of the secret talks between Abdullah and Kitchener that seemed to suggest the British favoured independent Arab states under British protection
British calls for Arab independence helped spark rebellion while there real intentions remained hidden
The war was opening up the opportunity to fulfil a long-cherished ideal.
Opportunity now led Hussein to consider rebellion
Far4 from being a proto-nationalist struggle for the sake of Arabism, this was a bid for dynastic security and an opportunity to replace the secularists in Istanbul with a genuine caliphate.
Hussein saw an opportunity for dynastic control and the creation of a new caliphate centered around his family
Ottoman forces in the region were strong enough to crush any premature revolt.
Fears of power now played into loyalty amongst of Arab states (question of which European state was pwoerful enough)
Thus to understand 1917 we need to see the global impacts of a war that left behind it the seeds of future conflicts around the world.
1917 began the shift toward a more ideologically driven shift in the fighting of World War 1 as ideology began to influence policy more and more
400 years of Ottoman rule in the Arab world was effectively over, even if, nearly a century of bloodshed in the region later, no one has yet been able to form a consensus on what should follow it
British campaigns helped end Ottoman control of Arabia
David Lloyd George committed precious British assets to the conquest of the Middle East.
The idea of peripheral warfare again took hold
Forged out of the crucible of two major wars, the USSR radically changed the nature of global politics for most of what remained of the twentieth centur
The seeds of communism would become a major force for the rest of the century
1917 appears less as the start of the final phase of the First World War and more as the starting point of the wars that would shape the rest of the twentieth century and beyond.
1917 marked the entry of the forces of communism and US ideology which would become the dominant ideological power house for the rest of the 20th century
superior ability of the French and British to manage their home fronts thus played a critical role in delivering victory.
Home Front morale was crucial in sustaining Allied resolve while Home Front morale collapse led to the defeat of Germany
‘the price civilians believed they could and should pay for victory or peace was not limitless
Sacrifice was not limitless
Indeed the extent of the economic crisis in Germany raised serious doubts about the ability of Germany to win the war in any meaningful sense, regardless of what its armies did on the battlefield.
Any military victory would be hollow if the German state sunk into severe impoverishment
Inflation ran rampant, robbing Germans of both purchasing power and savings.
The military prioritization of the economy led to its disintegration
the civilian economy became little more than an engine for providing resources to the army
This created severe deprivation for the civilian populace as now sacrifice could only be fixed by a decisive battlefield victory. Lose that victory and the sacrifices of the population could no longer be tolerated
German economy was simply incapable of meeting such a monumental challenge.
Germany was unable to meet the demands of its weak coalition partners
Germans had the additional responsibility of trying to prop up their faltering Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman allies
Germany's responsibilities were too great to match especially due to the economic and military strength of the US, France, and Britain
917, as America came formally into the war and the U-boat crisis abated, the French and British could take maximum advantage of such access. The Germans, by contrast, were reduced to taking resources from an already impoverished Eastern Front
Germany's victory on the East proved hollow as its gain did not match the gains the Western Allies made by attracting America to its side
If, however, they failed, the arrival of hundreds of thousands of fresh bodies would buy the Allies all the time they would need to grind the Germans down through attrition, superior firepower and the ongoing naval blockade that continued to cut deeply into German food and fuel supplies.
Germany thus needed to win the war quickly before the Americans could become involved. The Allies merely needed to delay Germany before the Americans made victory inevitable
he end of yet another frustrating year of war set up a race of sorts
Desperation of both sides to rush forces into battle while delaying the enemy created a race of reinforcement
Tragically, though, they had too few reserves to push through the gap and the British planners had erred by not leaving any tanks in reserve to help keep the gap open. Even if they had, the tanks did not have the ability to sustain such a breakthrough
British had finally been able to open a gap but did not have the resources or mobility to truly exploit it
They argued that tanks could supplement artillery barrages by using their strengths of surprise and mobility; tanks, moreover, did not chew up the ground for the infantry as artillery shells did.
Tanks were not merely artillery on tracks but a potent explotation tool
ritish and the French had invested heavily in tanks but thus far they had proven to be a disappointment due to mechanical problems and a poor doctrine for using them
Mechanical problems especially plagued tanks
Caporetto offensive succeeded beyond the Germans’ wildest imagination. Artillery destroyed Italian positions and the rapid collapse of Italian lines caused a panic and rout that sent 1.5 million Italian soldiers fleeing in disorder towards the presumed safety of the Piave river.
The rupture tactics and artillery bombardment finally broke the enemies morale which proved even more decisive than the battle itself
win not by trading punches as in a heavyweight fight, but by exploiting enemy weaknesses in something more akin to a judo match.
Exploitation not Brute force
This new system of infiltration tactics required highly trained infantry and a new approach to artillery
Infiltration tactics meant rupture the lines in specific places not overcome it in a tidal wave of infantry
more to disorient than to overwhelm.26 Into the breaches thus created the Germans sent specially trained soldiers who would bypass the enemy’s for- ward trenches in order to target the command and control centres behind them
Disabling command centers showed that the need to maintain an offensive after reserves arrived was paramount
the new artillery system used shorter and sharper barrages and included heavier concentrations of poison gas. Bruchmüller’s system also emphasised shorter barrages deliv- ered with little advance warning in order to maintain surprise and prevent the enemy from rushing reserves into the target area
New tactics showed the preeminence of surprise and the need to keep the enemy on the backfoot intelligence wise
ewer reserves with which to meet any future German offensives, such as the one that came the following spring.
The attrition of British forces in 1917 played a decisive role in their later crisis of 1918
In November Haig called a halt to an offensive that had done little to improve the Allies’ strategic situation.
Haigs offensive had once again achieved little strategically
The British adapted and scored local successes at places like Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde, but the campaign as a whole failed to achieve Haig’s goals. As autumn brought worsening weather and shorter days, British gains slowed to a halt
Local successes were possible but the possibility of decisive breakthrough was not
Command confusion, strong German defences that better protected sol- diers from the effects of artillery and almost unprecedented levels of rain further slowed British advances.
The environmental situation and strong German defences combined to make the campaign an absolute slog for British forces
Thereafter, however, little went as Haig had planned. The British were slow to exploit the shock of Messines, allowing the Germans to move reinforcements into the are
Inability of exploitation reared its ugly head again
offensive in Flanders offered the best way to draw the Germans away from the French and give his ally the time it desperately needed.2
The needs of coalition warfare thus proved decisive again
rench manpower was a dwindling resource and that the arrival of the Americans would be critical to Allied success
The mutinies of France and the destruction of Tsarist Russia put a premium on American manpower
ost of these attacks were successful and caused casualties that by 1917 standards were proportionate to their accomplishments.
Limited objectives with heavy firepower helped allow France to slowly regain good positions without seeking decisive battles which caused hevay casualties
Pétain’s strategic vision aimed to use more force, mostly with artillery and tanks, aimed at smaller goals. He wanted his offensives limited in both space and time; if an offensive showed signs of failure, he would shut it down and look elsewhere.
Petain sought limited offensives were firepower would reduce casualties and limited scope would allow for generals to end an offensive without the fears of investment
reform of the French army designed to make it a modern force that fought with artillery, armour and aviation all working together to reduce casualtie
Metal instead of flesh
nstituted major reforms in the French army, ranging from better food and more leave to ordering French officers to spend more time in the trenches with their men.
Petain helped create better conditions for French soldiers which greatly calmed unrest
He dealt harshly with soldiers who had threatened officers or encour- aged rebellion, but he also knew that the men had legitimate complaints.
Petain cracked down but made sure to listen to soldiers complaints
ledged that they would still defend French soil, but that they would no longer attack under such murderous circumstances.
French soldiers would still fight, but they would not engage in slaughter
failure of Nivelle’s grand plan occurred among the French troops themselves. Furious at the gross incom- petence of their own leaders, thousands of them refused to attack
The failure of Nivelles promises and later inability to cut his losses led to enraged French soldiery who took matter into their own hands
ritish generals were understandably reluctant to place their troops under foreign command even before the catastrophe on the Chemin des Dames; after it, they dug their heels in even deeper, with important consequences for 1918.
Failure of French offensive led to the rejection of unified command
It severely damaged French relations with the British, in part because the British felt compelled to renew attacks around Arras to relieve pressure from the French, and in part because Nivelle, who had once been so free with information, refused to share critical details of the failure with Haig’s head- quarters.
The Nivelle's optimism and boastfulness and later secrecy did not bode well for British commanders
intellectually incapable of stopping after having invested so much into the offensive’s success
The sunk cost fallacy of WW1 commanders
ivelle continued to send in reinforcements in hopes of breaking the lines, but that decision only increased the bloodshed.
Incapability of Allied commanders to cut their losses led to extreme bloodshed for limited gain
Nivelle had expected tanks and airplanes to help make his artillery more effective, but the cloudy, rainy weather grounded the planes and most of the tanks broke down in the difficult terrain.
Nivelle failed to truly implement combined arms warfare during the Chemin des Dames Battle
Currie had trained his men in their specific tasks and, in part because his own aims were limited, he could match what he asked of them to the resources available.
Limited objectives allowed for proper allocation of resources and proper cover of an assault as the proper firepower could be consolidated for a more limited objective
Learning from Nivelle’s artillery methods and improving upon them, Currie was able to give his troops adequate cover for the attack
The dominance of artillery in both offensive and defensive was well harnessed by Currie
He also threatened to resign if the French government did not back him, thereby creating a military crisis as well as a diplomatic crisis because Nivelle had Lloyd George’s support.
Llyod George's support proved decisive as the French did not want to risk upsetting their British allies
he advantage of exceptional high ground and positions that were invulner- able to the kinds of tactical artillery bombardments that had worked at Verdun.
Nivelle had choosen the wrong battlefield for his tactics to work
The ridge Nivelle planned to assault was a veritable cliff topped by a road, the Chemin des Dames, which afforded the Germans excellent visibility into the valley below. There would thus be no chance of achieving surprise
Thus Nivelle's campaign was already compromised as the Germans would not be fooled by the campaign in Arras
French would then use the methods Nivelle had allegedly perfected at Verdun to open a hole in the difficult terrain along the River Aisne
Arras would be a diversionary campaign to draw German forces way from the main campaign along the river Aisne
enemy at one point and then to attack another point where we will penetrate and will march toward his reserves in order to destroy them’.
In some ways, a innovative tactics
His scientific and aggressive methods seemed to stand in marked contrast to the slow, slogging approach that Joffre, Foch and Henri-Philippe Pétain preferred
Neville's tactics promised decisive results
same Bolshevik virus that they had injected into the Russian body politic infected German soldiers, contributing to the radicalisation of the once-loyal German left, which had now ‘found a new model in the Bolshevik revolution’.
Bolshevik ideas influenced German soldiers who soon turned against their leaders
Germans had to deploy more men in the East than they had originally planned, even if major combat there had ended
Germans were forced to deploy forces to quell unrest begun by the revolution and to protect the resources in German controlled territory
n December, they opened negotiations from a position of strength and in the ensuing Treaty of Brest- Litovsk they seized more than 1 million square miles of Russian territory, along with enough raw materials to compensate for some of the losses suffered from the British blockade.
Germanys strong position and Bolshevik desperation ended in a total victory for Germany
The failure of the Kerensky offensive led to a sharp decline in Russian morale and the virtual end of Russian support for continu- ing the war.
Failure of the Kerensky Offensive showed the inability of Russian forces to continue to fight
In the end, North American goods and American soldiers crossed the Atlantic safely throughout 1917 and 1918. The German submarine gamble had failed.
Introduction of convoys helped protect the sea lanes
ensions continued to build, however, and the publica- tion of the Zimmermann Telegram in March seemed to demonstrate to the Americans that the Germans did indeed pose a clear and present danger to the United States
The threat of German dominance was clearly felt by the publication of the Zimmermann telegram
hey knew that the move risked antagonising the world’s most powerful neutral nation, the United States, but they determined that the gamble was worth it. Submarines could cut the British Isles from badly needed imports and, they hoped, without Britain the French could not continue the war.
Battlefield priorities took priority over diplomatic concerns
major Allied offensives of 1917 proved to be failures, it is important to keep in mind that Allied generals did not have the luxury of remaining on the defensive
Allies needed to land the knockout punch before its coalition crumbled in the East
The French did not forget this intentional devastation when they drew up peace terms the following year.
The barbarism of Germany would play hard on Allied opinion in 1919
provide Germany ‘monetary indemnities and vast territorial annexations’ to justify the high German casualties of 1914–16
Again the logic of total war demanded complete victory to justify the sacrifice
German planners knew that a long war put pressures on the German home front that it might not be able to withstand for long.
Germany knew that it would need to land a knockout punch before the Allies ground it down
both alliances had remained determined and capable of maintaining powerful armies in the field and functioning economies to support them.
The logic of total war had allowed for the continued support of the war through vast mobilizations
neither side had broken financially or morally under the stresses and strains of three years of modern war.
The logic of attrition had yet to play a decisive role
United States emerged as the world’s unquestioned financial power and industrial giant.
United States emerged from the war as unquestionably the premier world financial and industrial power
but it eventually found a way to harness the energies and resources of the lands under its control. In doing so, it both inspired and terrified millions of people across the globe and set up a rivalry with the other beneficiary of 1917, the United States
The 1917 revolution began the cold war rivalry between the ideologies of the West vs the Soviet Union
Martin and others had expected the American contribution to Allied victory to be financial and naval. Even he didn’t expect the American army to do much to influence the outcome.
US was not in a position to influence the war: yet
1917 represented the beginning of the end of the European imperial system and the start of a new system that, a generation later, would place the United States and the Soviet Union in a position of power over Europe.
1917 as the beginning of the dominance of US and Soviet sponsored ideologies
important transition on the battlefield; the battles of Cambrai, Riga and Caporetto represented the start of a shift from the infantry-based age of mass assaults to the mechanical, combined-arms approach that featured infantry working with aviation, artillery and armour in various combinations.
Shift in 1917 from mass infantry assault to combined arms warfare
None of them dared even to dream that victory might be attainable in the year to come. Many more worried about defeat.
Many Allied commanders believed in the possibility of defeat more than victory
the larger story of the year revolved around the continuing inability to break enemy lines then sustain that breakthrough.
Continued inability to achieve a decisive breakthrough
Winning the war would require further monumental sacri- fices, but losing the war would mean accepting the devastating terms that the enemy demanded. The war was now about survival, not ideals
The logic of total demanded continued sacrifice as the price of peace was too large to stomach
The privations of that winter were so intense that people remembered it, especially in Germany, as the ‘turnip winter’ and as one of the worst seasons of its kind in European history.
The deprivations of the winter of 1917 helped lay a foundation for revolution in 1918
alreadystrong tensions produced by the war seemed to expand in the immediate post-war period,
Postwar saw an expansion of war in many areas
he year 1919 did not mark the end of the cycle that began in 1914, nor, indeed,did it illustrate any shifts in the violence of war
1919 did not see the end of the trends of extreme violence
he power of identity stakes in a war that radicalisedpositions on both sides; and surely the brutalisation that the Great Warseems to have brought in its wake to the Europe of the 1920s
Power of identity and the radicalisation it caused
n this context as well, paramilitary groups appeared; they were responsiblefor much of the post-war violence. The distinctions between civilians andcombatants, already vague during the First World War, completely vanishedin this type of conflict.
Lack of state interference led to an extension of post war violence
‘War Communism’ (1918–21), political splits betweencommunists and (real or supposed) counter-revolutionary opponents, cur-rents of social antagonism between urban and rural societies and ethnicstruggles and national confrontations all came together to sustain a climateof permanent and varied violence.
War Communism
Bolshevik regime sensed that it was fighting for its survival.
The amalgamation of foes led to growing desperation and radical violence by the Bolsheviks
Everything seemed to favour a radical-isation of political violence: the eschatological anguish aroused by the defeat,the fear of contamination by communists or Jews, the hope that the fraternityof soldiers in the trenches could be recreated against a common enemy
Hopes of crushing radical revolution, the traumatic defeat of Germany post war, and a desire to recreate the conditions of war led to a radicalisation of violence
. To deal with the revolutionarythreat, it depended on recently demobilised veterans, on groups of studentstoo young to have fought in the war but keen to use their strength in thestruggle against the ‘Reds’63 and on local militias
State became reliant on local forces to defeat revolutionary forces
The German state no longer held a monopoly on legitimate violenc
Collapse of the state led to new powers being able to use violence for their own ends
the end of the war brought with it a collective traumatic shock, and areformulation of the ‘culture of war’ into the struggles between counter-revolutionary and revolutionary movements.
Traumatic shock led to the rise of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces attempting to recover from these shocks
n other cases it was the collapse of the structure of the state, combined withmaterial chaos, which lay behind the explosions of violence
Collapse of the state left no real recourse for political action besides through violence
liberation of countries occupied during theGreat War and the occupation of the Rhineland by the victors, which gave risein both cases to violence against individuals and property
Violence against individuals due to victors demands for justice and revenge against collaborators, former enemies, etc.
Certain forms ofviolence were a direct consequence of whether a country had been victoriousor defeated in the war, and related to the implementation of the Armisticeconventions.
Violence defined by victor status
Inthis extremely diverse and complicated climate, a clear delineation of anycontinuity between the ‘cultures of war’ in 1914–18 and post-war violence istherefore far from straightforward
Culture of violence did not continue universally post ww1
national or ethnic tensions inherited from the disintegration of the four greatempires
Expression of national and ethnic tensions often through violence
mphasise the ten-sions between transnational ideals and the persistent rivalries among nation-states, which deeply affected the inner workings of the institution.
Tensions between a greater push towards universal justice and the nationalistic goals of the victors and vanquished
‘If you want peace, cultivate justice.’
Creed of the international peace system
uest for socialjustice lay the ambition for a world free from war.
Social justice was a pathway towards anti-war (deprivation feed war)
hrough the establishment ofstandards designed to improve the living conditions of workers and to protecttheir rights, the ILO gave substance to the belief in universal justice born fromthe ruins of the First World War.
ILO sought a program towards universal justice via labour protections
It was the war that made the legislation of labour a matter of primordialimportance
Legislation of labour
absence of any sanction against those who contravened international law, andin the absence of armed forces capable of imposing peace, the League ofNations could not ‘attain the goal of high international morality, the aim withwhich it had been founded’
League of Nations had no mechanism whether to enforce peace against aggresive actors
‘We must deliberately and definitively reject the notion of sovereignty,for it is false and it is harmful’
Growing shift from national to international organization
For many legal scholars in the 1920s, the transnational nature of thequestions arising during the transition from war to peace required a profoundredefinition of international law.
Redefinition of international law to meet the crisis of the post war transition
A new legal category arose,that of the stateless person, who lacked any of the rights belonging to citizenswith a country of their own.
Rise of the stateless and the malaise of democracy
Thus when Russian refugees flooded into Western Europe after the defeatof the White armies in the Russian civil war (1919–21), their presence inspiredgreat anxiety
Defeats of the Whites led to increasing anxiety of the domino effect of communist infiltration and victory (if they could win in Russia, where else could they win?)
In the eyes of many Westerners, however, the most serious threat came fromthe disintegration of the great empires of Central and Eastern Europe, andfrom the growth of communism.
Westerners feared that disintegration of empire and national revolutions would lead to the growth of communism
In how many grieving families did hatred of the enemy mark a large part ofthe interwar years?
Grief led to hatred as the people saw the enemy as the source of their pain
A form of remobilisation can even be seen in the immediate post-war period, delaying and hindering the process of mourning: to turn the pageon the war would be to betray the dead. I
Retaining the memory of the war as a service to the dead and exacting vengeance due to this memory
pacifist message that in the end became established as a kind of shared culturein the second half of the 1920s:
Loyalty to the memory of the dead inspired deep pacificim amongst European nations
societies tormented by the mem-ory of the dead, and by a form of moral responsibility imposed on them by thesacrifice of so many soldiers.
Societies formed a moral responsibility due to the sacrifice of the soldiery
In every country, the construction of a national memory of the Great Warwas inseparable from the memory of the war dead
Construction of national memory around the memory of death
In Germany, in a context of defeat compounded by political revolution, thearmy literally fell apart in the space of two months.
Chaos of the post war situation meant a lack of organized demobilisation
By ignoring the hopesof colonised peoples, and by refusing to ratify equality between the races,29the negotiators in Paris ran the risk of disappointing all those who had placedtheir hopes in the doctrine of President Wilson
The failure of Versailles to support the nationalistic hopes of colonized peoples, Versailles fostered resentment and disappointment amongst the colonized who would now need to resort to other methods of freedom (it would not be given it must be taken)
In January 1919, many saw the Paris Peace Conference asa test of Western determination to see the right to self-determination putinto practice.
Test of Western implementation of self determination
Thanks to developments in journalism in Egypt, India and China,Wilson’s speeches were translated and his message widely diffused anddebated in nationalist circles,
Wilson's ideas were widely diffused due to journalism and the scale of the peace treaty
‘When the survivors returned home in 1918 and 1919, they faced a newsocial phenomenon . . . the end of the myth of the invincibility and honesty ofthe white man’,
Colonial subjects had seen the weakness of the Europeans and now had more confidence and ability to challenge European rule
n practice, Wilson had in mind theterritories of the three empires – German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman –rather than Asian or African colonies.
Wilson saw self-determination not universally but specifically towards the Central Powers empires
And yet the beginning of 1919 was marked by thegrowing consciousness worldwide of a right to self-determination, which firstemerged in 1917 in the writing by Lenin and Trotsky condemning the RussianEmpire.
Growing consciousness of self determination was legitimized by Wilson's ideas
‘We were preparing not Peace only, butEternal Peace. There was about us the halo of some divine mission.
Treaty of Versailles was not only to do with Germany but toward nurturing a lasting peace
Treaty of Versailles, often presented as a victors’ peace,was in fact a compromise peace: a compromise between Wilson’s idealisticaspirations and a more realistic post-war approach
Compromise between Wilsonian idealism and the needs of her allies (namely France)
Nonetheless, the question of reparations poisoned diplomatic relationsthroughout the interwar years; their cost was the subject of endless negotia-tions in numerous subsequent conferences and nurtured nationalist feeling inGermany.
Question of reparations was a constant source of battle between the Allies and postwar Germany which fostered an embittered nationalism
n early tendency emphasised thedisastrous consequences of the reparations on the German economy and theyoung Weimar Republic.
Early tendency to see the harshness of the treaty as creating a fundamentally unstable postwar Germany
renewed energy in 1918–19 of the theme of ‘German atrocities’ – weighedheavily on the heads of state and diplomats at the Paris Conference.
Theme of German atrocities pushed heads of state to seek greater punishment to prevent and punish German barbarism
The sting of this moral condemnation was compounded by asense of humiliation, shared by the Austrians, over their territorial losses andthe end of imperial grandeur.
Sense of humiliation due to the destruction of its empire
The fact remains that for the Germans, and for most of the Allies,Articles 231 and 232 were seen as a form of moral condemnation
The moral condemnation of Germany was deemed as a slap in the face to the German people who had exiled the Prussian Monarchy
Article 231 assigned responsibility for the damages suffered bythe Allies to Germany and the Central Powers, while Article 232 reached theconclusion that a guilty Germany owed reparations for the damages that it hadcaused
231 War Guilt and 232 War Guilt=reparations
peace should be a ‘just peace’, based on a kind of moral pact that he called a‘covenant’, that it should not take place at the price of a severely weakenedGermany and that a distinction had to be made between the German peopleand their rulers, who alone were responsible for the war.
Germany should be punished but not so harshly it would unjustly punish its civilian populace who had been fellow victims of its leaders policy
Italy wanted to seethe Allies keep the promises made during the London Conference in 1915
Italy sought what was promised to her in 1915
econcile whathe considered a just punishment for the war crimes committed by the CentralPowers with maintaining economic harmony in Europe.
Lloyd George wanted to punish Germany without crippling it completely. British saw Germany as a key part of post war European economics, destroying her would simply weaken Europe's economy
For the British, who suspectedthe French of harbouring ambitions to annex the Rhineland, the reinforce-ment of French power in Europe was at least as alarming as the matter ofGerman power.
British were motivated by the traditional concerns of the European balance of power and preventing any European nation from dominating the continent
rance must makeconcessions, not to Germany but to her Allies.’
France realized that she needed to pacify her allies to retain the strength of the coalition for her future security
For France, both security and justice were at stake: ten Frenchdépartements had suffered from direct experience of battle or occupation,and the entire nation had lost a quarter of its male population between theages of 18 and 27.
France the direct recipient of German devastation and fearing the potential costs of a second German invasion in the future sought security at all costs and justice for its pains
Peace Treaty and its 440 articles were drawn up in great haste.
Haste of the peace treaty prevented a truly in depth analysis of the terms themselves by the delegations
The procedures of the conference remained nonetheless somewhat chaotic.No one had considered exactly how the negotiations would progress, nor atwhat speed
The unprecedented scale of the peace conference led to much chaos and misunderstandings amongst the victorious powers
he Paris Peace Conference was a carefully structured hierarchical edifice inwhich the representatives of the Great Powers controlled the game.
Great Powers controlled the Peace Conference
To my mind it is out of keeping with the new era which we profess an ardentdesire to promote’,
The German treaty was in many ways a clash of the Wilsonian Moment and traditional European diplomacy
he year 1919 to some extent symbolises all the hopes of the post-war era: anew diplomacy based on world peace and collective security; major transna-tional organisations like the ILO (International Labour Organisation) estab-lished in Geneva early in 1919; recognition of the right to self-determination.
1919 represented the hopes of the Wilsonian moment
Seen as the dawn of a new era, the peace treaties embodied collectivehopes for a profound change in international relations.
Peace treaties held the collective hopes of the globe toward a profound change in international relations
a ‘Wilsonian moment’, a shortperiod in which significant collective expectations coalesced.
1919 was also the Wilsonian moment: for the dawn of a new era
transition from war to peace’, it is almost as if the year 1919 represents only thebeginning of a larger phenomenon: a slow and chaotic demobilisation
1919 represents only the beginning of demobilisation
All these conflicts, each deadlyto some degree, prolonged and magnified the effects of the First World War, tothe extent that national histories sometimes associate the Great War with laterconfrontations as part of the same chronological sequence
New conflicts were intimately associated with the consequences and devastation of WW1
1919 meant that outbreaksof violence were still occurring between armed factions and against civilians:
1919 did not see the end of violence, far from it
. This term refers to a transition period ofseveral years, characterised by the return home of soldiers and prisoners ofwar, the pacification of the belligerent nations and the far slower demobilisa-tion of minds and attitudes, or what is also called ‘cultural demobilisation’
Slower process of war ends through soldier return, pacification, and cultural demobilisation
Nevertheless, the contention here is not that a given environment leadsautomatically to a certain form of rebellion or revolution.
Certain environments may lead to rebellion or revolution but it is not guaranteed
legacy of peasant rebellion was an important ingredient in theCdmmunists' rural success,
Rural rebellion as a precursor for Communist rural success
structuralweaknesses that facilitated endemic insurrection in premoderntimes are said to have enabled revolutionary breakthrough aswell.
Structural weaknesses which led to insurrections also enabled rveolutionary breakthroughs
Tied into a complex social, economic, and political network, peasants may rebel not only against immediatethreats to livelihood, but against perceived injustices in thewider system.
As members of political society, peasants may also revolt due to perceived injustices in the system (which likely led to the deprivation which caused heightened violence)
raise questions about this interpretation, askingwhether secret-society influence may not have been less sig- _nificant than the fact that the two movements represented contrary solutions to fundamental dilemmas of peasant survival
Secret society influence (external influence) as secondary to competing visions of peasant survival in times of intense deprivation
The Nien are shown tohave emerged from the-predator-y-behavior—smuggling, ban-ditry, feuds—endemic to this unruly border region. By contrast,The Red Spears illustrate the protective reaction against just suchactivities.
Nien as predatory while Red Spears are Protective
catalyst for rebellion, turning endemic forms of collective actioninto vehicles for antistate revolt.
Government intervention against these strategies for survival often caused rebellion as the peasants fought to protect their methods of survival
when violence reached anunacceptable level it would elicit state repression
Government would respond when heightened deprivation caused a heightened level of violence
Natural catastrophe was a major stimulus to increased predationand protective response. Invasion by outside forces—whetherrebels, warlords, or foreign armies—-also gave rise to heightened local competition.
Disruptions such as invasion, natural catastrophes, and other events which caused deprivation often led to a heightened level of violent competition
Higher-order collectivities definedthe membership, and often the ideological justification, of groupsurvival strategies
High order collectives defined the membership of certain strategies
it admits the importance of kinship, patron-client ties, and other communal allegiances in determining the degree and manner in which thestruggle was conducted
Certain social factors helped define strategy rather than simply the amount of resources one had
peasant society, where land constitutes the most prized resource, we would expect predatory behavior to be more common among the landless and protective measures to be moretypical of landowners.
Two strategies also helped define class though this was not universal
Theprotective response, by contrast, was generally led by those whohad both something to lose and the wherewithal to defend it.
Predatory was used by those who were more limited while protective was used by those with more resources
rational means that villagers used to maximize gain and minimizerisk in a situation where alternative opportunities were extremely limited
Both strategies used to maximize gain and minimize risk via violence
The first method of survival, termed the predatory strategy, entailed illegally expanding the resources of some membeiTof thecommunity at the expense of others
Predatory strategy: expanding resources via violent denial to others
Repeated ravages of flood and drought created adifficult and insecure milieu in which aggressive survivalstrategies flourished.
Huai-Pei and its harshness helped foster a violent survival method
Environments where resources are in short and unpredictable supply may breed conflict as a way of life.
Violence as a method of ensuring survival when resources are scarce
violence against fellow competitors is often a rationalstrategy.*
Violence as rational strategy
In certain environments, the most adaptive strategy for survival may well be collective violence
For certain environments collective violence is critical for survival
When we recall, however, that rebelliontends to be concentrated in certain geographical areas, the importance of the natural setting is immediately apparent.
Importance of geographical areas in formenting rebellion
an alternative interpretation of traditional peasant insurrection as a sustained, structured, and sgn-sible form of collective action. .The analysis focuses upon thertiral inhabitants themselves, emphasizing the adaptive value*ofpeasant violence for coping with the local environment they inhabit.
Traditional peasant insurrection as sustained collective action for coping with local environments
aipings had rejected the values and institutions of traditionalsociety made it harder for them to spread their control into the ruralhinterland beyond the walls of their captured cities
Taiping rejection of traditional society made them unable to spread their control beyond the cities into more conservative rural areas
Purism andesoteric ideology were hardly advantages in forging alliances with groupswhose outlooks, however anti-Manchu, were based on traditional assump-tions and traditional modes of organization
Taiping's revolutionary outlook was not conducive toward creating alliances with groups which were still wedded to traditional ideals
messianism and doctrinal ex-clusiveness had concrete disadvantages in the traditional Chinese setting
The Taipings refusal to compromise and the hardness of their fundamentalism left them unable to draw in external support
Indeed the traditionalism of their social base was paralleled by theindeterminacy of their political orientation.
Niens were far better placed to take advantage of local support
argely to their intimate ties to the institutions of local society
An intimate ties which the Taiping failed to replicate due to their revolutionary ideals
Even at this stage, the Niens are probably best understood as anoutgrowth of a Mafia-like local underworld which, in the process of re-organization and expansion, found it expedient to flourish a miscellaneousarray of symbolic paraphernalia from the well-stocked storehouse oftraditional heterodoxy.
Nien as a mafia organization with symbolic propaganda
his militarization servedonly to broaden the Nien community base as Nien leaders took charge oflocal defence in scores of villages.
Militarization became a basis for power
nien bands were ableto fit themselves into the prevailing social ecology by taking the lead invillage defence against neighbouring settlements.
Nien were able to seize power in social positions through local defense
Hung Hsiu-ch'iian's political incapacity meant that a singlecentralized authority could emerge only through rivalry among his imme-diate followers.
Hung isolation meant that there was no central figure to rein in the rivalries of his followers
diverted significant Taiping forces from the defence ofthe Heavenly Capital itself, now under siege by Tseng Kuo-ch'iian, andthereby hastened the final downfall of the movement
The Taiping were unable to stretch its forces enough to meet two concentric offensives
vailability of modern arms to theforces of orthodoxy meant that, for the ensuing fifty years, domesticorder could be maintained widi considerable success, notwithstandingChina's inability, during the same period, to build an armed counterweightto foreign aggression
Modern arms proved crucial to the maintenance of the conservative order
From Westerners he bought large quantities ofrifled small-arms and foreign-style field artillery and hired British andFrench officers to train his troops in their use.
Li saw the widespread adoption of Western military reforms
was unmatched as amilitary base
Its control of trade, local gentry access, and ties to commerce were exceptional for provincial bases
his frag-mentation of command was but one aspect of the Taipings' failure to re-establish centralized leadership after the death of Yang Hsiu-ch'ing.
Lack of established leadership led to fragmented offensives against the strength and unity of the provincial armies
fear that the Europeanswould 'gradually encroach upon the authority [over Ch'ing armies]'.
Fears which signaled the growing Chinese hostility to Western forces
hat Shanghai remained safe from the Taipings must be credited toactive European intervention through late May 186
Active European intervention was crucial in the defense of the city
But the provision ofmodern arms was ultimately of greatest historical significance; for, alongwith the munitions manufacturing enterprises that accompanied it, thistechnical advance served as the spark for the modernization of China'sarmies and military industry. 2
Provision of modern arms helped lead to the spark of modernization
no evidence that the Britishfeared the Taipings as a potentially stronger and more anti-foreign govern-ment. On the contrary, it was their supposed weakness and indisciplinethat drove the British to oppose them and support the Ch'ing.
Taipings weakness led to British support for the Qing
he British, meantime, were beginning to see their future interests interms of a revitalized and secure Ch'ing regime
British saw their future interests in a secure Qing regime which would be in debt to the Western powers and which could safely guard the status quo
growing aversion ofthe Western community to the 'blasphemous' Taiping Christianity, aswell as the blunt fact that the Taipings were against the opium traffic,must have affected the British attitude.
Religious aversion and Taiping hostility to profitable trade, led to growing Western aversion to the rebellion
n increasingly hostile view of the Taipings, stressing the 'destruc-tive nature of the insurrection and. . . the blasphemous and immoralcharacter of the superstition on which it is based'
Western powers had an incentive to protect their current interests through the status quo
the rebelswere seen primarily as a threat to foreign trade
A weak Qing empire was far more conducive to Western influence and interests
eeply suspiciousof foreign involvement, Tseng was convinced that the way to make use ofthe West was not to engage foreign troops but to establish Chinese arsenalsto make Western-style munitions.
Tseng thus took these motivations into the post Taiping Qing era
For the Ch'ing government, this linkage of personal military power andregular provincial authority was a portentous move.
Personal military power was now imperially linked to provincial control
here followed a momentous reorientation of imperial policy:there was now no choice but to entrust Tseng Kuo-fan with the leader-ship of the entire campaign.
Qing leadership was sidelined in favor of Tseng
for the Powers were in no frame ofmind to cooperate with the rebels and were more impressed with therevival of imperial power in the lower Yangtze province
Powers saw the Taiping as a threat and thus there attempts to gain Shanghai fell to failure
ssued in 1859, outlined a policy of strengthening central control, modern-izing China's economy and communications by the adoption of Westerntechniques, and cultivating friendship with the Western powers.
Hung sought to strengthen central control, modernize the economy and cultivate relations with the Qing primary backers
An equally grievous loss was that of centralized authority.
Yang's left a power vaccum of which one of the less powerful kings could fill
this arena of carnage, greed and paranoia perished whateverremnants of its original vision the Taiping movement might have re-tained.
The Taiping rivalries essentially destroyed the Taipings utopian vision
Shih hadoverwhelming support among the Taiping armies, Hung rallied hisforces in mid-November and killed Wei along with some 200 of hisfollowers.
Internal rivalries soon cascaded into a deck of cards which saw multiple mass purges
The catastrophe that struck the Taipings in 1856 sprang neither from thedeficiencies of their local administration nor from the strength of theiropponents, but from the instability of their own central leadership.
Taiping fell apart due to internal bickering
hardly a situation conducive either to firm local control or to genuinereshaping of local society
Taiping were unable to reconcile maintaining their war state and reshaping the social order
the Taipings found it difficult to impose theirartificial numerical subdivisions upon the indigenous units of localorganization and often found themselves simply applying new terminologyto existing institutions
Taiping's found it difficult to create their own indigenous units of organization
Taiping systemshared a weakness with that of the Ch'ing, namely that the regular localbureaucracy was thinly spread
Taiping bureaucratic system was too thinly spread
propagated a radically Utopian social programme,they had now to accommodate theory to reality
The need to create a wholly new establishment and to shift this establishment toward the realities of the nation was a extremely difficult prospect
Thus the needs of local militarization set in train serious and lastingchanges in the structure of Chinese financial administration, involving apartial shift from agricultural to mercantile taxation, and a dispersal ofsome of Peking's fiscal authority into the hands of provincial leaders.
Local militarization and provincialization
Once Tseng became ahigh provincial official himself, he furthered the trend towards provincialcontrol of regular categories of revenue.
Tseng helped start the trend towards provincialization