classical la nguag of Gr k ontology -ousia, hypostnsis, e tc. - and r d fin d it in p r anal and relational term . The ba ic natur of r ality wa no Jon g r ub tance, but r lation hip. au wa , fundamentally, n w
Eeeehhhhhh.... I mean, Sarah Coakley might disagree with that, I think. Idk haha. It's not quite this social trinitarianistic.
Barth's objection was that this was a second moment in God's life: God, who a lread y existed, deter-mined himself to be the One who saves his covenant people.1
Yes and no. Ironically.
The LoRD said
What does this say in the hebrew?
philosophy, as the free questioning of purely self-reliant Dasein, does of its essence have the task of directing all other non theological, positive sciences with respect to their ontological fo undation.
When it says directing all other nontheological, positive sciences, I don't think he means in the sense of coming to a more true understanding of reality or pure essence. It seems that dasein or essence here for him means purely the assumed reality of a certain historical people, a certain generation. This is obviously deeply informed and inseparable from the conversation of western philosophy. However, it's goal is to find out something of a social reality. It intends to find the assumptions of a people, the assumed categories of being as divorced from the content of their sciences, or the content of their specific 'beings.' It attempts to find the metaphysical assumptions of people and the concepts they use in their daily life, the assumptions they have about beings and categories. In this way, the categories are themselves in question, and metaphysics and philosophy sets about questioning the validity and contingency of those categories themselves. In this way, it is the driving force here, but it does not avoid a relationship with society and the content they fill these categories with. In fact, it is pure speculation on behalf of the philosophers to divorce the content from the categories. it's useful in that it judges the ultimate 'first cause' in the aristotelian sense of these categories, but it is nonetheless a speculation concerning the foundation of all society.
It is tied most closely to the question about the original ground of the unity of the three disciplines of theology.
More evidence of the above point
philosophy, history, and psychology
Is he just saying that it's just not reductive to these three things? But that it is the gestalt of all of them applied to the Christian religion?
man and of man to God.
This sentence and the sentence above it is one of the most profound pieces I've seen about theology. I think it's lurking unspoken in the writing of Jenson and perhaps Barth. It means that the object of theology is not just the entity of God, nor is it merely the human experience of God and faith. It's about explaining the content of the relation of humans to God, and God to humans. And, once this is thought about, one comes to realize that theology could not be anything else. It could not be about God as God, because theology uses language and human reason, which necessarily implies some set of assumptions about the relationship between God and humans. It implies that God is something that can be spoken of by humans, that he can be accurately discussed. The very fact that we speak about him at all means that God is the sort of thing that Humans can in some way understand. This is the case even if one tries to speak apophatically, because then one delimits the being of God by defining what he isn't, and that necessarily implies something positive about his reality. So, theology is necessarily about explaining how exactly God relates to human beings, and this is the most basic and visceral object of theology. It is what comes before any talk about God as God, and it is what comes before any talk about humans as humans.
Thus, the issue for Christians will quickly become, what is the nature of the relationship between God and humans? Is it the Triune God as Jenson would be inclined to say, or is Christ, as Barth would want to say?
Also, this is x/ne because I didn't see that he was saying that this is NOT the object of Theology.
But God is in no way the object of investigation in theology, as, for example, animals are the theme of zoology. Theology is not speculative knowledge of God.
Highlights the difference shown above
heology is a historical science,
I want to emphasize that historical need not mean or imply pastness. It merely implies a material, historical entity, an event that may be in the past, but just as easily may lie in the present or future. The point is that it's determinable, able to be discussed and spoken of. In this way, I don't see, yet, how this is at all incompatible with Barth's view of the subject.
there are only a few who have succeeded, by their own cultivation of their spirit, in extricating themselves from minority and yet walking confidently.
You can succeed in it.
This means implicitly that the latter belongs to a theology but not a mythology. One could say the opposite of Greek or Indian divinities: in general, they possess a rich mythology but no theology worthy of the name. Now if one considers that the Indian divinities have a mythology, there is no reason to refuse one for the Christian divinity.
Semantics?
Thus we have seen that there may be literary as well as theological arguments for regarding the latter part of ch. 16 as secondary. 4
I need this reference.
This is a critical locus classicus of the debate; from this Marx extrapolatedseveral of the theses which have come to form the contested territory of thetheory of ideology. First, he established as a source of &dquo;ideas&dquo; a particular point ormoment of the economic circuit of capital. Second, he demonstrates how thetranslation from the economic to ideological categories can be effected; from the&dquo;market exchange of equivalents&dquo; to the bourgeois notions of &dquo;Freedom&dquo; and&dquo;Equality&dquo;; from the fact that each must possess the means of exchange to thelegal categories of property rights. Third, he defines in a more precise mannerwhat he means by &dquo;distortion.&dquo; For this &dquo;taking off’ from the exchange point ofthe recircuit of capital is an ideological process. It &dquo;obscures, hides, conceals&dquo;-the terms are all in the text-another set of relations: the relations, which do notappear on the surface but are concealed in the &dquo;hidden abode&dquo; of production (whereproperty, ownership, the exploitation of waged labour and the expropriation ofsurplus value all take place). The ideological categories &dquo;hide&dquo; this underlyingreality, and substitute for all that the &dquo;truth&dquo; of market relations. In many ways,then, the passage contains all the so-called cardinal sins of the classical marxisttheory of ideology rolled into one: economic reductionism, a too simplecorrespondence between the economic and the political ideological; the true v.false, real v. distortion, &dquo;true&dquo; consciousness v. false consciousness distinctions.
This is a clear description of Marx's understanding of how ideologies come from economic backgrounds. Hall, however, will go on to continue this.
Now this relation between Marx and the classical political economistsrepresents a far more complex way of posing the relation between &dquo;truth&dquo; and&dquo;falsehood&dquo; inside a so-called scientific mode of thought, than many of Marx’scritics have assumed. Indeed, critical theorists, in their search for greatertheoretical vigour, an absolute divide between &dquo;science&dquo; and &dquo;ideology&dquo; and aclean epistemological break between &dquo;bourgeois&dquo; and &dquo;non-bourgeois&dquo; ideas, havedone much themselves to simplify the relations which Marx, not so muchargued, as established in practice (i.e., in terms of how he actually used classicalpolitical economy as both a support and adversary). We can rename the specific&dquo;distortions,&dquo; of which Marx accused political economy, to remind us later oftheir general applicability. Marx called them the eternalization of relations whichare in fact historically specific; and the naturalization effect-treating what are theproducts of a specific historical development as if universally valid, and arisingnot through historical processes but, as it were, from Nature itself.
Hall identifies that ideology in Marx is more complex than one would initially think