29 Matching Annotations
  1. Jan 2022
  2. www-oxfordhandbooks-com.proxy.aup.fr www-oxfordhandbooks-com.proxy.aup.fr
    1. on substantive ground

      i.e. based on concrete arguments for this or that concrete ethical claim, not based on the abstract meta-reasoning about what can be said or not, or what means what, of meta-ethics.

    2. by fiat

      fiat = Latin for: it shall be (so), like in the Latin Bible when God says Fiat lux = Let there be light … In other words, those meta-ethical theories would declare some substantive normative claims as false or not a legitimate part of ethical reasoning, as if they could just make them vanish like God makes things come into being.

    3. appeals to ordinary language and conceptual analysis were the main focus of philosophy

      i.e. the so-called analytic philosophy that dominated Anglophone philosophy and is still very strong there saw the job of a philosopher as figuring out what people really mean when they say things and to pick apart issues into their conceptual components.

    4. ecumenical

      inclusive (metaphor from Christian attempts to find common ground between different religions and types of Christianity)

    5. value

      Note that goodness is ambiguous here. McShane identifies it with value, which is, indeed the primary sense. However, goodness applied to a person can also mean virtue (the Greek term aretê has the literal meaning "bestness"). The difference is that goodness in the sense of value pertains to everything that you want to have or want to exist because it's so good. Goodness in the sense of virtue is a good or value in a more narrow sense: it's the good instantiated by a person, something that yourself might wish to have or would like others to have as well.

    6. parochially

      The opposite of universal or global; from a perspective that is too narrow and uninformed (and somewhat old-fashioned).

    7. intrinsic value

      Just as a reminder, since it's a new term: value independent from anything outside themselves. They are not just means to be employed for human purposes (that would be instrumental value); they are ends in themselves.

    8. The introduction of minimalist theories of truth, according to which a discourse is truth-apt if it presents assertions as true (i.e., as corresponding to the facts), if the assertions have truth-functional negations, and if their truth is independent of their justification, has made trouble for the project of distinguishing realism from antirealism/irrealism (Wright, 1992: 34). If one assumes a minimalist theory of truth, at least some versions of noncognitivism seem to satisfy the conditions for realism (Wright, 1988). This has led many metaethicists to consider realism versus antirealism/irrealism a less helpful way of classifying views than was once thought (Drier, 2004).8 While this description provides a rudimentary classification, it is worth noting that within contemporary metaethics, one also finds hybrid views, more fine-grained versions of the distinctions mentioned here, further subcategories, and cross-cutting classifications. Furthermore, the field has grown to consider a much broader range of issues than just the explanation of the nature of moral claims. These include questions of moral motivation, moral psychology, the nature and function of practical reason, the generality of truths in the moral domain, and moral epistemology. Some prominent views within metaethics (internalism and externalism, rationalism and sentimentalism, particularism and generalism, intuitionism, projectivism) are positions that theorists have taken about these other matters and so are not included in this classification.

      To my PL2041 students: Don't bother about this part of section 1 unless you are super interested. You can skip it.

      Maybe quickly about "minimalist theories of truth": in a nutshell they say that some statement can be true (a) if it is EITHER false OR true and (b) if it IS either false or true irrespective of the reasons you can give for its being true or false.

    9. prescriptions

      i.e. a command, or an expectation that something should be one, which is something that can only be fulfilled but not true or false.

    10. cognitive

      Cognition is a term for information processing by sentient beings or things using some kind of language or symbol system. Cognition can be perception and thought, for example.

    11. substantive

      i.e. ethical norms that have some concrete content (e.g. that ecosystems have intrinsic value) instead of being about other ethical norms

  3. Jan 2021
    1. suspicion of truth-tellers as dishonest

      Reading this in Jan 2021, one wonders whether this is still at the heart of the matter. There are those that see, the evidence isn't so very hard to find, that inidividual supposed to be truth-tellers, like the President, lie in your face shamelessly. On the other hand, there are those that have no suspicion at all of this, and other no less evidently frabricating 'truth tellers'.

      In short, there is no suspicion. It's either out in the open and there is no reasonable doubt that the truth is not being told; or there is no doubt or suspicion whatsoever because people are ready to believe anything.

    2. opinion

      Funny thing is, in Germany the critique in recent years has been rather the other way round, that politicians have themselves guided by polling data instead of acting according to their own well-informed judgment.

    3. class thinkers, but that “popular” conceptions of reality have become confusing or suspicious because of the saturation of reality representation with games of expertly researched and thus exclusive strategic deception—of pan-partisan nature.

      I'm not 100% sure I got this. As I understand, there is not the divide between elite/ruling class determining content and deluded masses consuming popular culture (really, a very bourgeois idea, even if Marxists entertain it).

      Instead, there are experts illusionists not positioned in one class or on one political side only. I'm not sure whether this really is so. It would imply that political parties, candidates, agents, interest groups all use the same means, have access to them and no scruples to use them.

      If this is the intended meaning, I'd doubt this. It is definitely not so in Germany, where I had a little bit of an opportunity to see politics and canvassing from inside.

    4. practices

      To summarize:

      public perception of dishonesty --> distrust and attempts to find a new epistemic footing (fact-checking market; surveys of distrust)

      industry and public practice of dishonesty and artifice --> (a) really post-truth, i.e. if there's only dishonesty, let's be at least the most emotionally appealing and entertaining, or the one who tells the story people want to hear most; (b) trust: fabrications and lies are believed

    5. constant discursive obsession with and accusation of dishonesty

      Doesn't the lying come first, i.e. a measurable increase in lying by public actors whose supposed rule it is to inform accurately? Or was there no such increase and just an anxiety?

      It also seems to be only the one side of the coin: concern and distrust; on the other hand is exaggerated trust in the fabricated artifices. Lies are only dangerous if there's anyone who believes them.

      In a way PT is thus just one symptom (maybe more symptom than cause) of polarization: the others are untrustworthy anyway, our own are trustworthy all the time. In other words, in spite of all the technology it is, at least in the public discourse and a personal level, a loss (or absence) of empirical standards of any kind.

  4. Aug 2020
  5. Jun 2020
    1. Manichaean

      A way of thinking in which the world is determined by two fundamentally opposing equal powers, one good and one bad. Named after a Late Antique philosophy-religion founded by Persian thinker and religious leader Mani (3rd cent.).