self-contradictory, but okay..

not necessarily always true. Later in the essay he proposes making a group where the culture is such that this is not so.

2 a quality of solitude.

1

No, there is no evidence from the given search results that someone has written a comprehensive, systematic history of human thought in the sense of tracing the processes and contexts in which different modes of thinking first arose, and generalizing abstract principles of universal relevance. The search results focus primarily on Isaac Asimov's fictional concept of "psychohistory" and the Foundation series, rather than discussing any real-world attempts at such a systematic history of thought.

The key points from the search results are:

[2] Psychohistory is a fictional science in Asimov's Foundation universe that combines history, sociology, and statistics to predict the behavior of large groups of people. It relies on mathematical modeling and statistical laws of mass action, akin to the kinetic theory of gases.

[3] The Foundation series explores trends in societal evolution and adaptation, following Thucydides' model of analyzing historical patterns, rather than focusing on specific cultural qualities at one point in time.

[5] This article suggests Asimov pioneered aspects of "prompt engineering" through his thought-provoking premises in science fiction, but does not mention any real systematic history of human thought processes.

While Asimov's psychohistory and the Foundation series examine large-scale historical patterns and societal trends in a fictional context, the search results do not indicate that anyone has undertaken the ambitious task of writing a comprehensive, systematic history tracing the origins, contexts, and universal principles underlying the development of human thought processes and modes of thinking throughout history.[2][3]

Citations: [1] https://blog.x.company/thinking-science-fictionally-learning-from-asimovs-robot-vision-at-100-8fa482afe776?gi=30ce089e8ea4 [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychohistory_%28fictional_science%29 [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foundation_series [4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wgSZA3NPpBs [5] https://hackernoon.com/asimov-unknowingly-pioneered-modern-prompt-engineering

as we discussed, some major sociopolitical clusters in this discussion are: AI scientists and ethicists (larger proportion are women) vs. Tech BRos (incl. TESCREAL ideology, motives to hype up systemic risk of LLMs a) as a distraction from their actual harms now to delay relevant regulation, b) hype up their importance so they get more venture capital, which relates back to their ideological motives) vs. policy specialists in regulation - I can find a reference again later linked to a podcast episode I listened to before about AI regulation agenda by an expert in the Obama and Biden admins - regulators are aware of the real public issues involved and at least the top specialists are not distracted by the systemic risks hype as a distraction and delaying strategy).

is this at the level of perception or thinking? or belief? reflective or intuitive belief?

There are so many qualitative differences between satirist and populist emotional framing. I suggest read a bit more about how metaphor cognition works and embodied cognition (it's a huge controversial topic across many academic fields and there's no settled consensus yet, but some possibilities have been ruled out.)

on moral orientations vs. salience https://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/persuading-people-on-immigration-is-hard-but-heres-what-can-be-done/?source=post_page-----18a7a13db901--------------------------------

My first impression about this is that there are so many unmentioned likely confounding variables in the background. I know that's always more or less inevitable, but in the final version I'd need more convincing that this is a reasonable simplification and the omitted potential confounding variables aren't too worrying.

There's a lof ot complexity packed in here. Currently most of the hype and buzz is about one sort of AI, LLM models, but that's really only one of many kinds of learning algorithms, and underlying learning algorithms there are many different kinds of data strutures or ontologies for machine learning or machine assisted learning. There's also manipulative and misleading discussion about this from big commercial AI companies, both because of their political ideologies and their profit motives. This is a really interesting topic but I think this is currently the biggest risk for your Theoretical Framework to really make sense. .

Another important difference is that most satirists don't target or scapegoat politically marginalised out-groups. On 'scapegoating' https://girardianlectionary.net/learn/girard-on-scapegoat/ (it's not exactly true as Girard claims that the sublimation of sacrifice to having an internalised meaning is unique to Christianity, e.g. the Upanishads did analogous recontextualisation and internalisation of Vedic sacrifices.)

How do you know this?

Its true that anyone can express themselves on social media, but equity in communication is really lacking just as much as in the old radio, tv, newspapers ('legacy') sort of media. In actual fact the network structures of legacy and social media are not as different as the marketing spin from commercial social media companies: they're both few-to-many. I heard this point from Marc Smith in a webinar last month https://twitter.com/AEJMC_PRD/status/1750940426385957104

This is assuming the modern post-2008 contextual usage meaning, but historically the first usage was in 1892 USA the 'American People's Party', and in that case they weren't really making a manicheanesque sort of division between in-group and scapegoated outgroups, they were genuinely criticising actual facts about elite corruption, nepotism, unjust exploitation of workers, etc. and they had practical demands (the 'Ocala Demands', after a conference at Ocala) which would have made a real positive difference to the working poor. I suggest this is really different from the sort of populist movements and leaders we're talking about post-2008 or post-2016.

Linkage from media ecological changes or new affordances and populism spreading globally. I find this very plausible but I recommend clarifying exactly how you think it works and comparing theoretical perspectives on how media technological transitions influence political discourse and community formation. I can share some references on this.

the contemporary far-right conspiracist imaginary

I would like to explore more how this sort of imagination works.

I think I read it in something David Hirsh wrote (we disagree on other things) that he suggested why Antisemitism keeps on recurring on the left is partly because of faulty imaginary ontologies. That's a hard concept to communicate beyond academia, but I wish we had a way to communicate it easily because I think it's really important and practical actually. The kind of implicit unconscious assumption of ontological divisions, binaries and hierarchies I think is something which culturally evolved in the societal context of capitalist selection for cultural ideas etc. which legitimise or stabilise their positions and their ability to continue exploiting and dominating. Disproportionate wage differentials within capitalist societies and extracting natural resources and exploiting labour in 'former' colonies necessarily require some people and some countries to be impoverished, and that requires culturally explaining away and solidifying as tho it's natural. I suspect that's where the binary and hierarchical form of imaginary ontology comes from, and even before the particular Western form of capitalism, more generally it's a sort of intra-specific parasitic strategy, like slave-making ants evolved sympatrically within and then beyond eusocial ant colonies.

It's not obvious to me that 'left' is a helpful construct. Afaiu it originates from the French National Assembly building's architecture, but we might possibly better have chosen the Athenian Pnyx as the environmental basis for an imaginary ontology of political space, which wouldn't support replicating 'left-right' reductionism or campism. .

Another dimension of the sort of imaginary ontologies which lead to Antisemitism is the time dimension. A preoccupation with protology more than a good eschatology. The latter is a relation of understanding with a possible and desirable future (or a range of possibilities) that we must remember in order to strategically work backwards from to the present. This is also further discussed in Zizioulas https://politicaltheology.com/in-memoriam-metropolitan-john-d-zizioulas-and-the-journey-of-theology-toward-the-future/#_ftnref2 An obsession with protology perhaps goes along with distancing causality and culpability for the state of the present, and as Jews were before Christian or Muslim civilisations, it's perhaps easier to distance the blame for the faults of our societies in the present onto almost prehistoric scapegoats than to accept our collective guilt and responsibility to the future.

I'm not fully convinced by this part, because of what's omitted more than what's there.

Actual prevailing main forms of Islamism are not the only possibilities for Muslims to engage politically and draw on their religious tradition for moral reasoning or even to reference where their ideas come from in public. I think we should recognise that Muslims have just as much right to do so as Jews and Christians, but also how we do so should be judged fairly by reasonably universal human standards, not as tho claiming a religious source of ideas exempts us from being reasonable and fair to each other.

It also omits how much Jewish and Christian Humanist philosophies eventually got incorporated into what we now practice as 'secular' constitutional law and legal philosophy, as I explained and referenced more in the twitter thread.

There certainly were and still are many reactionary forms of Christian groupings engaging in politics and using 'religion' as a stick to bash other people over the head with. I think around the time when modern Western style democratic states first emerged or were struggling to emerge from civil society, the reactionary misuses of religion were more prevalent than the humanistic interpretations and usages. Why that changed I guess is more related to the environment changing than because of anything essential to religious cultures vs other sorts of cultures. E.g. you can see that even atheism can become reactionary and chauvinist, and quasi-religiously bigoted against all versions of religion of all other communities, as if having the same label means they're all the same thing.

The whole systematic versions which eventually got incorporated into secular constitutional legal philosophy in democratic states were largely translated into naturalistic language, and I suggest they did so in order to make it reasonably universally accessible and to convince people freely and fairly rather than imposing it violating personal primacy of conscience. I.e. the means of convincing people is integrally linked to the end of salvation.

I also experience that there's a prejudice common among people who are not religiously literate (they only have a superficial acquintance with the terms and symbols) and especially if they've experienced traumas which were relate do instrumentalisation of religious symbols to legitimise abuse, such that if I mention anything explicitly linked to a religious tradition, instantly hairs go up on their back and they're poised for fight or flight. It's understandable and I sympathise with the traumatisation linked with religious abuse, but it's really unfair to generalise that much.

Interestingly there seems to be quite a big exception culturally for religious allusions in poetry - most cases don't get labelled 'religious' and cut off from the general public sphere and assigned to only a private particular group interest. This I guess depends on poets not abusing this privilege of humanistic interpretation of religious allusions in poetry.

The privatisation of religious references in public politics especially more so by 'leftists' tends to leave this area of human life undefended and allows the reactionary far-right to almost monopolise the usage and abuse of religion, which reinforces the prejudice that it has to be so.

Another thing I notice is not here is any comment on the fact that the globalisation of the information space means formerly 'national' information spaces' boundary conditions are liquifying, the paradigm of nation-states constituting internationalism predicts and explains and enables us to respond rationally and strategically to the world less and less now, but we still don't have tools or environments in which most people can see the digital territory they're in, orientate themselves relative to others sociopolitically - realistically and directly, not relying on others' secondary representations about the social structuring of relations in the digital multimedia environment, and it's impossible for most people to even imagine the space realistically let alone navigate. It's like global civil society is in the global hybrid war* without a map, so we have no hope of seeing bigger or whole patterns or planning over longer timescales, and as there's on structural supports for collective memory, all the big commercial social media basically train us to forget over about a two week cycle, so we're debilitated from imagining possible and desirable futures with more historical depth and breadth of comparisons.

I'm also concerned people who don't read so carefully might confuse multipolarity as a fact with multipolarism as an ideology which is currently constructed by and serves the Kremlin mainly. It doesn't have to be so - multipolarism could mean multiple completely different things, but currently it's mainly associated with Dugin.

*Global hybrid war - imo this is actually quite a bimodally distributed global network of two main clusterings of clusters, the fossil capital and authoritarian regimes network vs. the relatively but imperfectly (and worsening) democratic states and more fundamentally democratic civil society networks. I believe democratic values and social practices emerge naturally first in the sort of beyond-the-family scale of social relationships which we now call civil society or communities of mutual aid, or maybe majlis. I think civil society is primary for democracy and state institutions which conform to democratic values are secondary, and they emerge consistently in accord with democratic values to the extent that they're constrained to be so by civil society being more powerful in network terms than the state or market networks. So I believe that expanding and strengthening civil society networks globally is ultimately a more reliable way to progress according to our values towards possible and desirable futures than trying to renew the 'left'. I think one of the most important prerequisites for that is mapping tools so that people can see the digital environments they're in and not be blindsided by exploitative manipulation strategies so much, and more able to see and think about whole systems and socially coordinate strategically. More powerful in network terms is explored some more in https://necsi.edu/complexity-rising-from-human-beings-to-human-civilization-a-complexity-profile I think it means an optimal balance between degree centrality and betweenness centrality across the sub-network and an optimal balance between specialisation of social functions (one meaning of 'hierarchy') and distributedness - if too much distriutedness and collective decision-making is too inefficient to respond adaptively in time and if too much specialisation/ hierarchy and collective decision-making is too inaccurate relative to the social environment and the whole collective will collapse soon.

I agree with this but I think I would add a link to layers of the balance between social relatedness and individual autonomy, like in the SASB 3D interpersonal circumplex model of levels of relationships (SASB is a psychotherapy theory) and how they tend to pattern-match between layers in the person or in social groups, even if people aren't aware of that themselves - again, like my point about imaginary ontologies as a basic vector of enculturation which people are usually unconscious of having internalised as perceptual schemata. Personally I find Zizioulas philosophy of communion and otherness the clearest, but it is in quite hard language for most people I guess and some people would be triggered by the bits of theistic language in it.

and maybe particularly disproportionality of representation or gerrymandering of voting districts.

I've done this with NYT and Guardian - I occasionally read them but don't subscribe or read them starting from their own homepages anymore, just when they appear in my social media feeds.

WHAT?? lol

collective self-efficacy vs. collective learned helplessness but actually a false sense of collective self-efficacy - or is it actually effective, altho in an anti-democratic values direction?

but current social media platforms don't enable ordinary users to see the social graphs behind the representations they do see.

given that they have so much error variation because there are so many variables and it's such a divese and complex system they're trying to measure, it's not entirely convincing that the P<0.05 criterion is appropriate, nor to conclude that a statistically non-significant result means that there is not effect

potential for harm from this experimental manipulation? pre-inoculate or debrief participants about the manipulation?

The differences between traditional and new media environments

androgens are also slightly immunosuppressive, so males showing interest in disgust stimuli could be a way of signalling immunocompetence despite exposure to pathogens.

why, if they also contained humour? E.g. the British Police 'Tea and Consent' video.

why would you expect this sample to validly generalize to all humour or to all audiovisual mediated humour?

implicit variables: gossiper or target of gossip (bully or bullied) transactional management as another source of social conflict stress on the bullied rate of turnover of staff and costs of recruitment.

example of the dataset's non-representativeness of stable emotional essential meanings over time - and that emotional essential meaning can be manipulated using current events as material for narratives.

this one seems the most interesting so far.

network of tweets coded as 'activism discourse' less evenly distributed, more clustered around high degree-centrality nodes.

This is an unusually more distributed and less centralized network structure.

dubious distinction. why should 'collective action' imply identification with a common identity or ideology?

this is unlikely to be true given how recommendation / filtering algorithms work.

ELM theory - the interpretations of others are important for the focal individual's interpretation and action on it.

core results section.

actually these are pretty low means, average about 1-2, likes about 10. not sure it does indicate that on average they were discussed and circulated.

that's a pretty major cut of the dataset. potentially risky for external validity.

21 September 2018.

strength in numbers, but also, and not mentioned, they're not physically present in the same space as their potential abusers or abettors of abuse, so they are physically not at risk, directly at least, when they communicate in a social media environment.

main points: 1) two time periods and two distinct movements, 2014 and 2017, but no clear separation between datasets about each. 2) parasociality is a main theme, with both good and bad. 3) unaccounted for labour and the trauma of advocacy for founders, organizers and participants is an issue with social media communication as it's currently conceived.

limitations: didn't compare other social media platforms, didn't analyse time dimension or comparisons between the 2014 and 2017 movements. not really clear what the sampling time period was and that's critical for interpreting results to answer the question about interplay between different communication environments. also methodologically, saying when the tweets were published doesn't necessarily mean that at the time point when data were collected by scraping the public API that the same range of tweets were available - sometimes people delete their own tweets, and bot-nets usually mass delete their own tweets after about 24hrs to make detection and enforcement against automated manipulation harder.

interaction between interpersonal and social media environments.

very interesting comparison of interpersonal vs. digital social media's social dynamics.

relates to ELM theory - the interpretation of messages or signals depends on how others respond to them, so if abusive behaviours are called out, others will see and will elaborate on their meaning differently and then act differently. also relates to agendamelding, individual and social interpretation of different messages from different media, part of agenda setting theory.

this may depend on 'strength in numbers', and that strength in numbers may only occur when social + mass media combine to make a movement. Also, twitter may really have changed since the time when this study was done, so, even without the lack of 2014 comparisons, their results may not extrapolate to now validly.

that was their experience at that time point when both social and mass media processes combined, but it may not really mean what the authors concluded that social media alone would have produced that effect and experience for the participants. A logical way to test this would have been to compare what those who only experienced the previous movement in 2014 and what they experienced about the balance of positive to negative effects of social media.

movement building or community recruitment through the phenomenon variously referred to as parasociality or the hyperpersonal perspective, etc. is easier on social media.

convenience sampling, but rich qualitative data.

aka. 'the trauma of activism'

content analysis and interviews

Conflation of supposed cause and effect with no evidence for the nexus.

Argument in this paragraph overall seems to be about feasibility, but feasibility is not necessarily logically relevant to a normative judgement.

Unsubstantiated and probably untrue.

literally nonsense. the author has said above that cultural and socioeconomic status differences can be shown through clothes, but this statement is claiming the reverse - that clothes cause inequality.

Implication seems to be that they are different levels of problems - uniform is easier to solve than provision for special learning needs and difficulties with maths, so the implication seems to be that referring to ultimately more important but harder to solve problems is not a valid prioritization against a relatively trivial but easier to solve problem, or a factor which indirectly contributes to problems.

Irrelevant, and a poor quality evidence source to refer to.

Irrelevant.

Unsubstantiated and no argumentation for why this is relevant.

No it is not proof of causal connection! there are so many possible alternative causal factors, especially that there is probably less cultural diversity and socioeconomic diversity in rural areas than in urban areas.

unsubstantiated. common practice is not logical evidence for the claim that it doesn't lead to problems.

this part seems relatively more empirically reasonable and less just literary aesthetic performance.

parasociality?

I suspect this isn't an accurate summary.

compare to Schonbach's Myths

Fornasier has learned about the dynamics of opinion forming within a group. His model shows that it is relatively easy to steer the thinking of individuals who are part of a group in a certain direction. “There is also a good model for this in nature,” according to Fornasier. “To drive a herd of sheep in a desired direction, a good herding dog will always concentrate on the animal that is farthest from the group. They achieve their goal by reining in the most stubborn animal.” When it comes to opinion forming in groups, it is also simply a matter of reining in the most ardent supporters of the views that go against the desired consensus. The rest of the group will then follow. His findings are based on both theoretical results and numerical simulations, which are in turn based on opinion-forming models like those developed by the philosopher Rainer Hegselmann and the mathematician Ulrich Krause. What these say about opinion formation is that every group member adapts their opinion in line with those of the rest of the group in increments of time. Fornasier and his colleagues are able to describe this alignment process using ordinary and partial differential equations. “Since all group members have their own opinion at the beginning, it is important that all agents share their information and points of view,” he says of the principle. The consensus building happens in this process. This can only happen, however, if there is not too much separation. A

Still? or does the writer just think so because they're a boomer and their world hasn't changed since 1978?

research objective