In proposing "humanistic management" as an answer, Dierksmeier identifies moral rationality as the wellspring of better business decisions. Ethically persuasive, this can be supported further with empirical or policy based evidence like the integration of behavioral economics or stakeholder theory on order to show how moral and functional incentives converge. This would transform his proposal from philosophical to a pragmatically testable approach, making it more useful for management educators.

The term "freedom" shifts on menaing throughout the paper-from philosophical autonomy to managerial discretion to moral accountability. This semantic slide is disorienting. At some points, "freedom" refers to freedom from coercion by other individuals, at others, it refers to moral transparent with clear definitions of each occurrence of the term and how they relate. Otherwise, readers will likely conflate ethical responsibility with strategic flexibility.

The writer contends that economics should not be "value free" but should come out explicitly with its normative foundations. But previously in the chapter, he criticizes utilities as being too relativistic and subjective about values. There is a slight inconsistency here, he wants economics to be normatively sensitive and yet not subjectivist. To get out of this contradictions, he might have to be more precise about his ideal normativity that it is humanistic universalism, rather than utilitarian relativism. This clarification would make the general ethical stance more coherent.

Dierksmeier contends neoclassical economics' "physicalistic paradigm" makes economics inhuman by reducing people to predictable machines. While a good criticism, it risks being a straw man fallacy by oversimplifying neoclassical economics. Most modern economist concede bounded rationality and behavioral factor. His critique would be more effective if he was distinguished classical reductionism from more recent schools of behavioral economist rather than grouping all of economist.

The author argues that freedom is required to all responsibility, and corporate responsibility therefore requires managerial discretion. This argument is philosophically sound in moral theory but dubious in applied economics. It rests on the presumption that freedom and constraint are mutually exclusive, ignoring the fact that much of moral action is under constraints. The argument would sound much stronger if Dierksmeier allowed for degrees of freedom or situational limits to moral responsibility rather than an either or solutions.

Dierksmeier argues that the failure to include freedom in economic theory leads to flawed models of corporate responsibility . The structure of his argument follows a logical path, he connects the failure to mention "freedom" in theory and ethical failure in practice with the case of business school education. his conclusion, however, rests on huge assumption that managerial l ethics is directly affected by theoretical assumptions. That casual relationship, while convincible, is asserted but not established with sound empirical evidence. A stronger version would have such evidence included in comparison of ethics outcomes in humanistic schools versus non-humanistic schools.