2,276 Matching Annotations
  1. Mar 2017
    1. customers haveonly begun some action since 2008

      <br> Full Citation: Milenio. (2008a, November 18). Escuadrón jurídico de la capital mexiquense, a cobrar el agua. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This is an example of the types of legal actions that were begun in 2008 to attempt to recuperate long-standing customer debt for water services. In interviews it was revealed that these strategies include sending legal notifications with threats to repossess consumer's property. These types of measures can be thought of as socially controversial, and as of 2008 when interviews were conducted, were only tentatively being implemented.

      Excerpt: A partir de abril, 30 abogados del organismo de Agua y Saneamiento de Toluca notificaron a 7 mil usuarios morosos del servicio de agua potable, con lo que se espera recuperar poco mas de 50 milliones de peso, que se adeudan desde hace mas de cinco anios...Tenemos usuarios que nunca han pagado el agua, pero nada mas les podemos cobrar cinco anios, porque es lo que establece la ley.

      Translation: As of April, 30 attorneys hired by the Agua y Saneamiento Water Utility of Tolcua notified [or contacted] 7,000 non-paying customers for water service, and it is expected that over $50,000 million pesos will be recuperated. This debt is over 5 years old....We have users that have never paid for water, but we can only charge them five years back because that is what the law dictates.

    2. debt forgiveness programs that gen-erate some revenue but are far from cost recovery

      <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (2001b, July 9). Eximen a colonos de multas por agua—Otorgan en Toluca descuentos de hasta el 100 por ciento en multas y recargos a clientes morosos. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This article, dated 2001, reports the conditions of the Toluca water utility approximately one year after the first right of center PAN mayor has taken office and begun exploring whether it is feasible to increase water prices or begin a commercialization strategy. It is interesting to note that the PAN water utility directors begin to asses the financial records of the water utility and find that the number of households that do not pay their water bills (approximately half of clients do not pay). However in order to perform basic maintenance tasks and keep the water utility afloat, functionaries must have some revenue coming in, especially after the lack of subsidies and direct transfers after services were decentralized. In order to have some income, they opt to forgive not the debt owed but the part of consumer debt that comes from interests and fees. They are asking customers to pay their debt balance, or a portion of it, and offering to pardon “late fees.” Although this is a means by which to increase the water utility’s income, it is a minor short-term fix that sidesteps the politically sensitive issue of raising tariffs for poor service.

      Excerpt: Tras dar a conocer que de las casi 120 mil tomas que se tienen registradas en el municpio, 50 mil aun no pagan el uso del vital liquid, el Organismo de Agua Potable de esta ciudad inicio un programa de descuentos de hasta el 100 por ciento en multas y recargos, accion que permitiria al ayuntamiento recaudar recursos por 150 millones de pesos… “nos preocupa que de alguna manera, este dinero, durante anios se ha venido manejando como un rezago que al paso del tiempo se hav uelto una especie de illusion pensar en el hecho de que acudiran a pagar

      Translation: After determining that of almost the 120,000 connections registered with the municipality, 50,000 [homes] don’t pay for water, the water utility of this city began a program of discounts up to 100% of all fines and fees on overdue water bills, policies that will allow the municipality to recuperate up to $150,000 million pesos. …“it is worrisome that in some sense these funds, for years have been managed like a debt that has become an allusion to think that it will some day be paid.

    3. 7.5% of users in Toluca had meters in-stalled, as compared with Naucalpan’s rate of 52%

      <br> Full Citation: AYS (2008b). Metodologa para el ca lculo de tarifas por suministro de agua potable y drenaje diferentes a las establecidas en el co digo financiero del estado de Me xico y municipios. Agua y Saneamiento de Toluca. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: on p 34, numero de tomas is N =135,469, this is the total amount of registered connections. on p. 33, two charts show the following number of connections with meters (uso domestico y uso no domestico con servicio medido): 8309 (domestic) and 1969 (non domestic). 1969+8309=10,278 10,278 is 7.5% of 135,469.

      <br> Full Citation: OAPAS. (2008a). Reporte de tomas por tipo de contratacion. Organismo Público Descentralizado para la Prestación de los Servicios de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y Saneamiento de Naucalpan. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: To calculate the number of metered connections in Naucalpan, I summed the number of metered connections (servicio medido) from each category of user (excluding bajas definitivas), and took the percentage out of total number of connections which is 144,052.

    4. schools, hospitals, and government offices,which are also exempt from water payment

      <br> Full Citation: Milenio. (2008c, November 25). No pagan agua potable mil 100 edificios pú blicos. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: Historically in Mexico public institutions have had particular legal agreements with the federal government guaranteeing them free water access. As the water commercialization initiative began throughout the country, these arrangements have hampered the ability of local public officials to charge for water and also install meters after decentralization. These tensions are particularly intense in state capitals where the number of public institutions are much more numerous than in other cities, thereby creating systematic challenges for capital cities wishing to adopt commercialization policies. Toluca is one such city, and this article reports on this particular problem Toluca faces and some of the strategies the city has adopted to address the problem.

      Excerpt: Morales Hernandez [el director del organism de agua potable] refirio que tienen un estimado de mil 100 edificios publicos que no pagan agua en Toluca, de un total de entre mil 150 o mil 200; cifras que esperan detector con precision una vez que terminen de instalar medidores el proximo mes de enero.

      Translation: Morales Hernandez [the director of the water utility] notes that they have an estimate of 1,100 public institutions that do not pay for water in Toluca, out of 150,000 or 200,00, an estimate that they hope to have an exact figure for after they are finished with the new meter installation project.

    5. managedtheir own water supply due to preexisting legal arrangementswith the state government

      <br> Full Citation: AYS (2008a). Información básica de los servicios de agua potable, alcantarillado y saneamiento en el municipio de Toluca. Agua y Saneamiento de Toluca, p. 1. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source explains the range of service responsibility Toluca's water utility has. The water utility is mandated to service the urban, peri-urban and a limited portion of rural residents, but is not required to serve peri-urban and rural consumers that are served by "local committees" due to these committees having pre-existing legal arrangements with the state government, which was revealed during interviews (especially Interviews # 35, 43 ). The sum of people being served outside of the water utility's mandate (88,868+161,723) is 30% of the total amount of population being served (815,297).

      Excerpt: Chart titled: "Cobertura de los Servicios" on p. 1 out of 13.

      Translation: "Service Coverage." Gives the total population, water and sewage coverage by type of consumer (urban, peri-urban, rural).

    6. their own boreholes extract 30% of local supply

      <br> Full Citation: Milenio. (2007, May 4). Cinco industrias consumen 30% del agua potable de Toluca. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This newspaper article reports that there are at least 5 industries located within the city that use approximately 1/3 of the city's freshwater supplies. These industries do so legally as they have the required permits from the federal government to extract water, but its problematic for the city government, whose mayor is reported here to lament the use of ever decreasing freshwater (underground aquifers) for industrial uses that do not require potable drinking water. Because these industries directly manage their water extraction with the federal government, the water utility is unable to count them as paying customers, which means less revenue for the water utility and diverted freshwater resources that could otherwise be used for the city's urban population.

      Excerpt: En Toluca se asientan al menos cinco industrias que utilizan el 30 por ciento del agua del total que se consume de manera domestica en el municipio.

      Translation: In Toluca there are five industries that consume 30% of the total amount of water consumed throughout the city.

    7. prices many perceived to be too high

      <br> Full Citation: Milenio. (2009b, March 19). Sería un retroceso bajar tarifas y regresar a subsidias: OAPAS. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: I include this source to illustrate the types of promises that emerge during municipal electoral campaigns with respect to lowering water tariffs, and also to illustrate the difference in rhetoric and ideology from the PANs business oriented technocratic strategy to the PRIs populist discourse. These comments by what became the incoming mayor suggest that she would be uninterested in pursuing cost recovery policies that hurt the PRIs traditional base of low-income users.

      Excerpt: La candidata del PRI a la alcaldia de Naucalpan, Azucena Olivares Villagomez, se comprometio a revisar las arifas de agua potable en el municipio, para que se cobre lo justo y los usuarios reciban la cantidad que necesitan. Destaco que persisteun malestar en la ciudadania por los elevados cobros que hace el organismo, sobre todo en la zona residencial, donde la gente paga muy alto el costo por el servicio.

      Translation: The PRI mayoral candidate Azucena Olivares Villagomez promised to review water tariffs in the city, so that we charge what is fair and so that user receive the amount [of water] they need. She explained that there was a pervasive discontentment throughout the citizenry over the elevated tariffs charged by the water utility, especially in residential zones, where people are paying tariffs that are too high.

    8. emphasized the connection betweenincreased fees and improved services

      <br> Full Citation: OAPAS. (2008d). Para prevenir inundaciones. Organismo Público Descentralizado para la Prestación de los Servicios de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y Saneamiento de Naucalpan Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This is a poster distributed by the water utility to advertise the construction of hydraulic works infrastructure constructed by the 2006-2009 municipal administration (Mayor Durans second administration). The horizontal banner asks: which service is most important? The title says: In order to prevent flooding, we are constructing the Alivio Pluvial el Molinito, at a cost of $4,777,700.00 million pesos, to benefit over 10,000 inhabitants and the following neighborhoods: Fraccion. Jardines de Molinito Ampliacion Loma Linda, El Molinito y San Luis Tlatilco. This data is provided to show the partisan branding conducted on public works projects undertaken by Mayor Duran, as a part of credit claiming and support for his political party, and to justify the more unpopular cost recovery measures that were undertaken such as tariff increases. The poster is in blue, which is the PANs party color, and on the upper left hand corner there is a 2006-2009 logo, which indicates that the project is being constructed under the Mayoral administration of 2006-2009 or Mayor Duran.

    9. pittingwater prices against the more expensive cost of common every-day items, including other utilities

      <br> Full Citation: OAPAS. (2008c). Qué servicio es el más importante? Organismo Público Descentralizado para la Prestación de los Servicios de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y Saneamiento de Naucalpan. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This is a poster or advertisement distributed by the water utility to promote consumer willingness to pay for water service during the 2006-2009 municipal administration (Mayor Durans second administration). The horizontal banner asks: which service is most important? The banner compares utility prices for telephone, gas, electricity and water service, noting that water service is the least expensive yet the most vital to human existence. At the bottom of the ad it asks: If water is the most important and least expensive service, why do some people not pay for water service? This is a professionally designed and very effective advertising message complete with mascot and branded logo. I share this data to demonstrate the level of effort and commitment to marketing cost recovery campaigns this municipal administration undertook, which far exceeded what I observed in other water utilities that were part of the larger research project.

    10. Naucalpan pledged $MXP 75 million in hydraulicconstruction

      <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (1997b, November 5). Irán $75 milliones a obra hidráulica. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This newspaper article reports that the Naucalpan water utility pledged $75 million mxp in hydraulic construction at the beginning of Mayor Duran’s administration 1997-2000. This was intended to construct works to benefit 250,000 residents. I include this source to provide evidence for the assertion that PAN Mayor Duran’s first administration began a process of improvements in the physical and operational aspects of service delivery, and stood in sharp contrast to the level of commitment by prior PRI administrations to improve water service infrastructure in Naucalpan.

    11. much of whichwas reinvested back into these communities.

      <br> Full Citation: OAPAS. (2008b). Horarios de servicio de agua potable por colonia en Naucalpan. Organismo Público Descentralizado para la Prestación de los Servicios de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y Saneamiento de Naucalpan. Click to access full source.

    12. PAN loyalists“recycled”from prior administrations

      <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (2003, August 27). Reciclan funcionarios: gobierno, nuevos gabinetes, Naucalpan, recurre Moya a nueve elementos de la pasada administración para armar su gabinete. Click to access full source.

      Excerpt: De los 15 puestos de primer nivel que otorgo la Alcaldesa Angelica Moya y ratifico el Cabildo neuve estan asignados a personas que ya desampiaban algun cargo en la pasada administracion.

      Translation: Of the 15 directorship positions [or category 1 positions] that Mayor Angelica Moya assigned and were ratified in city hall, nine were given to people who had served in the prior administration.

    13. the city continues to struggle with solicit-ing payment and recovering debts from consumers

      <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (2008, January 20). Tienen 35% de morosos Click to access full source.

      <br> Full Citation: Universal. (2008, February 11). Adeudan agua 50 mil desde hace cinco añ os.

      Click to access full source.

      <br> Full Citation: Universal. (2009a, February 5). Identifican a 14 mil que no pagan servicio en Naucalpan. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: These newspaper articles published in 2008 and 2009 are presented to demonstrate some of the ongoing challenges that the water utility has in increasing tariffs and collecting payment from consumers ten years after the initial cost recovery policies were implemented. They are meant to be illustrative, rather than an exhaustive account of each incident concerning challenges to implementing cost recovery. And they are meant to document that these problems persist even a decade after initial protests began. Universal 2008 notes that 50,000 residents have not paid for water service in the last five years. Reforma 2008 notes that 35% of total water utility customers do not pay their water bill on time. Reforma 2009a notes that a Spanish consulting firm conducted a study (aided in part by IADB funds) of the water utility and found that 14,000 users were not paying for water and 1500 km of pipes were detected that were derivative clandestine connections.

    14. chose to not install meters in irregular settle-ments

      <br> Full Citation: Milenio. (2009a, February 1). Mantendrá OAPAS de Naucalpan cuota anual en zonas populares. Click to access full source.

      <br> Full Citation:Reforma. (1999, November 8). Ofrecen descuentos para el pago de agua. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: These sources are meant to provide examples of the types of concessions or special considerations that water utility functionaries implemented in order to lessen the blow of cost recovery measures. They are meant to be examples and illustrative, rather than exhaustive. Reforma 1999 documents a late fee forgiveness program implemented for 2000 to pardon all late fees associated with water payments in low income neighborhoods, noting that this program would be implemented prior to suspending service for nonpayment. Milenio 2009 documents that the water utility decided not to install meters in low income neighborhoods. Some of the reasons given include that pipes with irregular service would measure air rather than water, so its not fair to charge consumers for air on the meter reading. Interview 151, with a respondent who was a water utility employee working in the commercialization office and close to decision makers, revealed that functionaries reasoned that it would not make sense to spend money on meters in poor and irregular settlement neighborhoods because the low tariffs and high nonpayment rate of these areas would barely allow the utility to recover the costs of the meters.

    15. some resistance from the urbanpoor continued

      <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (2000, February 16). Exigen ajustar precio del agua—Piden vecinos aumentar precio a 392 pesos y no los 743 fijados por la Alcaldía; anuncian movilizaciones. Click to access full source. <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (2004, April 15). Inconforme tarifa de agua; Comunidad. Protestan vecinos de la zona popular por cuota anual del líquido. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: Both of these sources are newspaper articles that document some form of protest against cost recovery measures after the major 1998 protests documented earlier in the paper. Reforma 2000 documents a petition to the mayoral administration on behalf of a group of neighborhood association leaders to lower by approximately half the water tariff increase affecting low income neighborhoods for the year 2000. Reforma 2004 documents an 800 person march in April 2004 against water tariff increases and a sewage disposal fee implemented in 2004. These data suggest that protest against water tariff increases did not cease altogether after the first PAN administration, however, given the thorough newspaper search that was conducted, its clear that the bulk of protests occurred during the 1997-2000 mayoral administration, assuming that major protests would have been covered by local newspapers.

    16. open only to neighborhood associ-ation leaders

      <br> Full Citation: Gaceta. (2002). Gaceta del Gobierno del Estado de Mexico. Gaceta del Gobierno del Estado de Mexico (April 8), p. 19. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: I include this quote from the official meetings of the water utility in 2002 assessing the reprentativeness of the opinions gathered at the public forum, and the [silliness?] of their [random] numerical assessment of how much these neighborhood association leaders actually represented the families in these neighborhoods. Aside from the humor in this numerical assesment, I also include this piece of evidence to document that only neighborhood association leaders were invited to the town hall meetings, meaning that citizen's preferences were intermediated by corporatist leadership of local leaders (a practice that continues to be common in Mexico).

      Excerpt: Se comenta la participacion positiva de las comunidades por conducto de sus Presidentes de Consejo de Participacion Ciudadana y Delegados Municipales. En este ejercicio democratico participaron 85 comunidades, logrando una consulta a 9229 familias, considerando a cada uno de ellas una integracion de cinco miembros, se obtiene una muestra de 46, 145 habitantes, que representan el 10.38% de la zona popular sujeta a tandeo, esto nos permite asegurar que la consulta tiene una confiabilidad de 98%.

      Translation: There was a positive community participation via their neighborhood association leaders and municipal delegates. In this democratic exercise, 85 communities were represented, including 9229 families, [so] assuming 5 people per family, this is a sample of 46, 145 residents that represent 10.38% of poor neighborhoods with irregular service, allowing us to estimate that the meetings are 98% reliability score.

    17. only public forums undertaken by the water utility duringthis period occurred in 2001 and 2002

      <br> Full Citation: Gaceta. (2001). Gaceta del Gobierno del Estado de Mexico. Gaceta del Gobierno del Estado de Mexico (April 3). Click to access full source. <br> Full Citation: Gaceta. (2002). Gaceta del Gobierno del Estado de Mexico. Gaceta del Gobierno del Estado de Mexico (April 8). Click to access full source. <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (2001a, March 12). Termina sin acuerdo consulta sobre agua. Location: shareable

      Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: These sources document that the water utility held two public forums in 2001 and 2002 with neighborhood association leaders. Gaceta 2001 and Gaceta 2002 are minutes of the board of directors of the water utility discussing the public forum meetings, which were published in the state registrar. Through interviews I found out that the mayor at the time (PAN mayor Eduardo Contreras 2003-2006) was not highly partisan or had little political experience and felt that publishing this information was the appropriate thing to do to increase transparency. In conjunction with that sentiment, Contreras also allowed for a Board of Directors in the water utility that was bipartisan, rather than stacked with PAN loyalists. Gaceta 2001, p. 32 documents plans for a town hall meeting to assess responses to water tariff increases affecting 122 neighborhoods and to inform neighborhood association leaders of the costs associated with delivering water service in the hopes that increased information and transparency would spur consumer willingness to pay. Reforma 2001a is a newspaper article that reports that neighborhood association leaders leaving the 2001 meeting were dissatisfied with the meeting, and felt that their interests were not being heard. Gaceta 2002 is another publication of the meetings of the board of directors of the water utility documenting the second meeting that occurred in 2002, with the intention of reducing a "culture of nonpayment," and noting that this was a democratic exercise to incorporate the voice of the public into municipal decision making. I provide these sources as evidence that these meetings did occur, and I verified in Interview #151 with a respondent that had worked at the water utility for 15 years that these were the only public forums that were held, under the Contreras administration.

    18. insisted on continuing to imple-ment cost recovery measures

      <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (1998g, April 10). Exigen cuota fija de agua por $302—Solicita frente de Convergencia Político Social solicitó el Alcalde José Luis Durán establecer pago anual en 131 colonias populares. Click to access full source.

      Full Citation: Reforma. (1998d, March 18). Bajan 20% cuota de agua. Click to access full source. <br>

      Full Citation: Reforma. (1998e, March 19). Rechazan rebaja en agua.

      Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: These three newspaper articles document the aftermath of the March and April 1998 protest against water tariff increases. They largely recount the events that occurred during the marches, demonstrations and sit-ins, but also record official statements by municipal officials responding to the protests. Importantly, they record the mayor's reaction to the protests and concessions that were made. Reforma 1998g documents the requests that the Frente movement made of the municipal government, including lowering the annual tariff for water service from $402 to $302 mxp, extending a 50% reduction in water tariff to all members of the Front social movement, and extending the discount in water tariffs during April through July. Reforma 1998d and Reforma 1998e documents that the mayor (and water utility) responded with a 20% decrease in the water tariff, valid through the end of April, for homes that receive irregular service in low income neighborhoods.

    19. “viewing citizen’s paymentas revenues for a business is totally absurd”

      <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (1998g, April 10). Exigen cuota fija de agua por $302—Solicita frente de Convergencia Político Social solicitó el Alcalde José Luis Durán establecer pago anual en 131 colonias populares. Click to access full source.

      Excerpt: En un document dirigido al director de Organismo descentralizado de Agua Potable, Armando Perez Moreno, el Frente considera que el pago por agua ha causado descontento e irritacion, “pues la optica de ver los dineros del pueblo como los ingresos de una empresa es totalmente absurd.

      Translation: In a document directed towards the water utility director Armanda Perez Moreno, [the social movement] said that water tariffs have caused anger and irritation, “ viewing citizen’s payment as revenues for a business it totally absurd.

    20. calling for Dura ́n’s resignation and associating thesemeasures with anti-poor policies

      <br> Full Citation: Gaceta. (2001). Gaceta del Gobierno del Estado de Mexico. Gaceta del Gobierno del Estado de Mexico (April 3), p. 33. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source documents the perspective of the water utility in terms of the boycott payment and collective action instances against the water utility. It is a published account (inside of the state level registrar) of the minutes of a water utility board of directors meeting where discussions are being held over how to react to these instances of collective action. I provide this source as evidence that the water utility functionaries saw the instances of collective action as led by opposition party leaders rather than autonomously organized by civil society members. While I am unable to determine which side organized the protests, I believe that they were at least partially organized by PRI and PRD leaders to create problems for the first ever PAN administration.

      Excerpt: En vista que varias personas continuan tratando de manipular la informacion relacionada a los casos generados por la promocion del programa de "No al Pago de Agua", que iniciaran y extendieran algunos operadores politicos en Naucalpan por los anios 1998, 1999 y 2000, y dado el hecho de que por diferentes declaraciones que hemos escuchado a lo largo de los meses de conciliaciliacion con los usuarios, que preocupados del estado de indefension en que quedaron por la falta de seguimiento o cierre de dichas campanias, que los llevaron a depositar cantidades reducidas en consignacion ante los Juzgados Civiles de Cuantia Menor o iniciaron procedimiento ante el Tribunal de lo Contencioso Administrativo.

      Translation: ...various people continue to manipulate the information relating to the cases of promoting the "No to water payments" campaign that a few political operatives orchestrated in Naucalpan during 1998, 1999 and 2000...and... we have heard multiple declarations through the months from users worried that they felt defenseless against these campaigns...

      <br>

      Full Citation: Reforma. (1998c, March 13). Cuotas de agua, a referéndum. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This newspaper article reports on a clear instance of a PRI politician using the water prices conflict as a referendum against the PAN administration.

      Excerpt: Como partido vamos a convocar a toda la ciudadania, la todas los organizaciones sociales, si se decide no dar marcha atras, a realizar un referendum para preguntarle a la gente si esta de acuerdo en pagar las nuevas cutoas y si estan de acuerdo como gobierno Duran, afirmo Antonio Lara, regidor del PRI, y titular de la Comision Hidraulica en el Congreso.

      Translation: As a party we are going to gather the citizenry, all of the social organizations, if [the PAN] refuses to not backtrack [or concede to lowering prices], to conduct a referendum asking the people if they are consenting to pay the new tariffs and if they are in [favor] of the government of [PAN mayor] Duran," affirmed Antonio Lara, PRI city council person and head of the [state] congressional hydraulic commission.

    21. we receive water every third day, for barely three or fourhours, and sometimes it does not come until 11 pm”

      <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (1998b, March 12). Rechaza PAN bajar agua. Click to access full source.

      Excerpt: La gente si quiere pagar, pero los incrementos son deproporcionados; nosotros propusimos un increment del 30 por ciento de acuerdo a lo que decidimos en asamblea…[el agua] la tenemos cada tercer dia, no las ponen tres o cuatro horas apenas, a veces llega hasta las 11 de la noche”…

      Translation: See quotation in text of article.

    22. suggested consumers were willing to payfor water received

      <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (1998i, May 12). Pagan el agua ante Tribunal-Vecinos de Lomas del Cadete garantizan pago mínimo mientras sigue su demanda en contra de OAPAS. Click to access full source.

      Excerpt: Con la consigna de pagar lo que consideran justo y no lo que determine el Organismo de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y Saneamiento, al menos 200 vecinos de Lomas del Cadetec acudieron ayer al Palacio de Justicias del Poder Judicial a depositar sobres con dinero. Los sobres depositados por los vecinos contienen, cada uno, 215 pesos, que corresponden a la tarifa annual que se cobro por el servicio de agua en zona de tandeo durante 1997.

      Translation: With the intention of paying what they considered just and not what the [water utility] determined, at least 200 residents of Lomas del Cadete united yesterday in front of the Municipal [Court] to deposit sums of cash. The folders…contained 215 pesos, which was the tariff for the [intermittent service category] in 1997.

    23. price increase of as much as 266% for the irregular, poorquality water service they were receiving

      <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (1998a, March 11). Rechazan aumento al agua-Protestan mil vecinos de zonas populares por alza de hasta 266%; proponen pagar entre 15 y 30% ma´s. Click to access full source.

      Excerpt: Las organizaciones sociales UPREZ, COCODEN Y UCP, diversos lideres de colonos y dirigentes priistas y perredistas que en conjunto dicen representar 82 colonias populares...acordaron ayer formar un frente comun para no pagar el servicio de agua potable hasta que se reduzcan las tarifas....Los quejosos argumentan que la Alcaldia panista aumento las cutoas anuales de agua en la zona popular en un porcentaje de hasta 266 por ciento.

      Translation: The social organizations UPREZ, COCODEN Y UCP, diverse neighborhood association leaders and PRI and PRD leaders that together claim to represent 82 poor neighborhoods...yesterday committed to a water payment boycott until the water tariffs are lowered...[they] are complaining that the PAN mayor increased the annual block water tariff in poor neighborhoods as much as 266%.

      <br> Full Citation:Reforma. (1998b, March 12). Rechaza PAN bajar agua. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This newspaper article provides greater detail regarding the payment boycott and collective action that began in March of 1998 against the PAN administration due to the repeal of Acuerdo 10, the prior agreement for subsidized water that poor neighborhoods held with PRI leaders. I include this here to provide evidence that the PAN administration of 1997-2000 repealed the Acuredo 10 subsidy.

      Excerpt: La polemica se suscito luego de que la semana pasada el Consejo Directivo de OAPAS determine eliminar el subsidio denominado Acuerdo 10, que beneficiaba a 82 colonias, lo que derive en incrementos reales en tarifas de agua potable para la zona popular de Naucalpan, que oscilan entre el 76 y el 266 por ciento.

      Translation: The problem arose when the Board of Directors of the [Naucalpan] water utility decided to eliminate the subsidy Acuerdo 10 last week, which benefitted 82 neighborhoods, and which [now] results in real increases in water tariffs for poor neighborhoods in Naucalpan to oscillate between 76 and 266% increases.

    24. By 2008, 1,313 industries were registered clients ofthe water utility

      <br> Full Citation: OAPAS. (2008a). Reporte de tomas por tipo de contratacion. Organismo Público Descentralizado para la Prestación de los Servicios de Agua Potable, Alcantarillado y Saneamiento de Naucalpan. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: See 1313 total under Industrial category of users in Chart entitled Reporte de Tomas por Tipo de Contrataciones.

    25. being asked tohelp finance flood controls and improve deficient drainage sys-tems in their industrial parks

      <br> Full Citation: Reforma. (1996a, June 20). Buscan empresarios mitigar inundaciones. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source demonstrates the weak position of the water utility in 1996 to attend to the demands of business and industry with respect to hydraulic works.

      Excerpt: Cerca de 100 comerciantes y empresarios del Parque Industrial Alce Blanco cooperaran para reunir 200,000mxp y adquirir cuatro bombas que ayuden a evitar inundaciones en la calles aledanias a sus empresas...Debido a la situacion economica que esta afectando a todos los sectores y desde luego a este Organismo, no fue posible concluir antes de presente temporada de lluvia las obras que iniciamos para evitar inundaciones...

      Translation: Close to 100 commercial businesses and industrialists will cooperate to contribute $200,000 mxp to purchase equipment to help reduce flooding in the streets near their businesses....[as noted by a water utility functionary:] Given the [poor] economy that is affecting many sectors and including this water utility, we were unable to complete the anti-flooding prevention projects prior to the rainy season that we began [earlier in the year]...

    26. by 1997, the water utility was bankrupt

      <br> Full Citation: Gaceta Municipal. (1997). Gaceta Municipal. Gobierno de Naucalpan, Estado de México (December 15). Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source is a bulletin issued by the Duran mayoral administration (1997-2000) issued periodically and reporting on the activities of different municipal institutions. It is a valuable piece of evidence that references the conditions of the water utility at the beginning of Duran's mayoral administration in 1997, documenting the baseline against which some reforms can be measured.

      Excerpt: Al igual que la Hacienda Municipal, las finanzas del...OAPAS... se recibieron en situacion critica...adeudos importantes...ascendian a $4,405,000 mxp... A principio de anio, el OAPAS tenia un adeudo de $62, 551,000 mxp por agua recibida en bloque.

      Translation: Similar to the municipal budget, the water utility that was [transferred from the prior mayoral administration to the new mayoral administration] was in dire conditions..important debts exceed $4,405,000 mxp... At the beginning of [1997], [the water utility] owed $62, 551,000 mxp for bulk water [from the state water commission].

    27. most do not re-cover enough revenue to invest in minimal serviceimprovements

      <br> Full Citation: Poder Legislativo del Estado de México. (2008). Informe sobre la revisión de la Cuenta Pública Municipal: Volumen 8: Resultados de la Evaluación al Desempeño de los Organismos Descentralizados Operadores de Agua y Saneamiento y MAVICI. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source is the fiscal audit conducted by the Mexico state government auditing branch of the fiscal state of the municipal water utilities throughout the state in 2009. It is perhaps the most reliable source of data regarding the fiscal accounts of water utility because failure to comply with auditing or the manipulation of figures is a major legal offense and one that I found water utility employees to be quite careful about. This source shows the extent of the municipal water utility debt and challenge of raising internal revenue in Mexico State.

      Excerpt: I calculated these figures based on the number of water utilities in the state that showed fiscally insolvent numbers, on pages 39, 57 and 75.

    28. onlyapproximately 50% of the city has registered connections

      <br> Full Citation: CISA (2007). Municipio de Nezahualcóyotl, Estado de México: Diagnóstico del subsector agua potable, resumen ejecutivo. CISA Solutions, p. 24. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This document is a comprehensive report of the physical, financial and operational state of the Neza water utility undertaken by a private consulting company hired in 2007. This study was paid for by a higher tier of government. It was provided to me by an employee who had taken a copy and saved it for themselves.

      Excerpt: La produccion es inferior a la demanda, que representa un deficit del 5.02% de la misma. Se tiene una cobertura en agua potable del 86.97%, sin embargo si comparamos el estimado de usuarios a partir de la poblacion contra el numero de usuarios registrados en el padron del Organismo Operador del Municipio, esta solo alcanza el 49.75%.

      Translation: There is an official coverage data [according to water utility figures] of 86.97%, however if we compare the number of registered users to the city's population, coverage only reaches 49.75%.

    29. , there are a handful of“high”performers

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (2011b). Situación del agua potable, alcantarillado y saneamiento. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 93. Click to access full source.

    30. from 394 treatment plantsin 1992 to 2,289 in 2011

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (2012). Situación del agua potable, alcantarillado y saneamiento. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 49. Click to access full source.

    31. from 32 in 1975 to 100 in 2009

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (2011a). Estadísticas del agua de México. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 34.

      Click to access full source.

    32. total investment made in thesector since 2002 has doubled from 2002 to 2011, from .17%to .32% of GDP

      <br> Full Citation: IMTA. (2011). Programa de Indicadores de Gestión de Organismos Operadores del Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua. Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua.

      Click to access full source.

    33. commercial efficiency as a nationalaverage has increased by only 1% in the last decade

      <br> Full Citation: IMTA. (2011). Programa de Indicadores de Gestión de Organismos Operadores del Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua.

      Click to access full source.

      <br> Full Citation: World Bank. (2005). Mexico infrastructure public expenditure review (IPER). Washington DC: World Bank, p. 30. Click to access full source.

    34. While CNA data show a national average of73.8% of commercial efficiency in 2012

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (2012). Situación del agua potable, alcantarillado y saneamiento. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 60. Click to access full source.

    35. intestinal infectious disease in Mexico in 2005was twice as high as in Argentina, four times as high as inCosta Rica, and 15 times as high as in Chile

      <br> Full Citation: World Bank. (2005). Mexico infrastructure public expenditure review (IPER). Washington DC: World Bank, p. 28, footnote 56. Click to access full source.

    36. water-related health indicators have improvedover time in Mexico

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (2011a). Estadísticas del agua de México. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 102. Click to access full source.

    37. ncreasing from 157 liters percapita in 2003 to 480 liters per capita in 2010

      <br> Full Citation: IADB (2010). Determinants of bottled water consumption in Mexico. Executive summary. Inter-American Development Bank: Executive Summary, p. 15.

      Click to access full source.

    38. esti-mate that intermittent service affected 24.2% of consumers in2002 and increased to 28.5% in 2011

      <br> Full Citation: IMTA. (2011). Programa de Indicadores de Gestión de Organismos Operadores del Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua. Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua.

      Click to access full source.

    39. 45% of households experienceddaily intermittency and 55% of households periodic intermit-tency in 2000 based on census data

      <br> Full Citation: World Bank. (2005). Mexico infrastructure public expenditure review (IPER). Washington DC: World Bank, p. 27.

      Click to access full source.

    40. hysical efficiency asmeasured in terms of volume consumed/water produced hasincreased by less than 2% since 2002

      <br> Full Citation: IMTA. (2011). Programa de Indicadores de Gestión de Organismos Operadores del Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua. Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua.

      Click to access full source.

    41. (an estimated 84% oflost water is due to leaky infrastructure and 16% to clandestineconnections)

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (2010). Cobertura universal: Suburbios urbanos conectados a redes. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 12. Click to access full source.

    42. n some cities considerably higher

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (2012). Situación del agua potable, alcantarillado y saneamiento. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. Annex 1 a. Click to access full source. <br> Full Citation: Universal. (2009b, May 28). Consumo irresponsable causa pérdida de 70% de agua.

      Click to access full source.

    43. amount of non-revenue water (volume billed/vol-ume produced) in urban centers is approximately 47%

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (2010). Cobertura universal: Suburbios urbanos conectados a redes. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 12. Click to access full source.

    44. national average of 91.2% watercoverage and 89.9% sanitation coverage, increases from81.9% to 65% respectively, since 1991

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (1992). Situación del agua potable, alcantarillado y saneamiento. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 10. Click to access full source. <br>

      Full Citation: CNA (2011b). Situación del agua potable, alcantarillado y saneamiento. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 22. Click to access full source.

    45. decrease reliance on federal subsidiesthrough cost recovery, and decrease environmental pollution

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (1994). Sintesis de la memoria de gestion 1988–1994. Comisión Nacional del Agua, pp. 9-10. Click to access full source. <br>

      Full Citation: World Bank. (1990). Staff appraisal report for loan 3271-ME (No. 8973-ME). Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 10-16. Click to access full source.

    46. 637 of which serve populationsover 20,000

      <br> Full Citation: IMTA. (2011). Programa de Indicadores de Gestión de Organismos Operadores del Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua. Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua.

      Click to access full source.

      <br> Full Citation: INEGI. (2009). Panorama censal de los organismos operadores de agua en México. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, p. 9. Click to access full source.

    47. treating water as an eco-nomic good, cost recovery, service suspension for non-pay-ment, and“performance-based”financing schemes

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (1993). Informe 1989–1993. Comisión Nacional del Agua, pp. 47-48, 59-68.

      Click to access full source.

    48. operate with le-gal, fiscal, and administrative autonomy from city hall

      <br> Full Citation: World Bank. (1990). Staff appraisal report for loan 3271-ME (No. 8973-ME). Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 15-17. Click to access full source.

    49. sector financingderived from IFI loans follow APAZU operating rules

      <br> Full Citation: World Bank. (1990). Staff appraisal report for loan 3271-ME (No. 8973-ME). Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 11. Click to access full source.

    50. account for less than 2% of all water services in thecountry

      <br> Full Citation: INEGI. (2009). Panorama censal de los organismos operadores de agua en México. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía.

      Click to access full source. <br> Full Citation: CNA (1993). Informe 1989–1993. Comisión Nacional del Agua. Click to access full source. <br>

      Full Citation: Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1992). Ley de Aguas Nacionales. Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Click to access full source.

    51. the share of industrial and commercial con-sumption totaled only 10% of total consumption in 1990

      <br> Full Citation: (1990). Staff appraisal report for loan 3271-ME (No. 8973-ME). Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 5. Click to access full source.

    52. high incidenceof water-borne disease and a child mortality rate of over 70times that of the United States

      <br> Full Citation: World Bank. (1975). Report and recommendation to the President (No. P-1727-ME.). Washington DC, p. 10. Click to access full source.

    53. he rates have not been sufficiently increased be-cause of inertia and political considerations”

      <br> Full Citation: World Bank. (1964). An appraisal of the development program of Mexico: Volume VII, Annex VI, water supply, sewerage and public health. Department of Operations, Western Hemisphere. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 2. Click to access full source.

    54. users were charged only30% of the long-run marginal cost of providing service

      <br> Full Citation: World Bank. (1990). Staff appraisal report for loan 3271-ME (No. 8973-ME). Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 13. Click to access full source.

    55. cost of providingservice ranged from $MXP 1.50–1.75

      <br> Full Citation: SRH. (1973). Los servicios de agua potable en México. Distrito Federal, México: Secretaría de Recursos Hidráulicos, p. 208. Click to access full source.

    56. transfer systems to locals who felt little ownership of the pro-ject and had few system maintenance resources

      <br> Full Citation: World Bank. (1992). Project completion report for loan 1186-ME, 1913-ME, 2281-ME (Infrastructure Division, Country Department II, Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office No. Report No. 11448). Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 45.

      Click to access full source.

    57. further control for variation in state levelpolicy toward urban services.

      <br> Full Citation: GEM (1997). Evaluación 1997. Gobierno del Estado de México: Subsecretaría de Infraestructura Hidraúlica. Click to access full source.

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (2006). Estadísticas del agua, aguas del valle de México y sistema Cutzamala Región XIII. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 79.

      Click to access full source.

    58. at 8.8% of GDP, and it isalso the most densely populated state in Mexico, with 13.8%of the population

      <br> Full Citation: CNA (2011a). Estadísticas del agua de México. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 16. Click to access full source.

    1. 21 percent of survey respondents received over 75percent of their budgets from government funding.

      <br> Full Citation: Duda, Rubens. 2011. Bureaucrat, Department of Civil Society and Human Rights, Department of STD/AIDS, Ministry of Health. Author interview. August 24.

      Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: I substantiate this claim in the book manuscript but not in this article, due to space constraints, and because the claim is not central to main my argument. Nevertheless, I am including here a document containing notes from my 2011 interview with Rubens Duda, as direct evidence to support the claim. The interview notes are sparse and not particularly clear. However, the interview recording from Minute 20 to Minute 30-something, provides clear and direct evidence in support of my in-text claim. In it, Rubens Duda describes how the national AIDS program helped activists form state-wide AIDS advocacy networks in new states of Brazil. It was an effort led by the AIDS advocacy networks in Rio and São Paulo, and the national AIDS program support the efforts of these activists from Rio and São Paulo with funding and by traveling to different states of Brazil to help advertise and explain the concept of an AIDS advocacy network (referred to as “forums”).

    2. AIDS net-works in the Northeastern states of Maranhão, Pernambuco, Ceará, and Paraíba.

      <br> Full Citation: Falta de remédio para HIV causa protestos. 2010. Gazeta do Povo, April 29. Click to access full source.

      <br> Full Citation: Brasil: Falta de antirretrovirais gera protestos em sete estados brasileiros. 2010. Agência Lusa, April 28. Click to access full source.

      <br> Full Citation: Falta de remédios contra aids causa protestos. 2010. O Estado de São Paulo, April 28. Click to access full source.

      <br> Full Citation: Leite, Fabiane. Falta de remédios contra aids causa protestos. 2010. O Estado de São Paulo, April 28. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: Here, I am including newspaper articles about the protests that I mention in my descriptive claim.

    3. associations in the North and Northwest regions received fundingfrom federal contracts

      <br> Full Citation: Ministério da Saúde. 2003. Catálogo de organizações da sociedade civil HIV/AIDS 2001/2002. Ministério da Saúde.

      </a> Click to access full source. </a>

      Analytic Note: This document is a national catalog of civil society organizations working with AIDS in 2003. It constitutes an attempt by the national AIDS bureaucracy to collect data on AIDS NGOs in Brazil. I built my own national database of AIDS NGOs in 2003 to use for analysis, and I did it using the data contained within this catalog.

    4. officially regis-tered 508 AIDS associations by 2002 and 695 organizations by 2009

      <br> Full Citation: Ministério da Saúde. 2003. Catálogo de organizações da sociedade civil HIV/AIDS 2001/2002. Ministério da Saúde.

      </a> Click to access full source. </a>

      Analytic Note: This document is a national catalog of civil society organizations working with AIDS in 2003. It constitutes an attempt by the national AIDS bureaucracy to collect data on AIDS NGOs in Brazil. I built my own national database of AIDS NGOs in 2003 to use for analysis, and I did it using the data contained within this catalog.

    5. in fights between states and municipalities, between [civil society]organizations and the municipality or state”

      <br> Full Citation: Duda, Rubens. 2010. Bureaucrat, Department of Civil Society and Human Rights, Department of STD/AIDS, Ministry of Health. Author interview. Brasília, March 18.

      Click to access full source. </a>

    6. “in the context of a decentralized national health system” (

      <br> Full Citation: National Council of Articulation with Social Movements (CASM). 2004-9. Minutes of meetings. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This document is the original set of bylaws of the National Council of Articulation with Social Movements (CASM). The link provided here contains not only the bylaws but also the minutes of every CASM meeting since its inauguration in January 2004.

    7. a region notorious forhuman rights violations and gender-related violence

      <br> Full Citation: Ministério da Saúde. National AIDS Program. n.d. List of states’ AIDS activism. Unpublished internal document.

      Click to access full source. </a>

      Analytic Note: This document is an unpublished spreadsheet produced by the national AIDS bureaucracy. It contains detailed information about each civil society project financed by the national AIDS bureaucracy in the year 2007. Pages 7-9 contain data on groups that received legal aid “assessoria juridica” project funding. I tallied the total number of recipient organizations and also counted the number of recipient organizations per geographic region.

    8. funding for civil society to support projects that center on political advocacy

      <br> Full Citation: Ministério da Saúde. National AIDS Program. Civil Society and Human Rights sector (CSHR). 2006. Exercício 2006. Unpublished government document. Accessed August 28, 2006.

      Click to access full source. </a>

      Analytic Note: In drawing up Table 1, I used the information in CSHR 2006, the national budget for civil-society funding. Because I am interested in money that national bureaucrats give directly to civil society organizations, I deleted the two line items that entailed targeted transfers to state-level governments (items 1 and 2 on the budget, which I know are funds that are distributed to civil society groups by state-level governments through my numerous interviews and analysis of other government documents). I also relabeled the categories for clarity.

    9. direct federal funding for local AIDS associations in2006

      <br> Full Citation: Ministério da Saúde. National AIDS Program. Civil Society and Human Rights sector (CSHR). 2006. Exercício 2006. Unpublished government document. Accessed August 28, 2006.

      Click to access full source. </a>

      Analytic Note: This document is an unpublished budget of national AIDS bureaucracy funding for civil society projects, by type of project, in the year 2006. The first two line items constitute funding that the national AIDS bureaucracy transfers to state-level governments for distribution to civil-society organizations. The rest of the items in the budget constitute direct national funding for civil-society projects. In drawing up Table 1, I used the information in the budget on national direct funding for civil society, and I relabeled the categories for clarity.

    10. allocations of funding across years

      <br> Full Citation: Ministério da Saúde. n.d. Série histórica dos projectos financiados para OSC 1999–2008. Unpublished government document.

      Click to access full source. </a>

      Analytic Note: The document contains two spreadsheets, which are unpublished documents produced by and for the national AIDS bureaucracy. The first describes the number of civil society projects financed by the national AIDS bureaucracy between 1999 and 2008, by state and by year. The second describes the amount of funding for civil society projects, and the number of projects, funded by the national AIDS bureaucracy between 1999 and 2008, by region and by year.

    11. This is why it is fundamental for society to be together with uspressuring [government]”

      <br> Full Citation: Kalichman, Artur. 2007. Adjunct Director, State STD/AIDS Program, São Paulo. Quoted from a public address at the seminar Social Control and AIDS in the State of São Paulo. Click to access full source.

    12. If we don’t have a solid social movement, established at the locallevel, it is going to be very difficult to achieve this”

      <br> Full Citation: Chequer, Pedro. 2007. Quoted from a public address at the seminar Social Control and AIDS in the State of São Paulo. São Paulo, March. Click to access full source.

    13. an absence of political will to invest in AIDS

      <br> Full Citation: World Bank. 2010. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US$67 Million to the Federative Republic of Brazil for the AIDS-SUS Project (National Aids Program—National Health Service). Report no. 54060-BR. (pp. 4-5). Click to access full source.

    14. in evaluations of both Brazil’s public health pro-gram and its AIDS programs

      <br> Full Citation: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 2007. Audit Report No. 1-512-07-007-P. (pp. 9-15).

      Click to access full source.

      <br> Full Citation: World Bank. 2007. Governance in Brazils Unified Health System (SUS): Raising the Quality of Public Spending and Resource Management. Report no. 36601-BR. (pp. 65-66).

      Click to access full source.

    15. such as the rural states of Amazonas and RioGrande do Norte (List of states’ AIDS activism).

      <br> Full Citation: Lima, Noemia. 2010. Bureaucrat, Department of Civil Society and Human Rights, Department of STD/AIDS, Ministry of Health. Author interview. Brasília, March 19.

      Click to access full source. </a>

      Analytic Note: This source is an internal government spreadsheet from 2010, containing a record of the number of parliamentary causes in Brazil and their locations. It was printed and given to me by the government bureaucrat who was in charge of the effort to promote parliamentary AIDS caucuses, Noemia Lima.