75 Matching Annotations
1. Nov 2022
2. Local file Local file
1. 30

30 children?

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1. a survey conducted in east Asia found that 57% of thechildren had volunteered

East Asia?

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4. Local file Local file
1. three institutional options

What are other two options?

2. Presidential term limits are often the first casualty of authoritarian backsliding,and in many jurisdictions have been extended or abolished entirely throughconstitutional amendments” (Choudhry and Bisarya 2014: 190)

Authoritarian backsliding.

3. When undemocratic practicespersisted, the AU elaborated various norms and set up an increasingly robustenforcement and sanctioning apparatus on unconstitutional changes of gov-ernment (Vandeginste 2013).

This is a great mechanism. But, does it work?

4. the issue of a presidential term limit was raised by one speaker.

Only one speak, just like the case in Russia in 1993.

5. In theFifth Republic, no president was re-elected more than once before the intro-duction of term limits in 2008.

6. 1 December 1991

But it announced the independence on 16 December 1991. How?

7. The current political landscape of Kazakhstan bears strikingsimilarities to postcolonial African “imperial presidencies” (Prempeh 2008)

Prempeh, Kwasi H. 2008. ‘Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling Persistence of Imperial Presidency in Post-Authoritarian Africa.’ Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 35(4): 761–834.

8. there is no turnover in power of the regime.

the term limits that take place in authoritarian regimes constitute leadership turnover that takes place within the regime itself, or restrictions to the tenure of the president/leader.

9. Fixed terms will continue and the 2018 consti-tutional change only meant that the top leader would be able to serve morethan two, but certainly not infinite, life-long terms.

Naive.

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5. Local file Local file
1. If a third party agreed to enforcethe terms of a peace treaty, negotiations always succeeded regardless of the initialgoals, ideology, or ethnicity of the participants.

Not in Chinese Civil War between 1947-1949.

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1. In the absence of a supreme authoritythere is then the constant possibility that conflicts will be settled

What to define "constant possibility"?

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7. Local file Local file
1. eligious repression fosters regime support and weakens group identityby inducing risk-averse behavioral response at the individual level and eliminating in-termediate entities that carry out the transmission of cultural attitudes at the grouplevel.

It could not foster support for regime, but the fear of the regime.

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8. www.jstor.org www.jstor.org
1. it is sometimesdifficult in a crisis to determine who is the troublemaker and who is the victim.1

Nonsense. It is normally obvious that who is the troublemaker.

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9. Oct 2022
10. Local file Local file
1. As applied to term limits, such asurvey suggests that constitutional changes away from extremely strict one-termlifetime limits should generally be allowed but that judges have strong normativegrounding to place limits on attempts to eliminate or radically ease presidentialterm limits, and that even very strict term limits should not themselves be struckdown as a UCA.

What's point?

2. Rafael Correa recently tried a version of this in Ecuador. Seeking a thirdterm, he obtained a constitutional amendment in 2015 removing constitutionalterm limits, on the promise that he would step down for a term in 2017. AfterCorrea’s handpicked successor Lenin Moreno assumed the presidency, he calleda referendum that reinstated term limits in early 2018.

This is a special case which the overstayer steps down voluntarily.

3. These executives are remarkably successful, and their “battingaverage” in the attempts is something like 80 percent.

80%! That is something.

4. For example,China’s abolition of term limits in the Constitution will likely allow Xi Jinpingto remain president for a very long time, but he will be subject to re-election bythe Chinese People’s Congress every five years.

The author is so naive.

5. as ofJanuary 2017, 72 percent of presidential constitutions had executive term limitsas against 3 and 4 percent for the upper and lower houses, respectively.

useful data.

6. Upon hearing a rule, one knows what one is supposed to do (or at least,what the rule says one is supposed to do). But upon hearing a principle, one knowsboth what one is supposed to do and why.

This is so clear.

7. However, we can rely on previous estimatesindicating that between 20 and 30 per cent of presidents extend the term in oneway or the other (Baturo 2014: 148; Ginsburg, Melton, and Elkins 2011: 1845).

This is great information.

8. “the debate about term limits is the trade-offbetween the possibility of dictatorial takeover and restriction of democraticchoice.

?

9. The institution of term limitscan be understood as the dependent variable, as the explanatory variable, as afocal point, and as an indicator—a tripwire.
1. focal point
2. indicator-tripwire

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11. Local file Local file
1. Empirical Analysis

反送中： Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement

Movement led by women is more likely non-political, so more likely to be peaceful.

2. he female group are more united, comparing with men

Any supportive evidence for this argument?

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1. WMD

Weapons of mass destruction

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1. Why do voters support poli-ticians who undermine democracy?

Good questions.

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1. I refer to theprobability that an existing democracy will survive long enough to consolidate as theconsolidation odds and find that, on average, only about 1 in 3 democracies can expect todo so at the time of their transition.

1 in 3

2. Huntington’s two-turnover testand Gasiorowski’s twelve-year threshold

Is it a good index? Doubtful!

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1. when term-limitextensions are only short term and the incumbent stepsdown immediately thereafter (e.g. Brazil 1988, orComoros 2009).

stepped down voluntarily or by force

2. We define an incumbent takeover as an event perpetuatedby a ruling executive that significantly reduces the formaland/or informal constraints on his/her power.

Perpetuated or Perpetrated?

3. However, weare able to account for takeovers in such contexts byfirst using the removal of term limits as an observablemanifestation of expansion of incumbent power,

This is great.

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16. Local file Local file
1. State Repression

Treat it as number?

Which means there is a leading actor, which is ambivalent with the organization level(spontaneous or well planned).

Maybe "main participants"?

3. relevant control variables

How about the time (how long does the event last), size (how many participants)

4. ed by the female (1), or not (0)

Could be dintinguished? How much is led by female?

5. 1) Dissidents; 2) Employed; 3) Youth; 4) Civil Societies; 5) Political Opposition;6) Ethno-Religious Minorities; 7) Armed Forces

They are intertwined with each other.

6. his paper argues that the use of violenceby protesters depends on the actor mobilisation experience.

Main Argument: * iolence is more extensively used in protest events led by actors with limited mobilization capacity, and weakly connected.

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17. Sep 2022
18. hcommons.org hcommons.org
1. MajorBlake

?

2. The Organization of African Unity (OAU)

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19. Local file Local file
1. autogolpes

Autocoup: Selfcoup

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1. Second, many post–Cold War transitions were rooted more inthe weakness of incumbent governments than in the strength, strategies, ormobilization of opposition forces

A corruptive government is more critical.

So, should we wait for the complete corruption of CCP?

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21. Local file Local file
1. facial-recognition software

面部识别技术

2. “picking quarrels and provokingtroubles”

寻衅滋事罪

3. five-hundred Confucius Institutes in foreign universities and other institu-tions.

So many?

4. hostile for-eign forces

“境外敌对势力”

5. hide our light and nurture our strength

韬光养晦

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22. Local file Local file
1. the middle class is likelyto support some form of extremism.

That's right.

2. Chinese middle class is not exceptional at all.

Totally agree. It is not that Chinese middle class, or Chinese people is exceptional, but CCP is such an exceptional regime.

3. China is where they live and want to live;the Chinese regime is the regime that China has; and the regime’s truthis the truth they are prepared to live with.

Brilliant observation and depiction.

4. The Chinese middle class has no such associational life. The govern-ment outlaws organizations that might compete with the official top-down youth, women’s, and labor “mass organizations.”

老百姓“原子化”。

5. about 57 percent of the population

Based on a definition of the Asian middle class as those with consumption expenditures of $2 to$20 per person per day in 2005 PPP$, which counts more than 800-million Chinese as middle-class in 2005. Are you kidding?$2 -\$20 per day!

6. For example, in the2008 Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), which samples the entire popu-lation (both urban and rural) except for Tibet, when respondents wereasked to place themselves on a ten-step ladder from the lowest to thehighest status group in society, 58.2 percent ranked themselves in themiddle positions, 5 through 7.

Interesting! Most people are quite satisfied with their status.

Note that this survey is taken in 2008.

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23. Feb 2022
24. s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com
1. 1

Note: 1. Eighty-four percent of autocracies from 1946 to 2010 had a ruling party (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010), and 57 percent of these parties failed to outlive the founding leader (Meng 2019).

2. 2

Note: 2. I use the terms “authoritarian regime” and “dictatorship” synonymously. I also use the terms “dictator,” “authoritarian leader,” and “president” interchangeably.

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25. Jan 2022
26. s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com
1. I claim that constitutional rules thatdesignate a formal successor play a critical role in promoting peaceful leadershiptransitions in dictatorships

to designate a formal successor

2. Figure 1. Autocratic leadership transitions, 1946 to 2014.

peaceful vs. unpeaceful power transitions:

From 1946 to 2014, only 44 percent of autocratic leadership transitions were peaceful and resulted in the continuation of the regime after the departure of the incumbent.

3. regimes that formally designate the vice president asthe successor are more likely to undergo peaceful transitions

leadership succession, authoritarian regime, constitutional rules, Africa

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27. Local file Local file
1. 1.1 Bernoulli distribution

$$Y \sim f_{B}(y ; \theta)= \begin{cases}\theta^{y}(1-\theta)^{1-y} & \forall y \in\{0,1\} \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}$$

$$E[Y]=\theta$$

$$var(Y)=\theta(1-\theta)$$

2. 1.6 conclusion

The key innovation in the likelihood framework is treating the observed data as fixed and asking what combination of probability model and parameter values are the most likely to have generated these specific data.

3. maximum likelihood: general

General Steps

• Step 1: Express the joint probability of the data.
• Step 2: Convert the joint probability into a likelihood.
• Step 3: Use the chosen stochastic and systematic components to specify a probability model and functional form.
• Step 4: Simplify the expression by first taking the log and then eliminating terms that do not depend on unknown parameters.
• Step 5: Find the extrema of this expression either analytically or by writing a program that uses numerical tools to identify maxima and minima.
4. Definition 1.1 (Sum of squared errors (SSE))

$$\mathrm{SSE}=\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left[y_{i}-\left(\beta_{0}+\beta_{1} x_{i}\right)\right]^{2}$$

\begin{aligned} &\hat{\beta}_{0}=\bar{y}-\hat{\beta}_{1} \bar{x} \\ &\hat{\beta}_{1}=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(y_{i}-\bar{y}\right)\left(x_{i}-\bar{x}\right)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(x_{i}-\bar{x}\right)^{2}} \end{aligned}

5. 1.4 Gaussian (normal) distribution

$$Y_i$$

is distributed iid normal with mean $$μ_i$$ and variance$$σ^2$$

$$Y \sim f_{\mathcal{N}}(y ; \boldsymbol{\theta})=\frac{1}{\sqrt{2 \pi \sigma^{2}}} \exp \left[-\frac{(y-\mu)^{2}}{2 \sigma^{2}}\right]$$

6. Rather than consider the data as random and the parameters asfixed, the principle of maximum likelihood treats the observed data as fixedand asks: “What parameter values are most likely to have generated thedata?”

maximum likelihood:

The MLEs are those that provide the density or mass function with the highest likelihood of generating the observed data.

7. 1.3 Bias and mean squared error

Let $$T(X)$$ be an estimator for $$\theta$$. The bias of $$T(X)$$, denoted $$\operatorname{bias}(\theta)$$, is $$\operatorname{bias}(\theta)=\mathrm{E}[T(X)]-\theta$$ The mean squared error, $$\operatorname{MSE}(\theta)$$, is given as \begin{aligned} \operatorname{MSE}(\theta) &=\mathrm{E}\left[(T(X)-\theta)^{2}\right] \ &=\operatorname{var}(T(X))+\operatorname{bias}(\theta)^{2} \end{aligned}

8. 1.2 Binomial distribution

\begin{aligned} X & \sim f_{b}(x ; n, p) \\ \operatorname{Pr}(X=k) &=\left\{\begin{array}{lll} \left(\begin{array}{l} n \\ k \end{array}\right) p^{k}(1-p)^{n-k} & \forall & k \in\{0, \ldots, n\} \\ 0 & \forall & k \notin\{0, \ldots, n\} \end{array}\right. \end{aligned}

where $$\left(\begin{array}{l}n \ k\end{array}\right)=\frac{n !}{k !(n-k) !}$$ and with $$\mathrm{E}[X]=n p$$ and $$\operatorname{var}(X)=n p(1-p)$$ The Bernoulli distribution is a binomial distribution with $$n=1$$.

9. The value of θ that the maximizes the likelihood function is called the maximumlikelihood estimate

Definition of MLE.

10. 4.2 Mixture distribution/mixturemodel

$$f\left(x ; w_{j}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}\right)=\sum_{j=1}^{J} w_{j} g_{j}\left(x ; \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}\right)$$

$$\mathcal{L}\left(w_{j}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} \mid \mathbf{x}\right)=\prod_{i=1}^{n}\left[\sum_{j=1}^{J} w_{j} g_{j}\left(x_{i} ; \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}\right)\right]$$

11. Definition 4.1 (Profile Likelihood)

\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_{p}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{1}\right) & \equiv \max _{\boldsymbol{\theta}_{2}} \mathcal{L}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{1}, \boldsymbol{\theta}_{2}\right) \\ & \equiv \mathcal{L}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{1}, \hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{2}\left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{1}\right)\right) . \end{aligned}

12. 4.1 Uniform distribution

Uniform distribution: $$f(x)= \begin{cases}\frac{1}{b-a} & x \in[a, b] \ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}$$ $$E[x]={a+b\over2}$$ $$var(X)={(b-a)^2\over12}$$

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28. towardsdatascience.com towardsdatascience.com
1. Central Limit Theorem

the Central Limit Theorem tells us the sampling distribution of X̄ is closely approximated to a normal distribution.

2. the sample standard deviation S

3. standard error

4. Generally, bootstrap involves the following steps:
1. A sample from population with sample size n.
2. Draw a sample from the original sample data with replacement with size n, and replicate B times, each re-sampled sample is called a Bootstrap Sample, and there will totally B Bootstrap Samples.
3. Evaluate the statistic of θ for each Bootstrap Sample, and there will be totally B estimates of θ.
4. Construct a sampling distribution with these B Bootstrap statistics and use it to make further statistical inference, such as:
• Estimating the standard error of statistic for θ.
• Obtaining a Confidence Interval for θ.