For example, stochastic quasi-gradient algorithms [3] can be used forthe minimization of function (1).

. Here, we discuss a general formula for the dif-ferentiation of an integral over a volume given by many inequalities

while the absolute likelihood for a continuous random variable to take on any particular value is 0

also been the one with the lowest U.S. contribu-tion, in proportion to that of other participants

Kosovo has been the best managed of the U.S. post–Cold War ven-tures in nation-building.

On aper capita basis, assistance actually rose slightly compared to 1999and 2000. However, assistance dropped in 2002 to about 25 percentof GDP and is projected to fall to 15 to 20 percent of GDP in 2004. Asa consequence, rates of economic growth and increases in personalconsumption have slowed

As a consequence ofthese developments, Kosovo’s economic institutions and policieshave become completely independent from those of the Yugoslavgovernment

Facing disagreement within the international community onhow to tackle these challenges, the UN administration delayed manyof its decisions.

How-ever, a number of key decisions, including the overall budgetaryframework, remain under the control of UNMIK

In each of these institutions, well-qualified expatriate staff memberswere paired with Kosovars.

Thesebranches, which were set up quickly, provide a substantial share oftransaction services in the province.

continued uncertainly over Kosovo’s future status hasonly hardened its ethnic divisions and retarded its democratic devel-opment.

By putting the issueof Kosovo’s final status to one side, the international community hasbeen able to promote a democratic transformation in Belgrade, workout an accommodation between Serbia and Montenegro, defuse acivil conflict in Macedonia, continue to build multiethnic institutionsin Bosnia, and begin the integration of the region into both NATOand the EU.

UN and NATO performed with considerable if not uniform suc-cess the difficult task of persuading the KLA leadership to pursue itsaspirations for power through the open and democratic means offree elections, in which their prospects of prevailing were poor

vast majority of Kosovar Albanian popula-tion respected and were very grateful to the KLA for its role in theirliberation, most preferred to return to the more-mature and-moderate leadership of the LDK for their postconflict governance

UNMIKscheduled municipal elections for October 2000

UN, unlike NATO, could not draw on standing units tosupply the necessary manpower, it was slower in establishing a pres-ence in Kosovo.

humanitarianassistance “pillar” was phased out of the UNMIK structure by July2000.

KFOR continued to play a role by pro-tecting historic cultural sites and by escorting and safeguarding eth-nic minorities in various parts of the province.

, KFOR’s total presence in the province had droppedto 38,820.

SPUs were formed units from single countries, consistingof Italian Carabinieri, the French Gendarmerie, the Spanish GuardiaCivil and other such quasi-military police establishments.

accordance with UNSCR 1244,KFOR assumed policing duties in Kosovo.

TMK was allowed no role indefense, law enforcement, riot control, internal security, or any othertask involved in the maintenance of law and order.

Kosovo 119disaster response, conduct search and rescue, provide humanitarianassistance, assist in demining, and contribute to rebuilding infra-structure and communitie

Many demobilized KLA personnel found their way into the newlycreated Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK), which was established forthat purpose.

When the KFOR commanderattempted to move U.S. forces from the U.S. sector to reinforceMitrovica during the February 2000 crisis there, the U.S. militaryauthorities balked and required the troops to return to the U.S. sec-tor.

Russians agreedthat their forces would serve formally under U.S., but not NATO,command.

The Russian and U.S. defense and foreignministers met in Helsinki on June 18, 1999, and agreed on the termsfor Russia’s participation in KFOR.

KFOR, however, there was an immediate crisis. Russiantroops moved from Bosnia into Kosovo unexpectedly and seized thePristina airport.

Yugoslav forces completed their withdrawal with few diffi-culties by June 20, 1999, the deadline under the agreement.

Local and then general elections were held.

allowed the UnitedStates to reduce the scale of its financial and military commitmentsto only 16 percent of the reconstruction funding and peacekeepingtroops, while retaining adequate influence because of the U.S. posi-tions in the NATO and UN hierarchies and its unparalleled prestigeamong the population of Kosovo.

In contrast withBosnia, therefore, where two and eventually three of the top fourinternational positions were American, all the top spots were Euro-pean in Kosovo, including both the NATO and UN commands andthe leadership of all four UNMIK pillars

U.S. administration wished to maximize European responsibilityfor Kosovo’s reconstruction and democratization

UNHCR assumed responsibility under UN oversight forhumanitarian issues; the OSCE for democratization, the press, andelections; and the EU for reconstruction and development.

All international organizationsoperating in Kosovo (other than NATO) were subordinated to UNauthority, and the most important were assigned specific placeswithin UNMIK’s hierarchy

acknowledging continued Yugoslav sovereignty overKosovo, the resolution assigned all sovereign functions to eitherNATO or the UN.

protecting its own freedom of movement and that of the inter-national civil presence and other international organizations.

conducting border monitoring duties

supporting the work of the international civil presence andcoordinating closely with it

ensuring public safety and order and supervising demining untilthe international civil presence could take over

making postconflict recovery all thatmuch more difficult.

Both the military and the civilauthorities declined to perform important security-related tasks (forinstance, riot control and combating organized crime): the militarybecause it lacked the mandate and the civil because it lacked thecapacity

ugoslavia’s GDP decreased byone-half because of a combination of its involvement in wars inCroatia and Bosnia and its poor economic policies at home.

only as the conflict ended and, consequently, had noopportunity to plan, organize, or recruit in advance

1 million Kosovar Albanians, about 45 percentof the prewar population, had fled or were expelled from theirhomes

LAelements moved in, seeking to install themselves in positions ofauthority before the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)was in a position to assume its new responsibilities fully

A decade of Serbian repression, years of mounting civil conflict, and11 weeks of NATO bombing had driven more than half of Kosovo’spopulation from their homes and destroyed much of the infrastruc-ture and housing stock. Ethnic tensions were white-hot, and thepotential for retributive violence was very high. All elements of theSerbian administration were discredited, and most departed withSerbian forces, leaving Kosovo without the most basic structures ofgovernance.

UNSCR 124

In 1989, then Serbian and subse-quently Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic revoked Kosovo’sautonomous status, disbanded its institutions of local government,imposed direct control from Belgrade, replaced Kosovar Albanianswith Serbs in most official positions, and began to dispossess theKosovar Albanians of their equity in most communally owned enter-prises through a rigged process of “privatization.”

111Chapter SevenKOSOVOSerbs and Albanians have wrestled for control over the territory ofKosovo for hundreds of years.

Success is defined as the ability to promote an enduringtransfer of democratic institutions

Yet the United States can live with undemocratic states as long as they behave responsibly; indeed, some autocratic states such as Jordan are close American allies.

USAID should leave these areas either to multinational or private-sector organizations

they definitely cannot create indigenous institutions capable of maintaining law and order on their own

The U.S. public will not support more large-scale interventions like the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan

President Obama would be better advised to improve it.

Department of Peace

Today the U.S. is engaged in nation-building not only in Iraq and Afghanistan but also, on a smaller scale, in Chad, the Philippines, Colombia and Mexico

The Bush administration associated nation-building with the hated policies of the Clinton administration and refused to prepare for it.

disaster that struck Afghanistan in the 1990s

Many Americans drew the lesson that we should stay away from nation-building. It never seemed to register with the public that subsequent forays into nation-building, in Bosnia and Kosovo, were more successful. There is no doubt that helping to create a functioning state where there is none is difficult, especially when resources commensurate to the task aren't committed, as was the case in Somalia. But Somalia also shows why nation-building is unavoidable.

Before long, U.S. special operations forces were trying to hunt down the notorious warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. One such mission in 1993 led to the "Black Hawk Down" fiasco in which 19 U.S. servicemen were killed

country's distrust

If the U.S. and its allies are to address national security challenges successfully, then there is no choice but to engage in nation-building

In the 1990s, the post-Cold War desire to spend the "peace dividend" led the U.S. to turn a blind eye to the rising threat from Al Qaeda

Tilly's claim is that democratic breakthroughs occur -- for example, in Mexico -- when trust networks are integrated into public politics through broadened participation and binding consultations between the state and those networks; state rules gain the support of social networks, while the networks acquire a stake in responsible government.

His argument is that democracy is made possible not by general social attitudes of tolerance and trust but by the workings of "trust networks" -- religious sects, trade diasporas, craft associations, patron-client ties, credit networks, kinship groups, mutual aid societies, and many others -- that become indispensable for state rule.

In the age of terrorism, Ackerman argues, American democracy must, in effect, tie itself to the mast by creating in advance delimited emergency powers with requirements for repeated congressional authorization and specific time limits.

Ackerman thinks that the United States panicked in the aftermath of 9/11 and rushed the Patriot Act into law.

they trigger public panic and lead politicians to pass restrictive laws with the promise of greater security.

At the same time, it should recognize its own limitations; America has many strengths, but nation-building is not one of them.

In any event, letting others lead does not equate with “nation-building at home.” The latter is neither more nor less than prettified isolationism

Washington should take a back seat to other states—such as Britain, France, and Turkey—whose personnel have greater historical, linguistic, and/or cultural familiarity with the needs of those they seek to assist

states like Sweden and Australia that are not perceived to have an ideological agenda.

that does not necessarily mean that it should

Similarly, while Americans and other Westerners might recoil at the thought, Shari'a law is the rule of law; indeed, Shari'a antedates the Magna Carta by centuries. For this reason, it should come as no surprise that societies that long have lived under Shari'a in full or partial form do not necessarily respond well when Americans speak of imparting to them notions of the rule of law.

misapprehension, for that is what it is, is the notion of spreading democracy worldwide.

many Americans are of the view that what is good for them is ipso facto good for others.

both are critical to understanding the dynamics of any society

Bosnia, where stability remains fragile

Finally, security issues overshadowed development programs, and both in Iraq, and increasingly in Afghanistan once a revived Taliban threatened that country’s stability, the results were poorly planned projects that led to tens of billions of dollars in waste, fraud, and abuse.

Iraqis remained more loyal to their tribes, ethnic groups, and co-religionists than to what was, after all, an artificially created state.

Moreover, the relatively small military presence in the country ensured that it was traditional aid organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, as well as other civilian agencies, such as Save the Children and Oxfam, that took the lead in helping to put Afghanistan back on its feet.

What Afghanistan required, and its leadership requested, was support for the central government’s attempts to assert its authority throughout the country.

Nation-building became the subject of political debate in the 1990s, when it took on a specific connotation in the aftermath of the Balkan wars. The emergence of six new states from the ashes of the former Yugoslavia was accompanied by a need for outside support to foster good governance; ensure civilian control of the military; provide for the rule of law; encourage free enterprise; expand educational opportunity for men and women; and nurture civil society, such as trade and professional unions and a free press. At issue was whether, and to what extent, the Clinton administration should undertake such efforts, and, more particularly, whether military forces stationed in the Balkans were the appropriate vehicles for doing so.

Searching for a systematic impact, Haas argues that the degree of ideological "distance" between great powers has been crucial in how their leaders define interests and perceive threats.

Institutional lessons that were learned in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia were not effectively passed on to the Bush administration -- as has been painfully revealed by the ongoing U.S. occupation and reconstruction of Iraq.