Though I am now come to a conclusionof what obvious remarks have suggested to me concerningeducation, I would not have it thought, that I look on it as a justtreatise on this subject. There are a thousand other things that may need consideration;especially if one should take in the various tempers, different inclinations, andparticular defaults, that are to be found in children; and prescribe proper remedies.The variety is so great, that it would require a volume

The Lord’s prayer, the creed, and ten commandments, it is necessary he shouldlearn perfectly by heart; but, I think, not by reading them himself in his primer, but bysomebody’s repeating them to him, even before he can read

We cannot find any sect that teachesexpressly and openly, that men are not obliged to keep their promise; that princes maybe dethroned by those that differ from them in religion; or that the dominion of allthings belongs only to themselves. For these things, proposed thus nakedly andplainly, would soon draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate, and awaken allthe care of the commonwealth to a watchfulness against the spreading of so dangerousan evil. But nevertheless, we find those that say the same things in other words. Whatelse do they mean, who teach that, “faith is not to be kept with heretics?”

he case of idolaters in respect of the jewish commonwealth, falls under a doubleconsideration. The first is of those, who, being initiated into the Mosaical rites, andmade citizens of that commonwealth, did afterwards apostatize from the worship ofthe God of Israel. These were proceeded against as traitors and rebels, guilty of noless than high treason; for the commonwealth of the jews, different in that from allothers, was an absolute theocracy

Now whosoever maintains that idolatry is to be rooted out of any place by laws,punishments, fire, and sword, may apply this story to himself. For the reason of thething is equal, both in America and Europe. And neither pagans there, nor anydissenting christians here, can with any right be deprived of their worldly goods, bythe predominating faction of a court-church; nor are any civil rights to be eitherchanged or violated upon account of religion in one place more than another.

ask, what power can be given to the magistrate for thesuppression of an idolatrous church, which may not, in time and place, be made use ofto the ruin of an orthodox one?

Having thus at length freed men from all dominion over one another in matters ofreligion, let us now consider what they are to do. All men know and acknowledge thatGod ought to be publicly worshipped. Why otherwise do they compel one anotherunto the public assemblies? Men therefore constituted in this liberty are to enter intosome religious society, that they may meet together, not only for mutual edification,but to own to the world that they worship God, and offer unto his divine majesty suchservice as they themselves are not ashamed of, and such as they think not unworthy ofhim, nor unacceptable to him; and finally, that by the purity of doctrine, holiness oflife, and decent form of worship, they may draw others unto the love of the truereligion, and perform such other things in religion as cannot be done by each privateman apart.

The one only narrow way which leads to heaven is notbetter known to the magistrate than to private persons, and therefore I cannot safelytake him for my guide, who may probably be as ignorant of the way as myself, andwho certainly is less concerned for my salvation than I myself am. Amongst so manykings of the jews, how many of them were there whom any Israelite, thus blindlyfollowing, had not fallen into idolatry, and thereby into destruction?

For churches have neither any jurisdiction in worldly matters,nor are fire and sword any proper instruments wherewith to convince men’s minds oferrour, and inform them of the truth.

What I say concerning the mutual toleration of private persons differing from oneanother in religion, I understand also of particular churches; which stand as it were inthe same relation to each other as private persons among themselves; nor has any oneof them any manner of jurisdiction over any other, no not even when the civilmagistrate, as it sometimes happens, comes to be of this or the other communion

But since men are so solicitous about the true church, I would only ask them here bythe way, if it be not more agreeable to the Church of Christ to make the conditions ofher communion consist in such things, and such things only, as the Holy Spirit has inthe Holy Scriptures declared, in express words, to be necessary to salvation? I ask, Isay, whether this be not more agreeable to the church of Christ, than for men toimpose their own inventions and interpretations upon others, as if they were of divineauthority; and to establish by ecclesiastical laws, as absolutely necessary to theprofession of Christianity, such things as the Holy Scriptures do either not mention, orat lest not expressly command?

Let us now consider what a church is. A church then I take to be a voluntary societyof men, joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the publicworshipping of God, in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectualto the salvation of their souls

n the third place, The care of the salvation of men’s souls cannot belong to themagistrate; because, though the rigour of laws and the force of penalties were capableto convince and change men’s minds, yet would not that help at all to the salvation oftheir souls.

In the second place, The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, becausehis power consists only in outward force: but true and saving religion consists in theinward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. Andsuch is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force.

There is another power in every commonwealth, which one may call natural, because it isthat which answers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into society: for though in acommonwealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another, and as such asgoverned by the laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one body, whichis, as every member of it before was, still in the state of nature with the rest of mankind.

THE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of thecommonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it

oth Biden’s proposed national task force and the EU’s Digital Services Act represent key opportunities for developing new regulatory approaches mandating greater transparency and accountability in content moderation, algorithmic decisionmaking, and risk assessment.

The problem of gendered and racialized harassment and abuse targeting women political leaders extends far beyond the online realm: traditional media outlets, political parties, and civil society all have crucial roles to play in committing to and modeling a more respectful and humane political discourse.

Of course, governments can take action beyond passing and enforcing platform regulations. They can promote digital citizenship education in school curricula to ensure that teenagers and young adults develop the skills to recognize and report inappropriate online conduct and to communicate respectfully online.

Other countries have passed laws that make social media companies responsible for the removal of illegal material. For example, in 2017, Germany introduced a new law that requires platforms to remove hate speech or illegal content within twenty-four hours or risk millions of dollars in fines. However, this approach has raised strong concerns among human rights activists, who argue that this measure shifts the responsibility to social media companies to determine what constitutes legal speech without providing adequate mechanisms for judicial oversight or judicial remedy. In June 2020, the French constitutional court struck down a similar law due to concerns about overreach and censorship. French feminist and antiracist organizations had previously criticized the measure, noting that it could restrict the speech of those advocating against hate and extremism online and that victims would benefit more from sustained investments in existing legal remedies.

Female politicians often report that law enforcement officials do not take their experiences with online threats and abuse seriously enough; legal reforms and prosecution guidelines can help change this pattern. However, efforts to go after individual perpetrators are insufficient to tackle the current scale of misogynistic online harassment and abuse targeting women politicians and women and girls more generally: even if applicable legal frameworks exist, thresholds for prosecution are often set very high and not all victims want to press charges.

In 2019, Mexico passed a new law that specifically targets gendered online abuse: it punishes, with up to nine years in prison, those who create or disseminate intimate images or videos of women or attack women on social networks. The law also includes the concept of “digital violence” in the Mexican penal code.

Given tech companies’ limited action to date, democratic governments also have a responsibility to do more. Rather than asking social media companies to become the final arbiters of online speech, they should advance broader regulatory frameworks that require platforms to become more transparent about their moderation practices and algorithmic decisionmaking, as well as ensure compliance through independent monitoring and accountability mechanisms. Governments also have an important role to play in supporting civil society advocacy, research, and public education on gendered and racialized patterns of online abuse, including against political figures.

In addition, they could improve their risk assessment practices prior to launching new products or tools or before expanding into a new political and cultural context. At the moment, content moderation is often siloed from product design and engineering, which means that social media companies are permanently focused on investigating and redressing complaints instead of building mechanisms that “increase friction” for users and make it harder for gendered hate speech and disinformation to spread in the first place

In addition, they could improve their risk assessment practices prior to launching new products or tools or before expanding into a new political and cultural context

mplify gendered and racialized hate speech—a step that some organizations have suggested to help address pandemic-related mis/disinformation. As part of this process, companies could disclose and explain their content-shaping algorithms and ad-targeting systems, which currently operate almost entirely beyond public scrutiny.

Online abuse that relies on sensational language and images targeting female politicians thus tends to spread rapidly. Higher levels of engagement generate more user behavior data that brings in advertising revenue, which means social media companies currently have few financial incentives to change the status quo.

The move to more automated content moderation is unlikely to solve the problem of widespread and culturally specific gendered and racialized online abuse. Until now, social media companies have used automated tools primarily for content that is easier to identify computationally. Yet these tools are blunt and often biased.

social media companies currently do not disclose their exact guidelines on what constitutes hate speech and harassment or how they implement those guidelines. To address this problem, nonprofits such as Glitch and ISD have suggested that social media platforms allow civil society organizations and independent researchers to access and analyze their data on the number and nature of complaints received, disaggregated by gender, country, and the redress actions taken.

book recently created an Oversight Board tasked with improving the platform’s decisionmaking around content moderation—yet many experts are highly skeptical of the board’s ability to drive change given its limited scope and goals. Twitter reportedly increased enforcement of its hate speech and abuse policies in the second half of 2019, as well as expanded its definition of dehumanizing speech. However, its policies to date lack a clear focus on the safety of women and other marginalized groups. Broader reforms are urgently needed.

In Canada, a social enterprise created ParityBOT, a bot that detects problematic tweets about women candidates and responds with positive messages, thus serving both as a monitoring mechanism and a counterbalancing tool.

However, online abuse and sexist narratives targeting politically active women are not just the product of everyday misogyny: they are reinforced by political actors and deployed as a political strategy. Illiberal political actors often encourage online abuse against female political leaders and activists as a deliberate tactic to silence oppositional voices and push feminist politicians out of the political arena.

In many societies, the characteristics traditionally associated with politicians—such as ambition and assertiveness—tend to be coded “male,” which means that women who display these traits may be perceived as transgressing traditional social norms. Online harassment of women seeking political power could thus be understood as a form of gender role enforcement, facilitated by anonymity

Women in politics are also frequent targets of gendered disinformation campaigns, defined as the spreading of deceptive or inaccurate information and images. Such campaigns often create story lines that draw on misogyny and gender stereotypes. For example, a recent analysis shows that immediately following Kamala Harris’s nomination as the 2020 U.S. vice presidential candidate, false claims about Harris were being shared at least 3,000 times per hour on Twitter, in what appeared to be a coordinated effort. Similar tactics have been used throughout Europe and in Brazil. The disproportionate a

In India, for example, an Amnesty International investigation found that one in every seven tweets that mentioned women politicians was problematic or abusive—and that both Muslim women politicians and women politicians belonging to marginalized castes received substantially more abuse than those from other social groups.

Yet over the past several years, the gendered and racialized nature of the phenomenon has received increasing policy attention, as women appear to be disproportionately targeted by online abuse and disinformation attacks.

If effectively designed and implemented, the EU’s Digital Services Act and U.S. President-elect Joe Biden’s proposed National Task Force on Online Harassment and Abuse will represent steps in the right direction.

For example, a recent analysis of the 2020 U.S. congressional races found that female candidates were significantly more likely to receive online abuse than their male counterparts.

In 2017, soon after then Ukrainian member of parliament Svitlana Zalishchuk gave a speech to the United Nations on the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on women, a fake tweet began to circulate on social media claiming that she had promised to run naked through the streets of Kiev if Russia-backed separatists won a critical battle. Zalishchuk said, “The story kept circulating on the Internet for a year,” casting a shadow over her political accomplishments.

The sides flip once more on immigration. Congressional Republicans want to preempt state power to prevent Democratic cities from becoming sanctuary cities. Meanwhile, congressional Democrats are fighting to protect state and local rights to resist Trump administration policies against sanctuary cities.

For instance, the Trump administration is trying to remove tough environmental regulations — and state and national Democratic leaders are resisting by turning to state power. Just a few years ago, when Democrats controlled the House, Democratic Party leaders in Congress passed federal bills that forced states to set minimum environmental protection standards, for example, by regulating the use of lead pipes that carry drinking water.

Democrats, by contrast, are much more likely to limit state power by setting floor preemptions, or minimum standards that states must meet but can exceed if they want to. For example, such a law might set a federal emission standard for a particular industry but allow states to enact tougher emissions standards.Yes, Mitch McConnell’s secretive lawmaking really is unusual — in these 4 waysAs shown in the charts below, we find that when Democrats controlled the House between 1990 and 2012, 57 percent of preemption laws enacted were floors. By contrast, when Republicans controlled the House, 33 percent of laws enacted with preemption statutes were floors; the remaining 67 percent were ceilings limiting state regulatory power.

For example, Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush each signed 64 preemption statutes into law during their respective eight years in office. Similarly, between 1990 and 2012, no matter which party controlled the House of Representatives, roughly the same average number of preemption policies became law each year

The United States has a federal system, which means that state and federal governments divide and share power to make and enforce laws. As the chart below shows, the federal government has a long history of enacting laws that preempt, or limit, states’ and localities’ policymaking powers.

Is this a partisan reversal on states’ rights? Our research suggests not. Rather, both parties have historically promoted or preempted states’ rights depending on their party’s political goals for a given issue.

Perhaps most notably, California will be able to continue on its ambitious path of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The state’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, signed into law by a Republican governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, set in place regulations and market mechanisms to lower California’s emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.

The state is also expanding its grid market to neighboring states to increase the grid’s flexibility during times of production overcapacity. For example, daily electricity demand increases in Arizona when people get home from work, a time when California may have an overabundance of renewable energy that it could sell to Arizona. Because the sun sets in the two states at different times, peak electricity demand in Arizona (near the end of the day) may overlap with peak solar production in California (near the middle of the day).

“We really have to start talking about green states and brown states. There are about a dozen states” — many of them in Republican control — “with very strong renewable portfolio standards and very strong utility energy efficiency programs, and utilities are going to be the prime movers in building the electric vehicle charging infrastructure.” 

The Trump administration could hamstring California’s energy programs by cutting funding for a broad range of federal energy programs that support national laboratories, universities, and private companies. If, for example, the U.S. Department of Energy decides to cut funding for energy efficiency, California’s Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, which focuses on energy-efficient technology, might be vulnerable.

The Trump administration could also seize on a California policy it opposes, such as the state’s opposition to immigrant deportation, to justify cutting federal funding to the state, creating a budget crisis that would hinder California’s ambitious energy programs. Trump threatened such cuts earlier this month in response to proposed state legislation prohibiting state and local law enforcement officials from upholding federal immigration laws. “If we have to, we’ll defund,” Trump told Fox News interviewer Bill O’Reilly. “We give tremendous amounts of money to California. California in many ways is out of control.” But using such a blunt weapon to punish the state could threaten California’s economy, the sixth largest in the world, and could impede the vast economic expansion that Trump has promised his policies will deliver.

The Trump administration’s greatest point of leverage against California’s environmental policies is the air pollution waiver given to the state in the 1970 Clean Air Act. The waiver acknowledged the state’s severe smog problem and the precedent-setting car emissions regulations California devised to reduce air pollution by allowing the state to establish more stringent standards than the federal government’s. Since then, a dozen other states have agreed to follow California’s emissions policies, which means that about 40 percent of American cars are covered by its rules. That number is so large that car manufacturers generally design all their vehicles to meet California standards instead of producing one model for California regulations and another for federal ones. The result is that California’s policies drive technological change in the transportation sector, not just nationally, but internationally. 

What’s at stake in this face-off is California’s ability to maintain its own relatively rigorous environmental laws and regulations as the Trump administration loosens environmental provisions at the federal level. Implicit in the battle is a striking reversal of roles, in which environmentalists who once championed federal power over states now support states’ rights, while Trump appointees who once argued for states’ rights consider how to squelch California’s renegades. Neither side is likely to emerge with an all-out victory: While the Trump administration may use budget cuts, deregulation, and legislative pruning to box in the state, experts say, it has no way to prevent California from continuing on an independent path in key environmental domains.

All this puts the state on a collision course with President Donald J. Trump, who has made clear through his statements and appointments that he is ready to disregard the threat of climate change and stress fossil fuels as a path to robust economic growth. In response, California’s leaders, all Democrats, have expressed defiance. 

More than two decades before the U.S. Congress passed the Clean Air Act, California became the first state to enact air pollution legislation, in 1947. The state’s Air Resources Board, widely considered the most powerful air pollution regulatory agency in the world, has used its authority to prod hybrid and electric cars into widespread commercial use. Spurred by the nation’s strongest and most innovative building code, new buildings in California now use about 75 percent less energy than pre-code buildings, and have saved enough energy to head off construction of the equivalent of seven 500-megawatt natural gas-fired power plants. 

Prof. ROOSEVELT: Well to the extent that the term activism has any useful meaning, I think we would say it's, how often does a judge vote to strike down a state or a federal law? And if you ask that question, the answer is that conservatives are actually more activists than the liberals on the current Supreme Court. You'll see this in cases like affirmative action. So there, you know, you've got a pretty vague provision in the Constitution. It doesn't say race shall never be a factor in university admissions, it just says equal protection of the laws. But the conservative justices have said, essentially, race shall never be a factor and they're not getting that from the Constitution, they're getting it, presumably, from their views of good policy and they're saying our views are going to control not the views of the democratically elected representatives.

The term itself, I think, comes into use about 60 years ago, but the basic idea has been around for a lot longer. And the basic idea is a judge who's an activist is making decisions not based on the law but based on what that judge thinks is good policy. So, when the Supreme Court in the early 20th Century was striking down progressive laws, President Theodore Roosevelt criticized judges for legislating from the benches, when the Supreme Court was fighting back against Franklin Roosevelt's new deal in the 1930s, he said the same sort of things. In fact, you know, you could go back to Abraham Lincoln who thought the Supreme Court was pro-slavery and criticized those judges for making policy.

Advocates argue that efforts to suppress gun research have resulted in more lives lost. They say applying science to other public health issues like motor vehicle deaths and smoking saved lives without banning cars and cigarettes.

"Anyone who thinks there's a lack of researchers studying firearms has been ignoring the headlines," Lars Dalseide, an NRA spokesman, told The Boston Globe. "The fact is, a number of studies are released every year. While most are tainted with preconceived outcomes in search of supporting data, there is plenty of funding in that arena."

But the center's budget was eventually cut by $2.5 million, and Rosenberg was fired in 1999.

The NRA was motivated to support the amendment after a landmark 1993 study that concluded that having a gun in the home was more dangerous than not having one.

The Democrats wrote that part of the bill in order to reverse the Dickey Amendment of 1996, which many believe virtually halted all research on gun violenc

The growing momentum for tighter gun control after the deadly school shooting in Parkland, Fla., is highlighting the National Rifle Association's history of aggressively confronting challenges to what it regards as Second Amendment rights.

We find that the political leanings of local voters do matter for police practicesbut only in cities with unreformed governmental structures, where municipal depart-ments like the police can be expected to be more exposed to politics. Curiously, andunlike some prior studies, we do not find a direct, significant influence of voter parti-sanship on the orientation of the city council toward immigration enforcement.

The findings suggest that both the demographic threat thesis and the partisanshipthesis are too simple to fully explain why some cities and police departments embraceimmigration enforcement. Contrary to the threat hypothesis, the rate of increase in thelocal proportion of immigrants, all else equal, is not associated with our measures ofcity policy or police practices. And in fact, cities with high shares of immigrants in thepopulation tend to experience less aggressive enforcement.

Lewis et al. Why Do Police Departments Enforce Immigration Law? 13This measure represents the degree of aggressiveness in immigration policingpractices. Cities range widely across this 7-point scale; the mean police department,according to its chief, would engage in immigration enforcement in 3.9 situations, witha SD of 2.0. The spread of cities over this scale followed a normal distribution.'^ Weuse this 7-point ordinal measure, the police enforcement practices scale, as a dependentvariable in the multivariate analysis

Thefive possible response options can be viewed as an ordinal measure of how enforcementoriented a local government is regarding unauthorized immigrants. Starting with themost overtly «onenforcement response, chiefs in a relative handful of cities (4%) indi-cated that "our local government has openly declared this a 'sanctuary' community forunauthorized immigrants who are not engaged in criminal activities." A considerablylarger share (15%) replied that "Our local government supports an unwritten, informalpolicy of 'don't ask—don't tell' regarding unauthorized immigrants living in or trave-ling through our jurisdiction unless they are involved in serious crime." Importantly,a plurality of chiefs responding to the question indicated that their "local governmenthas no official policy vis-à-vis unauthorized immigrants living in or traveling throughour jurisdiction" (46%). Thus, having a local policy regarding unauthorized immigra-tion is hardly a ubiquitous characteristic of medium and large American cities.Leaning toward the/jra-enforcement side of the spectrum, 18% of chiefs said thattheir local government "has developed, or is developing, policies designed to encour-age local law enforcement to participate with federal authorities in controlling certainkinds of crime associated with unauthorized immigration." The most overtly enforce-ment oriented are the 12% of cities whose chiefs reported that their local governments

Beyond partisan leanings, a high proportion of Latino residents in the populationmight lead local policymakers to avoid aggressive immigration enforcement, as themajority of immigrants in many cities are from Latin America. In this view, Latinoresidents who are US citizens and voters act as political proxies for the interests ofimmigrants. Some US-born Latinos may identify with Latino immigrants due to co-ethnic bonds, whereas other Latino US citizens are themselves immigrants who havenaturalized. Of course, where Latinos are politically powerful, there are more likelyto be Latino elected officials as well, and these officials may have sufficient influenceto advance the interests of immigrants. Conceivably, cities with a large Asian share ofthe population may experience a similar political dynamic, although the limited sizeof the Asian population in most areas and the framing of the illegal immigration issuearound Mexican nationals suggest the relationship will be weaker for Asians.

Lewis et al. Why Do Police Departments Enforce Immigration Law?and the degree to which residents or elites who are US natives perceive a "threat" fromthe entry of new immigrants, (b) the community's proximity to national borders, (c)the political context of the community and the lines of authority between elected offi-cials and police, and (d) organizational characteristics of the police department itselfBelow we consider, in turn, each of these sets of potential determinants of policepractices regarding immigration enforcement.Demographic Change and "Threat"Whether and how the proximity of minority or subordinated groups to majority ordominant groups affects public attitudes and public policies has long been a matter ofdebate in the social sciences. A line of work dating at least to Key (1949) and Blalock(1967) suggests that white Americans living in areas with large and visible concentra-tions of minorities are more likely to act in response to perceptions of "threat," gen-erating prejudiced attitudes and repressive policies (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Gilesand Buckner 1993). The competing "contact hypothesis" suggests that the racial atti-tudes of white Americans tend to moderate or soften over time from frequent contactswith racial or ethnic minorities in schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods (Ha 2010;Oliver and Wong 2003; Welch et al. 2001).=To date, the threat hypothesis has focused mainly on the effects that racial con-text has on individual attitudes toward race or ethnicity. Extrapolating this idea to thelevel of municipalities, it could be hypothesized that local policy, and possibly localadministrative practices (Keiser, Mueser, and Choi 2004), will be more restrictive orrepressive toward a minority group when demographic changes are perceived by thedominant group as threatening. Most studies of racial threat have focused on relationsbetween whites and African Americans. The case of immigrants and Latinos is muchless well investigated (but see Chandler and Tsai 2001; Ha 2010; Hopkins 2010; Hoodand Morris 1997; Huddy and Sears 1995; Quillian 1995). Some case studies and jour-nalistic accounts suggest that cities in the main path of immigrant settlement attemptto "deñect" further immigration (Light 2006). However, other cities in such situationshave taken steps to welcome newcomers (Mitnik, Halpern-Finnerty, and Vidal 2008).Hopkins (2010) suggests a more nuanced pattern, providing evidence that when rapidgrowth in immigrants in a particular area occurs in combination with intense nationalnews media coverage of immigration-related issues, attitudes of residents becomemore hostile and local governments are more likely to consider anti-immigrant legis-lation. Taken as a whole, this vein of literature suggests that the proportion of immi-grants in a community, and recent increases in that proportion, will be associated withthe consideration of restrictive policies toward immigrants.

An additional complication is that the city government's policy choices may beinfluenced by its police department's practices regarding immigration enforcement.Some city governments may formulate policy in this area in response to police depart-ment requests for certain types of legislation, or due to political pressure or contro-versy generated by prior police activity. We

At least two kinds of legislative pressures bear on local police agencies in their interac-tions with immigrants. First, an increasing number of states and local governmentshave passed legislation specifically authorizing or requiring local police to assume amore proactive posture in identifying unauthorized immigrants. Arizona's SB 1070,for instance, requires local police to check for immigration violations when theyencounter someone they suspect may be an unauthorized immigrant and forbids localgovernments from limiting police cooperation with federal immigration authorities.Similar laws were passed in other states, but their legitimacy has been challenged inthe courts. In its June 2012 decision in US v. Arizona (567 US (2012)), the USSupreme Court placed strict limits on the power of police to detain the persons fheystop to check immigration status, whereas nevertheless allowing the law's so-called"show me your papers" provision to stand. The courts are also considering claims thatracial profiling will be encouraged by such laws.The second source of legislative pressure is the federal government. Congressenacted two laws in 1996 thaf specified several enforcement and intelligence roles for localpolice that had been formerly the province of federal immigration authorities. The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act gave local police the authority to arrest previ-ously deported noncitizen felons, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and ImmigrantResponsibility Act (IIRIRA) authorized training of local and state police to enforce fed-eral immigration laws. In addition, the Clear Law Enforcement for Alien Removal Act,introduced into the House of Representatives in 2005 (H.R. 3137) and reintroduced in2009 (H.R. 2406), aimed to both criminalize unauthorized presence in the United States(making it a felony) and allow local police to detain, investigate, and arrest alleged unau-thorized immigrants. Some have dubbed fhis trend toward devolution of federal author-ity to local police as "immigration federalism" (Huntington 2008; Spiro 1997).

The engagement of local police in the enforcement of federal immigration lawsraises enduring theoretical issues regarding the political control of bureaucracies,albeit in a different context from the mostly national-level studies of regulatory agen-cies that characterize this literature.

ges in federal legislation and by rising popular pressure to "do something"about unauthorized immigration, an increasing number of local governmentsauthorized or required their police departments to participate in the identificationof unauthorized immigrants and to cooperate with federal enforcement efforts ledby the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division of the Departmentof Homeland Security.

We find fhat immigranf-supportive cify policy commitments and fhepresence of a Hispanic police chief are associated with less intensive immigration enforce-ment by local police. Voter partisanship is also related to police practices, but only in citieswifh an unreformed form of government

I’ve long been frustrated with the “distance” between criticism and reading itself. Most critical energy is expended in big-picture work — situating texts in history, talking about broad themes — all of which is useful but hardly touches the excitement of actual reading, a process of discovery that happens in time, moment by moment, line by line. What I really want is someone rolling around in the text. I want noticing. I want, in short, marginalia, everywhere, all the time. Suddenly that seems deliriously possible