forbidden taboo

to have a conversation

Pepe Acacho17 (the current vice-president of the CONAIE) and Monica Chuj i explained that nature, as well as rights, are inexact translations of the indigenous vision. Yet the struggle of these communities needed a springboard toward an outside world that would otherwise not listen, and they found this springboard in the translation of Kichwa

of the Amazon. This vision, in Kichwa, is called Sumak Kawsay, translated as 'good living' and signalling the idea of a non-linear and non-progressive kind of development which takes into account community ties and relations to the natural environment.15 The idea of rights , already familiar to

tice. Presenting nature-as-subject as a lesson drawn from indigenous ways of life effectively erased the differences between different kinds of rights, and the fact that the various ways in which indigenous communities relate to nature cannot and do not contain classic legal-theoretical

Several scholars note the efficacy of New Zealand’s approach to environmental personhood. Dana Zartner, international law scholar, recently wrote that, “while still new and relatively untested, Te Awa Tupua, is probably the most successful rights of nature law in existence.”183 Other commentators have observed that, by reason of its precision, New Zealand’s mode of statutory recognition may avoid a main criticism typically directed at environmental personhood regimes, namely, ambiguity in application (as considered above).184 The benefits of the inclusion of a number of stakeholders in the organizational structure of New Zealand’s statutory rights of nature has also been emphasized.185 Finally, Gordon notes that the strength of the New Zealand statutes is derived from the dual “legal and cultural heft” the statutes embody.186 The Te Urewera Act and the Te Awa Tupua Act contain several elements that can be characterized as best practice.187 Namely, those statutes prioritize First Nations interests by the creation of representative entities with Māori membership.188 Therefore, critically, those entities include independent non-government representatives.189 In addition, the statutes provide a detailed organizational structure for the management of the representative entities.190 The representative entities are embedded within the governance of the ecosystems, meaning that the rights of the relevant ecosystem can be protected through policy-making processes rather than merely by litigation.191 Finally, the statutes operationalize funding arrangements for the management of the ecosystems.192

A survey of international rights of nature frameworks reveals that the types of rights of nature broadly fall into the following categories:122 a) positive enumerated rights (including to “exist,” “thrive,” and “be restored”) granted to nature as a whole (“all of nature rights”) and b) rights by analogy to a legal person granted to particular ecosystems (“narrow personhood rights”).123 In some cases, these categories overlap. The standing mechanisms accompanying these frameworks differ. Generally, in respect of all of nature rights a liberalized standing model is adopted to enable all persons or all citizens of the relevant country to enforce nature’s rights. Narrow personhood rights tend to limit standing to a representative entity tasked with speaking as the voice of the relevant ecosystem.

A survey of international rights of nature frameworks reveals that the types of rights of nature broadly fall into the following categories:122 a) positive enumerated rights (including to “exist,” “thrive,” and “be restored”) granted to nature as a whole (“all of nature rights”) and b) rights by analogy to a legal person granted to particular ecosystems (“narrow personhood rights”).123 In some cases, these categories overlap.

Under the Te Awa Tupua Act, the vesting of the Crown-owned parts of the bed of the Whanganui River in Te Awa Tupua does not transfer a proprietary interest in water to its representative entity or to the Whanganui iwi.108 Moreover, Te Pou Tupua’s consent is not required to use water from the River.109 On that basis, critics claim that the statute does not sufficiently enhance the Whanganui iwi’s ability to manage the River.110 331

Conversely, in Western jurisprudence the emergence of the concept of environmental personhood can be traced to Christopher Stone’s seminal 1972 essay “Should Trees Have Standing?” in which the American professor argued that the natural environment as a whole should be granted rights15 and be empowered to institute legal proceedings in its own right through a guardian entity.16 This would enable courts to take injury to the environment into account and to award relief that would directly benefit the environment.17 Stone emphasized that environmental personhood was not as radical as it initially appeared, noting that the legal world is populated by inanimate rights-holders: “trusts, corporations, joint ventures . . . to mention just a few.”18 Stone further drew a parallel between granting rights to nature and the history of the conferral of rights on oppressed or minority groups in ways “theretofore, a bit unthinkable.”19

A Māori perspective of the natural world encapsulates a holistic epistemological world view. Our ways of knowing, being and doing are connected with Papatūānuku (earth mother), Ranginui (sky father) and their many children,

including Tangaroa (oceans).

Maori epistemologies