6 Matching Annotations
  1. Nov 2017
    1. The response may be one of feeling blamed or held responsible for the sins of the forbearers and/or to deny contemporary complicity with practices of injustice. Sapphire makes the appeal to history and tradition and asks, how can an authentic ethic of justice be separated from where we have been and who we have been to one another? The contemporary scene did not emerge from a vacuum; it evolved historically and is immanently contextual. We cannot divorce ourselves from the totality of our history

      I think the most important part of this excerpt is the fact that we cannot run away from the past. The past is there and we have to learn from it. Feeling guilty certainly doesn't help. Townes wants us to recognize and come to terms with our history and learn how to fix it for the future. She is offering hope.

    1. Men, not great enough, nor hard enough, to be entitled as artists to take part in fashioning MAN; men, not sufficiently strong and far-sighted to ALLOW, with sublime self-constraint, the obvious law of the thousandfold failures and perishings to prevail; men, not sufficiently noble to see the radically different grades of rank and intervals of rank that separate man from man:—SUCH men, with their "equality before God," have hitherto swayed the destiny of Europe; until at last a dwarfed, almost ludicrous species has been produced, a gregarious animal, something obliging, sickly, mediocre, the European of the present day.

      In this last portion of part 3, we can hear Nietzsche's anger/frustration with Christianity in particular. He thinks that Christianity is "muddying" the waters of man's true nature. The diction in his writing is the most obvious sign of his tone behind his words. He calls the population of Europe a "gregarious animal"and a "ludicrous species." Although he is quite extreme in his interpretation of the effects of Christianity, we can see this in today's political world, and thus in the societal realm as well. We have become so afraid of hurting someone's feelings to the point that we avoid even offering opinions in general. We fear being cast out of society. We fear that straying from the flock will most certainly lead to our end. We mentioned earlier in class that Nietzsche thinks of people in two groups: wolves and sheep. Should we be the wolves or the sheep? Can we be a wolf in sheep's clothing, or a sheep in wolves' clothing?

    2. (that terrible farce, quite superfluous when judged close at hand, into which, however, the noble and visionary spectators of all Europe have interpreted from a distance their own indignation and enthusiasm so long and passionately, UNTIL THE TEXT HAS DISAPPEARED UNDER THE INTERPRETATION)

      This side note that Nietzsche adds is very insightful to what tends to happen with religion. Sometimes teachers look so deeply into the details that they miss the meaning of the whole piece. I think everyone is guilty of this at one point, but the text also gets lost under the opinions of others. Teachers are taught by teachers are taught by teachers. Thus, there are several layers of interpretation. In order to combat blindly believing popular interpretation, we need to revisit the text ourselves.

    3. The actual "interests" of the scholar, therefore, are generally in quite another direction—in the family, perhaps, or in money-making, or in politics; it is, in fact, almost indifferent at what point of research his little machine is placed, and whether the hopeful young worker becomes a good philologist, a mushroom specialist, or a chemist; he is not CHARACTERISED by becoming this or that. In the philosopher, on the contrary, there is absolutely nothing impersonal; and above all, his morality furnishes a decided and decisive testimony as to WHO HE IS,—that is to say, in what order the deepest impulses of his nature stand to each other.

      Here, Nietzsche compares a scholar to that of a philosopher. A scholar seeks knowledge beyond himself in an "impersonal" way. A scholar seeks knowledge in order to know the ways of science and the like, whereas a philosopher is personally connected to that which he studies: his/her self. A philosopher studies him/herself and how he/she is related to the world based on his/her own morality, not the "morality" of nature, a book, or another person's opinion.

  2. Oct 2017
    1. In regard to content (what is transmitted), it is organized around a stock of established knowledge, and becomes how to use a terminal. In place of “what is true?” we ask, “what use is it?” “Is it saleable?” “Is it efficient?”

      Within the broader university retraining aspect, Lyotard explains what happens to content when students are retrained. The lessons are organized around similar ones, but their points are misused in that we no longer question its validity, but rather we automatically swallow it and then ask how it can be used for our benefit. If the knowledge has nothing to do with our major, for example, we are hesitant to give it much attention because we think we will never use it. Not only is this modern value of efficiency rooted in the way we do business and produce things, it also rears its head in our psychological processes. In simpler terms, we no longer learn for the purpose of learning and gaining knowledge, we learn in order to increase our usefulness, our efficiency.

    1. That scientific and technical knowledge is cumulative is never questioned.

      Here, Lyotard identifies a constant within the problem. The fact that knowledge regarding science and technology is always growing is unquestionable. Taking this into account, our answer to his proposed problem may be different as time goes on.