Its financing predominantly runs through two channels: Guarantees provided to mortgage lenders and, via the Sakani Program, interest subsidies and down payment supports provided to home buyers

University of Texas finance professor John M. Griffin and his doctoral student Amin Shams detailed Tether’s activities in a 2018 paper. For the period of March 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018, Griffin and Shams found plausible evidence to conclude that a few actors printed tethers without real dollar backing to artificially rescue Bitcoin (BTC) when its price fell and stimulate its overall growth. The trading activity was concentrated on Bitfinex with trading patterns not seen on other exchanges. Griffin and Shams also noted the dubious nature of Tether’s reserves and demonstrated unbacked issuance. So long as no one could tell the difference between a tether token and a real dollar, these unbacked tokens could be traded as if they were real dollars. Think of it as a cheat code in a video game for unlimited gold when every other player must grind quests to get them.

Two weeks ago, French semiconductor manufacturer Sequans Communications raised $384 million from more than 40 institutional investors to buy bitcoin. The company’s stock jumped 215% that week and peaked at $5.83 a share—but it’s since fallen back down to $1.98.

The challenge of securing enough gas turbines is one of the clearest examples of how booming investment in artificial intelligence is reshaping the electric power industry, overwhelming suppliers and upending longstanding notions of what makes sense financially.

The agency is split primarily into two branches: Enforcement and Removal Operations, which has about 5,500 immigration-enforcement officers, and Homeland Security Investigations, whose roughly 7,000 agents investigate drug smuggling, human trafficking, counterfeit goods, and a range of other cross-border criminal activities.

Some ICE attorneys “are only waiting until their student loans are forgiven, and then they’re leaving,” he said.

Less than four months later, on April 25, 2019, the rumblings of the government’s first financial crisis began. J.P. Morgan decided to shed US$800 million worth of Lebac, a short-term bond from the Central Bank, and buy dollars. One of the largest financial institutions in the world, J.P. Morgan had voluntarily taken on US$2.3 billion in debt and had a good relationship with the Macri administration — several representatives had worked in its offices. Hence the bewilderment at the Central Bank.

December 17, 2015, Sturzenegger felt confident. Macri had taken office as president a week earlier, and as head of the Central Bank, Sturzenegger had fulfilled one of PRO’s main campaign promises: lifting currency controls, the cepo. He raised the purchase limit to US$2 million per month and removed all restrictions. The dollar rose to AR$13.93. Sturzenegger celebrated the measure at a lunch with the Central Bank’s board of directors. But one of the guests pointed out that the devaluation would immediately translate into higher prices, a phenomenon known as pass-through. “Pass-through is a myth,” he answered.

His bachelor pad was a set location for the Juan José Campanella film, La Hija de la Novia (The Daughter of the Bride).

In one of his books, he defines himself as an “incorrigible optimist.” Those words are not so different from descriptors offered by interviewees: workaholic, Swiss discipline, fundamentalist, hard-headed, and naïve. “In a sense, he is pretty dogmatic, with a dose of messianism,” said an economist who knows him pretty well. “He says: ‘I have the solution for Argentina’s crisis, I have it all thought out, I have the correct theoretical model’. As president of the Central Bank, he became the most incarnate version of that.”

On Tuesday, Starmer circled the wagons to defend McSweeney, telling cabinet: ‘We will learn from our mistakes, but we will not turn on our staff – including our chief of staff, without whom none of us would be sitting around this cabinet table.’

. He claimed that at the time he had been discombobulated by a fire-bomb attack on his home (an incident which credible figures in government have linked to the Russians, who will be delighted to know it put the PM off his game

his biographer Tom Baldwin (whom some on the left would like to replace McSweeney),

McSweeney is exercised by the fact that the civil service has 7,000 communications officers, 4,500 of whom work for arm’s-length bodies and quangos and frequently attack what the government is trying to do. Like Dominic Cummings, he is enthused by the possibilities of technology to speed change, such as AI in the NHS or gamers being hired by the Ministry of Defence to fly drones. He is now experimenting with ‘synthetic voters’ – essentially fake focus groups of AI voters who can tell ministers more quickly and cheaply what the public thinks of policies. In the last week he has been reading The Technological Republic by Alexander Karp, co-founder of the tech firm Palantir, which argues that the West’s technical dominance over the past century has been down to collaboration between governments and tech firms.

‘Rachel is a study in Shakespearean tragedy,’ a cabinet colleague of hers remarks. ‘She played a big part in getting our economic credibility back. But in opposition she essentially said no to things, and the problem is that the first thing she said yes to in government was the winter fuel cut.’ Starmer and Reeves both began with a miserablist message that ‘things will get worse before they get better’. This resulted from a major misunderstanding. ‘We tried to do what Cameron and Osborne did in 2010 and blame the last government,’ the cabinet minister says. ‘And while things were significantly worse than we expected, that didn’t resonate with the public.’ A Labour strategist adds: ‘We assumed it was 2010 because the public finances were a mess, but the public appetite was for 1997. They wanted the hopey-changey thing. We told them how it would get worse. We still haven’t really explained how it will get better. It’s almost like what we liked about George Osborne’s “pain for a purpose” was the pain part.’

“This kid is full of beautiful ideas, my kids love him, but he’s just not serious,” said a top corporate lawyer who donated to Kamala Harris’s presidential campaign. “Everything he’s proposing would require an increase in taxes and that’s just not going to happen.”

Executives and directors from around the world have called me to say that they can't fund any projects if they don't pretend there is AI in them. Non-profits have asked me if we could pretend to do AI because it's the only way to fund infrastructure in the developing world. Readers keep emailing me to say that their contracts are getting cancelled because someone smooth-talked their CEO into believing that they don't need developers. I was miraculously allowed onto some mandated “Professional Development For Board Members On AI” panel hosted by the Financial Times5, alongside people like Yahoo's former CDO, and the preparation consisted of being informed repeatedly that the audience has no idea what AI does but is scared they'll be fired or sued if they don't buy it.

“Opinion” also remains important for retaining and attracting new readership. Its top stories regularly bring in 750,000 to 1.2 million page views. The median number of page views for “Opinion” in 2024 was just below 200,000 per story, and that figure rose in early 2025. Still, a source familiar with the paper’s overall traffic said that “Opinion” is a solid, but not outsize, contributor to it.

In response to concerns from the agribusiness sector, Finance Minister Luis Caputo suggested producers engage in carry trade strategies to increase returns. Rural associations, in turn, replied: The productive sector we represent has received statements from national officials that are troubling. First, we were advised to engage in financial speculation—an activity entirely unrelated to our core mission. Our work is to generate real, exportable wealth, which over the years has allowed successive governments to confiscate a total of $200 billion.

Yes, China halted exports of all rare earths to Japan for two months in 2010 during a territorial dispute, scaring Japanese manufacturers, which nearly ran out of supplies. Sumitomo, a Japanese trading group, and the Japanese government subsequently helped Lynas, an Australian company, build more mining capacity in Australia and processing capacity in Malaysia, so that Japan would have an alternative to China.

The Houthis were also able to down more than a dozen U.S. Reaper drones, each worth around $30 million.

But there are two ways in which Hayek can be used to argue something different. In his own understanding of human evolution, we have continued to rely on forms of ‘tacit’ knowledge that lie beyond the reach of computers. It was the innate human ability to navigate uncertainty that enabled us to interact with one another in the marketplace. As a result we are able to use the hidden power of the market to build computers, but they shouldn’t be able to use it to build us. Of course, Hayek had no idea what might become possible in the age of AI, when computers are increasingly adept at mimicking all the forms of knowledge – tacit, unspoken, unconscious even – that human beings possess. He was thinking of cack-handed earlier attempts to use computer technology to run the economy, such as the doomed Project Cybersyn in Allende’s Chile, which promised to manage prices and goods in real time and never got further than resembling a set for a bad sci-fi movie. It may be that the latest AI technology will soon be able to ‘do’ freedom as Hayek understood it. Perhaps liberation isn’t only for humans after all. But there are grounds for Hayekians to be nervous of Silicon Valley’s ambitions in this area – let alone what is being attempted by its Chinese rivals. The point of the market was to allow us to fulfil our potential. If there are non-human entities who do better under market conditions than we do, might that not be a good reason to shut the market down?

Today, American intellectual property is locked into dominant firms, who spend large amounts of money making sure no one else can use it. Apple for instance spends $1 billion a year on its legal division, and Disney is right now suing people online for using Baby Yoda memes. China, however, has a way around our IP laws; it just hacks our corporations or legally forces technology transfer, and then moves this knowledge throughout its technology sector. Thus American know-how floods into China, while Americans are locked out of the wisdom we developed and paid for.

American strategy for 50 years has been designed to create financial assets, which we then traded to China and foreign countries for physical goods

Clarivate’s recent decision to shift from perpetual access ebook sales to a subscription-only model

And then there's the further point where they’re in the process of claiming that they can take money out of anyone's bank account or freeze anyone's bank account. It's actually mind-bending trying to keep up with these stories of all the different ways that they're going after bank accounts. I mean, they froze a New York state government bank account related to EPA grants that were already handed out that were being administered by Citibank. And I want to dig into that more and write about it more. But that's just one of, I would say, four or five different payment stories that are calamitous.

biofictions

In the end, this was a pyramid scheme resting on the investments of thousands, then millions, of Americans.

since Macintyre’s book has no footnotes

The Iraqi connection is usually the most neglected part of accounts of the siege, since it complicates an otherwise straightforward tale. Yet the operation was wholly planned and organised by Saddam’s intelligence service, right up to the moment the gunmen burst into the embassy. Macintyre recognises that ‘war between Iran and Iraq was looming, and the opening battle was being fought inside 16 Princes Gate.’ In fact, it wasn’t the opening battle: the embassy seizure was one of a rapidly escalating series of violent incidents staged by Iraq in the first half of 1980, leading up to its full-scale invasion of Iran on 22 September. Some years later, I read a declassified message from an agent in Baghdad working for the Defence Intelligence Agency, the intelligence arm of the Pentagon, sent on 8 April, three weeks before the Iranian embassy takeover. ‘There is a 50 per cent chance that Iraq will attack Iran,’ the agent wrote (his name is blacked out but he was evidently well connected with the Iraqi elite). ‘Iraq has moved large numbers of military personnel and equipment in anticipation of such an invasion.’ Skirmishes had already begun: two days earlier, an Iraqi commando unit had fired rockets at an Iranian oilfield. The agent finished by saying that Iraq’s leaders believed that ‘the Iranian military is now weak and can be easily defeated.’

With hindsight, Trump 1.0 is perhaps best described as a lite form of positive-sum populism. He won the election in 2016 against the backdrop of talk of “secular stagnation” (Summers) and a mini-recession in manufacturing. From 2017, Trump’s extraordinarily expansive fiscal policy accelerated growth, helping to restore something close to full employment. Tellingly, this generated tension with the inflation-guardians of the Federal Reserve. Meanwhile, tax cuts handed huge benefits to the highest earners and deregulation favored business. Trump’s wilder plans were either not fully fledged, or, he was restrained by “the adults in the room”. We don’t know what a second Trump term might have looked like. The chaos of 2020 blurs any clear analysis. But the escalation of tension with China was ominous, as was the radicalization on the right-wing.

There are questions, moreover, about whether foreign holders of US debt securities will continue to be treated fairly. Scott Bessent, Trump’s Treasury secretary, has reportedly mulled the possibility of converting five- and 10-year US treasury bonds held by foreign investors into 100-year securities bearing low interest rates, whether those investors like it or not. During the 2024 presidential campaign, advisers to Trump such as Robert Lighthizer mooted the possibility of taxing foreign purchases of US treasuries as a way of driving down the dollar and enhancing the competitiveness of US exports.

This is what his critics do not understand. They mistakenly think that he thinks that his tariffs will reduce America’s trade deficit on their own. He knows they will not. Their utility comes from their capacity to shock foreign central bankers into reducing domestic interest rates. Consequently, the euro, the yen and the renminbi will soften relative to the dollar. This will cancel out the price hikes of goods imported into the US, and leave the prices American consumers pay unaffected. The tariffed countries will be in effect paying for Trump’s tariffs.

Europe’s current economic model is unworkable. Post-war success was based on rebuilding shattered economies, the generous Marshall plan, low labour costs and a strong technical and manufacturing base. The common market reinforced by the single currency since 1999 facilitated trade amongst members. The expansion of the EU and the reunification of Germany created new pools of cheap labour and new markets. More recently, China provided new markets for automobiles, machinery and industrial technologies underpinning growth.

Benedikt had read Canetti’s novel Auto-da-Fé soon after it was published in 1935, prompting her to embark on her own writing career in her native Vienna and to follow Canetti into exile in Hampstead.

El año 2024 fue el de menores inversiones extranjeras en 20 años, las empresas transnacionales se retiran una tras otra del país. Quieren irse.

El Banco Central acumuló reservas brutas, pero las netas, las disponibles realmente para pagar, no se movieron en casi 16 meses de gobierno.

Senior officers openly acknowledge that the scope of current operations and combat requires a larger standing military, suggesting that establishing new regular battalions is key to reducing reservist strain and burnout. They say one regular battalion can handle the missions of 12 reserve battalions and that they hope to expand the regular force to lower the burden on reservists.

The Eisenhower stagnation was also the context for a major, if little remembered, employers' offensive against unions.  It was no coincidence that the recession came on the heels of 1956, a year in which unemployment dipped below 4%, wage growth accelerated, and labor productivity growth went negative. The episode fits easily within Michal Kalecki's famous sketch of the political business cycle . Capitalist not only experienced “1950-58 [as] a period of declining profit margins” they also “complain[ed] that they have ceased to be bosses in their own enterprise,” as the New York Times put it in a story on the “corporate rebellion” against workplace norms. Who could blame them if they grew “boom-tired”?

The second paper was about Leontief’s experience with American politics, particularly the history of national economic planning in the 1930s and 1970s crises and in the (relatively) stable period in between. The main lesson I took was the intensity of business opposition to planning (which was intense enough that Eisenhower’s business dominated Defense Department ended U.S. government funding for I-O; for awhile in the 1950s the U.S. was one of the few countries in the world without a public I-O program, despite the technique having been invented by U.S. government funded research). In the 1970s, many (including Leontief) expected that business would end up demanding central planning, and some powerful business figures did briefly ally with Leontief and certain labor unions to form the Initiative Committee on National Economic Planning. But this sort of corporatism failed to launch, and has been nearly forgotten. Despite these failures, the experience shows, minimally, that there is a planning tradition in the United States, and that the history of the “Keynesian era” of the 1940s to the 1970s cannot actually be understood solely in terms of Keynesian aggregative macroeconomics. If you make it to the end of the paper, you’ll see it’s actually a prehistory of supply-side liberalism.

The combination of deficit spending and monetary ease raised the old specter of debt monetization, in which the Treasury sells its debt directly to the central bank instead of the bond market, thereby freeing itself from interest obligations and market discipline. (Pejoratively, this is referred to as “printing money.”)

Last week, Mauricio Claver-Carone, Donald Trump’s State Department envoy for Latin America, said in a CNN interview with Andrés Oppenheimer that the US justice system will investigate the $LIBRA scandal, in which “defrauded Americans” lost millions of dollars: “It’s complicated that there were victims, defrauded Americans, hundreds — if not thousands — who have lost millions of dollars [to the $LIBRA cryptocurrency]. And [on top of] some of the president’s [Javier Milei] advisers were Americans… I think there are going to be judicial investigations; it is a complex issue, but a good lesson for President Milei, and for others, in the sense of being better advised, of having a better team and not falling into unnecessary mistakes and self-inflicted coups.”

To quote a reader with extensive HR experience who attempted to explain this dysfunction to me: While there are professionals that specialize in tech and with time develop enough depth to understand the discipline and move the needle in the right direction, for most recruiters it is not an economic advantage to do so; as the winds of the market are ever changing, recruiters are always the first ones to go into the chopping block when there are layoffs. Better to be a generalist recruiter and keep your job options open. I.e, the recruiters you are talking to probably go out of their way to avoid learning anything, because they may be recruiting in a different industry next month.

Hayek, after all, pioneered the notion of bombing countries that were recalcitrant to Anglo-American will, calling for lightning air attacks on Iran in 1979 and Argentina in 1982.

Schroeder seems to have come to appreciate some of the inconsistencies and internal contradictions in his approach, as is made clear by an essay written probably c.2015–16, a reflective think-piece published for the first time in Stealing Horses and in some respects the highlight of this collection. At the time of the 1914 centenary, he had come to accept that what he called a “collective tide of recklessness” may have been more significant in accounting for the outbreak of the First World War than systemic factors. Therein may well also lie a lesson and a warning for today. Great historians have a life, and they have an afterlife. Paul W. Schroeder’s may just have begun. But Disputing Disaster does not suggest new ways of examining Europe’s “seminal catastrophe”.

Much of this will be well known to scholars of the period, but Anderson writes with incision and often also with sympathy. The inclusion, as a British representative, of the late Keith Wilson strikes a jarring note. It is rather like adding a piccolo flute to a string sextet in the place of the cello. His output does not seem to fulfil Anderson’s criteria of substance and originality. His emphasis on the importance of the Russian factor in British policymaking and his suggestion of British dissimulation in 1914 go back to Herbert Butterfield and to an extent to Butterfield’s mentor, Harold Temperley.

On the economic front, instead of lifting capital controls as promised, Milei maintained the restrictions—the “cepo”—inherited from the previous two administrations. Concerned about the devastating effects that another peso devaluation could have on local prices and, consequently, on consumption, the government doubled down on these capital controls and introduced a new strategy based on the monetary approach to the balance of payments. This system, known as a crawling peg, established monthly 2 percent devaluations aimed at forcing convergence between inflation and the dollar’s exchange rate. Curiously, the same strategy was implemented by Argentina’s last dictatorship between 1978 and 1981, with disastrous consequences. Notably, the architect of that plan was Ricardo Arriazu, one of Milei’s most revered mentors. The strategy gained a lot of support from the financial sector, which itself stood to gain from the fixed devaluations of the peso.

The same quality of embeddedness and immersion can be observed in her accounts of the great decisional conjunctures in her career as chancellor. Merkel was at the centre of the process by which Europe’s leaders hammered out, over many arduous months, a response to the crisis that threatened first to bankrupt Greece and then to consume the Eurozone economy. She was among those who pressed for a solution that would pair emergency relief measures with a stringent (and politically costly) programme of structural reforms in the worst-afflicted Eurozone member states. This was a controversial stance, and she was caricatured in the Greek, Italian, Spanish and even parts of the British press as a Hitleresque ogre pounding Europe in the name of German dominance. But there were no stand-alone decisions: Merkel worked closely with a group of like-minded states (the most important among them Finland and the Netherlands), insisting that the negotiating parties honour the rules of the Lisbon Treaty, the no-bailout provisions of which stipulated that every government should take responsibility for repaying its own debts. She pushed this way and that as the opportunities arose, trying to move the process in the direction she preferred, but never breaking ranks with her colleagues. In this respect, she was less a helmswoman or chess player than a rugby forward at the heart of the scrum.

Apart from their loathing of his Peronista credentials,

Radical young Jorge (“Giorgio” to Italian relatives) Bergoglio remains, as aged Pope Francis, an impenitent Peronista. He repeatedly invokes the Italian radicals in his ancestry and speaks warmly of his first sight of the equestrian statue of Giuseppe Garibaldi in Rome.

e in his salad days as a young Russian émigré

With the passage of time,’ Ferguson says, ‘one realises that the episode really belongs, along with the George Floyd riots, in a chapter called the Madness of the Pandemic. The lockdowns created an atmosphere of near collective madness. Things were pretty crazy on both sides.’ Ah, ‘both sides’. In one stroke, the insurrection is explained by an irrational Zeitgeist – everyone was doing it! – and the millions who went out on Black Lives Matter demonstrations are treated as pathological cases: you see, everyone – far left, far right – was stir-crazy after such long confinement.

It is certainly unpredictable. But by the same token, if the threat is of a sudden “credit event risk”, this is something that can be contained by decisive action by the monetary authorities, as the US monetary authorities have demonstrated in recent years.

LP: You’ve also criticized the Biden administration for glossing over the ongoing situation during his presidency. Why the reluctance to offer clearer guidance and warnings? PA: It’s interesting, I take part in a Global Biosecurity Working Group that played a big role in defining the nine-point plan to address the pandemic that Biden used to get elected. But the minute he was elected, he put a hedge fund guy, Jeff Zients, in charge of the pandemic response. Zients decided the best way forward was to convince people that the pandemic wasn’t happening.

Que los pagos en moneda extranjera por obligaciones del sector privado financiero (bancos) y no financiero (empresas) son renovados en su totalidad. En este sentido, el importante incremento de los depósitos en dólares producto del blanqueo ha producido ya una emisión de deuda en el mercado local por cerca de u$s7.500 millones en los últimos tres meses y algunas empresas de gran tamaño han incluso logrado volver a colocar deuda en el mercado internacional a tasas de interés de un dígito que se ubican entre 5 a 7 p.p. debajo del rendimiento de los bonos del Gobierno nacional.

Kowol also draws attention to scepticism about the concept of a “people’s war”, or at least the left-wing variant of that discourse. To many Conservatives “the heroes of Dunkirk were not the civilian ‘little ships’ who had come to the rescue but the Army, Navy and Air Force, and their skilled and primarily upper-class leadership”. Furthermore, such ideas were linked to positive ideas about how the war was to be won. Tanks and bombers, in particular, were seen as weapons that could be used by elite warriors to destroy enemy morale. They could help achieve victory without the changes to the structure of the armed forces that radical socialists demanded and which Tories feared might upset the structure of society.

A case in point is the Army Installation Management Command, or IMC, created in 2006 and chartered to “reduce bureaucracy, apply a uniform business structure to manage U.S. Army installations, sustain the environment and enhance the well-being of the military community.” IMC is headed by a lieutenant general, with a major general as deputy and brigadier general as chief of staff. IMC includes a workforce of 30,000 soldiers and 70,000 civilians. Formerly, Army installations were managed by garrison commanders reporting to local commanding generals, with an Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation Management. In theory, centralizing the installation management function promised common standards and greater expertise. In practice, results have fallen far short, with the Army experiencing a “crisis” in installation management in recent years.

The immediate precedent for his work is, of course, that of Georges Perec, who devoted himself to exhausting places by describing them in obsessive detail. Perec invented a genre: he wrote guides to his own building, even to his own staircase (Espèces d’Espaces, 1974; Species of Spaces, 1997). Fifty years ago he sat at a café on Place Saint Sulpice to describe minute by minute what he saw (Tentative d’épuisement d’un lieu parisien, 1975; An Attempt at Exhausting a Place in Paris, 1982). In Clerc’s book we find a similar listing technique: gradually moving away from his apartment, always on foot, he announces the names of the streets in capital letters, followed by their dimensions: RUE D’AUBERVILLIERS (1820 × 30 metres) seems to be the longest, the smallest tiny RUE LUCIEN-GAULARD (31 × 8 m), which leads to Saint Vincent cemetery. We learn that it is the final resting place of the film-maker Marcel Carné (Hôtel du Nord), of Ninette Aubart, a survivor of the Titanic. Clerc lists all the cemeteries in the eighteenth, including Saint Ouen cemetery, which despite its name is in the arrondissement and contains the graves of the author’s father and grandparents. “Cemeteries have never made me melancholy, but precise”, he writes.

Five years later, he paused to describe, square metre by square metre, his two-bedroom flat (Intérieur, 2013; Interior, 2018)

“We must finally create attractive conditions for companies,” said Veronika Grimm, a member of the government’s panel of independent economic advisers and a professor at the Technical University of Nuremberg, urging the next government to adopt a wide-ranging agenda to revive competitiveness.

There are economic reasons to push for such a massive infrastructure binge. In many states, building new infrastructure is one of the few ways that electric utility companies can raise rates, decisions that require approval from the public service commissions that regulate what they charge and the profits they make. Big new sources of electricity demand—met with new infrastructure—can mean higher profits. Those utility companies are also political juggernauts in state capitols, where lobbyists can persuade lawmakers to roll out generous incentives to AI developers promising jobs and economic development. All of the above are understandably eager to avoid energy shortages at all costs, of course, and view having too much power as preferable to having too little.

En esta ocasión, Anaya leyó un emotivo discurso de despedida a Galtieri en el que afirmó: “Usted puso de pie a la Nación”. “Las generaciones futuras me juzgarán”, había dicho Galtieri al despedirse del periodismo el ahora ex presidente.

eva a descartar el “plan Massera” que contemplaba elecciones generales con tres candidatos militares.

Lo hacían no solo por la persistencia del terror reinante –no se descartaba por entonces que las Fuerzas Armadas intentaran volver a atentar contra la democracia- sino por el decreto del 13 de diciembre que ordenaba enjuiciar a militantes montoneros o del PRT-ERP.Existía el temor que una denuncia de violación de derechos humanos terminara siendo un búmeran que permitiera iniciar causas penales a las víctimas.

Sin embargo, cuando los sobrevivientes y los familiares de los desaparecidos iban a la sede del teatro San Martín a concretar las denuncias, omitían la pertenencia política de las víctimas, la mayoría enrolados o simpatizantes de organizaciones revolucionarias.

since Hitler’s tanks bestrode the continent

As such, it is particularly incumbent on the Fed to avoid further exacerbating the problem by reallocating to bills or focusing exclusively on bills when organic balance sheet growth resumes. That’s not to suggest it would be appropriate for the Fed to exclusively buy duration, as that would look and feel like monetary financing.

In the basis trade, hedge funds are taking long-term Treasuries and using them to manufacture different Treasury instruments: short-term, Treasury-backed repos that can then be held by the ultimate source of funds – institutional cash piles. From an institutional cash management perspective, a Treasury-bond backed repo is wholly dominated by a Treasury bill. There is no counterparty risk, no duration risk in the collateral, no risk of needing to take possession of an asset the liquidity pool is not allowed to own.

Kenner proclaimed it ‘one of the dozen or so most important books of the 20th century’, but this is hard to credit.

The myth of inviolateness was underpinned by the equally mythical ‘sovereignty of the seas’. Ever since the Middle Ages, it was declared that the kings of England ‘time out of mind had been in peaceable possession of the sovereign lordship of the English sea and the islands therein’. This comforting fiction survived every humiliation at sea and emboldened English skippers to demand that foreign vessels strike their colours in deference. This demand was frequently met with defiance, if not derision. After bumping into a returning Hansa salt convoy in 1449, Robert Winnington reported with some surprise: ‘I came aboard the admiral and bade them strike in the name of the king of England, and they bade me shit in the name of the king of England.’ Pepys records that even the hyperaggressive Captain Robert Holmes (later to be celebrated as the hero of ‘Holmes’s Bonfire’) was sent, briefly, to the Tower for failing to force the Swedish ambassador to strike his colours at the mouth of the Thames. This English obsession occupies over eight hundred pages of the standard work on the subject, Thomas Wemyss Fulton’s The Sovereignty of the Sea (1911).

The war in question is known to us as the War of Jenkins’s Ear, thus dubbed by Thomas Carlyle a century later

In recent years the ANPI, the largest partisan association, has reinvented itself, opening up membership to anyone who subscribes to its ideals. As a result there are now branches of ANPI in cities all over the world, including London and Glasgow.

First the authorities began announcing haphazard plans for accommodation in vacant buildings without doing any preparatory groundwork, leaving a vacuum that could be filled with xenophobic scaremongering; then the Gardaí, Ireland’s police force, gave far-right agitators the run of the streets as they broke the law and engaged in various acts of violence, enjoying a degree of latitude that would have been unthinkable for a protest movement led by socialists or republicans. This is the point at which self-consciously sensible folk would say that we should always choose cock-up over conspiracy as an explanation for such matters. But cock-ups usually go through a process of natural selection, weeding out the varieties that produce fewer political off-spring for those in power. The hands-off approach to the far right, which continued after a full-scale riot in Dublin’s city centre, is a matter of public record, acknowledged by the police themselves, and there is little doubt that the force would have come under intense pressure to change direction much sooner were such disturbances causing as much political damage to the government parties as they were to Sinn Féin.

Nevertheless, they continued to share a belief in what Novalis called “magical idealism”: the use of creative imagination to break down the boundaries between words and the world. Where Borges achieved this by mining the paradoxes of theology and mathematics, Bonomini’s circle set about developing what one critic called “the art of moral elegance”. This did not mean that they were blind to Argentina’s political turmoil: they declared themselves against both the junta and the murderous guerilla movements that opposed it. Bonomini liked to quote Borges’s dictum aimed at Juan Perón in 1946: “Dictatorships encourage cruelty; more abominable is the fact that they encourage idiocy … To fight against these sad monotonies is one of the writer’s many duties”.

Then there is the fact that this “logic machine” is frequently, comically incorrect in his judgments. While some of us were trying to urgently point out that Joe Biden should clearly not be running for reelection, Yglesias was in denial. The fraudster Sam Bankman-Fried, he said, was “for real” in his commitment to humanity’s well-being. (Bankman-Fried later admitted to a journalist that his ethics were “mostly a front.”) Yglesias admitted he trusted Bankman-Fried because he was rich. (“Well, if his company has a $20-billion valuation, there must be something to it.”

I mean, people say let your money work for you. The monetary policy run by supposedly independent central banks keeps bailing out investors, while deliberatly creating conditions that bankrupting other players in the economy, allowing the people who’ve been bailed out with printed central bank fiat currency to pick up even more quality assets at distressed prices.

Frustrated with the quality of the new conscripts sent to the front line by territorial recruitment centers, commanders are now seeking to conduct their own mobilization drives to better screen and train new fighters, multiple commanders and soldiers said.“The main problem is the survival instinct of newcomers. Before, people could stand until the last moment to hold the position. Now, even when there is light shelling of firing positions, they are retreating,” said a soldier with the 110th Brigade.

Another place where we can talk about real tradeoffs is the question of which investment projects are able to obtain financing, especially given the end of the long period of very low interest rates. Just as machine tools can be scarce, so can access to credit. There are two important dynamics here. First, as interest rates rise, private capitalists will demand a higher return on any investment projects. Second, as interest rates rise, the costs of keeping an existing enterprise going will rise and weaker firms will fail. Civilian-oriented investment to meet social needs will be disadvantaged by both of these dynamics, as we can already see in the case of renewable energy. Historically, when credit is tight, the government has taken steps to ensure that financing is available to military-industrial producers. For example, the Defense Production Act of 1950 directs the Federal Reserve to help oversee special “V Loans” to military producers. The same Fed currently dismisses out of hand the idea that they should do anything at all to tilt the field in favor financing the green transition. This sort of double standard should be politicized, as part of a broader attack on the political economy of financial constraints on industrial production.

The rouble's fall has been compounded by a fall of more than 20% in the stock market so far this year as investors shift their savings from stocks to deposits, which offer interest above the benchmark rate of 21%.

Still, she said that the source of the error wasn’t her. Her research assistants on the project may have caused the problem; Schroeder wonders if they got confused. She said that two RAs, both undergraduates, had recruited the women at the gym, and that the scene there was chaotic: Sometimes multiple people came up to them at once, and the undergrads may have had to make some changes on the fly, adjusting which participants were being put into which group for the study. Maybe things went wrong from there, Schroeder said. One or both RAs might have gotten ruffled as they tried to paper over inconsistencies in their record-keeping. They both knew what the experiment was meant to show, and how the data ought to look—so it’s possible that they peeked a little at the data and reassigned the numbers in the way that seemed correct. (Schroeder’s audit lays out other possibilities, but describes this one as the most likely.)

wo days later, Schroeder posted to X a link to her full and final audit of the paper. “It took *hundreds* of hours of work to complete this retraction,” she wrote, in a thread that described the flaws in her own experiments and Studies 1a and 1b. “I am ashamed of helping publish this paper & how long it took to identify its issues,” the thread concluded. “I am not the same scientist I was 10 years ago. I hold myself accountable for correcting any inaccurate prior research findings and for updating my research practices to do better.” Her peers responded by lavishing her with public praise. One colleague called the self-audit “exemplary” and an “act of courage.” A prominent professor at Columbia Business School congratulated Schroeder for being “a cultural heroine, a role model for the rising generation.

Along with some others, notably Myrdal, Hirschman didn’t wait for intellectual exile: he proudly gathered up his followers and led them into the wilderness himself. Unfortunately, they perished there.

it would not be a great exaggeration to say that we have never known how large Nigeria is. The first census after independence, in 1962, was marred by regional infighting, because of its role in determining federal spending and assembly seats. The initial results, which reduced the population share of the politically dominant north, were rejected by the Northern People’s Congress. A redo in 1963 was also rejected as fraudulent—this time largely by southern politicians. The 1973 census was largely rejected as illegitimate; the 1980s and 1990s saw no censuses under military dictatorship; and the 2001 census produced an implausibly low number.4 Even in the relatively successful 2006 attempt, census enumerators were attacked and killed, and the results were still disputed

And it was in turn thanks to Fischer, Anderson believes, that complex multi-nation studies of the kind written by Renouvin, Albertini, Sidney Bradshaw Fay, Bernadotte Schmitt and others made way for the single-country studies (France and the Origins of the First World War, Russia and the Origins and so on) that dominated from the 1970s onwards.

Anderson brings a peculiar gift to the work of criticism: he can step into a book and inspect it closely, even sympathetically, scrutinising its structures, immersing himself in its style and atmosphere; then he can step out of it again and size it up coldly from a distance. It’s surprising how rare this is. Historians rarely attempt it. We tend either to dismiss one another’s books altogether or to fillet them for material and move on. Anderson, by contrast, lets the books and arguments of his subjects relax and breathe a little, until they begin to betray their inner contradictions and blind spots – then the vivisection can begin.

. Macintyre presents hi, as a conscientious cop doing his job

“Without nostalgia who could love England?”, asks that excellent poet Anne Stevenson.

His process for creating posts, he told me, is pretty simple and AI intensive: “I use ChatGPT to ask for the best images that can generate a lot of popularity and engagement on Facebook,” focusing on topics like the Bible, God, the U.S. Army, wildlife, and Manchester United. “WRITE ME 10 PROMPT picture OF JESUS WHICH WILLING BRING HIGH ENGAGEMENT ON FACEBOOK,” read the ChatGPT prompt in one screenshot he shared with me. You then take the prompts to the image-generation programs Leonardo.ai and Midjourney. Voilà: slop.

(According to Einav and Finkelstein, Medicare for All can’t accommodate patients’ varying “tastes for medical care.”)

This failure also has also created constituencies among various types of domestic manufacturers opposed to the kind of market liberalization inherent to sanctions relief—undermining a core belief held by Western policymakers that sanctions can spur behavior changes in countries like Iran through bottom-up pressure, including from business lobbies.

By the late 2010s, as the sociologist Yagil Levy writes in Shooting and Not Crying, published in Hebrew last year, killing had become the principal metric of military efficacy. Operational success was measured by the number of targets generated and the percentage of assassinations carried out. ‘There was this romance with big data,’ Alon recalled. ‘People got rewarded for spearheading projects with buzzwords like “artificial intelligence” in the title.’ Commanders doled out medals to enterprising conscripts eager to help automate intelligence operations. Government officials celebrated Israel’s technological capabilities as proof of its military supremacy. In May 2023, Eyal Zamir, the director general of the Ministry of Defence, boasted that the country was on the verge of becoming an ‘AI superpower’.

the data-driven tech boom of the 2010s led the army to employ the services of civilian firms that were experimenting in mass surveillance and machine learning. The American data analytics firm Palantir opened an office in Tel Aviv and secured contracts with the Ministry of Defence and the IDF. Microsoft, Alphabet and Amazon all have offices in Israel. Start-ups staffed by veterans of intelligence units and funded by venture capital firms, often from the US or the EU, offered advanced surveillance and weapons systems. Among the most prominent were the cyber-espionage firm NSO, the biometric surveillance company Oosto and the hacking firm Cellebrite. Over the last decade, defence officials have claimed that the revolving door between the military and civilian technology firms is key to maintaining Israel’s military edge.

n the mid-2000s, military chiefs began remaking intelligence units in the image of Silicon Valley start-ups. The press framed service in military intelligence as ‘better than a degree from MIT’, claiming that it prepared young Israelis for success in a global tech economy. Applicants, typically from the middle-class, liberal and Ashkenazi communities who had rallied for an end to the occupation a few years earlier, vied for entry. Preparation began early. Teenagers took coding classes, studied foreign languages and passed the requisite tests. New recruits were rewarded with lectures from billionaire tech moguls and tours of Tel Aviv start-ups.

Yet another Syrian-Argentine who was a Menem intimate is Ruben Beraja, whose tenure as DAIA chief coincided with the latter’s presidential mandate. Beraja was a participant in the notorious US $400,000 payoff to witness Carlos Telleldín — about which, more here — and by the late ‘90s had become a fairly controversial figure, in spite of his repeated protests about supposed “victim-blaming.” Memorial groups and what of the Jewish left which had survived the Proceso increasingly began to harass him wherever he went, demanding that justice extend past phantom Iranians to the various Menem associates implicated in AMIA. Ruben Beraja got the last laugh, though. The failure of his own Banco Mayo, in which almost all Jewish institutions kept their funds, enabled a restructuring of Argentine Jewish life which substantially marginalized left-wing factions from the governance of DAIA and other national umbrella organizations. In their place came religious and Zionist hardliners, awash in foreign donations, who remade the public face of Argentine Judaism in their image and swept any inconvenient questions about AMIA under the rug. Chief among these was the missionary cult Chabad-Lubavitch, whose relief efforts for Jewish families left destitute by the 2001 crisis pulled them from standing at the barricades with gentile peers (Lutzky, 2012: Chapter Seven). The first major revolt against neoliberalism in the twenty-first century was also the first in Argentine history where Jews hewed in large numbers to the side of reaction — a trend which has continued to deepen ever since.

Announcing the Bank of Russia’s latest rate hike to 19%, Elvira Nabiullina acknowledged rates might go to 20% in October and rates would continue to climb to get inflation back to the 4% target in 2025. But monetary policy cannot tame what’s driving inflation.

The answer is simple: the tech industry's desperate attachment to artificial intelligence is largely fueled by the SaaS industry, because AI is the first meaningful new "thing" they've had to flog to customers in quite some time, and because so many of these solutions are sold in bulk on annual contracts signed by people who aren't the end user, artificial intelligence feels like something that they can put on top of another solution and claim it's new.

might galvanize the other side more than their own—Corbyn’s 2019 reception in Mansfield being a case in point

Even in seemingly unpopulated or abandoned areas of Gaza, soldiers engaged in extensive shooting in a procedure known as “demonstrating presence.” S. testified that his fellow soldiers would “shoot a lot, even for no reason — anyone who wants to shoot, no matter what the reason, shoots.” In some cases, he noted, this was “intended to … remove people [from their hiding places] or to demonstrate presence.”

branded its staff “third-rank students from first rate universities”

At the time, Democrats seemed uniquely fat and happy. In the summer of 2016, a manufacturing worker from the corporation Carrier, which had just announced it was sending jobs to Mexico, asked President Obama at a town hall meeting about offshoring. Obama was annoyed. Such jobs, he said “are just not going to come back.” Trump’s appeal in that context was pretty obvious.

The Greens’ approach to environmental policy is economically punishing for most people. They are in favour of high co2 prices, making fossil fuels more expensive in order to create an incentive to get off them. That may work for well-to-do people who can afford to buy an electric car, but if you don’t have much money, it just means you’re worse off. The Greens radiate arrogance towards poorer people and are therefore hated by a large part of the population. That’s something the AfD plays on—it thrives on hatred of the Greens, or rather of the policies the Greens pursue.

But the Greens have been fanatical on this point, so completely in thrall to the us that they have adopted a virulently anti-China position. Baerbock, the Green Foreign Minister, has made real diplomatic blunders. In at least one instance, in Saarland, she scared off an important Chinese investment with a lot of jobs attached. So, this is a worrying new development.

Brazil was no exception, and it adopted a suite of ad hoc programs: emergency aid to people in situations of vulnerability; an emergency benefit for formal employees; an emergency benefit for maintaining employment and income; and emergency financing to cover payroll expenses. These emergency income guarantee programs consumed 63.5 percent of the “war budget” spent in 2020.16

gainst this backdrop, this section proposes an analysis from the perspective of financial cycles. To do this, we discuss two points: first, a fall in the two main banking revenue streams appeared as a trend before the Covid crisis and, for this reason, we can consider that decline to have a more structural dimension; second, the state played a key role in restoring the sector’s profitability.

And while Barnett conducted numerous high-profile interviews over the years with the likes of The New York Times, the producers of the Netflix documentary Downfall, and the Today show, what was most unusual from his lawyers’ perspective was that he had the receipts. Unlike would-be whistleblower clients who find themselves “perp walked” out of the plant without access to their phones or email accounts, Turkewitz told the Prospect, “John had meticulously documented everything, he had thousands of pages stored on his computer.” Those documents were especially invaluable because of the meager force of the “AIR 21” statute governing aviation whistleblowers, which forces industry employees who are fired for speaking out about unsafe practices to litigate their grievances in a secret court system operated by the Department of Labor that lacks subpoena power.

The judge said this while ruling in the DOJ’s favor, in a case filed by 737 MAX victims’ families to force the agency to hand over its files on the decision to close the Boeing case with a toothless DPA. The judge, Beryl Howell, denied the families’ motion, but rebuked the agency for failing to “take seriously the reputation of the Department of Justice [in] responding to all the smoke that has been generated about this DPA,” as evidenced by its failure to send a single lawyer from the fraud division to the March 1 hearing. “It’s the Department of Justice’s reputation at stake here in how well they’re protecting the public interest,” she told the courtroom.

In any given year, Cairo pays 50–60 percent of state revenue in payments on this debt, while 40–45 percent of its revenue comes from regressive taxes on the poor, many introduced in 2016 with IMF support. The other half of its state budget is borrowed money, which Cairo acquires from Gulf Arab donors, the IMF, and by selling its own deposit certificates and bonds at high interest.

Col. Roger Cabiness II, an Army spokesperson, acknowledged parts backlogs in a statement to Army Times. He said a “working group” between Army Materiel Command and “other stakeholders” aims to reduce such backorders. Cabiness also said that “advanced manufacturing, data analytics and other innovative solutions” will combine to ease the difficulty of getting the right parts at the right time.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Trevor Nelson, who at the time was a sergeant first class leading maintenance for 1-66′s Bradley company, and other Iron Knights described parts backlogs that meant some tanks faced long delays before repair. That made the unit lean even harder on its functional vehicles and on its soldiers. Sometimes the “burnt out” maintainers would resort to visiting auto parts stores and buying common parts on their own dime.

Donna Desrochers, a senior associate at rpk GROUP, a national higher education consulting firm, and former principal researcher in the education program at the American Institutes for Research, says that while colleges could be more financially transparent, "some of this staffing up is legitimate" to address equity gaps and help students do well.“I don't think it's all bloat," she says. "It’s more nuanced than, ‘Universities are hiring all these professionals they don’t need.' Investments in student success are worthwhile. It costs a lot to get students enrolled, and it’s best to help them persist and succeed in college.”

Mediapart’s speciality has been to police and intimidate the left. Any time a left voice strays from Atlanticist orthodoxy, they try to whip it back into line. Edwy Plenel, the ex-Le Monde, ex-Trotskyist founder of Mediapart, has been particularly virulent on Ukraine. He’s recently recycled his pro-nato analysis of the Yugoslav war and his verbose charge against Régis Debray, trying to associate Mélenchon with Milošević, while Zelensky would be the new Trotsky and Putin, Stalin. It’s obvious from his book that he knows almost nothing about Ukraine. But attacking Mélenchon has become the national sport, of which Mediapart is a keen practitioner.

But the hero redeems himself with — and “Beaumont” promotes —  the super-secret explanation of why the British have been losing to the Russians. Through a spy ring they recruited at Oxford, the Russians have their agents in the top jobs in Whitehall and Downing Street. This spy ring, code named COSTELLO, is so secret that in Moscow it’s run by the Kremlin apart from the foreign and military intelligence services, the SVR and GRU.

Experts believe the country will then have to stump up an additional €25bn-€30bn a year out of the general budget to meet the 2 per cent goal — an eye-watering sum that could require swingeing cuts in welfare spending if the country is to balance the books.

According to the ACA's estimate, the shortage for the coming year is about 3,500 soldiers, among other things in the shadow of the many dead and wounded in the wa

As 2023 ended, the company’s strategy department was abolished. Unit strategy functions were also reduced. The company no longer wants a plan for company-wide new technology development, new product development or, most crucial, restoring the links between the people who design and build aircraft and the people who manage the company. There are also no plans to promote technical people to senior management positions. Stephanie Pope’s recent appointment as chief operating officer means another finance person has been made Calhoun’s heir apparent.

really good workplace novel, a really good workplace satire—Then We Came to the End; On the Floor—hauls the essential unreality of working life out of the weird blandness of working life as much as out of the particulars.

America is a post-moral society, and therefore no obvious evil can be condemned without the palliating piping-in of Drs. Efficacy and Outcome.

The engineers and workers at Boeing, in other words, really want to build quality aircraft, but are prevented from doing so by the suits. This is consistent with what I’ve heard from labor negotiators who dealt with Boeing in the early 2000s; the executives absolutely despised their union and attempts from the workers to preserve quality processes. Next month, the Machinists are going to start negotiating with Boeing over pensions, health care, and salaries. But the subtext will be the absolute rage towards the executives who ruined their once-great company.

A lot of these lifehacks boil down to making your life easier. There's a spot on our kitchen counter where I put e-waste. Whenever I go out to the car, I carry any e-waste out and put it in a bag in the trunk. Any time I'm near our city dump, I stop and throw the bag into their e-waste bin. This is now a habit, and habits are things you get for free: I spend zero time thinking about e-waste, which means I have more time to think about things that matter (and our e-waste still ends up in the right place).

Constant pressure to hit quarterly performance targets meant that machine quality often suffered. In some cases, machines would be shipped out the door unfinished so the delivery could be booked, and assembly would be completed by service technicians at the customer’s location. In his history of the American machine tool industry, Albert Albrecht states that “the actions of these larger corporations and conglomerates, under the leadership of financial MBA’s, perhaps more than any other factor, contributed to the restructuring and decline of the US machine tool industry at the end of the 20th century.”

The third major shift in the machine tool industry was the rise of foreign producers, especially Japan. Japan’s machine tool industry had been devastated by the war and the immediate aftermath (when many of Japan’s machine tools were shipped to China and the Philippines as war reparations), and by 1955 Japanese tools were just 0.5% of world exports. But Japan was eager to become a major producer of machine tools, and its manufacturers quickly became more capable. Between 1955 and 1960 Japanese machine tool production rose by a factor of 15, and in 1960 American Machinist magazine noted that “Japanese machines for the first time appear to merit recognition and to be competitive with machines of the most advanced industrial nations.” By the end of the 1960s, imports remained a small fraction of the US market (around 10%), but were gaining momentum: between 1964 and 1967, Japanese machine tool exports to the US rose over 1200%.

Dean claimed to have noticed a significant deterioration in Spirit’s workforce after Spirit went through several rounds of mass layoffs in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, despite the huge influx in government funding they received. According to court documents, Dean said that “Spirit laid off or voluntarily retired a large number of senior engineers and mechanics, leaving a disproportionate number of new and less experienced personnel.”

The French were initially gung-ho in support of the Whites against the Bolsheviks, but cooled off after a debacle in Odessa, which they briefly occupied early in 1919 with White allies who were ‘more of a hindrance than a help’.

Within interwar Britain, none were more influential than Ralph Hawtrey, who laid much of the intellectual foundations for the infamous “Treasury View” of the interwar period. From his theorization of the unrelenting tendency toward inflation in credit-based market economies, to his justification of the necessity of “independent” central banks—a proposal which Keynes notably endorsed—Hawtrey’s influence in fashioning the deflationary approach of the British state throughout the 1920s was unrivaled.

In particular, the share of domestic consumption contributing to economic growth declined throughout the 2000s.  In the mid-2010s, the share of private consumption was less than 50 percent of GDP, significantly lower than that of other advanced countries. This growth pattern was associated with rising income inequality and wage depression. The Gini coefficient of disposable income rose, and the wage share of workers fell significantly in the 2000s, though there was some improvement after 2010. Notably, the relative poverty rate reached 17.6 percent, and the share of low-wage workers receiving less than two thirds of the median wage stood at 23.5 percent in 2016. By contrast, the rich fared well, with the top 10 percent income share at about 43 percent of GDP in 2016, second only to the US.

Almost overnight Balcerowicz pushed through legislation to liberalize the economy, remove price controls, make the Polish currency convertible, and eliminate the fiscal deficit by reducing substantially government subsidies to state enterprises. In order to deal with inflation, partial indexation of wages and incomes was introduced. Faced with the reduction in subsidies, state enterprises reduced production and raised their prices. Hyperinflation took hold and, along with it, mass unemployment. In the government, economists advised that this inflation was necessary to bring down real wages and eliminate the money balances built up during the last decade of Communist rule, as shortages of consumer goods left households with incomes but little on which to spend.

The move was hailed as a “historic moment” last week by Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who said during a news conference that it marks the first time the country will permanently station forces outside its borders.

We have a whole word here at Gawker, "writering," to describe the tribe of writers whose principal writerly concern is being writerly, and who spend all their time congratulating one another on their writing and promulgating correct rules for writing

What exactly are his credentials? 35,550 tweets? How does he essentially differ from the cranks who, before the Internet, had to vent their spleen by writing letters in green ink? (Elsewhere in the same post, he wrote that his critics had breached their duty to "exchange ideas in a humble and respectful manner.")

He said the country had already made great progress on this path: its debt-to-GDP ratio had fallen to 64 per cent, from 69 per cent when Lindner entered government in 2021. And that, he added, must continue.“For that reason and unless there’s a real need, we can’t just take on more debt than is allowed,” he said.

“The terrorists had a distinct tactical advantage in firepower,” said Yair Ansbacher, 40, a reservist in a counterterrorism unit who fought on Oct. 7. He and his colleagues mainly used pistols, assault rifles and sometimes sniper rifles, he said.

Born in Colombia, Rocha was raised in a working-class home in New York City and obtained a succession of liberal arts degrees from Yale, Harvard and Georgetown before joining the foreign service.He was the top U.S. diplomat in Argentina between 1997 and 2000 as a decade-long currency stabilization program backed by Washington was unraveling under the weight of huge foreign debt, triggering a political crisis that would see the South American country cycle through five presidents in two weeks.

Se pusieron en contacto conmigo algunos ex montoneros, especialmente los que habían intentado rebelarse contra la conducción nacional, Miguel Bonasso, por ejemplo, y varios miembros totalmente desconocidos que habían pasado algún tiempo en la cárcel y me escribieron para decir que el libro les había ayudado a entender lo ocurrido en sus vidas. Para mí, esas cartas, escritas por jóvenes que empezaban a valorar su actuación pasada y la experiencia montonera con un espíritu de autocrítica, tenían más valor que cualquier reseña del libro.

Además, no tenía mucha confianza en las instancias judiciales argentinas durante aquel período. Por lo general, habían sido muy pasivas durante la guerra sucia y ahora, de la noche a la mañana, parecían descubrir los derechos humanos cuando las peores violaciones y las juntas militares ya habían pasado.

-¿Por qué sobrevivieron más montoneros que miembros de otros grupos guerrilleros como el ERP? -Por varias razones. Contaban con más efectivos y simpatizantes que los otros grupos, estaban más metidos en las estructuras políticas y sociales del país, se relacionaron mejor con las tradiciones históricas argentinas, fueron más pragmáticos en algunos sentidos y también sacaron a muchos de sus dirigentes del país a tiempo al endurecerse la guerra sucia. También, hay que recordar que tenían mucho más dinero que los demás, dinero producto de los secuestros.

Soon after the Mitterrand experiment began, however, it started to unravel. As a reaction to the Socialists’ ambitious plan for economic reform, capital started to flee France almost immediately. Despite the imposition of draconian capital controls, the government was unable to halt the flight.

Segunda hipótesis: los relatos de los “sobrevivientes” sobre la vida cotidiana en los centros de detención clandestina vulneran, corroen, contradicen, quebrantan abiertamente, la representación mítica del “detenido-desaparecido” como un “héroe” y “mártir”, como un sujeto no contaminado por la eficacia destructiva de la represión. Tercera: las estrategias de “sobrevivencia” frente al poder concentracionario son sospechadas como “traición”, pues violentan el mandato sacrificial asociado a la figura del “detenido-desaparecido”. Cuarta: la condición política actual del “sobreviviente” es resistida, difícilmente asimilada por las organizaciones de derechos humanos y de izquierda, pues su pasaje por la experiencia concentracionaria es reconocido como expresivo de ciertas formas de negociación con los “represores” que, aún cuando puedan y merezcan interpretarse como silenciosas resistencias de los oprimidos, no han dejado de ser sospechadas como actitudes “colaboracionistas”. Finalmente, la quinta hipótesis sostiene que el “sobreviviente” es visualizado no sólo como un símbolo del “horror” del terrorismo de Estado, sino de la contundente “derrota del proyecto revolucionario”; esto es, como un exponente viviente de dos experiencias sociales negativamente significadas.

De hecho, para Astiz la ESMA no parece haber sido tan solo un infierno, sino un purgatorio, ya que algunos compañeros tuvieron que colaborar con la dictadura en tareas de inteligencia «aún sin haber traicionado».

En 1978, la dictadura militar conducida por Jorge Rafael Videla empezó a mostrar sus primeras resquebrajaduras, debido al aumento de la conflictividad sindical y las huelgas obreras. La Conducción Nacional de Montoneros decidió entonces que era hora de pasar de la «defensiva estratégica» a una Contraofensiva popular. La previsión de los dirigentes montoneros era que, en un ambiente caldeado por las movilizaciones obreras, una serie de acciones militares de propaganda armada iban a colocar a la guerrilla peronista a la cabeza de la movilización, recuperando presencia en las calles y acelerando la descomposición del régimen militar. En última instancia, si tenemos en cuenta las categorías nativas de los propios actores, era el método que les había dado tan buenos resultados entre 1970 y 1973, cuando el asesinato del general Aramburu les otorgó un capital político suficiente como para conducir un movimiento de masas y convertirse en un actor político de peso.

la segunda mitad de los años90, el incremento de las luchas sociales coincidió con un avance de las organizaciones de derechos humanos. Los movimientos sociales que aglutinaban a trabajadores desocupados, familiares de desaparecidos y asambleístas barriales tendieron un puente simbólico hacia los 70, explicando la parábola histórica del neoliberalismo como resultado del golpe militar de 1976. Las organizaciones de Derechos Humanos reivindicaron al militante político que había detrás de cada víctima del terrorismo de Estado, desplazamiento que contribuyó a volver más inteligible al objeto de la guerrilla. En ese sentido, la publicación de La Voluntad en 1997, de Eduardo Anguita y Martín Caparrós, reflejó el intento de sistematizar los testimonios de la experiencia militante y de repolitizar a las víctimas, como una forma de resistencia frente a la cultura neoliberal

Yet Bonasso barely writes. Like many others – including the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, led by Hebe de Bonafini – Bonasso is confident about the new political cycle represented by Kirchnerismo. Like other cultural and political actors in Argentina today, Bonasso's confidence seems to rely primarily on Kircherismo's human rights politics, which has so far been marked by the reopening of trials of the military after the annulments of the so-called ‘Leyes del Perdón’. Perhaps more fundamentally, Bonasso seems confident about the probability of constructing a new ‘we’ for the remains of the Peronist Left. A ‘we’, this time, articulated from within an actual political process. This ‘we’ probably has read Bonasso's books and learnt of a political culture configured around powerful tropes and images of loyalty, betrayal, the Peronist People and its secret archives.

Most fundamentally, Bonasso builds up an interpretation of December 2001 that links it to the 1970s. Those who repressed and those who resisted, Bonasso argues, were linked to the 1970s scene. Rodolfo Walsh's assassin was not in the Plaza de Mayo, but his son was there, and Bonasso accuses him of being involved in the murder of one of the five killed. The thousands of disappeared were not in Plaza de Mayo, but their mothers and children were there, to fight what Bonasso deems ‘secular combat’ (Bonasso, Citation2002: 197).

Bonasso's ability to articulate these tropes appeals to strong, emotive identifications. Perhaps readers also sought to find, at least in narrations, an intensity of the political that had seemed to be definitively lost in the 1980s and 1990s: a symbolic recovery of some postcards of intensity, of years in which the People went to the streets and ‘gave their best sons’.

To that political generation, dispersed throughout the political field, Bonasso offers powerful images of a shared past without obliging it to rethink collective responsibilities. In this sense, the reading of Bonasso's testimonial novels, as Beatriz Sarlo argues, probably entails a tranquillizing effect, a nostalgic one

In so far as the ‘market’ – in this case, accessed via the publisher – does not pursue charitable endeavours, the question that remains is: into which ‘market’ does Bonasso's narrative fit? Who, to put it another way, reads Bonasso? The question of readership and the meanings it generates is a difficult one to track. Nevertheless, the narrative itself – its style, its main tropes – provides us with important clues. Even though the construction of an intergenerational bridge is a key ‘authorial intention’ – as the figuration of ‘the generational reserve’ in La memoria en donde ardía clearly illustrates – Bonasso speaks to his generational peers. It is a generation defined not only by age but also, and fundamentally, by politics. This generation is able to decode shared signs and does not need further explanations of contexts, situations or names.

In other words: Bonasso's narrative articulates a Peronist Left's political culture by activating, in the 1980s and 1990s, central images and tropes encoded in a 1970s tone (Williams, Citation1977: 122). As in other products of the same cultural formation, such as Fernando Solanas's Tango (1985) or even Sur (1987), Bonasso's writing constructs a militant memory and, in so doing, configures a residuality.

With the electoral defeat of Peronism in 1983, the demobilization that followed, and the ensuing spread of ex-militants throughout the various political alternatives – Peronist or not – no room remained for the reconstruction of the Peronist Left in the 1980

The core of Bonasso's project of rescuing hidden voices and secret archives in the 1980s and 1990s is to locate the Peronist People, its ‘best sons’, and its main traitors and enemies. In so doing, Bonasso's narrative attempts to reconstruct an intergenerational bridge, to secure the transmission of a militant memory which otherwise would be lost or diminished by the ‘discourse of the renegades’. Bonasso's militant memory, whose basic premise is not to discuss the politics of the 1970s Peronist Left directly, is nonetheless a memory of defeat, and it is loaded with bitterness. This memory is an attempt to provide a re-created political culture with its values, symbols and traditions.

An archive of ‘the People’ and its resistance is not complete without an archive of both the powerful and the treacherous. The memory of the People's politics is impossible without the archive of the anti-People, because they are both terms of the ‘central contradiction’. Bordenave's archive, homemade and depressing, metaphorically points to the reinscription of memory and history by a son of the People. To a degree, Bordenave's archive works, in the narration, as a counterpoint to the recovery of the hidden voices of the rank-and-file militants, the People's ‘sons’.

Recuerdo de la muerte begins the search for hidden voices. Dri's testimony concerning the experience of the dictatorship's concentration camps, in this case, alternates with a series of five chapters called ‘Lejanías’. Interrupting the fluidity of the narrative, these chapters evoke, also from Dri's perspective, the story of his militant formation from September 1955, when his father was an eyewitness to the bombings of Plaza de Mayo, to his increasing involvement in the Peronist Left. It is noteworthy that Bonasso basically represents Dri, a middle-class young man whose political formation took place in the province of Chaco, during his ‘rank-and-file’ experience. Bonasso removes Dri from Buenos Aires – and the ‘modernist’ 1960s – as well as from the 1970s Montoneros' leadership, to which Dri ultimately belonged.

The division of labour within that friendship condenses what was most promising of the revolutionary 1960s and 1970s. According to Bonasso, the Peronist feeling and tradition paradigmatically embodied in Dardo Cabo might guarantee ‘real interchange’ with an ideologically radicalized middle class and, thereby, the construction of a wider popular alliance. Yet that friendship was unique: the inclusion of the term ‘real’ reinforces the sense of failure of such a relationship on a more general level. The emphasis on that friendship throughout Bonasso's narrative points to the fact that not all of the ‘popular camp’ was willing to abandon its conservative stance and even less of the radicalized middle class sought an authentic approach to the Peronist People.

It is this ‘end of the historical Peronist identity’ that entails the inability to define the frontiers between the loyalist and the traitor

Bonasso, first reorganizes the dichotomy, he then links it to the context of the 1970s and, finally, he translates it into the 1980s and 1990s political and cultural landscape. Along with the re-enactment of this set of values, Bonasso's writings also emphasize one of the central symbols of the Peronist political culture: ‘the Peopl

Bonasso, according to Sarlo, cannot overcome the logics of immediacy, which would demand a shift away from the position of witness-narrator in order to understand that past rather than romanticize it (Sarlo, Citation1997, Citation2005). In a similar fashion, Hugo Vezzetti (Citation2002) expresses concerns over the construction of a heroic Montoneros past and the almost ontological impossibility of rethinking the 1970s in Bonasso's narrative. Sarlo and Vezzetti emphasize one of the key purposes that underlie Bonasso's narrative: to construct a militant memory of the 1970s. Equally important, they also identify a central drawback: his reconstruction of the 1970s, which almost entirely relies on his own condition as ‘witness’, does not expand our historical knowledge of that period.

Many critics have highlighted Bonasso's apparent inability to move beyond a 1970s perspective, and have interpreted this inability more generally as a symptom of the difficulties the Peronist Left has in both comprehending its own political responsibilities for the tragic finale of the revolutionary experiences of the 1970s, and of discussing post-dictatorship issues related to mourning and the memory of state repression.

“We know what was announced but we do not know what exactly was signed with the suppliers,” he said. “We will not announce that we will be cutting all the contracts that were signed, even if we were also surprised to see Poland buying everything from Americans and Koreans, and not from our European partners.”

Some European defence executives are also concerned about the impact of South Korea’s state-backed push on the region’s plans to shore up industrial sovereignty in the wake of the Ukraine conflict. “State subsidised companies coming into Europe, setting up factories and pushing for volume production is not a concern in the short-term and is helpful to Ukraine,” said one executive. “But in the long term, there is a risk these companies could outcompete domestic players with less strong balance sheets.”

Korean exporters are also assisted by the government, including its willingness to step in and place orders so as to keep production lines “hot” in the absence of orders from abroad.

Because South Korea produces armaments at a larger scale than many of its western competitors, it can offer better value for money on assets such as tanks and howitzers and lower-end fighter jets.

Hanwha Aerospace recorded the biggest rise in new orders, with its backlog soaring from $2.4bn in 2020 to $15.2bn at the end of 2022, according to the FT analysis. The company, the country’s biggest arms producer, which makes the K-9 self-propelled howitzer tank, has benefited significantly from Ukraine-related orders, in particular from Poland. South Korea has catapulted up the ranks of arms sellers over the past two years because of significant export orders, particularly from eastern European countries. It was the world’s ninth-largest seller of arms in 2022, up from 31st place in 2000, according to Sipri.

Svyrydenko said Ukraine would prioritise defence and debt servicing which meant “there’s a huge risk of underfunding of certain social sectors”. Kyiv might have to delay paying wages for 500,000 civil servants and 1.4mn teachers and benefits for 10mn pensioners if foreign aid did not come through, she said.

En 2019, Villarruel acompañó a Javier Ortega Smith, el secretario general del ultraderechista Vox, en una presentación en el Círculo Militar. “Me atrevo a vaticinar que puede haber un 30 por ciento de los argentinos que estén buscando a alguien que realmente los represente”, dijo el segundo de Santiago Abascal durante su estadía porteña.Villarruel es la presidenta honoraria de la Fundación Oíd Mortales, que firmó la Carta de Madrid, el documento fundacional de una alianza de agrupaciones que orbitan alrededor de Vox en España e Hispanoamérica. Allí denuncian que parte de la región está “secuestrada” por regímenes totalitarios de inspiración comunista

Según Mercado, Villarruel comenzó su activismo en la Asociación Argentinos por la Memoria Completa, que cayó en desgracia después de que una investigación periodística expuso que su máxima dirigente, Karina Mujica, ejercía la prostitución en Mar del Plata.

. In recent months the rouble has actually appreciated, in part because officials introduced capital controls.

MDA: The Fernández government had no epic narrative. Milei could establish a political horizon because Peronism lacked one. Peronists tried to maintain their classic bastions, but those bastions were void of content. When, for example, schools couldn’t open during the pandemic, they offered no narrative argument for that decision. Kids, mothers, and teachers alike suffered a lot, and we failed to explain the reasons for closing the schools. We lost the banner of education during that time.