end of the Cold War, ethnic hatreds ex-ploded, and the country knitted together after World War I began to un-ravel.

But the ad-ministration did nothing more than impose sanctions to back up its toughtalk. It briefly considered and quickly rejected military intervention. Takingover Haiti would be easy, Powell asserted; getting out, very difficult.

The nation must maintain absolute military supremacy,the draft firmly asserted. It must prevent any power or combination of pow-ers from challenging its position.

many of them yearned for what WarrenHarding had called “normalcy” and relief from the burdens of worldleadership

anarchy already gripping Africawould spread across the globe, the chaos in the less developed countrieseventually contaminating the developed nations.

The end of the Cold War took the lid off a pot thathad been boiling for years. In Central and Eastern Europe, the MiddleEast, Central Asia, and Africa, fragile national loyalties gave way to fierceethnic and tribal conflicts, secessionist movements, and vicious “ethniccleansing.”

Critics complained that globalization waswidening an already yawning worldwide gap between rich and poor

he process was often sim-plistically viewed as Americanization and provoked angry reactions.

hese innovations made it impossible for governments to controlinformation, as in the past, contributing to the collapse of the Soviet em-pire and in time the USSR itself.

mergence of democracies and marketeconomies in the former Soviet satellites, Latin America, and even SouthAfrica offered the hope of a new age of global freedom and prosperity.

“The ghosts of Viet-nam have been laid to rest beneath the sands of the Arabian desert,”

Powell and the military wanted U.S.troops out as quickly as possible. Civilians worried that a Shiite Iraq mighttilt toward Iran and that the Kurds’ secessionist dreams could threatenTurkey. They most feared the disintegration of Iraq.

United Statesforces might be tied down in an extended occupation and entangled inIraqi politics in ways that made Vietnam look easy.

he U.S. military permitted much of hisRepublican Guard forces to escape, thus facilitating his retention ofpower

Scowcroft viewed Saddam’s actionsbroadly in terms of the “ramifications of the aggression on the emergingpost-Cold War world.” To do nothing would send the wrong message tobad guys across the globe

oth factorsconspired to make any adjustment more difficult, even where individualmembers of the leadership realized (‘‘objectively,’’ as they would have said)that policy changes would be useful or even necessary

There was, Reagan firmlybelieved, a grand design in Soviet foreign policy that was diametricallyopposite to all that America stood for – its antithesis, the evil version ofempire.

‘Let’s not delude ourselves, the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest thatis going on.

America to reestablish order in the natural development of ‘‘newly inde-pendent states,’’ which the Soviet Union had been perverting at will duringthe de ́tente era.

This remarkable turning away from even the mildest form of skepticismwith regard to the qualities of the movements that directly or indirectlyreceived American backing can only be explained by the great concern thatUS elites by the late 1970s had begun attaching to the new wave ofrevolutionary change in the Third World and to Soviet interventionism

hestrove to overcome the effects of the Vietnam War, Reagan was aware thathe had to do so without risking the US losses that conflict had produced.

sought to target Third Worldregimes seen as closely allied to the Soviet Union, such as Nicaragua,Afghanistan, and Angola. The president wanted to see Soviet defeats andan internal change of political direction in these countries, because suchchanges would confirm Reagan’s own conviction that his country was onthe side of history and that socialism was a thing of the past.

the moral education of the CCP connected that self-restraint to the Party’s high revolutionary cause, aimed at achieving a bright future formankind, and thus formed a persuasive logic to replace the individual self with the collective.

Their feeling of shared weal and woe thusconsolidated a sense of collectivism and fraternity.

Although Communism is not comparable to religion, the two have something incommon, that is, their pursuit of ideals and their emphasis on devotion and sacrifice

Liu Rong was quite frank about the idea of planning for himself, including theissue of “finding a wife.” Subconsciously, he found it natural to think about getting married,but, on the other hand, he also implicitly condemned this focus on personal plans when hesaid, “What is the difference between us and the petty bourgeoisie and the reactionarybourgeoisie if we all plan for ourselves from the standpoint of individualism?”

This laid a sound foundation for the successful impact of theRectification Movement on these cadres and for the successful implementation of themarriage restrictions

cadres’ long-cultivatedself-consciousness and obedience to the Party’s will were also important factors con-tributing to their self-control.

The CCP’s collectivism was heightened in wartime.

CCPmembers stressed that marriage must conform to the collective interests of the Partyand that during the War of Resistance, marriage must benefit the revolutionary cause.

After all, as the Rectification Movement pressed forward,the importance of organization was increasingly emphasized, and many people choseorganizational interests over those of the individual

In otherwords, they subordinate the interests of the Party to their own interests.

arriagerestrictions applicable to these officers aimed not only at helping them avoid thedistractions of family issues but also at promoting ordinary soldiers’ perceptions ofequality between officers and troops.

The persistence of vir-ulent racism in the United States and its most blatant manifestation inrigid, legalized segregation in the South gave the lie to U.S. claims forleadership of the “free” world and became a stock-in-trade of Communistpropaganda

eyday of decolonization, more than one hundred newnations came into being, creating a fertile breeding ground for great-power competition.

wage the conflict largely through client states, diplomacy, propaganda,and threats of force.

The extension of thecontainment policy to Southeast Asia put the United States on the wrongside of nationalist revolutions, laying the basis for war in Vietnam

president unwisely refused to seek congressional authorization for fear ofsetting a precedent that might bind his successors, suggesting the extentto which the Cold War had already shattered traditional attitudes on suchissues

bove all, it pressed for a huge boost in de-fense spending to support a massive buildup of nuclear and conventionalarms.

he Truman administration approved NSC-49advocating that the United States “block further Communist expansionin Asia.”

it seemed to shift theglobal balance of power against the United States

Again, whatever is in accord with nature is best, for in all things nature does what is best.

Furthermore, it is evident that several persons could by no means preserve the stability of the community if they totally disagreed. For union is necessary among them if they are to rule at all: several men, for instance, could not pull a ship in one direction unless joined together in some fashion.

Therefore the rule of one man is more useful than the rule of many.

Now it is manifest that what is itself one can more efficaciously bring about unity than several

"Where there is no governor, the people shall fall."

there are many men together and each one is looking after his own interest, the multitude would be broken up and scattered unless there were also an agency to take care of what appertains to the common weal.

t is therefore natural that man should live in the society of many.

Wherefore, if man were intended to live alone, as many animals do, he would require no other guide to his end.

Consequently man needs some directive principle to guide him towards his end.

the British concluded that the possible gains of war with theUnion would not be worth the risks. For all his bluster and meddlesome-ness, Napoleon followed London’s lead. The Union was also lucky thatthe Civil War took place when Europe was as unstable as at any timesince Waterloo. The distractions caused by its internal conflict and the re-sulting great power divisions rendered intervention less likely

In terms of Manifest Destiny, Americans continued tobelieve that Canadians would opt for republicanism, but they respectedthe principle of self-determination rather than seeking to impose theirviews by force

ut they increasinglydoubted it would be used.

hey passionately op-posed the acquisition of new slave states

Theavailability of new land in the West and acquisition of new markets forfarm products would preserve the essentially agricultural economy uponwhich republicanism depended

he nation’s remarkable success increasingly turned optimisminto arrogance, however, and repeated clashes with Indians and Mexi-cans created a need to justify the exploitation of weaker people.

More often than not, Manifest Destiny covered and attempted to legit-imate selfish motive

Some Americans argued that if the United States did not take Texas andCalifornia, the British and French would. At least, they might try to sus-tain independent republics that could threaten the security of the UnitedStates

oined in 1845 by the Democratic Party journalistJohn L. O’Sullivan to justify annexation of Texas, Oregon, and California,the phrase meant, simply defined, that God had willed the expansion of theUnited States to the Pacific Ocean—or beyond. The concept expressed theexuberant nationalism and brash arrogance of the era

t expressed the spirit of the age and provided a ringing,if still premature, statement of U.S. preeminence in the hemisphere. Itpublicly reaffirmed the continental vision Adams had already privatelyshared with the British and Russians: “Keep what is yours but leave therest of the continent to us.

On the most pressing issue, he setforth a non-intervention principle, warning the Holy Allies and Francethat the United States would regard as “dangerous” to its “peace andsafety” any European effort to “extend their system to any portion of thehemisphere.”

Whatever its attitudes toward Latin America, the United States couldonly view with alarm the possibility of European intervention. The threatrevived memories of those early years when the omnipresent reality of for-eign intrusion endangered the very survival of the new republic. It couldforeclose commercial opportunities that now seemed open in the hemi-sphere.

nation en-joyed a rare period of “free” security in which to develop without majorexternal threats.

Europe’s imperial urge did not slacken, andfrom 1800 to 1878 the amount of territory under its control almost dou-bled.2 But the focus shifted from the Americas to Asia and Africa.

In sum, by the r 570s and r 5 8os newly designed forts had givendefenders a strategic advantage over besiegers in each of the sultan-ates of the northern Deccan. This, in turn, lowered the level ofinter-state warfare, froze inter-state boundaries and allowed the sul-tanates to devote their energies to patronizing cultural projects thatwere both distinctive and remarkable

The perfect plot, accordingly, must have a single,and not (as some tell us) a double issue; the change in the subject’s fortunes mustbe not from bad fortune to good, but on the contrary from good to bad; and thecause of it must lie not in any depravity, but in some great fault on his part

ence poetry is something more philosophicand of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather ofuniversals, whereas those of history are singulars.

mitation is natural to man from childhood, oneof his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitativecreature in the world, and learns at first by imitation

But the inhabitants of either orboth may exercise their primitive rights, and solicit a unionwith us. They will certainly do no such thing to Great Britain.By joining with her, therefore, in her proposed declaration, wegive her a substantial and perhaps inconvenient pledge againstourselves, and really obtain nothing in return.

because the power ofGreat Britain being greater than ours to seise upon them, weshould get the advantage of obtaining from her .the samedeclaration we should make ourselves

he objectof Canning appears to have been to obtain some public pledgefrom the Government of the United States, ostensibly againstthe forcible interference of the Holy Alliance between Spainand South America

et the two English-speaking states simultaneouslycompeted for market supremacy, strategic superiority, and to establish clientsand allies within the new Latin American states

he framers of the 1823 message, as well as laterproponents of the Monroe Doctrine, concluded that only by controlling the entireWestern Hemisphere—and, consequently, the new states of Latin America—would the United States be able to survive, develop, and ultimately replace theempires of the Old World.

The greatest fear of US statesmen was that these internaland external vulnerabilities would merge, transforming their independent unioninto fractious colonial dependencies, virtual western pawns of the Europeanbalance of power.

US statesmen would have no choice but to levy high taxes, create astanding army, and centralize political power. But these actions would inthemselves endanger the union by contravening established political practices,perhaps even leading disillusioned Americans into the arms of Old World

Oldconcerns about Western separatism resurfaced during the Monroe cabinet’sdiscussions

personal responsibility gave authority to those who were less interested in forgingnational unity than in establishing their own independence

Supplies of British goods and capital were determined far more byconditions in Britain and the world market than by conditions in the UnitedStates. Consequently, Britain was able to exercise a much greater degree ofeconomic influence on the United States than the Republic was able to exert onBritain.

Indeed, the UnitedStates relied on the Royal Navy for protection against external threats

Eliminating their primarymeans of support would help quell the Indian menace and open theNorthwest to American expansion. In a broader sense, the elimination ofBritish power from North America would enhance U.S. security

Persuaded by May that no settlement was likely, andwith the approaching election putting a premium on action of somekind, Madison submitted a war message to Congress.

he threat of Indian warfare on the frontier, which Americans alsoconveniently blamed on Britain, added to an already long list of griev-ances

nlike Adams a decade earlier, the president did not fan the martialspirit. He closed American ports to Royal Navy ships and demanded notmerely reparation but British abandonment of impressmen

The residue of Anglo-phobia left from the Revolution deepened as the crisis intensified. Out-raged by British insults to their honor, Americans insisted on demandsLondon could not possibly meet, placing the two nations on a collisioncourse

y this time, the resumption of war withEngland was imminent. Desperate for money and angry at Spain, he ig-nored the Treaty of San Ildefonso and sold the United States all ofLouisiana instead of simply New Orleans for funds to underwrite waragainst England.

A chance to do so to an extent he could not possibly have imaginedcame with the Louisiana crisis of 1802–3 and the acquisition of a vast newterritory.

efferson’s expansionism represents the fullest expression of his national-ism and republicanism

Eager toprove to North Africans—and Europeans—that the United States wouldmeet force with force, he dispatched four ships to the Mediterranean to“protect our commerce and chastise their insolence” by “sinking, burning,or destroying their ships and Vessels.

He was certain that appeasement encouraged more outra-geous demands.

Genuine political and economic freedom required a populationof independent landowners engaged in productive enterprises

A republican population de-manded, in turn, access to foreign markets to ensure continued outlets forAmerica’s agricultural surpluses and the availability of sufficient land toprovide an economic basis for freedom for a rapidly expanding people

is inaugural commit-ment to “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations—entangling alliances with none” echoed in less qualified terms

hey secured release from theFrench alliance, making possible a truly independent foreign policy

The removal ofBritish troops from U.S. soil, along with Spanish recognition of the south-ern boundary and granting of access to the Mississippi, eased the foreignthreat to frontier communities, curbed secessionist impulses among west-erners, and facilitated incorporation of the West into the Union

Insisting on its rights to trade with both major belligerents, the UnitedStates suffered heavy losses in shipping but achieved major gains in for-eign trade. Exports increased from $20 million in 1792 to more than $94million in 1801, imports from $23 million in 1790 to $110 million in 1801,and the reexport trade jumped from $1 million in 1792 to nearly $50 mil-lion in 1800. This prosperity was based on unusual conditions, to be sure,but it provided a foundation for future economic growth

Despite their partisanship and occasional excess, the Federalists skill-fully guided the United States through a perilous era. Displaying oppor-tunism and pragmatism in time of crisis, they exploited the European warto America’s advantage while scrupulously avoiding the full-scale involve-ment that would have been disastrous at this stage of the nation’s growth

of that conflict until 1815 perpetuated the threat to the United States, butseverance of ties with France rendered its situation much less compli-cated. The nation would not be a party to another “entangling alliance”until the mid-twentieth century

nfluenced byexperience dating to the colonial period, he stressed the importance of anindependent course free of emotional attachments and wherever possiblebinding political commitments to other nations

His ref-erences to alliances set forth a view common among Americans that theirnation, founded on exceptional principles and favored by geography,could best achieve its destiny by preserving its freedom of action.

ally no restrictions and also gained access to the much-coveted West In-dian trade,

ut they served the national interest as well.Desperately in need of U.S. foodstuffs, France purchased large quantitiesof grain and permitted American ships to transport supplies from its WestIndian colonies to its home ports, a right generally denied under mercan-tilist doctrine. Hundreds of American ships swarmed into the Caribbeanand across the Atlantic to “fatten on the follies” of the Old World

fter long andsometimes bitter debates and frequently over Jefferson’s objections, thecabinet had hammered out a neutrality policy that construed Americanobligations under the French alliance as narrowly as possible

They also recognized that war would significantlyincrease demands for their products and might open ports previouslyclosed. As a neutral the United States could trade with all nations,

that to become too closely attached to either powercould result in a loss of freedom of action, even independence.

Americans had long agreed they must abstain from Europe’s wars, andthe new nation’s still fragile position in 1793 underscored the urgency ofneutrality.

Returning to Japan to search for a new way of life, Akira's professionalgoals suddenly seemed meaningless to him. Soon after his return he pickedup a book published by Aum Shinrikyo, and was impressed with the group'steachings on Armageddon. Akira stated that Aum Shinrikyo attracts manyyounger people like himself who have studied science and technology. "S

pendyears in Tokyo's meritocratic rat race, when overnight you can become amover-and-shaker in Om's Construction, Intelligence, or Health and WelfareMinistry. 1

"elect" religious elite.

Students of Japanese religion identify two surges of New Religions-thosethat grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s (shinshukyo), many of which haveprewar roots, and the New New Religions (shinshinshukyo) that haveemerged since the 1970s.

The ultimate objective behind the sarin production was to overthrow the presentJapanese government and establish the new government of Aum Shinrikyo.

he next generation, born in 1960-s, was much less idealistic in its aims: money for them was not anultimate goal, but just a way to provide their living; young people were seeking spiritual enlightenment more thaneconomical welfare.

hierarchic and strict: one must follow the necessary rules from the early childhood. Even in school, society beginsto control the individual, and being a collectivistic culture

n 10 years Aum Shinrikyo became apowerful cult owning a hospital, several restaurants and foreign offices.