42 Matching Annotations
  1. Nov 2019
    1. Dissent by Justince Kennedy

      Kennedy did not dissent. He was in the majority, but he did have a concurring opinion.

    2. the Texas law is a permissible regulation of speech.

      is NOT a permissible regulation of speech

    3. may always

      "may not" Distasteful speech, even hate speech, can be protected under the first amendment

    4. Second Amendment

      First Amendment, freedom of speech/expression

    5. painted an American flag on his bare chest, but painted it upside down

      He was given an American flag by someone else, and then he proceeded to light it on fire.

    6. Arthur Smith

      Gregory Lee Johnson

  2. Oct 2019
    1. not neutral in all respects

      It is neutral in that while religion may be involved, it does not specifically mention whether the money should be used for a religious or non-religious school. That is up to the individual to decide.

    2. attempt to channel funds to wealthy citizens

      In his opinion piece, Rehnquist mentions how the only preference taken in administrating the funds was that "the program is a preference for low-income families, who receive greater assistance and are given priority for admission at participating schools" (415).

    3. most likely violates the establishment clause.

      The program DOES NOT violate the establishment clause in these three court cases. The Supreme Court deems them to be constitutional and not in violation of the establishment clause, because they are providing funds to a program that helps out a "broad class of citizens" even if their intent is to go to a religious school. The money is used for their educational purpose, and not directly to the school itself.

    4. Stevens: dissenting

      Stevens dissented, but he did not write a separate opinion on his own

    5. dissenting

      concurring

    6. No. By a vote of 7–2 the Court ruled in favor of Zelman.

      Court ruled 5-4 against Zelman

    7. 14th Amendment

      First Amendment, establishment clause

    8. 5 percent

      96.7% used vouchers

    9. 10 percent

      80% were religious

    10. p194

      pg. 412-417

    11. (1982)

      2002

    12. Baltimore

      Cleveland, not Baltimore

    1. No trace is to be found in the Constitution of an intention to create a dependence of the Government of the Union on those of the States

      I'm guessing he means that the Federal Government cannot rely or depend on state governments to carry out essential functions? What functions would these be?

    2. it acts upon institutions created not by their own constituents, but by people over whom they claim no control.

      Is Marshall trying to protect the Federal Government from the states with this statement? Often, we hear about protecting citizens from the federal government, but not often do we hear about the federal government being protected from the states.

    3. Legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with the power of controlling measures which concern all,

      Are they implying that the federal legislature contains members of all states, and therefore they can be trusted with matters that concern all citizens?

    1. Congress

      Can the President, not Congress, take over an industry in order to prevent a national emergency?

    2. the several provisions of the Constitution that grant executive power to the president.

      The Constitution can be vague here, especially when it comes to emergency powers. There is nothing that states the President can seize private property from a firm in order to fulfill a national security concern. The Court rules that the executive branch and Congress may have "concurrent authority" in these situations.

    3. to follow policy set by Congress, not the president himself.

      There is no set policy set by Congress here. They have not passed any laws that require the steel industry to comply with the war effort in Korea.

    4. but Congress has clearly chosen to rid itself of that power and give it to the president.

      Congress never rid itself of this power, and it never delegated this power to the President. As the court says, the President can "rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter"

    5. can be upheld

      The Court strikes this down, and rules that this is not a proper example of the President's inherent power as a military commander.

    6. against

      in favor of the steel industry, and against the executive branch

    7. Roberts: dissenting

      Roberts was not a Supreme Court Justice at this time. Justice Black is missing here

    8. Vinson: dissenting

      This is missing Minton and Reed as the two other Justices who dissented

    9. Jackson: dissenting

      This is incorrect, Jackson was one of the majority votes

    10. Vietnam War,

      The US was not directly engaged in a war in Vietnam at this point, but rather was in the Korean War in 1951

    11. sugar manufacturing industry

      the correct industry would be the *steel industry

  3. Sep 2019
    1. If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act?

      It seems the biggest question Marshall has here is the question, "Do we listen to the newest laws, or the original statements of the Constitution?". This is interesting in that Marshall is a federalist and preferred centralized power. It seems here that while he prefers a strong central government, he also wants one that is held strongly in check by a judicial branch.

    2. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits.

      Did John Marshall fear the legislative branch the most? It seems that a lot of the founding fathers were most fearful of the executive branch, as they had just fought a revolution against a royal king. However, it seems here that Marshall is worried about a legislature that can simply change laws that it doesn't like at any given time.

    3. the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party.

      I'm assuming here he is implying that the Supreme Court has the original say or decision when it comes to public officials? As in, people who work for the government?

    1. This is a Federal program that provided grants for the repair of buildings near the Federal building in Oklahoma City that were damaged by the bombing there. Would that be permitted?

      I believe that Alito is one of the majority members for this case. He brings up a good point here of possible discrimination against institutions solely based on their religious affiliation. If a bomb (or fire) had damaged a row of both non-religious as well as religious buildings, would it be unfair if the religious buildings were denied money to help repair their structure?

    2. it's separate from the religious instruction that might be carried out over those computers.

      I think Kagan is included in the majority vote. While she isn't necessarily taking sides here, I think she is comparing this to a previous case where a religious institution was able to receive funds because they were able to show the separation between education and their religious intent.

    3. get the public money.

      I think this segment clues in to Ginsburg being one of the dissenters. I think she is cautious about the idea of religious institutions being funded in some way by a general public.

    4. this 39-State tradition of have -- keeping hands off of religion, and the answer from the States' view is yes. In 1820, Missouri's first constitutional convention adopted from Jefferson's Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom the language that, "No man can be compelled to erect, support, or attend any place of worship." We modified that, made it more specific in the 1865 and 1875 constitutions. And in 1945, it was reenacted in our latest constitution with reference back to the founding era. The -- the question, then, is whether that fits within this Court's jurisprudence under the First Amendment. And there we look at both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, and the play between the joints that this Court confirmed or recognized in Locke v. Davey.

      What is this 39 state tradition? And what states have not followed that tradition?

      Also, Locke v Davey has been mentioned a few times, what was decided in this case and why is it significant to this case? (I'm assuming it has something to do with religion and free exercise)

    5. and there is a point where you can accommodate religion, this other benefit, under the Free Exercise Clause, but I think they all balance out each other.

      What is this balance that he is referring to? It seems that the establishment clause and the free exercise clause are opposite ends that counter each other in some way.

    6. You have a playground. No one is taking the playground away from you.

      I think this points toward Sotomayor being one of the dissenters. In this passage, I think it is clear that she believes that the government is not technically taking anything away from the church, or in this case, not allowing the playground to open.

    7. that extends into a State's decision to deny some uses -- to deny funding to some uses at the same time as it gives funding to other uses

      What are the official rules with States denying funds for religious use? How does this compare with the federal government? Are there are distinct rules, or are they pretty general/open to interpretation?