theexercise of mere natural virtues does not leave the person content. Instead, the more easilyaccessible value of pleasure takes over, and becomes formative of her conception of the good.
doesn't this imply that they can change their conception of the good when they are not content?
But on becoming rich, shefinds out that she is not content, and even feels that something important is missing in her life.She may then be inclined to revise her view of what the good comes to, and of what kind oflife would make her happy
THIS IS THE KIND OF REFLECTION HE DOESN'T ALLOW FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF LATER ON
But since her bad character has become deeplyentrenched, which has made her a slave to appetite, she has difficulty forming an alternativeconception, which could be conducive to the good life. 3
can she un-entrench herself? what if she was put in a position where she was forced to, over and over, perform objectively virtuous action, or face death? could she, over a long enough time, develop habits that would entrench that notion of the good life, and have her become a good person?
conception of goodness, or at least abandon it? Moreover, if the bad person is aware that sheviolates an important value, then she seems to be in the same situation as the akratic person,who acts against her knowledge of the good
ok well at least he realizes this
But since she has some sense of justice acquired through theexercise of the natural virtue of justice, she may still be aware that she violates an importantvalue, which, however, she has not taken the trouble to articulate and internalise throughpractice
Is this arguing that she knows that what she's doing is not just, she just doesn't know what actually would be just, or she just doesn't care that it's not just?
At first, she may not even realise that it is an erroneous conception of goodnessthat impedes her in the quest for a good life, and that it should be replaced by a conception ofgoodness as virtue
can the bad person turn good?
ad person is distressed over the fact that she foundthe things pursued appealing in the first place
makes me think of the person with pedophiliac thoughts that never acts upon them, but hates themself for having those thoughts
Since she feels satisfaction from pleasure, that is a sufficientreason both to believe that pleasure is good, and to pursue more of it. But even if satisfyingappetite may bring some contentment, there is another desire, namely wish, which is leftfrustrated.
"since she feels satisfaction for it" may be a good reason not to start with the thought that it is actually making you unhappy, and is probably a good reason why its low down on the list of things you would consider. but after enough tries, with a direct association between pleasure and dissatisfaction, wouldn't they put it together?
But despite the fact that the thirst is not quenched, there issomething enjoyable about the soft drink, which makes the thirsty person stick to the viewthat soft drink will quench her thirst, and go for more of it.
how stupid is this person, that they cannot differentiate between a) taste and b) satiation? makes the bad person seem extremely stupid to be sooooo infatuated with the taste of it that they cannot POSSIBLY realize the fact that soda makes them thirstier
the badperson may not be aware of the source of her frustration
seems like that would require a person very averse to any self-reflection. no one wants to be unhappy. if one is generally unsatisfied in life, you'd think you'd start to try to determine what's making you unsatisfied
for on obtaining it, she will still think that it is good, and lookfor more pleasure in the future
so she is unsatisfied without realizing she is unsatisfied? like the person who has only ever been in a toxic relationship, not knowing that she is unhappy and that there is real happiness out there?
To begin with, a person may be ignorant aboutwhether a particular thing is good.
*good in any sense of the good, either apparent or true
So an important reason for the bad person’s erroneous conception of thegood is her ignorance of what she really is.
with "what she really is" being a rational being
According to this Platonic reading, the source of the miserable condition of the badperson is her inclination to pursue what is appealing at the moment, without forming areasoned, and stable, conception of the value pursued.1
This seems like LeBar
t arises when the pursuit ofpleasure violates values embraced by the rational part of the soul
"It" being the bad person's conflict
However, rejecting instrumentalism about external goods might appear to pose a problemfor eudaimonism’s focus on agency. For rejecting instrumentalism seems to imply that thereare certain goods in a person’s life that are neither activities nor instruments for activities. Andin that case, won’t the presence of those external goods be something with respect to whichone is passive? Aren’t we forced to concede, then, that some life-goods are Bpassivities^,thereby conceding the central point of Wolterstorff’s objection to eudaimonism?
good question dude!
Now, in order to enjoy the good of aesthetic engagement, onewill typically need things outside oneself. For example, if I spend all of my waking hours in adim prison cell, or on a factory floor, then I will not have the opportunity to enjoy the beautyand majesty of the natural world. I will miss what could have been a good in my life. However,it seems contrary to the very nature of aesthetic engagement to think of all beautiful things ashaving merely instrumental value.
Necessary but not sufficient ofc ofc
rights presupposes the idea of goods to which one has a right
If one has a right to something, that thing is a good in itself
Furthermore, the goods to which we have rights must be intrinsic goods—Bnot merelyintrinsically preferable, but intrinsically good, in the sense that their presence in one’s life allby itself makes one’s life better^.1
Why? Sarah: In other words, the goods that presuppose our rights to these goods must have intrinsic value, or else one could not logically be mistreated if they were to be deprived of these rights.
None of these goods are activities on my part. Nor are they tools or circumstances for myacting well. As Wolterstorff points out, being denied these goods need not impede my virtuousactivity; indeed, it might even prompt me to act more virtuously
These are goods that contribute to my well-being/flourishing without being virtuous activity or being contributors/instrumental to virtuous activity
motive
Happiness is included in the highest good, but can it be included in the motivation for action?