Annotation:

1)

"Most economic migrants—both low- and high-skilled—fare much better in destination countries than if they had stayed in their origin country... These gains increase substantially over time."

This frames migration as a developmental success for individuals. While it supports the idea that free migration can improve global welfare, it also opens the debate on whether these personal gains come at the cost of inequality within receiving countries, particularly when immigration is not accompanied by redistribution policies.

2) "Some workers—those whose skills are similar to migrants’—may lose wages or even jobs, and they need support." This raises the question: Are the economic gains from free trade and immigration unevenly distributed? If lower-income workers in the U.S. and Europe lose out in the short term, does this mean that immigration and trade increase domestic inequality — even if the national economy grows overall? Source: Autor, David, et al. "Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure." Am. Econ. Rev., vol. 110, no. 10, Oct. 2020, pp. 3139-83, doi:10.1257/aer.20170011.

3)

The more closely migrants’ skills and attributes match the needs of the destination labor market, the smaller are their effects on nationals’ wages." I hadn’t considered how much the concept of “match” (between skills and labor demand) affects whether migration leads to wage suppression. It reframes immigration not as inherently harmful or beneficial to equality, but as something dependent on policy design — which is empowering.

Thoughts #1:

"Migrants can contribute much to the destination economy’s efficiency and growth, especially over the long term. Low-skilled migrants perform many jobs that locals are unwilling to take, or for which they would ask wages above what consumers are willing to pay." This passage suggests that immigration can have a positive economic impact, filling labor shortages and contributing to overall growth. This directly relates to the inquiry question because while free trade agreements and immigration may increase inequality in certain labor markets, they also drive economic expansion. Do these benefits outweigh potential wage suppression for native workers?

Questions #2:

"Some workers—those whose skills are similar to migrants’—may lose wages or even jobs, and they need support."

This raises an important question. Do free trade agreements and immigration worsen inequality by disproportionately affecting lower-skilled native workers? If globalization creates overall economic growth, why do some groups benefit while others struggle? Should governments provide compensation or retraining programs for those displaced by trade and migration?

Sources:

"Do Trade Agreements Lead to Income Inequality?" Knowledge at Wharton, 25 Mar. 2025, knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/do-trade-agreements-lead-to-income-inequality.

Epiphanies #3:

"The share of migrants in the global population has remained relatively stable since 1960. However, this apparent stability is misleading because demographic growth has been uneven across the world." I had always thought migration was increasing dramatically, but this suggests the real issue is uneven population growth. This changes my view—perhaps rising inequality isn’t just about immigration or free trade but also about global demographic shifts. How will an aging Europe and U.S. economy adjust to this?

BQ: Thought #1

“But the lesson of the new coronavirus is not that globalization failed. The lesson is that globalization is fragile, despite or even because of its benefits.”

The author argues that globalization has not failed but is vulnerable due to its efficiencies. This directly relates to the inquiry question, as China's liberalization has fueled globalization by making supply chains more interconnected. However, the pandemic revealed the risks of heavy reliance on single-source suppliers like China. While liberalization has benefited the world economically, it also increased global fragility. However, is the idea of specialization not just inherently important for countries? There is a specific reason why we rely so much on trade and do not just manufacture everything ourselves.

BQ: Epiphany #3

“China is using the crisis to showcase its willingness to lead... Beijing seeks to portray itself as the leader of the global fight against the new coronavirus to promote goodwill and expand its influence.”

This made me realize that China’s economic liberalization wasn’t just about economic growth; it was also a strategic move to gain geopolitical influence. Whether or not it was China’s original intention, China’s ability to control supply chains gave it diplomatic leverage during the crisis. It changes how I think about economic liberalization, as it is clearly not just a tool for economic shift but also a tool for global power. I wonder what would happen if North Korea suddenly played the same card after the death of their current supreme leader.

BQ: Question #2

China’s initial response was to hoard medical supplies, causing emergency shortages worldwide. This raises a question: Should globalization include stricter international agreements to prevent resource hoarding in the case of worldwide crises? Who would even implement these agreements or decide what is “lawful” or not? The UN? If globalization is meant to encourage cooperation, is there any way to not only encourage but also incentivize more collaboration in times of crisis?

Citation: Lin, B., Funaiole, M. P., Hart, B., & Price, H. (2021, September 30). China Is Exploiting the Pandemic to Advance Its Interests, with Mixed Results. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-exploiting-pandemic-advance-its-interests-mixed-results

BQ: Thought #1

“But the lesson of the new coronavirus is not that globalization failed. The lesson is that globalization is fragile, despite or even because of its benefits.”

The author argues that globalization has not failed but is vulnerable due to its efficiencies. This directly relates to the inquiry question, as China's liberalization has fueled globalization by making supply chains more interconnected. However, the pandemic revealed the risks of heavy reliance on single-source suppliers like China. While liberalization has benefited the world economically, it also increased global fragility. However, is the idea of specialization not just inherently important for countries? There is a specific reason why we rely so much on trade and do not just manufacture everything ourselves.

Annotation #3 (Epiphanies):

This made me realize how much faith economic models place in governments to manage budget and revenue effectively. (Like the taxes generated from climate policies). I had always assumed that if a policy generated revenue, it would be used productively to negate negative externalities or to fund a government agency crucial to the daily lives of citizens. However, in reality it is probably being used to fund more defense contracts… What if governments misallocate those funds or prioritize short-term political gains? It changes how I think about large-scale government interventions and policies as even well-intended policies can fail if the execution is flawed or corrupt.

Paper:Public Choice and Environmental Polic

Annotation #2 (Question):

This passage really highlights the economic concept of negative externalities. It raises the important question of how and when a government should balance climate policies with economic growth, especially given the vast amount of uncertainties in climate projections. How do policymakers determine the correct level of intervention when economic models on climate change rely on uncertain future predictions? To what extent could a government intervene in our day to day lives with the purpose of "climate protection"?

Annotation #1 (Thoughts):

This statement suggests that economic growth will continue to be richer, even if climate change impacts are significant. However, it makes me question the idea of current climate change actions, especially ones that are more "aggressive". Are these "more extreme" pro climate change actions, such as heavy taxation on non "green" cars, justified if future generations will be wealthier and better equipped to handle climate-related challenges. This idea directly relates to the inquiry question, by thinking about the same question but from the complete opposite perspective.

"World inequality, however, cannot be explained by climate or diseases, or any version of the geography hypothesis. Just think of Nogales. What separates the two parts is not climate, geography, or disease environment, but the U.S.-Mexico border."

Thoughts: The authors make a really strong point against the notion that geography is the main decider of wealth and development. The strongest and most obvious case to me is probably North and South Korea. This prompted me to think about other examples that are closer to my personal life. Having lived a significant amount of time in China I can very much see how this is also the case, for example the Provence of Guangdong is very developed and extremely wealthy, while it's neighbors Guangxi and Yunnan remain much poorer. However, I can also think of many examples that go against this argument as well. The first one that popped into my head was the oil producers in the Middle East. They have similar systems and cultural beliefs that one would normally associate with a less developed country, yet they are extremely wealthy and hold great economic and diplomatic power. Why? Because of their natural geography which gave them oil. It ties into today’s inquiry question by challenging the idea that natural conditions alone explain why some nations fail while others succeed.

“The real reason that the Kongolese did not adopt superior technology was because they lacked any incentives to do so. They faced a high risk of all their output being expropriated and taxed by the all-powerful king, whether or not he had converted to Catholicism.”

Question: This really makes me wonder. How much does economic growth depend on security and trust in the government? If people fear that their wealth will be taken away, they won't invest in the future, but if that's true, how did China, a communist country, grow so fast despite having strong government control? There are so many cases where large corporations suffer big losses in capital and assets based on political disputes. Are there cases where restrictive governments have still managed to create incentives for economic development? If so, how did they do it? This connects to today’s inquiry question by highlighting the role of government policies in either encouraging or stifling long-term prosperity and domestic growth.

“Although the ignorance hypothesis still rules supreme among most economists and in Western policymaking circles—which, almost to the exclusion of anything else, focus on how to engineer prosperity—it is just another hypothesis that doesn’t work.”

Epiphany: I've always had the perception in politics that bad leaders are just plain stupid. Why would a president promise to lower grocery prices, then immediately places tariffs on their largest long term importers? Wouldn't anyone with any background in economics know the consumer bares most of that tariff? So I often find myself asking: Why did they do that? Because their just stupid: That's what I'd always thought. But now, I wonder if they really are stupid or if they know exactly how to fix an issue, but they fail because those in power choose policies that serve their own interests rather than those of the people. This completely changes how I think about global inequality. It's not just about finding the right policies like investing in education, infrastructure or specific industries, but its about fixing political power and who benefits from the system staying the way it is.