In this part of the article, De George supports the idea that small, gradual improvements in business ethics are more realistic and effective than trying to completely change the entire economic system. This argument makes sense because practical, step-by-step changes are often easier to achieve and sustain within existing business structures. However, the strength of this claim depends on how effective those small reforms actually are—sometimes they only create the appearance of progress without fixing deeper issues. To make his argument stronger, De George could acknowledge these trade-offs and explain when gradual reform is enough and when bigger structural changes are necessary, using real examples of companies or industries where ethical improvements led to meaningful change.

In this section, De George praises philosophers who take a practical approach by working directly with real-world ethical issues, but he also emphasizes the influence of major thinkers like Kant and Mill on business ethics. This creates a bit of tension because if the strength of applied ethics is its focus on context and practicality, then relying too much on broad, abstract theories could seem inconsistent. De George does hint that both can work together—using traditional theory as guidance while solving concrete problems but he doesn’t fully explain how they connect. To make his argument clearer, he could show exactly how universal theories can be applied in specific business contexts without losing their practical value.

In this part of the article, De George disagrees with Rorty’s idea that philosophy should be judged by whether it improves people’s character. Instead, he suggests that philosophy’s value lies in helping expand moral imagination and guide institutions. This argument makes logical sense because changing the standard for evaluation naturally changes how we see philosophy’s relevance. Still, De George never clearly defines what “moral imagination” means, which makes his point feel a bit vague and open to interpretation. To make his argument stronger, he could give specific examples of what an expanded moral imagination looks like in practice, like when companies start recognizing more stakeholder interests or include human-rights principles in their values.

In this section, De George suggests that the work of philosophers has influenced corporate behavior and the way companies talk about ethics. The argument makes sense because it follows a clear logic—philosophers create moral frameworks, those ideas spread through education and public discussion, and eventually, companies adopt new ethical policies or language. However, De George doesn’t fully prove that philosophers were the main cause of these changes, since factors like laws, market demands, media pressure, or social movements could also explain them. This makes his claim seem a bit overstated. To make it stronger, he could mention clear examples of philosophers directly advising businesses or policymakers, showing how their ideas actually shaped corporate reforms.

In this part of the article, De George argues that moral imagination by itself is not enough and that ethical theory is needed to make sense of conflicting intuitions and to justify actions. The argument follows a logical path because if intuitions often clash, then using structured frameworks can help organize and clarify them. However, De George presents theory as the only real way to create coherence, without acknowledging that there are other valid ethical methods like narrative ethics, casuistry, or reflective equilibrium. This creates a small false dichotomy because he makes it seem like we must choose between imagination and theory when in reality both can work together. To make his point stronger, he could include examples of how theory and intuition complement each other in ethical reasoning.

In this piece of the article De George affirms that philosophers were the primary founders and builders of academic business ethics. This is technically a historical claim that can be evaluated. The argument has a very logical structure because technically if philosophers initiated curricula, journals, societies, and research agendas, then they can be credited with founding the field, but the soundness of this argument requires a citation or supporting evidence like dates, founding figures, institutional histories. Because these citations are missing, the claim is risking falling in generalization because other figures like lawyers, scientists, teachers and activists have also contributed to the growth of philosophy. To make this argument stronger he should present more specific examples and evidence to substantiate causation other than the apparented correlation.

De George goes on to contend Rorty's account is way too narrow because it basically makes philosophy be equal to just the analytic core. The structure is in fact valid because the premise that Rorty is treating philosophy in a very narrow way can support the conclussion that his dismissal of philosophy's relevance is mistaken. I personally think ths soundness of the claim depends pretty much on whether Rorty did in fact intend to give it such a short meaning. De George provides textual evidence but sometimes attributes an extreme thesis to Rorty without showing that Rorty consistently uses that narrow definition. I think ther is a risk of Strawman happening here if De George overgeneralizes Rorty’s position. I think a more careful and detailed analysis/approach would quote Rorty’s key passages and show precisely where De George’s counterexamples undermine them.

In this sentence De George argues that applied ethics are a "genuine" change or revolution because it has re-shaped philosophy into a discipline guided towards resolving practical problems. This claim is technically plausible and logically sound if philosophers that were once focused on bigger problems now address more concrete moral issues and alters curricula, hiring, and public engagement, then calling it a “revolution” is justified. However i would argue the term "REVOLUTION" can be very ambiguous and ver very rethorically loaded since it could either mean institutional change, conceptual change or just an expansion on the topics treated. To be able to support that ethics are a revolution in philosophy he would need to mention more specific indicators to avoid relying on metaphor and to make the claim empirically testable.