In 1971, psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman published a now-classic paper, “Belief in the law of small numbers,” reporting that people “regard a sample randomly drawn from a population as highly representative, I.e., similar to the population in all essential characteristics.” I’ve been thinking a lot about this idea lately when coming across discussions of evidence. The (false) small-numbers heuristic leads people to expect that all, or almost all, the empirical evidence in some controversy will go in the same direction. Individual pieces of evidence can be analogized to samples from a larger population of potential evidence. Presumably the entire population of evidence, if it could be seen at once, would confirm the truth or at least strongly favor the correct hypothesis. (Here I’m thinking of a simple case in which there are two models of the world, one of which is essentially false and one essentially true.) Now let’s get back to stories. True stories will contain a mix of confirming and disconfirming evidence; that’s just the way the world works, or, to put it another way, that’s the statistics of small samples. But, in a fictional story, all the evidence can go in the same direction, and that can feel right, in that it fits our false intuition. The question then arises, where does the incorrect heuristic of the law of small numbers come from? It could come from all the stories we hear!
Worse in overfictionalized areas: crime