effeminophobia,
the fear and hatred of homosexuality & effeminophobia: the fear of effeminacy
effeminophobia,
the fear and hatred of homosexuality & effeminophobia: the fear of effeminacy
The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
The causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors
The greatest source of factions had always been the various and unequal distribution of property
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed.
Give everyone the same opinions, passions, and interests.
faction
political parties
Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires.
The first was to destroy the liberty essential to their existence.
no matter how impressive Hoy's statistics, the Enquirer found ways to denigrate his performance, his dedication, and his manliness.
Female athlete: judged by achievements, not by gender
At his resentencing hearing, Jones told the court, “I’m not the same person I was when I was 15. . . . I’ve become a pretty decent person in life. And I’ve pretty much takenevery avenue that I could possibly take in prison to rehabil-itate myself.” App. 152. “Minors do have the ability to change,” he reflected. Ibid. He noted in closing, “If you de-cide to send me back without the possibility of parole, I willstill do exactly what I’ve been doing for ten years. But all I can do is ask you . . . please give me just one chance to show the world, man, like, I can be somebody. I’ve done every-thing I could over the past ten years to be somebody. . . . I can’t change what was already done. I can just try to show . . . I’ve become a grown man.” Id., at 153. Today, Jones is31. His time spent in prison has now eclipsed the childhood he had outside of it.
Elements of Pathos- appeals to the audiences' emotions.
the Court recognized that this guarantee has special significance for children. The EighthAmendment does not excuse children’s crimes, nor does it shield them from all punishment. It does, however, demand that most children be spared from punishments that “giv[e] no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.”
Sotomayor saw how this ruling may go on to impact juvenile defenders in the future, stripping away their lives and any hope of rehabilitation. She did not want the " hard law" approach of Kavanaugh and the court to make an example out of Jones.
While incarcerated, Jones earned his GED and sought out work, becoming a “very good employee.” Id., at 106, 109, 153. Jones and his prison unit manager often discussed the Bible, and in time,his unit manager came to think of Jones “almost like [a] son.” Id., at 107. Jones confided in him that Jones “regret-ted” what he had done. Id., at 112. Jones’ grandmother (Bertis Jones’ widow) testified at Jones’ resentencing hearing and submitted an amicus brief to this Court. She remains “steadfast in her belief that Brett is not and never was irreparably corrupt.”
Shows that investigation has been done into whether or not Jones is considered "incorrigible" but that it was ignored by the court when discussing the sentencing.
Instead, he was trying to go see his grandmother totell her what had happened.
Another way that the narrative of the murder was twisted by the court to show a lack of remorse on behalf of Jones.
Jones then attempted to save his grandfather by admin-istering CPR.
Shows remorse that kavanaugh tried to hide when addressing the sentencing.
Jones lost access to medications that he had been taking for mental health issues. Id., at 38–39.9 When he was 11 or 12 years old, Jones began cutting him-self so that he “would not feel the panic and the hurt that was inside of [his] head.” Id., at 75. He later experiencedhallucinations and was prescribed antidepressant medica-tions. Id., at 92, 124. These medications were supposed tobe tapered off gradually. Id., at 38–39. When Jones left for Mississippi, however, they were abruptly cut off.
Pathos/Logos; also provides insight not only into Jones troubled past, but his mental state and how it got out of hand and may have led to murder.
The police were called, and Jones was arrested.8 Ibid. Jones’ stepfather then threatened to kick out Jones’ motherand brother if Jones did not move out. Id., at 81. As a re-sult, Jones’ grandparents picked him up less than two months before the murder and brought him to Mississippi.
Pathos- provides background information on Jones living situation that was not previously revealed to the audience.
Jones was the victim of violence and neglect that he was too young to escape. Jones’ biological father was an alcoholic who physically abused Jones’ mother, knocking out herteeth and breaking her nose on several occasions. Id., at 71–72. The two separated when Jones was two years old. Id., at 71. Jones’ mother then married Jones’ stepfather, who was also abusive, especially toward Jones. He beat Jones with belts, switches, and a paddle labeled “The Pun-isher.” Id., at 39–40, 78, 81. He rarely called Jones or hisbrother by their names, preferring cruel epithets. Id., at 77, 81, 101 (“[H]is favorite thing to call them was little moth-erf***ers”). According to Jones’ mother, Jones’ stepfather“hated Brett more because Brett reminded him of [Jones’ biological father].” Id., at 78. According to Jones’ grand-mother, he was simply “easier to hurt and beat.”
Pathos- provides a back story that the court never provided the audience with when they were first discussing his sentencing. Creates more of an argument for Jones that not only explains his actions, but shows that rehabilitation could benefit him.
ones killed his grandfather just 23 days after Jones’ 15th birthday.
Pathos- appeals to the audience's emotions as it explains how vulnerable and immature Jones was at the time when the crime was committed.
deserves an answer to Miller’s essential question:whether his crime demonstrates that he is permanently in-corrigible.
Logos- argues that this is necessary for the case despite Kavanaugh's repeated ruling that investigations into it were unnecessary.
the Court transforms
Word choice used not only to express disagreement, but to point out how information and facts have been manipulated to obtain to a certain narrative.
Fewer than 2 percent of resentencings in Pennsylvania have resulted in the reimpo-sition of LWOP. See The Campaign for the Fair Sentencingof Youth, Tipping Point: A Majority of States Abandon Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Children 7
Uses facts and statistics to state why a sentence of LWOP is unjustifiable for most minors who have been convicted of committing a crime.
Miller offered nothingmore than a prediction that “a discretionary sentencing pro-cedure would help make life-without-parole sentences rela-tively rare.” Ante, at 13. Miller’s substantive rule was not a prediction. Rather, Miller held that juvenile LWOP sen-tences must be rare because it is only “the rare juvenile of-fender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”
Logos- uses the court's interpretation of miller against them and reveals how it contradicts the final ruling of Jones vs. Mississippi.
Miller relied on Roper and Graham “for a simple proposition: Youth matters in sentencing.” Ante, at 10. That is true, but the Court conflates two waysin which youth matters. When Miller was decided, the Court’s individualized-sentencing cases had already firmlyestablished “that a defendant’s youth is a relevant mitigat-ing circumstance that must be within the effective reach of a capital sentencing jury.”
Logos
a juvenile death sentence is unconstitutional under Roper, and a juvenile sentence of LWOP for a non-homicide offense is unconstitutional under Graham.
Logos- Uses the facts of Roper and Graham to support her argument regarding the juvenile death sentence.
the Court had interpreted the Eighth Amendment torequire that sentencers make individualized, discretionary decisions when imposing the death penalty. For instance, in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), a plurality of the Court concluded that “the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, [can]not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s characteror record and any of the circumstances of the offense.”
Logos- uses the facts of another supreme court case to support her argument regarding Jones.
“there must be a determination as to whether Jones falls within th[e] protected class” of children who are ineligiblefor LWOP.
Makes the argument that the court and the judge never even bothered to look into whether or not Jones was considered "incorrigible" for life without parole.
“giv[e] effect to Miller’s substantive holding that life without parole is an excessivesentence for children whose crimes reflect transient imma-turity,” but they “d[o] not replace” it. Id., at 210. “Even if a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the EighthAmendment for a child whose crime reflects ‘“unfortunate yet transient immaturity.”’ ”
Points out how the facts of Miller's case could have been used to prove Jones's, but was ignored by the court.
quietly admits in a footnote, however, Montgomery went on to clarify that the fact “[t]hat Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement doesnot leave States free to sentence a child whose crime re-flects transient immaturity to life without parole. To the contrary, Miller established that this punishment is dispro-portionate under the Eighth Amendment.”
Sotomayor points out that the court acknowledged how the their case is contradicted by Miller.
“Miller did not impose a formal factfindingrequirement,” and so “a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.”
Logos- Sotomayor is pointing out the court's decision is based off of one line from Miller's supreme court case. Implies that they are grasping at straws.
Thus, under Miller, juvenileoffenders “must be given the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not, their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored.” 577 U. S., at 213.
Logos
Montgomery recognized that Miller “has a proceduralcomponent,” in that “[a] hearing where ‘youth and its at-tendant characteristics’ are considered as sentencing fac-tors is necessary to separate those juveniles who may besentenced to life without parole from those who may not.”
Logos- uses the facts of other supreme court hearings and their opinion on juvenile defendants to make her point about Jones.
an additional constitutional requirement that the sentencer must make afinding of permanent incorrigibility before sentencing a murderer under 18 to life without parole. But to reiterate, in Miller and Montgomery, the Court unequivocally statedthat such a finding is not required. And we will not now rewrite those decisions to impose a requirement that the Court twice rejected.
Logos- uses facts from both cases to not only prove his own argument, but to disprove the dissents.
be-fore imposing a sentence of LWOP, a sentencer must actu-ally “make that judgment,” and make it correctly
Implies that the decision made was incorrect.
“Imprisoning an offender until he diesalters the remainder of his life ‘by a forfeiture that is irrev-ocable.’” 567 U. S., at 474–475 (quoting Graham, 560 U. S., at 69). It is the “denial of hope” itself.
Uses pathos to appeal to the audience and the sense of vulnerability instilled within a child.
“the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposingthe harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even whenthey commit terrible crimes.”
She uses logic to make her point that the sme kid gloves that Millers sentencing and ruling was handled with should also be used for Jones as they fit the same criteria of youth and immaturity.
sentencing them to die in prison
Pathos- appeals to the audiences emotion through word choice
[m]aturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the foundation for re-morse, renewal, and rehabilitation.”
Offers more evidence as of why his age and immaturity should make him less likely to receive a life sentence than the average person.
“To justify life withoutparole on the assumption that the juvenile offender forever will be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible.” Id., at 72. But “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”
Uses logic to throw out the argument that Jones's incorrigibility should have even been considered as a factor for his sentencing.
The Court is fooling no one. Because I cannot countenance the Court’s abandon-ment of Miller and Montgomery, I dissent.
Sotomayor uses egos and expresses that her interpretation of Miller and Montgomery is vastly different than the courts and has led them to a false conclusion. Sotomayor almost expresses that she believes the cases are being used as an escape goat for the court to sentence the child.
Weighed against these“signature qualities of youth,” the penological justificationsfor the death penalty collapse.
Logos- uses the analytical resource of comparison to state why age should be taken in consideration not only with the death penalty, but with the decision to grant a life sentence as well.
“as any parent knows,” and as scientific and so-ciological studies have confirmed, juveniles are less mature
Logos- use of scientific evidence and reference to sociological studies to prove her point
Juvenile offenders “cannot with reliability be classi-fied among the worst offenders” for several reasons.
Logos- Sotomayor uses the courts' recognition that children do not deserve to be sentenced to death to make her point.
Miller’s essential holding is that “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest children, those whose crimes reflect ‘irrepa-rable corruption.’”
Sotomayor uses the Miller case to point out that there is no evidence that Jones falls into the category of being one of those "rarest children whose crimes reflect 'irreparable corruption."
In the Court’s view, a sentencer never need determine, even implicitly, whether a juvenileconvicted of homicide is one of “those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.”
Logos- Sotomayor uses this quote to present her main argument which is that there is no evidence that Jones is incapable of reform.
The States, not the federal courts, make those broad moral and policy judgments in the first instance when enacting their sentencing laws.
Kavanaugh appears to be pushing the burden of the sentencing off of himself and onto the state courts.
a homicidecommitted by an individual under 18, is a horrific tragedyfor all involved and for all affected
This quote is the first time that Kavanaugh even remotely sympathizes for the assailant.
But Miller did not say a word about requiring some kind of particular sentencing explanation with an implicit finding of perma-nent incorrigibility, as Montgomery later confirmed.
Egos- Kavanaugh uses reasoning to explain why the Miller case differs from the Jones case and why they reached different conclusions.
The Court pointed to statistics from 15 States thatused discretionary sentencing regimes to show that, “when given the choice, sentencers impose life without parole on children relatively rarely.”
This statistic provides elements of logos, but also egos because it demonstrates that the judge took this into consideration with giving Jones a sentence of life without parole.
In short, Miller followed the Court’s many death penalty cases and required that a sentencer consider youth as a mit-igating factor when deciding whether to impose a life-with-out-parole sentence. Miller did not require the sentencer tomake a separate finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing such a sentence. And Montgomery did not purport to add to Miller’s requirements.
is he basically saying that Jones's sentence could have been reduce or been granted parole if he had taken up a different argument?
Rather, Miller repeatedly de-scribed youth as a sentencing factor akin to a mitigatingcircumstance. And Miller in turn required a sentencingprocedure similar to the procedure that this Court has re-quired for the individualized consideration of mitigatingcircumstances in capital cases such as Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 303–305 (1976) (plurality opinion), Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 597–609 (1978) (plurality opinion), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 113–115 (1982). Those capital cases require sentencers to considerrelevant mitigating circumstances when deciding whether to impose the death penalty.
Logos- compares the different supreme court cases and their rulings to explain why Jones is different and therfore reaches a different conclusion.
is difficult even for expert psy-chologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity,and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irrepa-rable corruption.”
Logos- this quote demonstrated why an investigation into whether or not Jones is "premanently incorrigible" would not be required or necessary for Jones's sentencing.
Jones advances three distinct arguments for why this Court should require a sentencer to make a finding ofpermanent incorrigibility before sentencing a murderer un-der 18 to life without parole.
Starts his opinion by disproving the arguments presented by Jones.
“There is a line between homicide and other serious violent offenses against the individual.”
Logos- Kavanaugh adds this quote to draw attention to the severity of the crime committed by Jones.
About 850 of the individuals who committed a homicide were known to be under 18—meaning that, on average, more than two homicides were committed every day by individuals under 18.
Logos- Kavanugh is providing this information to demonstrate that juvenile offenders need to be held accountable and cannot be let off the hook. If the court systems turn a blind eye to juvenile offenders, there would be chaos.
permanent incorrigibility.
Egos- This phrase was repeated over 26 times throughout the hearing which drills it into the minds of the audience.
Under Mississippi law at the time, murder carried a man-datory sentence of life without parole.
Kavanaugh justifies the judge's sentencing here.
Brett Jones was living with his grand-parents, Bertis and Madge, in Shannon, Mississippi.
Kavanuagh could have provided more information here regarding Brett Jones living situation which could have appealed to the audience. Lack of empathy for the juvenile.
And Jones says that the trialjudge did not make such a finding in his case.
Kavanaugh starts by disproving Jones argument before further diving into the facts of the case.
The Court’s decision today should not be construed as agreement or disagreement with Jones’s sentence.
Does this mean that they don't agree with the initial sentencing, but within the eyes of the constitution they are upholding the conviction anyways?
considering an offender’s youth and attendant char-acteristics—before imposing” a life-without-parole sentence.
How many teenagers are capable of rehabilitation as their brains mature?
Miller and Montgomery therefore refute Jones’s argument that a finding of permanent incorri-gibility is constitutionally necessary.
Jones and his lawyer are making the argument that he has not been found of permanent incorrigibility and therefore should be granted parole.
In the case of a defendant who committed a homicide when he or she was under 18, Miller and Montgomery do not require the sentencer to make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before sentencing the defendant to life without parole. In such a case, a dis-cretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.
The case concerned sentencing of juveniles to life imprisonment without parole which appears to be the case's legal dispute of whether or not that is unlawful in the eyes of the constitution or if that is considered cruel and unlawful punishment.
when he or she was under 18
Pathos- Fails to mention Jones actual age at the time of the murder. Deprives the audience of sympathy.
At the end of the hearing, the sentencing judge acknowl-edged that he had discretion under Miller to impose a sen-tence less than life without parole. But after considering the factors “relevant to the child’s culpability,” App. 149,the judge determined that life without parole remained the appropriate sentence for Jones
I believe that this is an example of ethos because it expresses the Justices' trustworthiness of the judge who imposed the initial sentencing for Jones. It demonstrates that Kavanaugh finds him to be a credible source who took Jones's youth in to account when sentencing and made the right decision. In his formal conclusion Kavanaugh writes, "relevant to the child’s culpability,” App. 149, the judge determined that life without parole remained the appropriate sentence for Jones," and states that he sides with him as a credible judge.
“‘No, I already got rid of it.’”
Pathos- demonstrates a lack of remorse on behalf of the assailant.
When that knife broke, Jones picked up a second knife and continued stabbing Bertis. In total, Jones stabbed his grandfather eight times.
Pathos- When describing the murder, Kavanaugh makes sure to describe how brutal and committed to the murder Jones was when it occurred. This makes it seem more deliberate and evil than a heat of the moment crime of passion.
Jones told Austin that he “‘was going to hurt’” his grandfather.
Pathos- appeals to the audience's emotions because of the inclusion that the murder was premeditated.
Jones committed whenhe was under 18.
Pathos- fails to mention that the assailant had turned 15 only three weeks prior.
the defendant is permanentlyincorrigible
Logos is found here within the legal rationale used by the court to reach their decision. They believed that a child does not need to prove to be repeatedly disobedient in order to be receiving a sentencing of life without parole.
“a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.”
Does the court have the moral high ground to deem a child incapable of reform? Or is this cruel and unlawful punishment?
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is the main opinion by Justice Brett Kavanaugh which states that the state of Mississippi should uphold its initial sentencing of life without parole for Jones. This is the decision provided by the court which is backed up legal rationale used by the justices.
yllabus
the summary added by the court which provides readers with a better understanding of the case and the decision met by the court. In this case, it summarizes how a sentencing authority need not find a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MISSISSIPPI No. 18–1259. Argued November 3, 2020—Decided April 22, 2021
These are the formal elements of the case which describes the case docket number, argument dates, and decision date of Jones vs. Mississippi. It also tells us about the case's certiorari which is that the Court reviewed the case from the lower court, the Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Mississippi jury convicted petitioner Brett Jones of murder for killing his grandfather.
This details the story of Brett Jones and the crime he committed that lead to his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
OCTOBER TERM, 2020
These are the formal elements of the case which describes the case docket number, argument dates, and decision date of Jones vs. Mississippi. It also tells us about the case's certiorari which is that the Court reviewed the case from the lower court, the Supreme Court of Mississippi.
The Court noted that it expresses neither agreement nor disagreement with Jones’s sentence, and its decision does not preclude states from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving juvenile commission of homicide.
I believe that this is an example of ethos because it expresses the Justices' trustworthiness of the judge who imposed the initial sentencing for Jones. It demonstrates that Kavanaugh finds him to be a credible source who took Jones's youth in to account when sentencing and made the right decision. In his formal conclusion Kavanaugh writes, "relevant to the child’s culpability,” App. 149, the judge determined that life without parole remained the appropriate sentence for Jones," and states that he sides with him as a credible judge.
I believe that there are also elements of pathos here. When researching the case, it is common knowledge that the defendant was so young that he had only turned 15 three weeks prior to the murder. To avoid the audience sympathizing with Jones, Kavanaugh not only fails to mention his age and refers to him as a juvenile instead, but he also fails to acknowledge that the murder was claimed to have been done in self defense.
Question
The case concerned sentencing of juveniles to life imprisonment without parole which appears to be the case's legal dispute of whether or not that is unlawful.
Facts of the case
This details the story of Brett Jones and the crime he committed that lead to his mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.
Docket no. 18-1259 Decided by Roberts Court Lower court Supreme Court of Mississippi Citation 593 US _ (2021) Granted Mar 9, 2020 Argued Nov 3, 2020 Decided Apr 22, 2021
These are the formal elements of the case which describes the case docket number, argument dates, and decision date of Jones vs. Mississippi. It also tells us about the case's certiorari which is that the Court reviewed the case from the lower court, the Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Jones v. Mississippi
Another formal element of the paper which demonstrates how Jones and the state of Mississippi are involved in the case.
A sentencing authority need not find a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole; a discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient to impose a sentence of life without parole on a defendant who committed a homicide when they were under 18.
This appears to be the syllabus as it appears before the main opinion. It is the summary added by the court which provides readers with a better understanding of the case and the decision met by the court. In this case, it summarizes how a sentencing authority need not find a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
Taken together, these two cases refute Jones’s argument that a finding of permanent incorrigibility is constitutionally necessary to impose a sentence of life without parole.
I believe that Justice Kavanaugh uses the elements of logos here as he compares this current supreme court case to two others in order to make his point and reach his decision.
Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion.
This is the conclusion of the syllabus as it demonstrates that Justice Brett Kavanaugh was the justice who authored the main opinion.
Justice Clarence Thomas
This is the concurring opinion within the document because it demonstrates how Justice Clarence Thomas agreed with the result of the main opinion provided by Kavanaugh. However, he got to his conclusion by the rationale that the outcome of Montgomery was incorrectly decided.
“a discretionary sentencing procedure where youth is considered.” Under Montgomery, sentencing discretion is necessary, but under Miller, it is not sufficient. Rather, a sentencer must actually make the judgment that the juvenile is one of those rare children for whom life without parole is a constitutionally permissible sentence.
I believe that Justice Sonia Sotomayor used elements of pathos when issuing her dissent, as she frequently referred to the youth of Jones at the time when the crime was committed. This concept of sentencing a child to life in prison appeals to the audience's emotions and tries to instill feelings of remorse.
“a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.”
Logos is found here within the legal rationale used by the court to reach their decision. They believed that a child does not need to prove to be repeatedly disobedient in order to receiving a sentencing of life without parole.
In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012),
This is the main opinion by Justice Brett Kavanaugh which states that the state of Mississippi should uphold its initial sentencing of life without parole for Jones. This is the decision provided by the court which is backed up legal rationale used by the justices.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion
This is the dissenting opinion provided by Justice Sonia Sotomayor who disagreed with the result.