Dissent by Rehnquist
Our specifications for a case brief indicate that the Separate Opinions section must include dissentions or concurring opinions, along with other justices who join the dissenting or concurring opinion. In this case, the brief fails to indicate that Justice White and Justice O'connor joined Justice Rehnquist in the dissenting opinion.
Dissent by Stevens
Justice Stevens did not write his own dissent. He is not listen with joining Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent either, where Justice White and Justice O'connor do join the dissent.
Dissent by Justince Kennedy
Justice Kennedy did not dissent the opinion.
Second Amendment
The question is whether or not the act violates the 1st Amendment, not the 2nd Amendment.
painted an American flag on his bare chest, but painted it upside down
He didn't paint a flag on his chest, but instead he burned the flag.
Arthur Smith
The defendant's name was Gregory Lee Johnson.
Johnson
The ruling was in favor of Texas.
Reasoning
This reasoning does not include the name of the justice who authored the opinion. For this opinion, the author was Justice Brennan.
491 U.S. 397
This citation does not include the year that the case took place, as required per our case brief specifications.
Reasoning There is no doubt that the program challenged here was enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a failing public school system. Our decisions have drawn a consistent distinction between government programs that provide aid directly to schools and programs of true private choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals. Three times we have faced challenges to neutral governmental programs that provide aid to a broad class of individuals, who in turn direct aid to religious schools. Each time we have rejected the challenges (Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest). These cases make it clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who then direct their aid to religious schools, the program most likely violates the establishment clause. Here, the program is not one of true private choice. It is not neutral in all respects toward religion and is part of an attempt to channel funds to wealthy citizens who send their children to religious schools. Only certain religious groups are free to participate. Despite the respondent's claim, we have repeatedly recognized that no reasonable observer would think a neutral program of private choice, where the state aid reaches religious schools through the independent decisions of private individuals, carries the imprimatur of government endorsement. Additionally, the constitutionality of this program turns on whether most schools in the program are religious.
I'm not sure if this is an error or not, but our guidline sheet to writing briefs says not to use direct quotes in the Reasoning. I believe that this whole thing is full of direct, if not extremely close quotes coppied from the original opinion. Therefore I would say that is an error in this brief that needs to be fixed.
religious groups are free to participate
You do not need to be religious to participate.
is not neutral in all respects toward religion
It IS neutral in all respects toward religion.
the program is not one of true private choice
The program is actually believed to BE one of true private choice.
the program most likely violates the establishment clause.
Actually, the opinion of Justice Renquist at this point said that the program is not redily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.
O'Connor: dissenting
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion.
vote of 7–2
Although it is not told to us directly what the vote was, Epstein and Walker note 4 justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter) who were dissenting justices to the case. This means the actually vote had to be 5-4 in favor of Zelman. (or at the very least, we know the vote could not have been 7-2)
Court ruled in favor of Zelman
This Holding does not include the name of the justice who wrote the opinion of the court, which is a requirement laid out in our document from blackboard regarding case briefs.
14th Amendment to the Constitution
The issue is actually whether or not the voucher program offends the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment.
5 percent
Epstein and Walker also tells us that 96.7% of the schools that were attended with vouchers were religious.
10 percent
Actually, Epstein and Walker, p. 420, tells us that roughly 80% of the private schools that partook in the program were religious.
The Baltimore school district
This says Baltimore, but the case actually dealt with a Cleveland School District. This is a major error, and must be fixed.
Epstein and Walker, p194
This citation does not include the date the case was decided, which is required according to our instructions for our case briefs.
axation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the General Government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the Constitution has declared.
Wait, what is the consequence and what caused that said consequence in this instance?
act incorporating the bank is constitutional
Why is the questions whether or not the bank can be taxed by the state? Isn't the answer clear? If it is a state bank, then let it be taxed by the state. If it is a federal bank, let the national government do as it wishes with it? Can someone clarify?
shall be the supreme law of the land,
At the risk of asking a "dumb" question, how could states ratify the constitution, saying it "shall be the supreme law of the land" and still be allowed to act on their own as states? This wording seems to say to me that the states give up their own state government rights when they use strict wording such as this.
which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
This sentence mentions the laws which are made in pursuance of the constitution, which I take to mean laws that are made with the constitution in mind, or that are based on things that the constitution has already said. But that would mean there are some laws that have been passed that are not in pursuance of the constitution. How can that be? Isn't the basis for all laws the founding constitution which our Founding Fathers created and set the country on track to follow?
without effect;
Question of clarification: Does this mean that, when using the constitution to help judge a case, there is not any clause in the constitution that can be unused to determine the opinion of that case. I mean, any clause must have meaning in any case? I find this hard to believe, since (and I could be wrong, please tell me if I am), times have changed and certainly not every single thing said in the constitution can be used in every case today.
The power of nominating to the senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated, are political powers, to be exercised by the President according to his own discretion. When he has made an appointment, he has exercised his whole power, and his discretion has been completely applied to the case. If, by law, the officer be removable at the will of the President, then a new appointment may be immediately made, and the rights of the officer are terminated. But as a fact which has existed cannot be made never to have existed, the appointment cannot be annihilated; and consequently if the officer is by law not removable at the will of the President; the rights he has acquired are protected by the law, and are not resumeable by the President. They cannot be extinguished by executive authority, and he has the privilege of asserting them in like manner as if they had been derived from any other source.
I find this paragraph to be confusing. If I am reading this correctly, it states that the President has power to appoint someone to the court, but once he has made his decision, then he has used up all his power in the matter. But then it goes on to say that if the president wants to remove the person, then the rights of the officer are terminated. So then the president would use more power than he had to remove that person which he had previously put in place. Then the paragraph says that the president can't do that because you can't undo something that you did because then it would have been as it if had never been. I guess what I'm asking is this; Is the paragraph saying that the president can't remove someone from office because then it would be as if the person never was in office, so it would be pointless?
They're just saying we don't want to be involved with the church.
These comments by Sotomayor make me think that she was the second dissenting justice. She has just gotten through explaining that no one wants the church to change its beliefs, change the way it goes about its religious business, or even how to use its money. She just points out that the funds should not be involved with a church. That is why I think she is a dissenting justice.
As long as you're using the money for playground services, you're not disentitled from that program because you're a religious institution doing religious things. And I would have thought that that's a pretty strong principle in our constitutional law.
Although earlier I would have said that Kagan was a deserter based on some comments, this comment made me change my tune, and I believe that she is one of the majority justices. he lays out a very plain argument that carries a lot of weight, in that the money is being used for something that is not a religious activity, but only for the safety of kids at play. Therefore, you cannot refuse that money because it is not a religious act that it is helping. Therefore, I think Kagan is a majority justice.
There are Establishment Clause concerns here, even if there's not a violation
There is a lot of judicial lingo that I do not totally understand. How could something be a concern when there is no violation, especially considering something like the Establishment Clause which to me seems like a pretty cut-and-dry issue? Either money is being rejected from an institution because is religious or its not. Can someone fill me in here?
Has the -- has the -- the State courts, have they ever said the amendment prevents the State from giving grants or from spending money on police protection for churches?
This comment from Breyer makes me think that he is one of the 7 majority justices who votes in favor of the church, because he is asking directly if the state courts of Missouri have every tried to prevent money like this being given to churches, to which Cortman replies with a frank "No."
he term "church" in i
This comment raised an interesting question in my head. Does it matter what church is defined as in Missouri? I mean, can't anything technically be called a church nowadays if someone wants to claim it as a church? So why does Alito ask how Missouri interprets the term, "church"?
And doesn't that fit this case?
This makes me think that Ginsburg is one of the two dissenters in this case, because, right off the bat, she very quickly wants to put in a comment that ties this case to one that was decided long ago, which had the religious institution losing the case. If she's already pointing to that so early in this case, I feel like she may be one to rest on that in her final opinion.
religious schools, just not for religious activities.
I guess I'm just a little confused by the difference between the two things Cortman is mentioning here. If monody is given to religious schools, where else would the money those schools receive be used, if not for use in a religious function?