235 Matching Annotations
  1. May 2022
    1. Rasmussen - LIO is challenged by internal and domestic forces - both of which are working together/feed off of one another. How has Trump impacted both the internal challenge (increased polarization) and the external challenge (emoboldened auth challenge)

    2. threat to the LIO is asymmetric - auth regimes less vulnerable to 'hacking of democracy than liberal democracies - liberal openness in digital age makes liberal democracies more vulnerable than auth regimes

    3. Three pillars of LIO 1) Liberal democracy 2) Open economies 3) multilateral institutions

    1. Mr. Trump would be able to execute a fully mercantilist foreign policy if elected to office remains an open question, the direction his policies would take the country is becoming increasingly clear.

      issue with a mercantilist approach is that it views imports as bad and exports as good - also see's trade as zero-sum. This undermines how much influence that US gains from investment in other countries (FDI) and how much imports to US means that others countries economies are bound with US so its in their interests to comply - also - whilst Trump claims that LIO does not favour American citizens income - cheap Chinese imports are more beneficial for low income American's than any other income group

    2. This is a good point - stable leadership requires other states to believe the US's leadership is fair ----empire by consent - only form of stable leadership - coercion isnt

    1. Para 'the wilsonian mindset encourages' --- Dueck makes a good argument about why multilateral institutions arent useful for all international security challenges 1)they work at perimeter of international power pol 2)claims usually unenforced 3)infringement on sovereignty - global orgs populated by dictators having greater moral claim over sovereign decisions of free countries

    1. The long-term trend within the Republican party, predating Trump, is toward political populism, cultural conservatism, and white working-class voters—and this has international implications. Republican foreign policy nationalism is not about to disappear

      this will have use for Trump question about future impact on US foreign policy

    1. International Trade is good for US power because FDI gives it increased leverage over other countries ++++ other countries heavily invested in the US - decline of US will also mean decline for them --- can see this with China-US relationship - China aware that is trade with US is incredibly important to it ---US is by far China's biggest trade partner

    1. good critique of white liberal being complicit in alienating white working class --not just 'white working class' that is weaponized by the right - also by the left - can give example of 'white van man' Emily Thornberry - example of Corbyn Labour alienating working class - especially after Brexit where many Corbyn supporters began to increasingly look down on white working class

  2. Apr 2022
    1. no consensus on either its direction (whether trust increases or decreases voter turnout)

      evidence that if there is a populist party available than a reduction in trust (political dissatisfaction) will increase stability of support by voters of populist parties

    1. nations with large elderly populations particularly vulnerable to the viru

      elderly are highly likely to vote populist - so populists rallying against virus would have jeopardised the elderly and thus alienated them

    1. it is true that populism often arsies from the adandonment of demoecratic principles - much of the criticism of EU has been because of its inability to be more democratic

    1. centre-tending parties are criticized.

      centrist parties can encourage votes for right-wing populists parties - populism based on idea that there are issues loads of people care about but people aren't being listened to e.g. austerity for left and immigration/culture for the right

    2. materialist concerns rather than post-materialist concerns: ----this is interesting as the Brexit debate was overwhelmingly deemed to be about cultural issues not economic concerns

    3. immigration is blamed for scarce resources for working class - does that mean that cost-of-living crisis will see a resurgence of immigration salience???

    4. ''Racist discourses and class disadvantage in the context of critical disengagement'' - 1st paragraph in this section - talks about New Labour's abandonment of class struggle rhetoric

    5. first paragraph under 'Methodological issues' - racialization of white working class so that it can be weaponized against multiculturalism - is a way of talking about class inequality but putting emphasis on competition between different ethnicities rather than addressing wider structural issues that have resulted in this problem

    1. Page 201 - increase in voting amongst working class during Brexit due to 1) presence of real alternative 2) direct democracy PR - this leads into first point

  3. oxford-universitypressscholarship-com.manchester.idm.oclc.org oxford-universitypressscholarship-com.manchester.idm.oclc.org
    1. Notes 12 - 'accomodative strategy' is used by COnservative party to suffocate far-right party's ---- this was seen in Cameron's EU referendum policy to prevent COnservative los to UKIP

    2. Page 186 - social change argument is that people's differences in voting cant be explained by a lack of resources - but this isnt true - throughout the 2000's the information cost would not have increased which resulted in a decline in voting - rather people choose not to vote because they had no way to express their interests or identity ------ increases in postal voting should have reduced cost of voting for working class

    3. NOTES section - Przeworski and Sprague - talks about Paper Dilemma - (this is in UKIP and Labour regional work) - talks abotu option that voters have and the predicament that Left-wing party's are in - use this quote to argue about class non-voting

    4. Page 187 - rise of SNP led to a change in working class towards that party - not because of policy differences but because there was an alternative to express discontent - also the image of Labour party as no longer serving interests of working class - this is due to association with Conservatives and they had to campaign with them

    5. Page 183 - class voting for UKIP - large increase in voting due to occupation

    6. Page 182 - large increase in support for UKIP from working class

    7. Page 181 - academic consensus is that working class support for radical right is driven by multiculturalism and mobilised through immigration as central issue ---- voting cared about immigration but it was the strategic environment of early 2010's that allowed for immigration to become politcally salient and gave opportunitiy for Laboru

    8. Page 181 - perception of Labour as working class in Scotland changed due to having to campaign with COnservative party and being seen as being on the same side

    9. Page 177 - working class stopped seeing Labour party as representative of their interests and so for that reason decided not to vote - decline in partisanship

    10. Page 175 - by 2010 - class participation has become a new participatory cleavage ------ thus its not about resources that explain change in voting but instead about group appeals

    11. Page 172 - resources model - people's likelihood to vote is dependant on socio-economic resources

    12. page 172 - people turn out to vote because it is about expressing their partisan identity or social group

  4. Mar 2022
  5. Jan 2022
    1. a sense that the ‘we’ shares a common public culture, which in turn provides the cultural basis for collective agency

      this is the distinct public culture argument

    1. SECONDARY SECTOR JOBS more likely to have wages determined by competition - whereas primary jobs are often for firms that often have monopoly power (huge multinational with few competitors) which means wages in primary sector can be set by internal labour market (labour market that exists within firms).