This is used to account for the fact that manifestos will be a different size. Taking the log means that manifstos with more sentences arent necessarily shown as having higher sentiment. For example, manifesto A has 4 sentences all positive on on 'defence' but manifesto B has 100 sentences and 60 of them are positives on defence. If you didnt take the log, it would seem like manifesto B was more positive towarss defence.

They apply sentiment analysis to sentences that contain the words associated with the topic modelling analysis. This couild be a solution to not having to perform sentiment analysis on massive documents which could be very hard.

talk about how it is a really interesting field with a rapid expansion of its technology - this means a life of constant learning in this field as it is developing so quickly

being able to model real-life events to make predictions or extract insights is really interesting. - can talk about how learning to web-scrape is an example of this

The combination of domain expertise + maths + programming is a really interesting combination

Technical analysis - this involves choosing firms to invest in based on changes in the market (looking at the economy from a micro rather than macro position). The top performing firms are shortlisted and then price and volume data is analysed

Macro investing is about making decisions to invest based on global developments rather than industry or market specific developments. This mean s paying more attention to factors influencing the macro environment e.g. recessions or country experiencing a growth spurt.

In case of emergency evacuation staff do not need badges to enter and exit building - but the article says that staff must always wear their badges on premises

MBI = management team is replaced form a team outside - new management. MBO = existing management team looks to take greater control of business so purchases more shares

What the data base provides: - description of products, services and target markets - finance and funding history - key people within the company (so that other firms/people can network with the businesses.

The growth triggers that Beauhurst have are unique - enables them to identify businesses that are early in growth and may have been missed by other market researchers/business intelligence companies

the longer the rally effect goes on - the more sensitive it becomes to government handling

During a crisis, a government may have an 'information' advantage - can be difficult for other organisations to access deaths rates in country without government - and also difficult to access death rate figures for other countries for benchmarking ---this can impede retrospective voting as benchmarking is made more difficult

Hypocrisy can be magnified in a time of crisis - in which people expect solidarity with politicians, which is highly beneficial to those polticians if they are viewed as acting in solidarity

Another elements of COVID is that in order to be relevant to party politics - masks, vaccines/lockdowns may be polticised and integrated into culture war discourse - this will play the role of decreasiong the extent of retrospective voting as COVID evaluations take on a more postional/ policy preferences role ----this highlights the literature on how parties take advantage of 'novel issues' can linking them to issues they already own. ---ANOTHER EXAMPLE is linking PANDEMICS TO IMMIGRATION - AS SEEN IN US

War time scenario's also intensify feelings of patriotism - which could also be relevant to party politics if one party is more closely associated with patriotism and the other isnt

Pandemic's create anxiety - this intensifies the status quo as people place their trust in leaders more than normal - this can act as a buffer against performance evaluations as the preference for status quo and temporary trust in leaders makes people more likely to believe the gov is competent ---as the leader is evaluated as 'symbol of peoples' trust - this can send party poltiics to the background - oppo party may not want to 'polticise a tragedy and thus reduces the extent to which they can criticise the gov (reducing partisan cues - thus making oppo partisans more likely to support leader

Trust is lower and is based on people belief that gov can handle crisis well i.e. Gov can be competent ---this is important as compliance with pandemic rules requires trust - thus the governments handling of covid can exacerbate compliance with rules - thus worsen covid - leading to even further deterioration of conditions NEGATIVE FEEDBACK LOOP OF GOV MISHANDLING COVID - thus increasing potential for electoral volatility

Evidence that consumption of news media during COVID has increasing significantly

Government tried to fudge the numbers for COVID deaths

SHARP CHANGE STATUS QUO: Green and Jennings 2017 - exogenous shocks are important as they usually produce change in competence - Green argues that most change in competence isnt the result of party strategy making certain issues salient

Gov attempt to blame Public Health England for shitty covid response - thus fits this second strategy of 'blame avoidance:agency strategy'

As tenure continues - series of negative shocks results in a critical period in which gov support no longer can recover - whilst vaccine bounce may have temporarily improved performance, the failing of handling COVID early on can still have a long-term affect as 'ONE' of those negative shocks that contribute to the reaching of a critical point

Change is competence evaluations had bigger effect on party choice is party that benefits is a larger party

Politicially sphisticated voters convert anyway BUT for low sophisticated voters, updating percpetion of party competence increases more liekly to lead to vote change

Criteria for crises to affect partisanship: 1)salient enough to pass awareness threshold 2)issue must be considered important 3)must draw attention to an issue that wasnt salient before or cause parties to revise their position on an issue (Cons and the large spending increase they have had)

People are less willing to adjust their evaluations in line with partisanship ---people more willing to adjust responsibility in line with partisaship

Political sophitication impacts selective attribution - more sophisticated less likely to selectively attribute

Selective attribution occurs for both econ and healthcare Selective evaluations occurs mainly for econ

voters use a running tally when evaluating gov performance -i.e. don't remember objective state of country throughout electoral cycle but the running tally they have takes account of performance earlier on in the cycle

Framing can be much stronger when people dont have prior opinions about an issue --they are more susceptible to manipulation

Individuals preferences are driven by whichever frame is last or loudest

Elite competition and heterogenous discussions limit and often eliminate framing effects ---this matters for Lab leader during vaccine bounce - their narrative capacity was significantly reduced - tuhs their ability to challenge the narratives that was posed by the Conservative party was reduced - thus discussions around vaccines were homogenous and this reinforced the Cons framing

Framing effects can therefore violate people preferences, since their preferences are dependent on the framing

Positive frame or negative frame (frames that stimulate positve/negative associations e.g. 1) Project A will result in 10% unemployment 2) Project B will result in 90% employment People will overtly choose option 2 - due to positive association with employment

Impact of framing that can change people's evaluations despite despite same objective outcomes: 1) presenting same situation but one give a certain outcome and other gives risk e.g. can save 200 of out 600 or 2) can save 600 and 1/3 you save 600 but 2/3 chance no one saved (options have same outcome but one is guaranteed i.e. option 1)

People who are likely to have a prior opinion are less likely to be influencing by issue frames

Interesting point that a shock like COVID management could prove fatal to a gov - even if the improve their management -----only reason Johnson did recover was because of another ELECTORAL SHOCK ---difference with ERM crisis is that whilst the economy improved - it wasnt a poltiical boom in the same way the COVID vaccine was

. The permanence of the desertion of Labour is now conditional primarily upon Conservative performance ---many voters becoming undecided

'' Those votes were often the product of frustration and fatigue rather than conviction and confidence'' --many who voted for Cons in 2019 did so out of frustration and fatigue - rather than confidence and convictions - this helps explain why so many people went from Cons to undecided after shitty covid response

elites rally during times of crisis - means higher evlauaiton of gov policy since support from opposing partisans is often a powerful cue

Another good point - oppo parties dont want to be TOO critical that they are accused of 'playing politics' during a time of national crisis

Larger mainstream party's often find themselves even more constrained to be supportive of gov policy as they are expected to act as the ''opposition''

During a crisis, larger oppo party may be additionally critical of party is an election is on the horizon and being supportive of gov could have electoral consequences (helped Cons that pandemic occured very far away from an election

During a crisis opposition party more likely to support gov legislation, if oppo has government experience

Majoritarian systems - parliament debates often head-to-head and thus more combatative/oppositional

Incumbent has huge information advantage over the opposition (at the start of pandemic anyway

key similarities with rally and COVID with mil effect - e.g. deaths Key similarities with econ affects e.g. lacking a clear adversary but still having big societal impact KEY DIFFERENCE - pandemic does not play to already existing political conflict lines

Blame is very difficult in Corona due to how complicated it is - who is to blame: Public Health bodies, expert, political parties, gov, devolved gov, Mayors...

COVID requires high levels of public cooperation - therefore oppo party being too critical and encouraged reduction in support of gov policy could lead to less public compliance with COVID which will exacerbate the situation

Attitudes towards Coronavirus measures are more heavily assoicated with left-right dimension than Gal/Tan - further bad implications of Cons since its 2019 election attracted econ left voters

INTERESTING POINT - defectors of Cons due to COVID mainly went to undecided - thus could have facilitated them winning a vote ----!!!!!!this could also explain why poll numbers between parties may MISS THE PICTURE OF CONS COMPETENCE - if they dont include undecided voters.

Brexit preferences/financial support have not done enough to cut through Cons bad handling of COVID ---however financial support could have helped to cushion the electoral impact (by reducing unemployment figures - which may be used by public to punish Cons)

Ethnic minorities far more likely to judge Cons as having managed COVID badly - could be due to how extra vulnerable they are

Positional issues like preference for lockdown vs econ/protection trade-off - less impact than covid handling

Handling of pandemic is cutting through partisanship/Johnson favourability AND Brexit

Main defectors of Cons are the new voters

Lib Dems lost a large chunk of their 2019 vote - this could be example of the incumbency advatnage in pandemics - very little space for non-mainstream party's to get air time

Boris Johnson's appeal in the red wall in different - and due to FPTP system and volatile voters - this magnifies the loss of Johnson's appeal to these voters

The high levels of public spending may have als presented an opportunity for Cons to change how they are perceived economically - no longer the party of austerity politics (which is deeply unpopular)

COVID and the large amounts of public nspending - meant it was difficult for COns to deliver levelling UP scheme - which was important in holding onto Red Wall Cons voters

who would have beneffited from attention divergence due to new issues becoming salient

harder to criticise incumbent at start of covid - other issues fall away - want to rally

more volatile an electorate - more willing they are to rally around a party - UK electorate is very volatile - Cons shit starting performance is responsible for a smaller rally around the flag affect

One reason for Rally affect is lack of criticism by opposition - incubent viewed as embodiment of nation - oppo party dont want to seem like they are fracturing the country

Great Argument - Cons shit management of COVID meant their rally around the flag effect didnt last that long

"the crisis of 2020 could, paradoxically, lead to normal politics even in abnormal times" - ARGUMENT THAT COVID CAN REVERSE THE ELECTORAL SHOCKS OF BREXIT - this isnt wholly true though - Brexit may have clouded people perception of economy - arguing that economic impact of Brexit is blamed on COVID

"However, the biggest group of Red Wall defectors – 46 per cent – is made up of voters who do not know who they will vote for or are considering not voting at all. " - really important point - MOST RED WALL DEFECTORS ARE FLOATING VOTERS - not moving back to Labour

"Conservative Party strategists seem to hope that they can reignite cultural issues in the run-up to the next election and retain their winning 2019 coalition" - UK was unique in that culture discourse over masks and lockdowns did not occur like in other countries like the US

IMPORTANT to raise the issue of increased values gap between MP, members and voters - and how this can create issues for Cons as economics raises in issue salience

"While the global financial crisis led to a widespread belief in the need for austerity, covid-19 has provoked a very different response." - COVID has highlighted inequality - aftermath is that people less in favour of austerity to deal with econ aftermath of pandemic - more in favour of taxes

''ECFR’s polling suggests that covid-19 may have further widened the economic values gap between Conservative MPs and the electorate'' - this has been highlighted by the cost of living crisis - which is an after affect of the pandemic - and is evidence of the pandemic increasing the salience of economic issues - COVID key workers asking for pay-rise - more public support for key workers striking BECAUSE of the actions during the pandemic

''Conservative voters themselves, slightly more say their opinion has worsened – 32 per cent – than say it has improved – 30 per cent'' - evidence that UK's shit performance is cutting through partisanship

Cross-pressured voters: - this is an important part of the issue salience zero-sum argument. As one issue increases the other declines - and this becomes relevant due to cross-pressured voters - decline in Brexit/cultural issues is important to this

ERM CRISIS - parallels are being made in terms of party competence, with handling of COVID and ERM crisis - hard to determine whether or not this has happened - vaccine rollout seems to have earned him competence support - but this has fell due to Omicron and partygate

Article raises a good point about Cummings scandal - reason why it leads to lower competence on economy is that people are less willing to take on econ cost of lockdown if politicians arent making the same kind of sacrifices

One important point is how did COVID impact affective polarisation - could have reduced it due to reduceing salience on Brexit + COVID was a valence issue - not as much room for polarisation as everyone kind of wants the same (fewer COVID deaths/risk)

''If Brexit goes badly and the economy crashes, however, might future elections be driven by Brexit blame, incompetence, and recrimination?'' - COVID has created economic insecurity that has made Brexit more difficult to pul of - COns getting fully behind Brexit means there future is tied to Brexit - Covid has played a role in creating a more negative evaluation of Brexit - thus may lead to further damage to COns as a result of Brexit incompetence/blame in future

This is similar to COVID - may not necessarily have caused a transfer in votes from Cons to Labour - but created a larger number of undecided voters

'' if parties provide new choices to voters when competing on that dimension, realignment of electoral choice on that issue or dimension could be the result.'' --increased salience of 2nd dimension - this could help reverse dealignment of class

''shocks affect party strategies'' ---Conservative party u-turn on windfall tax - COns increasingly having to adopt left-wing policies to tackle cost of living

Shock criteria no3 - cost-of-living - Cons losing longer lead they have held on economy --narrative on 'economic competence' increasingly changing from 'balancing deficit' to 'living standards' - this is an issue much closer to Labour "Issue Ownership' -COns have been put into a position where they are taking Labour/left wing policies

''electoral shocks are sufficiently salient that political actors are forced to engage with them even if they are electorally disadvantageous'' --Tories have had to accept Labour windfall tax - doesnt look good for them as it Labour's policy

'the first long-term trend is the' ---'perceptual filter makes voters more likely to engage in reward/punishment ---voters more willing to 'accurately' take in information on performance

''Arguably, there was little between the major parties on major issues of policy, with Labour desperate to appear as fiscally responsible'' ---lack of ideological convergence for Labour may have contributed to increasing focus on valence politics - thus exacerbating their issues - the framing of austerity thus proved highly effective for COns - hamstrung Labour ideologically as public spending seemed to be explanation for crash BUT by moving ideologically closer to Cons - further emphasised valence politics (poor competence leader + bad econ competence meant this also wouldn't work)

2015 - no Evidence to suggest Labour lost because it wasnt left-wing enough ----but this is because left-wing policies had been tainted - big public spending had been presented as a liability in many cases OR!!!!!!!!! - THIS IS EVIDENCE THAT COMPETENCE MATTERED OVER IDEOLOGY

Another issue for economy is that less affluent voters are less likely to vote - this can further hamstring left-wing parties - redistributive policies are popular amongst an electorate with a low voter turnout - this was demonstrated in 2017 with Corbyn

SNP anti-austerity package further highlighted how right Labour econ was - made them look increasingly similar to Cons

Labour may have also increasingly took blame due to clarity of responsibility - this was high in UK institutionally - due to single party executive, long time in power +++++ credibility of alternative (Cons econ competence rose significantly - thus further adding to 'effective opposition party

''If they saw an improvement in the economy, they gave credit to the Conservatives. But Labour received no credit, only a share of the blame.'' ---again - narrative framing of election was incredibly helpful

Miliban ran slogna of cost of living crisis - didn't work since voters associated the economy with 'balancing the books' ---electoral shocks of inflaitons now means cost of living is viewed as econ competence

Success of COnservative electoral strategy to make budget deficit highliy salient would have increased punishment on COrbyn - his left-wing policy would be viewed as even more unrealistic if economic competence/recession was seen as the result of increased spending

Media actually reinforce stability of issue ownership - give more exposure to issue owners - media helps to maintain issue ownership - HAS A CONERVATIVE BIAS - THIS IS why it can be difficult to change issue ownership of economy to left wing parties if its established on the right (e.g. article on austerity saying right-wing parties believed to balance budgets better)

Impact of media is limited by balancing - when challenger is up against issue owner (as is case with balanced media) - there is little impact on changing issue ownership

issue ownership can be changed by the media/leaders performance on media -BUT - affects are quite temporary - issue ownership stability is more like an equilibrium - can be disturbed through media coverage - but may only be brief (so best done during end of election campaign

impact of elites/media on issue competence is strong - cna refer back to Corbyn and use by media of 1 thinktank that said his policies were bad - plenty of other think tanks ignored

OVERALL: - Down's arguement that poltiical competition is determined by appealing to median voter not true - as countries become more economically open - party's need to appeal to preferences of market actors also - market actors are far more econ right wing than voters - this can lead to balancing voters econ pref and market actors pref ----this will contribute to feelings among voters that they dont have control of economics of their country

''preferences of managers and business representatives are well to the right of the mean voter position''

''The influence exerted by market actors might be of little consequence'' --policy preferences of market actors can differ from the median voters --e.g. multinational corps will be less in favour of taxes/ regulation This conflicts with economic issues voters care about like public spending or labour market performance (employment/wages)

globalization of economy increases the need for party's to respond to preferences of market elites (this can go in an opposite direction to the preferences of voters) --reason why they listen to market/international/global elite is due to: - they may have more knowledge than party in how to deal with transnational economy issues - funding/lobbying

Greater Polarization on an dimension, the more likely that issue is to dominate ----support for this shown on page 81

Religious voters more liekly to vote according to second dimension issues ---this could be similar for other ethnic minority voters - stakes for them are higher for second dimension issues

Progressivity of welfare state (not same as size) ---refers to how much of welfare state based on progressive tax etc ----this means that changes in welfare system have larger impact for both poor and wealthy Less progressive system where relative wealth doesnt have much impact on size of contribution of welfare received - change in welfare state wont have much of an impact

To test H4 (Party constituency) they measured issue ownership on taxation and redistribution of wealth

Other sources of issue ownership: 1)competence evaluations - how party actually deals with issue and the outcome will affect issue ownership 2) Party consitituency - connections of party's to certain social groups - e.g. is party is connected to 'the poor' it will be judged as having 'issue ownership' over tackling poverty

Sources of issue Ownership: 1) Partisanship 2) Ideology - both of these influence issue ownership through perceptual screen - filters information

Combination of rising inequality incentivises parties to manipulate the salience of issues - adopt more value based dimension for right wing party's (but this is conditional - has to be 'latent support for it'

''in the face of rising economic inequality, not all rightist parties will be equally able to pivot to values-based appeals.'' -this was easier in UK due to immigration shock + ideological convergence of econ providing opportunity for working class voters to express their interests in immigration

Increase in inequality leads to right wing party's putting greater emphasis on cultural issues - this affects issue salience and so will impact voting behaviour

difference between persuasion (event changes people minds on an issue) and primining (increase saliecne of attitudes hat th voters already had)

SO - worsening econ reduces support for RRP since they dont own econ BUT negative econ perceptions (disregarding actual conditions) can increase RRP if they can connect perceived worsening conditions to immigration ----in this way economic pessimism fuels anti-immigraiton beliefs - immigration becomes more salient to them - but its is underlied by econ pessimism

RRP struggle to mobilizes voters who put high salience on economy BUT they can mobilize voters who think econ has deteriorated if they can link downturn to issues they 'own' - such as linking immigration or EU to econ downturn ---people percieve econ as getting worse but see immigration as more salient issue - THIS CAN BE RESULT OF LINKAGES CREATED BY RRP PARTY'S

Zero-sum nature of issue agenda means increase salience of economy (e.g. during econ shock) reduces salience of immigration - which causes RRP to suffer more

RRP (radical right party's) win on immigration - they own issue so benefit when it is highly salient ---they loose on econ issue though since they have incentive to not talk about it since they dont have ownership of that issues ---as a result - immigration salience is good for the whilst economy salience is bad for them

''More broadly, this article adds another piece to addressing the puzzle of why democracies do not redistribute more in the face of rising inequality'' ---useful for explaining the response to Recession with rise in support for radical right and increase i inequality yet left done quite shit

Voter respond to econ performance is asymmetric ---voter punish bad econ performance more intensely than they reward good econ performance - --good econ growth leads to lower electoral volatility - voters of all parties less likely to switch

'however, the organizational dimension' -- greate party memberships OR union membership - smaller electoral volatility

'' because voters tend to punish poor performance rather than reward positive performance '' ---economic performance on voter behaviour is asymmetrical - voters more likely to more intensely punish gov for bad econ rather than reward for good econ performance

''that the time since the previous election is a key...'' --greater time since previous election greater degree of volatility. if voters aren't partisan's then they vote on factors like personal situation, condiiton of society etc - greater time difference - greater chance that one of these factors have changed

''study indicates that the competitive position of political parties...'' Greater the number of incentives to vote strategically (instead of party you prefer most) decreases loyalty/attachment to any party thus increases electoral volatility

this is important as between 2015-2019 there were 3 elections - quite alot

''reflecting that economic crisis results in political disaffection'' Might not be the case that decline in econ growth has caused increase accountability - but instead economic crisis results in political disaffection which drives volatility -

dealignment (departisanship) - is the intervening mechanism by which economy is having an increasing impact on volatility (lack of partisanship better enables voters to reward or punish party' due to economy) - 'mechanism of accountability' has begun to develop - party's more likely to be punished than previously - ''leaves voters more open to other voting motives, such as satisfaction with economic performance''

dealignment (departisanship) - is the intervening mechanism by which economy is having an increasing impact on volatility (lack of partisanship better enables voters to reward or punish party' due to economy)

'assessing the impact of these'' -VOLATILITY IT GREATER IN non-PR countries --this leads to strong reward-and-punishment mechanisms - this is important to economic voting

First paragraph - claim that Trump's unpredictability was a by-product

''they also demonstrate how Trump’s anti-China rhetoric proved influential both internationally and domestically in ways that have potential staying power even after Trump’s term in office'' -----US still needs to work with China on transnational issues e.g. Climate change - less able to do this is people have racist beliefs towards China

Iran nuclear deal represents a threat the commitment to multilateralism by both countries - US and EU had different roles

'if we accept that the idea.....' -- EU multilateral effectiveness could have been somewhat strengthened by US/Trump vacation e.g. ability to fill vacuum i..e with TPP-2 deal --hedging their own security networks - developing EU frame for dealing with insecurity

''Agency mattered and states certainly acted, especially to enhance their capabilities and, therefore, their power.'' ---states are rational actors that pursue their own interest - Musgrave article casts doubt on this

LIO support needs to be strengthened at home - problem is that Trump has not shielded AMericans from globalization - instead he has ignored the (climate change) or worsened them eg inequality ----much of this is to do with the desire to find an 'other' that can be used to scapegoat issues

''This was in turn followed by disagreements over burden-sharing in the War on Terror following 9-11'' ---US WAR ON TERROR and preoccupation with ME - US part of the bargaining to maintain burden sharing - US is inflating security threats far above what they actually represent

'Moreover, trusting relationships are not.....' ---moral trust is a more stable ground of trust - Biden helped to reinforce that with Ukraine invasion

''The predictive approach to trust is most often'' ---realists like Mearsheimer are sceptical about sustaining interstate relations ---good place to use Mearsheimer to criticse 'lack trust' critique of Trump

rather than these multilateral organisations crumbling - other states have increased their efforts to maintain - the result being that the US has lost out

sovereign obligation is a good response to Trump's arguement that the LIO should be reformed to promote national sovereignty

Source 7 - Trump's claim to reinforce sovereignty seems at odds with the domestic situation in which he has violated the checks and balances of the political system

source 72 - paragraph - does good job in explaining the role of Trump's nationalism - how it uses foreign policy to create stability for people

Source 3 - Trump's nativism reinterprets reality to inflate threats - e.g. viewing the COVID pandemic as a immigration issue rather than a public health issue

His claim that Trump isn't authoritarian/ threat to democracy seems dubious considering his reaction to the Election results ---his, and US nationalism in generals, adulation for auth strongmen - which fits with the American Jacksonian populism that exists

Really good bits in this source on how Trump's nationalism was civic and not authoritarian

claims that American nationalism has always been civic - this just isn't true

Trump has consistently risked FP relation for short-term domestic support e.g. response to covid virus - pinning blame on China to shift his own responsibility - which played really well with his base

nationalist blame attribution - important part of Trump's rhetoric. Trump can put political responsibility on foreign actors, shut immigration down ----this undermines US national power by undermining its security (racism and cant tackle issues) but also undermining LIO (attributing racial blame is less likely to lead to cooperation - when states are shamed they are more likely to continue with bad act)

Trump response to COVID - was quick to control immigration - but reluctant to impose social distancing

Trump's nationalist agenda and particularly partisan appeal - contributed significantly to polarisation in US ---further issue with Trump's brand of nationalism

Source 35 - how democratic backsliding has been heavily supported by foreign actors

Source 32 - explains why use of 3rd parties - like international orgs is useful for greasing wheels of diplomacy - can help to bridge a divide in trust between two parties

Source 30 - explains why when countries are shamed they are less likely to comply - this could help to explain China's reaction to Trump's rhetoric of 'China' virus - China wants to save face by not complying with US request for COVID help - this highlights the issue with antagonism with China - competition with China cannot leave space that prevents cooperation - LIO requires cooperation to sort transnational issues

''surely troubling that many democracies and longtime U.S. partners are scrambling to mitigate the effects of America First, while a number of revisionist or authoritarian powers look to take advantage.''

3RD PARA 'exploiting the vacuum' - China has gained a number of symbolic victories in portraying itself as leader of transational issues + promoting its alternative form of rule

'AMERICA FIRST AS A MODEL' - Trump has facilitated the democratic backsliding that has begun to occur - Orban, Poland and Turkey all using Trump as examples ---part of this can be seen in appropriation of Trump's rhetoric of 'fake news'

3RD PARA - HEDGING THEIR BETS' Mexico seeking alternative arrangements like increased trade with China - this would be especially bad for regional influence of US/Monroe doctrine - Trump exclusionary rhetoric is therefore bad - US soft power in US heavily undermined

3rd para - 'RESISTING THE ROGUE SUPERPOWER' - Trump had become so toxic that trashing US was a way to gain political points at home e.g. Merkel criticism of Trump + Mexico - Made them less likely to bargain with the US

LAST PARA 'HUGGING AND APPEASING' - problem with hugging and appeasing is that it increases political cost on allies for when appease Trump - due to Trump bad reputation and volatile policies - these actors from liberal democracies may face domestic costs from engaging with Trump ---issue with hugging and appeasing to avoid volatile US policy is that Trump was so unpopular - certain leaders feared domestic political cost from being seen as close to Trump

LAST PARA 'REPLACING ATLAS' SECTION - negative side of US removing itself from multilateralism due to anger at the failure of burden-sharing - is that those multilateral organisation are incredibly important to other allies so they will continue to happen regardless ---- and the outcome will be less favourable to the US due to its absence ------ this once again highlights the inevitability of interdependence - US cannot isolate itself from these externalities

key aspect of realism is 'buck-passing' - Trump has done much to encourage this - idea is that great powers seek that other states should shoulder the burden in deterring/defeating threatening states

''it is interesting because....' - realists claim that it is false assumption that foreign policy is determined by internal characteristics e.g. leader, political system, ruling ideology ---however Trump personality + domestic politics plays an integral role in determining what population and government perceive as threats

Trump's populism was heavily reliant on FP in order to create its narrative: - domestic liberal elite were portrayed as globalists serving the interests of other

''police and military are seen to be....' -Jacksonianism - form of populism that has high trust in military and police as providers of security - the irony here is that the deep state is against the people - but police/military are to be trusted orgs

America First is inherently positivist - see's world as being transactional/zero-sum

''a striking feature of this policy is how'' ----Trump removal from Iran deal ++++ sanction it imposed on Iran it coerced its allies to also join - this violates the idea of a community of democracies - access to US financial system restrained if allies didn't join in with embargo ---this also matter - leveraging US financial power lessens its use everytime its used

'Trumps new nationalism' - Trumps nationalism has made heavy use of US foreign policy - specifically in regard to immigration and building wall with Mexico - he even threatened to use emergency powers to do so

trump FP has had continuity - not replaced LIO just offered a more belligerent version of it

'Trump proclaimed his movement.....' Great argument - Trump complained about burden sharing - yet he wanted to continaully icnrease US spending - this doesnt make much sense - and highlights the dubious nature of Trump's claims about the financial burden the LIO has imposed on US situation at home

not just that Trump has been undermined by blob - but also by HIS OWN national security team

good point - nationalist populsim is a threat to the world - and due to social media they are highly interconnected - for the US to retreat in order to fix its own democracy would be bad - since this is part of the authoritarian challenge

'still further, would enforcing'...... This paragrpah argues that regime change is a fundamnetal part of LIO - either through military intervention or through economic sanctions - Trump imposed heavy econ sanctions on Venezuela - this has only strengthened the countries hatred on US and kept dictator in power - TRUMP didnt change the status quo

''As the authors desire new rules'' ----climate change provides an opportunity for US to lead the world - without having to use its military force - which other countries think its power is too heavily reliant on - thus would provide a significant opportunity for US soft power

'''in view of this, Lissner and Rapp...''' ---there is a much broader definition of burden-sharing than just the military

Wohlforth 8th para - explains why US interventions in post-cold war era have rarely been guided by liberal norms of promoting democracy - democracy is often promoted in areas that have material benefit (thus quite realist leanings) ---- argument here is that you cant look at only interventions as being examples of liberalism - if liberalism has the tendency to impose its values on other countries - then how does that explain the places where US hasn't intervened to impose democracy - THIS FITS REALLY WELL WITH THE SELECTIVE DEMOCRACY ARGUMENT

Another example of how liberalism isnt unique in its desire to interfere in other countries domestic poltiics is how other great powers are chooses to act - Russian intervention in US elections ----LAST PARA WOHLFORTH - desire to intervene in other nations often goes hand in hand with balance of power politics - as seen during in Cold War as it was done by both US and USSR to balance one another

Wohlforth - 4th para - all ideologies has a inclination to impose their own domestic institutions on other countries - this isn't unique to liberal internationalism

''briefly considers and dismisses 'civic nationalism' -----Mearsheimer doesn't believe civic nationalism can work ----THE FORM of ethno-nationalism that Trump uses is based on negative depictions of groups closely related with foreign public - will only alienate those foreign public - Trump's nationalism fuels itself on undermining US power

SNYDER - argues that liberalism can still work - calls it embedded liberalism

Para 8 Snyder - also argues that Iraq War wasn't Liberalism

3rd Paragraph by Pitts - explains why Iraq War wasn't Liberal Internationalist -didnt follow key norms like multi-lateralism -violated key liberal norms like human right , excessive militarism ---evidence that it was liberal internationalism is usually rhetoric ((why take their words at face value)

Krauthammer - evidence of someone who supports Trump's use of unpredictability

Last paragraph - Trump's see's bargaining power not as determined by reliability - but the opposite - Trump's unpredictability is part of his leverage is his mind - however, this unpredicatability comes with the cost that if his bluff is called e.g. several times Trump's harsh rhetoric/threats have been contradicted by his admin team - this makes it seem like his leverage is false because he isn't actually in control - or it reveals those threats as a false pretense - he never actually meant them i the first place

Trump has highlighted his lack of concern for soft power - this could explain why he does not give great weight to a state' reputation for reliability - instead states reputation is defined by its hard power - as evidence by Trump's portrayal of American exceptionalism and respect as being based on material powers

Reputational damage from backing out of past agreements- means that successors states loose out of future potential agreements - and in order to restore reliability it has to comply with international commitments that is may not see as optimal

Partisanship means that voters are also less likely to punish their administration for taking bad foreign policy decisions - whole point of democracy is that leaders are held to account for bad decision that they make - Threats from democratic countries are meant tobe more valid as the leader experiences a political cost for taking unpopular decisions - growing partisanship threatens this

Polarization means increased dependence on executive powers that can be overturned ++++++ means admin's have wildely different views of foreign policy so also less stables

separation of power means that international treaties ratified by 2/3's congress - so hard to overturn - BUT ALSO - hard to sign in the first place. Result is increaisng reliance oinf executive powers to ratify treaties - which means they can be easily turned over by next president

Caling Virus a 'chinese virus' enables Trump to deflect the blame of his poor response

Trump's labelling of the virus as a 'foreign virus' prioritises it as a immigration issue first and a public health issue second - this is the issue with Trump's populism - he constantly has to fit issues into his populist narrative - when a problem is presented that reveals the complexity of an issue - Trump's populism risks being exposed -----

China's growing influence in multilateral organisations is in part due to the US disinterest in those same IO's

Halliday - nostalgia can never be satisfied as revolution prevents replication

Sources: Barry Posen - 'illiberal hegemony'

Trump represented illiberal hegemony - hegemony but achieved through negation (opposing other powers)

''there are various explanation'' --- this paragraph talks about the 'continuity dilemma' - how left, right see it

argues that Trump reactio to WTO and Paris CLimate accords is in line with attitude of any admin since Reagan - therefore argues that Trump's leadership is representative of continuity

'Mearsheimer argument' - spreading liberalism abroad inevitably leads to illiberalism at home.

go to the 'regime of truth section' - dominant discourse from elites masquerades as truth or fact - because it is unquesitonned

Trump presented himself as a reactionary populist - redistribution with social conservativism - but instead - he hasnt offered redistribution - just social conservatism - thus Trump's populism has offered a corrective mechanism to liberal democracy by fixing people economic insecurity - just appealed to the cultural backlash - cultural backlash is not good response to LIO - fixing economic insecurity does help respond to problems with the LIO

testing

Whilst unilateralism of Trump has previous precedent - the wholesale departure from liberal norms is a significant discontinuity

multilateral constraints on US could be violated without much consequence

3 critiques of Trump:

1) open quesitoning of US security agreements 2) Open admiration towards illiberal autocrats and poisening of relation with allied democracies 3)Trade wars with US main partners

interesting point about role of nationalism in the undermining of the LIO; -Trump has promoted resurgent nationalism - but nationalism isn't inherently a threat to the LIO - but the brand Trump has promoted is ---this gives a useful place for debate with Colin Dueck who argues that LIO is too opposed to nationalism