Demonstrating direct links from Twitter: https://twitter.com/adam42smith/status/1353884595100512256

Casta Diva from here: https://demo.dataverse.org/api/access/datafile/22074

vs.

Casta Diva from here: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/92/Bellini_Casta_diva_par_Claudia_Muzio.ogg

So apparently a 9th century Arabic rock star invented deodorant.

Cheating

My first annotation!!!

DataCite and Zotero come to mind. I think there may be more than you allow for, though I don't disagree on the difficulty of finding funding for ed-tech infrastructure.

more testing

Annotation Testing

testing annotation

I wonder if there's any chance they'd publish and open source these additional measures?

Test annotation

Full Citation: Teoria e Debate. 1995.6. “Era possível ganhar no primeiro turno.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

Click to access full source

Analytic Note: This opinion piece by leading moderate Eduardo Jorge is an example of the return to viability logic in the aftermath of the success of the Plano Real and the popularity of the Cardoso government. (In the broader piece, not just the excerpt above) Jorge argues that the PT could have demolished the Brazilian right completely by making an electoral pact with the PSDB, that the failure of the PT (and left in general) to be willing to share power and make programmatic concessions has been one of the party’s greatest weaknesses, that the radical takeover of the party has prevented program from occurring and the promise of the 1st Congress from being realized, and that if the PT is ever to win power it will have to become much more pragmatic and flexible.

Excerpt: O PT está diante de um problema que continuará, senão for desvelado e enfrentado até ao fim, nos confinando como um partido importante e representativo, mas incapaz de compartilhar hegemonia e de governar na democracia. Refiro-me à ideologia, à regra, à cultura tradicional nos partidos de esquerda, que implica buscar a qualquer custo, por quaisquer meios, violentos ou pacíficos, uma hegemonia total e, portanto, totalitária. Segundo esta mentalidade, todos os sectores, da associação de escoteiros à seleção nacional de futebol do sindicato ao Parlamento, devem ser iluminados por nossa ‘luz’, onipresente, onipotente e onisciente. É verdade que o PT vem lutando contra isso desde o seu nascimento e que no seu 1º Congresso, em 1991, aprovou por 70% a 30% dos votos dos delegados, a rejeição da ditadura do proletariado, a regra máxima do autoritarismo na esquerda. Mas a tradição é forte , recusa-se a morrer e encontra caminhos para voltar a oprimir nossas consciências socialistas. Foi o que aconteceu em 1993 e 94, com a base e a direção do partido empolgadas diante do favoritismo inicial da candidatura Lula, com a possibilidade de vitória solitária ou com aliados tratados com menosprezo ou queridos desde que submissos. É essa matriz que precisa ser abandonada.”

Translation: The PT is facing a problem that will continue, if not unveiled and confronted to the end, confining ourselves to being an important and representative party, but one incapable of sharing hegemony and governing under democracy. I refer to the ideology, the rule, the traditional culture in parties of the left, which means seeking at any cost, by any means, violent or peaceful, a hegemony that is total, and therefore, totalitarian. According to this mentality, all sectors from the scout association to the national football team, the unions to the Parliament, must be illuminated by our 'light', omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient. It is true that the PT has been fighting it since its birth and in its 1st Congress in 1991, approved by 70% to 30% of the votes of the delegates, rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat, the extreme law of authoritarianism on the left. But the tradition is strong, and refuses to die, finding ways to return and subjugate our socialist consciousness. That’s what happened in 1993 and 94, with the base and the head of the party motivated with the early successes of Lula's candidacy, with the chance of a solo victory or one together with disrespected allies or those that would be submissive. It is this attitude that must be left behind.”

Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.10.7. “A Missão Impossível.”

Click to access full source

Analytic Note: This opinion piece from Tarso Genro in the wake of the 1994 elections is another example of the return to viability appeals by moderates. Genro refers to the strategy of falling back on old radical Socialist ideas in order to win elections as a Mission Impossible, ridicules the notion of blaming the media for Lulas defeat, and posits that the left must find a new direction.

Excerpt: "Hoje impossvel fundamentar um projeto estratgico no seu significado econmico-social, como foi possvel na cultura do velho socialismo revolucionrio e na social-democracia reformadora. Fernando Henrique compreendeu perfeitamente tudo isso e abdicou at da social-democracia. O PT no compreendeu e remendou o ``furo" do socialismo clssico com uma viso social-democrtica, obreirista reformista, to superada como o socialismo sovitico: foi um acordo com a conscincia antiga.... O pior, porm, que pode nos acontecer no momento , confirmada a derrota de Lula, culpar a grande mdia como se pudssemos ter uma estratgia de vitria com a solidariedade da mdia; buscando responsveis individuais como se a nossa linha de campanha no fosse resultado de uma cultura poltica."

Translation: "Today it is impossible to support a strategic project in its economic and social sense, as it was possible in the culture of the old revolutionary socialism and that of progressive social democracy. Fernando Henrique fully understood all this and even renounced social democracy. The PT did not understand and fixed the problems of classic socialism with a social-democratic vision, a progressive working class, overcoming all as with Soviet socialism: it was an agreement with an old consciousness. The worst, however, that can happen to us at this moment, with the confirmed defeat of Lula, would be to blame the media - as if we could have a winning strategy with the solidarity of the media; seeking the guilty - as if the orientation of our campaign was not the result of our political culture."

Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.4.12. “Radicais reduzem influencia no partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

Click to access full source

Analytic Note: This source provides evidence for the descriptive claim that some signs of decreasing radical influence could be found even before the 1994 presidential election and 1995 PT party congress (but after the implementation of the Plano Real). In the key state of São Paulo, moderates started to reassert control over the party machinery as the governance crisis began to abate.

Excerpt: Os grupos de esquerda e extrema-esquerda diminuíram a vantagem que tinham em relação aos outros setores do PT paulista. A corrente interna que mais cresceu foi a “Unidade na Luta”, liderada por Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. O critério usado para a comparação é o número de delegados ao Encontro Nacional do partido que foram eleitos na convenção do PT paulista no último fim de semana. Em 93, as alas de esquerda e extrema apresentaram chapa conjunta e levaram 55,9% dos delegados. Em chapas separadas agora, somadas estas correntes ficaram com 50,9% dos eleitos. A “Unidade na Luta”, chamado de “centro” do PT, saltou de 32,3% dos delegados para 36,1%. Um pouco do acréscimo deve ser atribuído à queda do grupo liderado pelo deputado José Genoino, da “direita” do PT.

Translation: Groups of the left and extreme-left saw their advantage decrease over other sectors of the PT of São Paulo. The internal current that grew the most was "Unity in Struggle", led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The criterion used for comparison is the number of delegates to the National Meeting of the party who were elected at the convention of the PT in São Paulo last weekend. In 93, the left wing and extreme-left joined forces and took 55.9% of the delegates. Running separately now, together these factions got 50.9% of the vote. "Unity in Struggle," called the "center" of the PT, jumped from 32.3% to 36.1% of the delegates. A part of the increase should be attributed to the fall of the group led by Rep José Genoino, of the "right" of the PT.

Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.1.25. “Lula tenta retomar comando do partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source

Analytic Note: This source simply provides evidence and further background for the descriptive claim that internal conflicts were occurring within the party, especially between the Lula campaign and the radical leadership of the National Directorate.

Excerpt: “Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva acha que é hora de passar para a sociedade que um eventual governo seu não vai ser dominado pelos sectores radicais do petismo. "O ano passado foi para todo mundo falar. Agora é hora de pôr ordem na casa", vem repetindo a amigos desde que resolveu tentar inverter o curso político interno que sua campanha estava tomando. Ao falar de 93, Lula referia-se à ascensão dos grupos mais radicais do petismo ao comando da máquina partidária. A queda do grupo mais ligado a ele correu no 8.º Encontro Nacional do PT, em junho, em Brasília. Como estava fazendo nos últimos anos, naquela ocasião Lula ausentou-se da discussão depois de uma tímida e frustrada tentativa de manter a hegemonia de sua ala, a antiga tendência Articulação. Mas a decisão de abrir para PSDB, PDT e até PMDB a cabeça de chapa em alguns Estados –imposta por Lula na reunião do Diretório Nacional no último fim de semana– não foi assimilada facilmente.”

Translation: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva thinks it high time we showed society that a Lula government will not be dominated by radical sectors of the PT. "Last year everybody could talk. Now it is time to put the house in order", he has been saying to his friends, since he decided to reverse his campaign’s political course. When speaking about 1993, Lula referred to the rise of radical groups commanding the party machinery. The fall of the group most connected to Lula occurred in the 8th National Meeting of the PT, in June, in Brasilia. As he has been doing in recent years, Lula made himself absent from the discussion after a timid and unsuccessful attempt to maintain the hegemony of his ward, the old faction “Articulação". But the decision to allow the PSDB, PDT and even PMDB nominate the main candidate in some states - imposed by Lula at the meeting of the National Directorate in the last weekend – was not easily embraced.

Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.1.25. “Lula tenta retomar comando do partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source

Analytic Note: This source simply provides evidence and further background for the descriptive claim that internal conflicts were occurring within the party, especially between the Lula campaign and the radical leadership of the National Directorate.

Excerpt: “Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva acha que é hora de passar para a sociedade que um eventual governo seu não vai ser dominado pelos sectores radicais do petismo. "O ano passado foi para todo mundo falar. Agora é hora de pôr ordem na casa", vem repetindo a amigos desde que resolveu tentar inverter o curso político interno que sua campanha estava tomando. Ao falar de 93, Lula referia-se à ascensão dos grupos mais radicais do petismo ao comando da máquina partidária. A queda do grupo mais ligado a ele correu no 8.º Encontro Nacional do PT, em junho, em Brasília. Como estava fazendo nos últimos anos, naquela ocasião Lula ausentou-se da discussão depois de uma tímida e frustrada tentativa de manter a hegemonia de sua ala, a antiga tendência Articulação. Mas a decisão de abrir para PSDB, PDT e até PMDB a cabeça de chapa em alguns Estados –imposta por Lula na reunião do Diretório Nacional no último fim de semana– não foi assimilada facilmente.”

Translation: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva thinks it high time we showed society that a Lula government will not be dominated by radical sectors of the PT. "Last year everybody could talk. Now it is time to put the house in order", he has been saying to his friends, since he decided to reverse his campaign’s political course. When speaking about 1993, Lula referred to the rise of radical groups commanding the party machinery. The fall of the group most connected to Lula occurred in the 8th National Meeting of the PT, in June, in Brasilia. As he has been doing in recent years, Lula made himself absent from the discussion after a timid and unsuccessful attempt to maintain the hegemony of his ward, the old faction “Articulação". But the decision to allow the PSDB, PDT and even PMDB nominate the main candidate in some states - imposed by Lula at the meeting of the National Directorate in the last weekend – was not easily embraced.

Full Citation: Teoria e Debate. 1995.6. “Era possível ganhar no primeiro turno.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

Click to access full source

Analytic Note: This opinion piece by leading moderate Eduardo Jorge is an example of the return to viability logic in the aftermath of the success of the Plano Real and the popularity of the Cardoso government. (In the broader piece, not just the excerpt above) Jorge argues that the PT could have demolished the Brazilian right completely by making an electoral pact with the PSDB, that the failure of the PT (and left in general) to be willing to share power and make programmatic concessions has been one of the party’s greatest weaknesses, that the radical takeover of the party has prevented program from occurring and the promise of the 1st Congress from being realized, and that if the PT is ever to win power it will have to become much more pragmatic and flexible.

Excerpt: O PT está diante de um problema que continuará, senão for desvelado e enfrentado até ao fim, nos confinando como um partido importante e representativo, mas incapaz de compartilhar hegemonia e de governar na democracia. Refiro-me à ideologia, à regra, à cultura tradicional nos partidos de esquerda, que implica buscar a qualquer custo, por quaisquer meios, violentos ou pacíficos, uma hegemonia total e, portanto, totalitária. Segundo esta mentalidade, todos os sectores, da associação de escoteiros à seleção nacional de futebol do sindicato ao Parlamento, devem ser iluminados por nossa ‘luz’, onipresente, onipotente e onisciente. É verdade que o PT vem lutando contra isso desde o seu nascimento e que no seu 1º Congresso, em 1991, aprovou por 70% a 30% dos votos dos delegados, a rejeição da ditadura do proletariado, a regra máxima do autoritarismo na esquerda. Mas a tradição é forte , recusa-se a morrer e encontra caminhos para voltar a oprimir nossas consciências socialistas. Foi o que aconteceu em 1993 e 94, com a base e a direção do partido empolgadas diante do favoritismo inicial da candidatura Lula, com a possibilidade de vitória solitária ou com aliados tratados com menosprezo ou queridos desde que submissos. É essa matriz que precisa ser abandonada.”

Translation: The PT is facing a problem that will continue, if not unveiled and confronted to the end, confining ourselves to being an important and representative party, but one incapable of sharing hegemony and governing under democracy. I refer to the ideology, the rule, the traditional culture in parties of the left, which means seeking at any cost, by any means, violent or peaceful, a hegemony that is total, and therefore, totalitarian. According to this mentality, all sectors from the scout association to the national football team, the unions to the Parliament, must be illuminated by our 'light', omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient. It is true that the PT has been fighting it since its birth and in its 1st Congress in 1991, approved by 70% to 30% of the votes of the delegates, rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat, the extreme law of authoritarianism on the left. But the tradition is strong, and refuses to die, finding ways to return and subjugate our socialist consciousness. That’s what happened in 1993 and 94, with the base and the head of the party motivated with the early successes of Lula's candidacy, with the chance of a solo victory or one together with disrespected allies or those that would be submissive. It is this attitude that must be left behind.”

Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.10.7. “A Missão Impossível.”

Click to access full source

Analytic Note: This opinion piece from Tarso Genro in the wake of the 1994 elections is another example of the return to viability appeals by moderates. Genro refers to the strategy of falling back on old radical Socialist ideas in order to win elections as a Mission Impossible, ridicules the notion of blaming the media for Lulas defeat, and posits that the left must find a new direction.

Excerpt: "Hoje impossvel fundamentar um projeto estratgico no seu significado econmico-social, como foi possvel na cultura do velho socialismo revolucionrio e na social-democracia reformadora. Fernando Henrique compreendeu perfeitamente tudo isso e abdicou at da social-democracia. O PT no compreendeu e remendou o ``furo" do socialismo clssico com uma viso social-democrtica, obreirista reformista, to superada como o socialismo sovitico: foi um acordo com a conscincia antiga.... O pior, porm, que pode nos acontecer no momento , confirmada a derrota de Lula, culpar a grande mdia como se pudssemos ter uma estratgia de vitria com a solidariedade da mdia; buscando responsveis individuais como se a nossa linha de campanha no fosse resultado de uma cultura poltica."

Translation: "Today it is impossible to support a strategic project in its economic and social sense, as it was possible in the culture of the old revolutionary socialism and that of progressive social democracy. Fernando Henrique fully understood all this and even renounced social democracy. The PT did not understand and fixed the problems of classic socialism with a social-democratic vision, a progressive working class, overcoming all as with Soviet socialism: it was an agreement with an old consciousness. The worst, however, that can happen to us at this moment, with the confirmed defeat of Lula, would be to blame the media - as if we could have a winning strategy with the solidarity of the media; seeking the guilty - as if the orientation of our campaign was not the result of our political culture."

Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.4.12. “Radicais reduzem influencia no partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

Click to access full source

Analytic Note: This source provides evidence for the descriptive claim that some signs of decreasing radical influence could be found even before the 1994 presidential election and 1995 PT party congress (but after the implementation of the Plano Real). In the key state of São Paulo, moderates started to reassert control over the party machinery as the governance crisis began to abate.

Excerpt: Os grupos de esquerda e extrema-esquerda diminuíram a vantagem que tinham em relação aos outros setores do PT paulista. A corrente interna que mais cresceu foi a “Unidade na Luta”, liderada por Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. O critério usado para a comparação é o número de delegados ao Encontro Nacional do partido que foram eleitos na convenção do PT paulista no último fim de semana. Em 93, as alas de esquerda e extrema apresentaram chapa conjunta e levaram 55,9% dos delegados. Em chapas separadas agora, somadas estas correntes ficaram com 50,9% dos eleitos. A “Unidade na Luta”, chamado de “centro” do PT, saltou de 32,3% dos delegados para 36,1%. Um pouco do acréscimo deve ser atribuído à queda do grupo liderado pelo deputado José Genoino, da “direita” do PT.

Translation: Groups of the left and extreme-left saw their advantage decrease over other sectors of the PT of São Paulo. The internal current that grew the most was "Unity in Struggle", led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The criterion used for comparison is the number of delegates to the National Meeting of the party who were elected at the convention of the PT in São Paulo last weekend. In 93, the left wing and extreme-left joined forces and took 55.9% of the delegates. Running separately now, together these factions got 50.9% of the vote. "Unity in Struggle," called the "center" of the PT, jumped from 32.3% to 36.1% of the delegates. A part of the increase should be attributed to the fall of the group led by Rep José Genoino, of the "right" of the PT.

Sample annotation for testing

Needs example here

Need links and instructions here

@dwhly Could you fill this in?

I think people should almost always use content negotiation on doi.org. There's no need to remember multiple APIs

I think doing something with the new event-data stuff that DataCite and CrossRef are working on would be really cool (i.e. show dataset associated with a given article or so)

But the cool thing is that we can actually already get this formatted into a citation -- woah:

curl -LH "Accept: text/x-bibliography; style=apa" http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.116.061102

This isn't actually a good way to request bibtex. It uses a clumsy citation style that hacks together bibtex. Better:

curl -LH "Accept:application/x-bibtex" http://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.116.061102

We should use https://doi.org/ throughout. the dx is no longer necessary & discouraged

Probably shouldn't just teach this using the new functionality as of August 2016) to generate pages from /docs in the master branch.

As per above, I really wonder if some version of executable document shouldn't be part of this: RMarkdown, SWeave, or even just plot.ly integration in Authorea

I like google docs, but I feel really uneasy about pushing it for scientific writing. For one, it's version control isn't great: it's really hard to understand changes and, when writing in suggest mode, documents quickly become unmanageable. Also, if you ever lose access to your google account, you loose access to your docs.

I think there's really more here, given the possibilities we have:

1. Easily and without additional labor produce your material for the web (html), for paper/printing (pdf) and for e-readers (epub) and possibly even:
2. Integrate data analysis in your articles, making them "executable."

Why not just "humanities"?

Link to EG4 for machine-readable from here.

Is this specific enought? Wouldn't the link require some property to be discoverable?

How well are these already defined for datasets? Any best practices?