сследование направлено на:

В философии социальных наук мы предлагаем онтологические ограничения социологической теории,способствующие аналитическим базовым концепциям, независимым от эпистемологической оптики.

укрепляет

коллективное правило само становится асимметрией среды, структурирующей реальность.

каждый получает максимально возможный выигрыш

физического маркера

социального как онтологически отличающегося от всего остального

реалистическая программа

Классическая дихотомия социальной онтологии

Проблема не только в сложности феномена, но и в состоянии исследований, пытающихся его объяснить

их существование зависит от того, что мы о них думаем

In philosophy of science,

Social institutions, as conceptualized by Guala’s rules-in-equilibrium theory, can be grounded in evolutionary processes aided with cognitive niche construction that produce normative correlated equilibria sustained by epistemic agents’ conditional strategies

The emergence of proto-normativity (internal deontic or proto-deontic beliefs mediating conditional strategies) constitutes a necessary foundation for “proper” social normativity with explicit sanctioning mechanisms and normative beliefs

Integrative modeling: by combining evolutionary game theory with agent-based simulations, the research provides a mechanistic account of how epistemic conditional strategies could have evolved naturally from simpler reactive behaviors, filling a gap in existing literature.

Philosophical reflection: The results of modeling and simulation are interpreted through the lens of social ontology and philosophy of science. This includes evaluating the metaphysical status of emergent social kinds, the naturalization of proto-normativity, and the implications for social science theory building.

Agent-based simulation:

Evolutionary game-theoretic modeling:

Conceptual analysis: The dissertation begins by clarifying key concepts such as social conventions, game-theoretic equilibria, conditional strategies and social norms. This involves critical engagement with existing philosophical literature to establish a coherent conceptual framework that guides the subsequent modeling work.

of biology:

The entire process can be modeled using evolutionary game theory, demonstrating the plausibility of a naturalistic emergence of epistemic correlation devices and proto-normativity without presupposing more advanced cognitive constructs like collective intentionality or explicit sanctioning mechanisms. This transition is not merely conceptual but can be computationally investigated through agent-based simulations that capture the dynamics of the cognitive evolution of correlation devices represented as ecological cues of different layers of abstraction

through formal modeling and simulation,

the evolutionary emergence of epistemic belief-mediated conditional strategies from more primitive, reactive, non-epistemic conditional strategies.

ognitive science

Agents minimize variational free energy by updating internal models to better predict sensory inputs

P(a∣c)=QcaQcH+QcD P(a \mid c) = \frac{Q_c^a}{Q_c^H + Q_c^D} P(a∣c)=QcH​+QcD​Qca​​

πE

To demonstrate how a signal affects the payoff structure, we add a new strategy Follow Signal (FS)

The expected payoffs for both players in this equilibrium are: Husband: 2q+0(1−q)=2(13)+0=232q + 0(1-q) = 2\left(\frac{1}{3}\right) + 0 = \frac{2}{3}2q+0(1−q)=2(31​)+0=32​, Wife: 1p+0(1−p)=1(23)+0=231p + 0(1-p) = 1\left(\frac{2}{3}\right) + 0 = \frac{2}{3}1p+0(1−p)=1(32​)+0=32​.

the challenge of mutual cooperation versus self-interest in scenarios like arms races or public goods provision.

particularly in dynamic and extensive-form games

he inequality ensures that the expected payoff from following the recommendation is at least as great as from deviating.

The inequality states that player iii cannot increase their payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy from si∗s_i^*si∗​ to any other available strategy sis_isi​.

It has mostly been developed within analytic philosophy (Baker, 2019; B. Epstein, 2015; Gilbert, 1992; J. Searle, 1995) and social scientific tradition of critical realism (Elder-Vass, 2010; archer1995?)

To put conventions into the context of social ontology, let us take a closer look at social

conventions and, more broadly, social institutions

Guala (2016) mentions

as they provide a sensible source of explanation of how and why we live together

ui

There is a formal distinction between behavioral, or “general” as Lewis call it, and signaling conventions.

Furthermore, Lewis’s notion of common knowledge, foundational to his theory of conventions, derives from Schelling’s emphasis on mutual awareness within strategic interaction.

Unlike social norms, conventions

than necessary, nature of meaning and coordination

history, definitions and problems

Battle of the Sexes

challenges in game theory

from deviating

S

game

conventions as Nash equilibria sustained by common knowledge and precedent.

Hume identifies conventions as solutions to recurrent coordination problems where multiple potential solutions.