1,303 Matching Annotations
  1. Last 7 days
    1. Political dispositions—espe-cially party—moderate its uptake as do contextualfactors outside movement control.

      The political identification of the parent is the most salient part

    2. By changing norms and affecting how people thinkabout teaching children, social movements may yieldlong-term attitudinal changes in the future public

      Sort of an optimistic belief

    3. Our measures in con-trast capture behaviors: consumption patterns and col-lective action choices that we corroborate with othertypes of data

      May or may not lead to conversations

    4. Ourresults suggest both that movement concepts are storedin long-term memory and that the politics of socializingchildren is a topic even those without young childrencare about

      Also just an argument against stagnant political views and importance

    5. the public, and not justparents, has a stake in crafting the nation’s futurethrough the socialization of children

      Again, this is gonna increase the importance of the community we situate the kids in too cough suburbs cough

    6. Whilethese estimates are imprecise due to small sample size,it appears Democrats are moved to support curricularmaterials focused on issues of racism and discrimina-tion when primed with BLM, while Republicans andindependents are not

      Socialization goes beyond parenting

    7. how did white Americansthink about exposing kids to progressive race conceptsrelated to the police, discrimination, and white privi-lege in public schools?

      I mean now we are seeing a backlash

    8. Peaceful protests mayhave opened opportunities for our white parent sampleto include their children in movement politics andincreased the likelihood they would do so for thefirst time.

      This would be an argument for making protests more ubiquitous

    9. The propor-tion of peaceful protests has no relationship to in-homeactivities—but it is positively associated with engagingin public-facing actions

      Makes a lot of sense

    10. then, parents whose workforce hoursdecreased during the pandemic—and presumably,whose caregiving hours increased—were more likelyto engage in progressive race-related parenting thanthose with consistent employmen

      But might just be an increase in parenting time writ large

    11. For each respondent, we create a variable—pro-portion peaceful protest—indicating the share of BLMprotest events defined as peaceful within 25 miles oftheir zip code between May 25, 2020, and our surveyfielding.

      Again controlling, people closer to protests are more likely to do so

    12. These actions arethose that are publicly observable outside the home andmost require resources or opportunities coordinatedwith others

      More commitment, more socialization

    13. They pro-vide tips about books to buy, television shows to watch,and ways to start and lead conversations with childrento shape their racial attitudes.

      They have the political motivation and this is the political avenue

    14. Conservative content was again absent from the random sampleused to assess interrater reliability. Few posts in the data receivedthis mark

      Maybe some self selection there

    15. #blacklivesmatter, #black-menmatter, #blackwomenmatter, “black lives matter,” black, Afri-can American, racist, racial, race, racism, march, boycott, riot,protest, diversity, privilege, implicit bias, white, minority, discrimina-tion, “of color,” police, policing, “all lives matter,” and justice

      Pretty broad

    16. Democrats or spending unusualamounts of time with their underage children canrespond by taking actions at home directly with theirfamilies.

      Hard to measure, what about curriculum change?

    17. First, we should observe increased attention torhetoric on race and child-rearing. On social media sites,this may look like new frames, tools, and tips for action.

      Change is information landscape

    18. while the practicesthey use to transmit political values to their children, ortheir priorities in this process, evolve in response to thepolitical environment.

      Both new opportunity and new demand to socialize on these topics

    19. argue that successful governancestarts with raising children to be the right kind ofcitizens with values and behaviors consistent with thenation’s goals.

      Yadayadayada its important

    20. Social movements, whichdisrupt agendas and challenge social norms, may beparticularly important for changing white race sociali-zation practices

      Do white people start caring about race when it becomes politically salient

    21. might influence adults’ socialization prior-ities and practices.

      I mean there is a whole lot to be studies about social media too, kids are very directly exposed to politics

    22. We argue socialization is itself political with adults changing their socializationpriorities in response to salient political events including social movements

      Socializing their kids is not a passive process

    1. Yet without any need for ad hockeries or “adjustment”of assumptions, the simplest possible Bayesian models generate strong, nonob-vious, but well-verified logical implications across the entire field of votingbehavior, including the study of socialization. How can this be so?

      We thought it didn't work so why does it work

    2. more likely to share their parents’ PID than are the children of less close relation-ships who are similarly placed in the social structure

      Anecdotally and from personal experience, I doubt this

    3. Some parent–child pairs love each other deeply, most care a great deal abouteach other, and a few are oil and water, but in all these cases it is rare forthere to be much impact on the child’s choice of occupation or lifestyle.

      Really?!?!?! This seems batshit, if I respect my parent I think I am more likely to adopt their views for one.

    4. Large party benefits at a given time period have effects that aretransmitted across generations but die out over time

      The size of benefits matters and it might be talked about around the dinner table for a long time

    5. All else equal, greater social mobility (an attentuated main diagonal ele-ment in R) induces more centrist (Independent) PIDs among young voters

      This makes less sense to me, shouldn't it matter the kind of social mobility and don't some social contexts result in less centrist views

    6. All else equal, the more limited or more erratic the political experi-ence of the parental generation (smaller λ), the more centrist (Independent) theinitial PIDs of young voters will be.

      Adopting the average, or maybe young voters can sniff out BS

    7. New voters’ current PIDs are initially more labile (higher subjectivevariance of estimate) than their parents

      Also thinking intuitively, we have less information to base it on, its not as tied down yet

    8. The Proposition implies that among these idealized young vot-ers just at the exact moment before they begin to learn on their own, somemight be Independents,

      In reality they are being socialized by other factors beyond their parents

    9. The parents’ current estimate of their mean benefits (their current PID)may be written as

      I am going to the polls and all I know is the party benefits and opinions of my parents

    10. Concretely, they know only that if their parentsdisliked Republicans, then it is likely, but not certain, that their experience inadulthood with the GOP will be negative, too.

      They are predicting based off the observation of their parents

    11. he first part is her expected benefit stream due to her partial inheri-tance of the social position of her parents and thus her correlation with theparty benefits

      We expect similar benefits to those that our parents are getting

    12. ill often occupy similar positions in the socialstructure, and thus parental experience is likely to be relevant to the child’sfuture adult life

      their political context is chosen by their parents, the suburbs or the school they go to reflect their parents politics

    13. For example, it follows from the assumptions that partisanswill be better informed than Independents, that successful incumbents willdisproportionately attract young voters to their party, and that voters withintermediate amounts of information will be the most likely to defect fromtheir party identification

      Uncertainty about the outcome correlates with defect, but what outcome is valued might be different

    14. Voters choose a party or candidatewhen they believe that its future course of benefits exceeds that of the otheralternatives

      Again, super individualistic, maybe this is true in the suburbs

    15. Parents are rarely able to influence their teenagechildren’s hairdos, clothing styles, tastes in popular music, or even more im-portant decisions such as the choice of a life partner.

      Something to be said about trivial or personal things, politics feels more important, a place where I trust my parents authority

    16. Longstanding party attachments inoculate citizens against overnightnew party movements, some of which may harbor potential totalitarians

      But they also trap up is status quo

    17. Partisanship remains the central factor inexplaining not just how people vote, but also how they see the political world

      And it is increasingly one dimensional and personal

    Annotators

    1. These localities would retain many of the functions enjoyed to-day, including education, police and fire protection, limited zoningpowers, libraries, and community services. They could elect councilmembers and administrators, but their boundaries would be subject toperiodic reconfiguration

      Sort of talking about a council manager type beat

    2. Although it is unclear whether such places have morecivic capacity than other types of communities (such questions await ex-ploration in future research), some limited anecdotal evidence suggeststhat they might

      The cost benefit is something I remain skeptical of

    3. it is unreason-able to expect that in today’s metropolitan areas, economic and racialdiversity could be maintained in communities under 50,000 in size.

      In reality the relocation and political/physical infrastructure this would take is like fucking impossible

    4. If we want to address the problems of democracy insuburbia, we need to rearrange the configuration of local governments inmetropolitan areas.

      This is the arrow chart we say above

    5. Municipalities with larger popula-tions lose vital civic capacity as residents tune out local politics; thesmaller the local unit, the more citizens are involved in community af-fairs

      But you need diversity which is harder to get w/ small populations

    6. ocalities with a weak civic capacity have lesscapability of making local government responsive and fewer options foraddressing social problems; consequently, they will be subject to greatersocial tension.

      The suburbs have greater social tension, but on what scale?

    7. Localities with greater civic capacity have greater resources available toidentify social problems, develop governmental solutions if possible, andcraft alternatives if public efforts cannot be mustered.

      Are healthier places

    8. However,in communities with greater civic capacity, citizens can be more easilyorganized and mobilized.

      Important as the building block for government action and accountability

    9. Bypreventing municipal institutions from addressing such conflicts, politicalfragmentation undermines the much-lauded role of America’s localities asarenas for democratic governance

      Limiting the issues that matter at the local level

    10. any issue involving the redistribution of wealth to groupswith less revenue-producing capability will not be advanced by a locality

      Because affluent places have disproportionate power

    11. Any change in the number of participants,Schattschneider argues, changes the results.

      Right so its great when its contained to EG but eventually EG wants to bug providence

    12. Civic withdrawal insegregated suburbs may not only lead to a narrow vision of self amongcitizens; it may also preempt the opportunity for learning essential demo-cratic skills and a broader understanding of community.

      Which would be bad for dsemocracy if we could actually prove that was the cause

    13. political participationcorresponds to higher trust, but more trusting people are also more likelyto be politically active, although campaign work seems to increase levelsof trust more than vice versa

      Unclear which way the causation flows

    14. the civil societyperspective views citizen participation as not simply important for demo-cratic organization but essential for realizing one’s humanity.

      In that case the suburbs are defiantly NOT good

    15. The ordering of these competing preferences depends upon how Irealize myself at any particular moment, an understanding that is pro-foundly shaped by my institutional and social circumstances.

      So rational actors who are detached is not a good theory

    16. only to highlight the antidemocratic character of suburban institu-tional arrangements

      Points out that there is going to be an inherent inequality between municipalities

    17. they can simply“vote with their feet” and move to another jurisdiction

      Self sorting leads to same-ness which is not a problem as we see above, might also be a problem for the causation the author wants to claim as self sorting would be selection bias. Of course ability to sort is not perfect eh.

    18. These models startwith the Hobbesian-like premise that individuals in a political system areisolated and autonomous, with the added condition that all individualsare motivated to act in ways that maximize the utility of their actions.

      Latter, maybe, former, hell no

    19. If all people in a society think alike, then anyone member can speak for the group.

      This presupposes that economic and racial homogeneity equates to political homogeneity

    20. also varies with the diver-sity of opinion in a polity.

      The views of a pop will not be stagnant and neither will the population and so civic action accounts for changes

    21. Similarly, if a person shares a politywith people who have an identical set of preferences, then the necessityof mass participation is quite low, as any one voter can articulate theviews of many.

      homogeneity

    22. Ifrepresentatives are adequately representing the aggregate of citizen inter-ests, then the level of citizen participation either necessary or possible inthe governing process is fairly low

      The problem to be concerned about is the inter-municipal conflicts

    23. that higher participation levels are an unquestionedbenefit for a democracy because they correspond to more authentic, rep-resentative, and fair governing processes

      But what if those processes are already transpiring

    24. Most important, the findings highlight the often over-looked role of social contexts and institutions in civic life

      The place you live shapes the politics you participate in

    Annotators

  2. Apr 2026
    1. Their soulless, anticivic,and anticommunity designs are putatively fostering an alienation thatthreatens the fabric of American social life

      But actually its because they are white and wealthy

    2. re approximately 5 percent lesslikely to contact officials, work informally with their neighbors, and votefrequently in local elections

      Residential style is worse for democratic outcomes

    3. Although people in the least residential cities exhibit slightly lower ratesof contacting and meeting, they are just as likely to work informally andvote in local elections

      Some stuff goes up and some goes down but overall civic participation does not change much

    4. Without the pressures of real estate developers,bedroom suburbs may have few issues on the municipal agenda thatcause much controversy.

      Less going on, but is democratic participation in a place without strife actually needed?

    5. For example,some scholars conjecture that necessary commuting deprives bedroomsuburbanites of time and resources available for social interaction andcivic work.

      More time in the car, less time hanging out at the bar

    6. According to this viewpoint, social behavior derives mostly fromthe individual characteristics of the bedroom suburbanite rather thanfrom anything endemic to the bedroom suburb

      Varies

    7. greater percentage of people with financial investments in their localityand, given the property-centered nature of local politics, will be moreinterested in the affairs of city hall.

      Same as above, more invested in the area, the thing is that is probably true for people who work there too

    8. Municipalities with many homeowners are places where more res-idents are invested in their communities: socially, financially, and histori-cally

      Don't see themselves moving anytime soon

    9. Smaller places, with a smaller retail market and limitedlabor pool, will have a harder time sustaining work sites

      Maybe keeps them residential once they have been established as such

    10. but what type of use- or exchange-value they desire from their property and whether there are groups withlarge financial investments seeking to manipulate local politics, often atthe expense of neighborhood quality of life.

      But this would not be present in a "dearth of indigenous workplaces"

    11. such as the prevalence ofgarage facades or the absence of public spaces, are typically accused ofalienating the citizenry.

      But I mean also if you're not seeing people in the office or at the corner store...

    12. continued to be nestled close to industrial areas. It was onlywith the advent of the streetcar and the automobile that the proximitybetween work and home began to widen and an entirely new type ofplace arose, the bedroom suburb

      Sprawl

    Annotators

    1. By separating racialgroups along municipal boundaries, suburbanization stifles debatearound racial issues, effectively demobilizing citizens from public life.

      And halts policy progress

    2. In some places, peopleare more familiar with their neighbors or host more local events; in otherplaces, people hardly know their fellow townsfolk. Where such people aresocially familiar, neighbors are more likely to talk about politics and re-cruit others for local activities.

      This is some examples of the kind of thing that might change in the suburbs

    3. we need to first determine why they are more interested in publicaffairs, how they acquire civic skills and resources, or why they are morelikely to be mobilized for political action.

      And how suburbia changes this

    4. In places with aricher associational life, citizens will be able to link more easily with theirneighbors, will be informed about local issues, and will express theiropinions to local institutions

      Social capital != democracy

    5. According to manythinkers, the political norms and networks of reciprocity that citizens de-velop in voluntary organizations are vital for maintaining the health ofdemocracy.

      More important for mobilization

    6. Voting is also thekey mechanism for controlling political leaders, with the reelection man-date ensuring some responsiveness to citizen concerns. Thus the simplestand crudest way of gauging a polity’s democratic performance is to seewhether or not its citizens are voting.

      Very political, very formal

    Annotators