Instead, we should be asking ourselveswhy 44% of Medicaid recipients work full-timewithout having access to affordable privatehealth insurance

This typeof work does not always have consistenthours but is based on demand each week, soit needs to be reviewed over longer periodsof time. If they are forced to recertify more

meetingcommunity engagement hours prior toreceiving benefits. This new requirementwould require Medicaid recipients to provethey have worked or volunteered for atleast 80 hours each month.

As a result, taxpayers will be forced to cover moreuncompensated care.

Uninsured patientsaccount for approximately $22.5 billion of theuncompensated care

all so therich can enjoy a tax cut.

$13,432 the U.S. spends.

If thesefacilities close, many Americans, particularly inrural parts of the country that voted heavily forPresident Trump, will be harmed

Weknow from experience that most will choose theemergency room if they have no insurance.

In addition, 52% of Americans saidthey believed the CDC would function worse overthe next four years.

Tylenol

DIVORCING HEALTH GUIDANCE FROM SCIENCE

wokescience.

NIH grants for innovation andresearch

DEFUNDINGHEALTH RESEARCH

more competition, more diversity of school models and more accountability for performance in the nation’s education system.

through the spread of charter schools.

Yet only one state, Louisiana, denies schools voucher money if their students perform poorly on state standardized tests. In West Virginia, voucher students who fail state tests lose their eligibility for the program.

This is just common sense: Expensive private schools are often excellent, but cheap private schools are often worse than neighboring public schools

public funding per child is now roughly equal in poor and affluent district

Because community service programs inelementary and secondary schools andnational service programs after high schoolcan instill in young people a sense ofpurpose and patriotism, and

t America,its culture, and its literature

nd more time teachingwhat it is like to live in nondemocraticcountries, where there is no right to freespeech or to criticize the gove

Ina nation whose federal government spends1,000 times more money on STEM educationthan on civics, it’s important to placegreater emphasis on sustaining Americandemocracy.

at precisely are the best ideasand aspirational values that bind togetherwhat author Heather McGee calls a nation of“ancestral strangers”

The same fate likely awaits any presidential candidate who deviates from their line.

This has seriously compromised the Democratic Party’s ability to formulate creative and practical solutions to real-world problems, not all of which can be solved by attacking corporate power

purports

break open neighborhood cartels that prevent new entrants into the housing market

a style of politics that has flowed into the party along with the neo-Brandeisians

as most housing analysts believe.

prevent any large entity from renting out large numbers of single-family homes. The amendment undercut the bill’s intent to make housing more affordable—making it illegal for a company to build homes and rent them out would restrict the supply and drive up the cost for renters.

regulatory threats to compel firms to support his political agenda

Wall Street Dems”

Neo-Brandeisian idea

They see in Trump’s populist gestures confirmation of the appeal of their own ideas and potential for cooperation.

could be defused by turning the issue back to billionaires.

there’s a reason that Frederick Douglass and [W. E. B.] Du Bois were so concerned about monopoly power.

belief system is more like a religion

but this, too, failed to explain what Biden’s populism had actually achieved.

succeeded

and lauds small businesses and farms that are less able to generate economies of scale than giant corporations are, and therefore have to charge more for their products.

indelibly

but the fact that many of its products harm its consumers and society as a whole

not as law enforcement but as a broad policy tool for fixing a lot of problems—economic, political, and social.

‘This cement merger threatens democracy’?

executive action.

The neo-Brandeisian thinkers Warren recruited into the administration represented the movement’s brightest minds and most energetic administrators.

shill

A profound crisis must have profound causes, and Lynn was offering a totalistic account of social decay.

We can vertically integrate and do the writing ourselves.”

short-term price effects.

discrimination and barriers to new entry,

It’s so much easier to teach public policy to people who already know how to write than teach writing to public policy experts,

I helped edit, and review some of the articles and books I have shaped.”

price controls

oligarchy

Bill Clinton

antitrust policy.

“We may have democracy, or we may have great wealth concentrated in the hands of a few, but we can’t have both,

overcharging consumers, undercutting their competition, and preventing innovation.

as a corrupt enemy who must be expunged.

many party leaders have adopted his sweeping theory of everything.

those who are paid to do so

paradoxically—contributes to an individ-ual’s sense of place-based resentment.

jealousy

Similarly, future work shouldexamine the extent to which urbanites harbor resentmenttoward suburbs and the political ramifications of thosefeelings

such as intra-state urban-rural divides

resentment might not have held its predictivepower, as modeled in this paper.

over urbanAmerica’s disparate political influence and anti-ruralstereotypes (e.g., “those backward hicks”) have longbeen pervasive in America and many other Western so-cieties

Ourresults, which show that place resentment was onlyconsistently predictive of vote choice for rural voters

that place-based animus fluctuates with thegeographic context of the election.

“have become so ideolog-ically inbred that we don’t know, can’t understand, andcan barely conceive of ‘those people’ who live just a fewmiles away”

and, therefore, islikely an important component of the emergent urban-rural divide in American politics.

Figure

larger sums of money that U.S. Senate electionsgarner and how that excess money translates intoheightened levels of voter exposure to campaign re-lated communications across various media

there was a 13.5 point decrease in the prob-ability of voting for the Democratic House candidate

Figure

Place-based resentmentpredicts electoral outcomes in the U.S. House, Senate, andgubernatorial contests, but only among the rural subset ofthe American population

The interaction termcaptures variability in the effect of place-based resentmentamong self-identifying urbanites, suburbanites, and ru-ralites. Given that interaction term in the model, wepresent the results of the marginal effect of place-basedresentment.

cities are often shorthand for peoplewho are not white.

Finally, we include a multi-faceted measure of racialresentment. 8 Racial attitudes imbue the American psy-che, and distinguishing race from other dispositions is acomplicated endeavor

vote choice in the2018 Congressional midterm elections and the variouscontests held for state governor in that year.

Figure

Figure

among those who identify asliving in “very rural” areas.

using the difference in feelingthermometer ratings of the Democratic and Republicanparties as the dependent measure;

Evaluationsof the Parties

(nearly 17% higher, in fact)

rural areas have an outsized voice inAmerican politics due to institutions like the Senate andElectoral College

the appreciation forpeople who choose to stay in communities unlike theirown;

the deservingness of differentcommunities in respondent’s state;

The distribution of political power within re-spondent’s state;

self-report depending on how each respondentunderstands their community in relation to others

mong all respondents, place-based re-sentment will predict vote choice in the U.S. House,Senate, and Gubernatorial Elections. Respondent’s placeof residence will moderate the directionality of resentfulattitudes toward specific parties running for office.

have trans-formed into a form of place-based resentment

This raises the question of whether placed-based attitudes are distinct from racial ones

not everyone embodies place identity and, ofthose that do, not everyone harbors place resentment

individuals rely on their own sense of place in orderto understand their personal stakes and justify their po-litical beliefs, because they live “not just anywhere, [but]somewhere in particular”

their place-based ingroup as beingunjustly deprived relative to the “others.”

hese identities provide apowerful heuristic for how Americans interpret politicalphenomenon that affect those spaces

Neighbors are engaged in a common enterpriseoften despite religion or partisanship; they are tied to-gether by the fact that they live near one another and sharea set of common experiences

nique because of eachplace’s inherent peculiarity.

filter political information

creating narratives about the types of communities thatare winning or losing, and who is to blame.

By quantitatively measuring place-basedattitudes, we are able to distinguish place-based resent-ment from other prior dispositions, such as feelings ofracial animosity, which are highly spatialized

within state-and district-level races.

living in different placesare drawn together because of how think about com-munities unlike their own

build social co-hesion

We conclude that placematters in the construction of individuals’ political beliefsbecause place—the social connection individuals feel to aparticular locale—is highly amenable to politicization.

. Rural resentment is a powerful predictor of vote choice in bothelection years examined

d racial resentmen

we study the extent to which Americans feel animus toward communities that aregeographically distinct from their own and whether these feelings explain Americans’ attitudes toward the two majorpolitical parties and self-reported vote choice.

location in space structures the propa-gation of opinion, while factors such as size and density shape its diversity

social context in which people share their likes and dislikes, values, andbeliefs

In someplaces the conflict may be primarily economic—revolving around the way ruralproperty is overvalued and taxed, for example, while in others the separation is morecultural and moral.

. If we take two voters who are of thesame race, religion, age, education level, income, sex, marital status, and report-ing the same level of religious commitment, and one is living in the central city,and another lying well outside a metro area, there will be a difference in politicalparty affiliation.

This is a dubious conclusion, however, given that com-positional characteristics are themselves distributed unevenly in space, likely theresult of features associated with disparate settlement and socialization patterns.

Similarly, the probability of identifying as a leaningDemocrat declines from .18 to .16 and the probability of identifying as a leaningRepublican increases from .15 to .18. The probability of being an independent risesmodestly from .09 to .10.

independent

than it is on assessing the impact ofplace location net of whatever influences these controls exert.

concentration

independents

education

Population Density (logged scale)

Consider Casper, Wyoming (82601) along I-25 in eastern Wyoming.Though it is two hundred miles from Denver, the community measures nearly 1,700persons per square mile, which is more than double the median in the sample. Thereare also locations that are close to major cities but are lightly populated, includingneighborhoods near Phoenix, Arizona, and in Anchorage, Alaska.

Localesat approximately this distance include Woodbridge, Virginia, and Bowie, Maryland,both suburbs of Washington, DC; and Chesterfield, Missouri, a western suburb ofSt. Louis. These are middle-range suburbs, not bordering the core city but not lyingat the fringe of the metropolitan area, either.

less

A respondent who lives in close proximity to a citythis size is considered less rural than one living farther away.

we use the population density of the locale in which the respondent resides.We calculate the population density based on a ten-mile radius around the centroidof the respondent’s ZIP Code.

we situate each respondent at or near thecentroid of their ZIP Code of residence.

Lower density areas are expected to adhere to morallytraditionalist positions, controlling for compositional characteristics of the popula-tion and also accounting for distance to the nearest city.

Small scale set-tlement encourages religious adherence and traditional views of morality becauseit accentuates group life among those with common beliefs over acting as an indi-vidual

Habitual ways of thought and behavior are upheld and perpetuatedover long periods of time.

Consequently, values in these places are more interdepend-ent and distinct

Left leaning, or “progressive” ideologiesare typically those more accommodating of new modes of thought and behaviorin social and political life.

These measures gauge the place-based differ-ences in the number of people an individual might meet within a routine work-day.

the urban–ruralpartisan gap has more than a simple source rooted in racial composition, economicconditions, age differences, or religious background.

Studies document the unconventionality ofurban life, running contrary to tradition in multiple domains

Goods and ser-vices that were once considered luxuries become necessities as more people come todesire what is advertised

The physicaldistance between the two locations is itself influential in the observed difference inpolitical values

Urban–rural differences in opinion may exist asa consequence of the separation of two populations from each other. As distanceincreases, so will the divergence in viewpoint.

Distance captures the degree of isola-tion of two populations and figures prominently in explaining species differentia-tion across the landscape.

the values and traditions of that bygone life may still influence contem-porary beliefs and behaviors

behavioral path dependence,” whichoccurs when “ideas, norms, and behaviors [are] passed down...[and] interact withinstitutions, reinforcing each other over time

self-reliance and traditionalism

more individuals moved to cities, their common economic inter-ests drove class consciousness and created political unity within urban and ruralpopulations respectively.

With the rise of the city came the rise of manufacturing and thedecline of agriculture.

dominated by sectional interests defined by the “greatcrop regions, founded on climate and

first, the geo-graphic distance between small towns and major central cities, and second, differ-ences in population concentration.

Among some groups, theurban–rural divide is wider (e.g., whites) than among other groups (e.g., blacks)

Third, the concentration and density of urban Democrats have reinforced theirparty loyalty and progressive-leaning over time with a similar development occur-ring among geographically dispersed Republicans, thereby heightening the diver-gence in political preference by location

We find that sizable urban–ruraldifferences persist even after accounting for an array of individual-level characteris-tics that typically distinguish them

to understand the urban–rural fissure that hasbeen so noticeable in recent elections

This might be the case not just for developmentof political attitudes in the US South but also in other arenaswithin American politics and elsewhere in the world

an im-pact on political habit whose influence has not worn awayeven yet.

As affirmative support, we showed that greaterprevalence of slavery predicts more conservative (for manyyears more Democratic) presidential vote shares, higher ratesof radical violence, and decreased wealth concentrated inblack farms in the decades after Reconstruction

(i) partisan identification,(ii) attitudes on affirmative action, (iii) levels of racial re-sentment, and (iv) attitudes toward blacks

What these correlations show is that children withracially conservative parents in 1965 are more likely to beracially conservative themselves at least through age 50,which is evidence of intergenerational socialization.

which measured the racial attitudes of anational probability sample of high school senior studentsin 1965 along with their parents

10 percentage point increase in proportion slave leads to a1.8 percentage point drop in the percent of whites whoidentify as Democrat today (95% confidence interval:[22.7, 21.0]). Where mechanization grew rapidly, with0.06 more tractors per 100,000 acres (90th percentile), thesame change in proportion slave leads to only a 0.2 per-centage point decrease in the percent Democrat (95%confidence interval: [21.1, 0.06]).

the incentives for whites tointerfere in the labor market with such tactics should lessen

in comparison to white farmers, blackfarmers in former high-slave areas were significantly worseoff than those in other areas of the South. They were morelikely to be under tenancy agreements and less likely to owntheir own farm.

is greater in counties that had highslave proportions in 1860,

but also to suppresstheir mobility and wages

does not trace itsorigins to this time period.

In both states,perhaps surprisingly, there is little evidence of a strongrelationship between slavery and vote choice, even in anelection that focused so heavily on the issue.

differences in white viewsappear to organize around the density of slavery more stronglyafter the Civil War.

suggesting that there is some decay in these geographicallybased relationships over time

they were threat-ening because they were an important provider of labor and,in the post-emancipation environment, they could leave.

poor whites were complicitwith the landowning elite and would engage in and supportviolent acts toward blacks, even though such violence couldpresumably also lower white wages

emancipation brought blacks some freedomover the amount of labor they supplied, and many ex-slaveschose to work for themselves rather than for the white rulingclass

evidence for intergenerational transmission of racialattitudes.

institutionalpath dependence and intergenerational socialization

bypromoting racially targeted violence, anti-black norms, and,to the extent legally possible, racist institutions.

Proportion slave, 1860

the effects are in the oppositedirection as statistical discrimination theory would predict.

discrimination against blacks because they are, on average,poorer than whites

butthose differences are fairly constant across proportion slavein the county.

For geographic sorting to explain our results, patterns ofmobility into (and out of ) the former slaveholding areaswould have to differ from non-slaveholding areas

Proportion slave, direct effect

Indeed, the correlationbetween percent slave in 1860 and percent black in 2000 is0.77

Cotton suitability

Second, because counties may have had different norms aboutrace, we include controls for (vi) the proportion of total pop-ulation in 1860 that is free black.

but we use the differ-ence in case slavery has an overall effect on racial groupthermometer ratings

but may also reflect beliefs on policy issuesclosely related to race, including redistribution

for example, income gaps betweenblacks and whites, urban-rural differences, and other con-textual and individual-level factors

should have decayed more) in areaswhere the incentives for anti-black attitudes faded earlier

ntergenerational socialization

reacted more sharply toemancipation by curtailing blacks’ rights and oppressing newlyfreedmen and their mobility

the historical persistence of attitudes orig-inating in slavery and (ii) contemporary factors, includingcontemporary demographics and geographic mobility.

if the politics of the South revolves aroundany single theme, it is that of the role of the black belts”

makingour position quite distinct from much of the existing publicopinion literature.

abruptly increasing black wages, raising la-bor costs, and threatening the viability of the Southern plan-tation economy

Du Bois (1935)

that un-dermined Southern whites’ political and economic power.

We show thatthese differences are robust to accounting for a variety offactors, including geography and mid-nineteenth-centuryeconomic and social conditions.

weshow that whites who currently live in counties that hadhigh concentrations of slaves in 1860 are today on averagemore conservative and express colder feelings toward Af-rican Americans than whites who live elsewhere in theSouth.

which in turn have been passeddown locally across generations

Following the Civil War, Southern whites faced political and economicincentives to reinforce existing racist norms and institutions to maintain control over the newly freed African Americanpopulation.