aw the chance to drive a wedge between the BEF and the Frencharmy and inflict the deadly blow on the Allies he had hoped for.

stiff resistance of the British Third Army, but Ludendorff alsoseemed to believe that the BEF had been beaten and that it was now time toturn against the French army to prevent reinforcements being sent to theBritish.

Operation Michael had succeeded on one section of the front where astrategic victory was beyond the possibilities of the German army.Ludendorff, however, had the Eighteenth Army push on, not, as planned, ina north-westerly direction but south and south-west

As the Britishhad just taken over part of the front from the French army, the principles ofdeep defence had not yet been fully applied

EF held on to the strategically crucial Vimy Ridge andprevented the German troops from reaching their objectives. Progress wasmade but casualties on the German side were high

Ludendorff referred to his experience on the Eastern Front: attack, find theweak spots, use the momentum and push forward. This gave the offensive ahigh degree of flexibility but the inherent flaw of this plan was that the attackcould splinter into a number of advances without achieving a decisivevictory.

Here the German troops would have to cross the old Somme battlefield.This was also very difficult terrain but not as muddy as ‘Flanders fields’

the morale of the British soldiers after the costly offensives of1917 would be low, and decided to attack the BEF first.

The German High Command hadexperienced the resilience of French soldiers and shrank back from taking onthe French army at Verdun, the logical point for an offensive

developed a new method ofdirecting fire without ranging shots. The artillery aimed its fire at the enemy’sbatteries, Headquarters and lines of communication.

brief period of artillery preparation before attacks usinghurricane bombardment with the aim of preventing the Allies from learning earlyon where the major blow would fall.

The German army used combined-arms and infiltration tactics, which hadbeen successfully applied by General Oskar von Hutier in the Battle of Riga andwhich were later tested at Caporetto and during the counter-attack at Cambrai.

etter fightingefficiency

The troops lived off the country and tried to extract more resources(especially food) from Ukraine. This led to local uprisings which were crushedby German and Austrian troops, generating even more disaffection.

he defeat of the Russian Empire wasthe precondition for the independence of half a dozen nations.

negotiations should begin without conditions and be based on the principleof no annexations or reparations. The offer of peace also included the right ofself-determination of nations which – as later became clear – opened up thepossibility for manipulation.

y 1918 Czechs and Slovaks were also hoping for an independent state. Thevague promise of more autonomy if the Central Powers won the war wasundercut by the very real possibility of independence in the event of an Alliedvictory.

Wilson did not demand the dissolution of both empires but proposedautonomy for their nationalities.

right of self-determination of all nations.

He took a gamble, placing all his hopes on thesuccess of the spring offensive

German ambitions and thevolatile situation in the former Russian Empire prevented the full weight ofGerman military power from being directed to the Western Front.

Ludendorff shared the imperialist dreams of some of the military, political andeconomic elite, and wanted to fully exploit the collapse of the Russian Empireand the power vacuum it created by expanding borders, promoting colonisa-tion and securing German dominance in Eastern Europe for the foreseeablefuture.

There are two important teachings pertaining to governance in10Confucianism: respect for and maintenance of the (hierarchical) social order, and ethical rule

The East Asian International Society itself can trace its intellectual origins back to China. As theregional hegemon, China set the rules of diplomatic conduct with foreign polities, and also assumednormative supremacy within the order.

The constitutive6norms of the East Asian International Society were hegemonic constructs that originated from China,and were premised on Confucianism and the assumption of Chinese supremacy

This hypothetical argument highlights the openness of China’srelations with foreign powers created by its frontier expansion, and pointsto the possibility of more fluid geopolitical alliances, each of which had ef-fects on military balances, technological reform, and the political economyof trade.

Merchant elitescould benefit from cooperation with state officials in the development ofthe new regions.

inally, frontier expansion offeredan outlet for peasant farmers, relieving pressure on the land in the core re-gions while granting them greater freedom from state burdens.

ising regional powers rivaled theclaims of the central state apparatus

Bayly’s argument points to the corrosive impact of commercialization onsocial solidarity. The cash nexus challenged bonds based on military loy-alty, religious devotion, or kinship, replacing them with considerations ofprivate interest.

state then had to gain the loyalty of its military and of-ficial servitors not through appeals to unity but through contractual rela-tionships

his should be seen not as the “decline” of Ottomancivilization but as a reorientation of political power toward regions in re-sponse to new commercial sources of wealth.

commercialization challenged the presupposi-tions on which the empires based their right to rule, which were fundamen-tally the maintenance of social order and the upholding of moral norms.

hese empires failed “becausewealthy and prideful men found less and less reason to support the myth ofempire to the disadvantage of their own real local interests.”

Flexible, negotiated local admin-istration, a feature of imperial rule everywhere, revealed itself more openlyon the frontier than elsewhere.

was a negoti-ated state in its interior, somewhat like the Ottoman empire, but its peoplehad much stronger local social institutions and a greater ability to resist thestate when they chose.

If coopera-tion benefited both sides, local government could be carried out smoothlyby flexible interpretation of regulations.18 But when the state was weak orabusive, or local elites held the balance of power, conflict flared up.

Hence a great deal of authority was dele-gated to local associations to carry out tasks that served the state.

he Ottomans created a centralized state by very different meansfrom western European states like France because they negotiated withtheir rivals instead of trying to suppress them.

Westerners, of course, equally divided among themselves but willingto follow British leadership, included “most-favored nation” clauses inthe unequal treaties precisely to prevent this well-known Chinese strategy

s-sence of Qing frontier policy was to keep the Mongols divided by con-stant diplomacy, drawing in allies against other, more dangerous rivals.

In each case, Mongol leaders gained official rank, salaries, gifts,and guarantees of subsistence in return for surrendering the right to moveor freely designate their successors.

The Qing rulers, however, realized that negotiation, with coercion heldin reserve, could work just as well on distant frontiers as in domestic con-texts.

Even in the relatively peaceful mid-Ming, local control depended precari-ously on compromises between civil officials and those who controlled mil-itary force.

hese so-called banditshad powerful patrons, reaching as far as the eunuchs in the imperial courtitself.

Furthermore, although there wassubstantial private trade across both frontiers, the unregulated smugglingthat developed along the south coast, with its many small harbors and fastships, was far harder to control than the narrow choice of routes across thedeser

he much larger torrent of silver and credit flowing intothe south drew Canton merchants into close dependence on their Britishcounterparts

All the foreigners astutely took ad-vantage of local flexibility to push their own commercial interests as far aspossible, but if they pushed too far, the Qing shut down the trade to bringthem in line

he frontier served as an experimental zone for adapting prece-dents to local circumstances.

esignatedHan merchant groups obtained monopoly licenses to trade with foreigners;regulations strictly controlled access to ports, times of stay, and goods to betraded.

he kind of military and diplomatic experience gained on the northwesternfrontier generated inappropriate responses for the new challenges on differ-ent terrain.

Yet the flexibility of the empire, its ability to react to ex-ternal shocks and take advantage of new opportunities, seems to have de-clined, so that while Japan could react rapidly to the appearance of Westernsteamships in its harbor in 1854, Chinese officials could not mount a uni-fied response to the Opium War of 1839–1842.

Chinese rulers, in theirown eyes, had finished their project by 1760

n each case the in-novations arose from the demand of the frontier regions for security andthe needs of the military commanders for adequate supplies.

innovations that built an increasingly centralized and coordinated bureau-cracy which used mercantile and agrarian resources actively for economicdevelopment to serve its security needs

the Qing em-pire also engaged in a competitive state-building process as it pushed itsborders outward

competitive European state systemestablished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries generated the processof state building, military mobilization, and commercial growth that fueledimperial expansion.

hese endemic weaknesses of the granary system wouldundermine the entire effectiveness of famine relief, allowing severe out-breaks of peasant revolt.

The end of this expansion in the mid-eighteenth century, and the end ofthe frontier wars, meant that both the incentives for innovation and themeans of control slackened

Many of its projects were de-signed to ensure the security of poor regions so that severe attacks of fam-ine would not touch off revolts, and so that military forces could obtainsubsistence from local markets

ncentive to reform itself declined,and the will to control abuses slackened.

end to military challenges on the frontier let much dy-namism ebb out of the bureaucracy.

Despite extensive controls, the enormous paper flow of the bureaucracy byits very nature obstructed clear lines of communication and control, leavingthe way open for abuse.

This frontier expansion project stimulated official mobilization of theempire’s economic resources.

A language of civilization defined the identity of these peo-ples and the treatment they received.

Balancing coercive, monetary, and cultural appeals was thekey to preserving the state and maintaining social order.

When preaching harmony failed or harvests collapsed in a drought,officials had to summon up whatever police forces they had to prevent ban-ditry or revolt.

the Manchu rulers organized theirsociety to make war. The Manchu people were created in 1616 as part ofthe state formation in Manchuria dedicated to unifying through force thetribes of the Northeast. D

hus the "Western conquest" proved abortive. Instead of being takenover by the new invaders, the Chinese world order finally disintegrated.

The power structure, the establishment,by any definition came to include a large Western element.

The Ch'ing officials control them througha personal relationship, which is the essence of control in the Chinesebureaucracy.

"If you can't lick 'em, join 'em," had its Peking counterpart: barbarianstoo strong to defeat can be pacified by concessions, letting them participatein Chinese life

on-Chinese Manchus had conqueredthe Ming state and taken on Chinese ways. In ruling they used Chinesecultural forms and Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese personnel. To thisstructure additional non-Chinese could now be added.

Westerners could and did par-ticipate in the Ch'ing power structure but were quite incapable of takingon Chinese culture as previous barbarian invaders had done.

culture,on the other hand, included the ideology of imperial Confucianism, theunderlying classical philosophy of social order, and the ritual observancesand ceremonial forms which all together legitimized and sanctioned theruling authority.

power structurewas based on military capacity, force held in reserve, and included theadministrative capacity of emperor, magistrates, censors, and officialdomgenerally to maintain control of the functions of governmen

gain the imperialedict makes the point that if a British officer is to be given the command hemust, like Ward, become enrolled as a Chinese subject and accept Ch'ingcontrol.

This was part of a general effortto extend the interval between tribute missions, perhaps a symptom of theweakening of the institution

He extended [his control] over them by means of regulation

These statements assume a Sinocentric world in which theSon of Heaven at the apex treats the rulers of peripheral peoples with anoverwhelming benevolence (Jen) and thereby ensures their allegiance andsubordination.

hey had not become dependencies or vassals(fan), yet they had been generally pacified, and the Ch'ing dynasty stillruled. From "outer barbarians" they had become "inside barbarians,"fitting into certain traditional institutions to a considerable degree. Aftermaking raids on the coastal frontier, they had been induced to ceasehostilities.

This point could not impress culture-bound " realists" who saw the growingwealth and power of the West and thought only how to foster the wealthand power of China.

hus the early treaties in themselves did not remake the Chinese view ofthe world. To China they represented the supremacy of Western power,but this did not convey the Western idea of the supremacy of law.

Bythese material interests they would be motivated, it was hoped, to keep thepeace

By this the materialistic foreigners were granted certain benefits and privi-leges that would grow into vested interests, for which they would dependupon the emperor and by which he might therefore control them

The traditional model of tribute-and-trade was already con-siderably distorted.

The treaty system emerged from a long transitional order in Sino-Western relations which may be called the Canton system

The result was that the treaty system, which gleamed so new in the eyesof British consuls, was actually from the Chinese point of view little morethan a refurbishing of the traditional tribute system,

Yet this conventional picture of Ch'ing passivity and collapse in theface of Western vigor and expansion fits the end of the century better thanits middle decades.

The Westernpowers, coming from outside the tradition, intent on their own aims, didnot realize how closely the treaty system was built within the frameworkof Chinese tradition

early treaty period down to the1880's was seen as only the latest phase in this tradition of "management"{ch'ou-pan) of barbarian affairs

Thus the treaty system in its early decades from the 1840's to the 1880'swas not merely a Western device for bringing China into the Westernworld; it may equally well be viewed as a Ch'ing device for accommodatingthe West and giving it a place within the Chinese world

another twenty yearsbefore the Chinese Empire entered the Europocentric family of nationsdiplomatically1 and began to show symptoms of modern nationalism.

And so the Opium War and the first treaties, in Peking today and aroundthe world, are viewed as the dawn of the New. This essay, per contra,suggests that they only began the twilight of the Old.

However, the extent of diversity that can result from divergent nationalpolitical developments may well prove to be limited in practice by abidingvalues, elite accommodations, or practical realities such as those inherent inthe nature of world problems or the structures of government and society

Unless some new strait-jacket arises to replace the role of social cleavages in limiting the diversity ofpolitical structures, it is not unreasonable to expect the particularization ofvoting choice at the individual level to be echoed at the national level byincreasing divergence in party systems.

he particularization of issue concernsprovides a plethora of possibilities from which to pick and choose whenputting together a policy agenda.

These new associations further contribute to theirrelevance of former social cleavages.

may be seen by many as more salient than the problems of socialjustice that were the bread and butter of socialist party platforms in earlieryears

‘The establishmentof regular channels for the expression of conflicting interests ... helped tostabilize the structure of a great number of nation-states.’

universalpart involves the presence o f ‘classic’ democratic rights such as freedom ofspeech, freedom of association, and freedom of the press, all of which help toguarantee the free expression of interests.

What we are suggesting is that declining cleavage politics can be regardedas a consequence of the successful resolution by political systems of deep-seated conflicts of social interests

evelopments will have resulted in growing numbers of persons who cannotunequivocally be located in terms of the simple schemata which arecommonly used to describe social structure and its cleavage

In the process, previous linkagesbetween occupation and political and social identification will have losttheir simplicity to the point where the distinction between capital andlabour may have retained little relevance for distinguishing people’s politicalorientations.

Formerly dominantcleavages cease to be relevant in a different kind of society and cannot butlose some of their determining power on individual behaviour.

Ifa small number of cognitive and evaluative dimensions is of great importancefor most voters, if parties are sufficiently homogeneous, if the party systemoffers sufficient diversity to express the different viewpoints along dimensionswhich are the important ones in the minds of the electorate, and if thosedimensions are relatively stable over time, what this will amount to is asystem of ideological or value alignments which will effectively anchorvoters and parties, and which will constrain the net amount of volatilityfrom election to election.

Few parties,and particularly the limiting case of only two parties, tend to restrict therange of policy positions from which voters can choose

To attain (or maintain) such ideological or value coherence, it matterswhether political parties and other relevant elites offer to media and votersa ‘model’ of political coherence

Does the developmental process of particularization, leading to erosion oftraditional group loyalties, imply that voters and party systems are losingtheir moorings and will drift in whatever direction they are propelled byunpredictable events

A quite different kind of ‘new’ cleavage relates to the emergence of asupposed distinction between persons with materialist and those with postmaterialist values

Certainly, there has been an enormous increase in issue diversification inpolitical life, with the emergence of ‘new politics’ issues such as feminism,ecology, nuclear disarmament, and rights for ethnic and sexual minorities,as well as right-wing concerns such as those of the survivalists, antiabortionists, libertarians, and others that were not on the political agenda oftraditional cleavage politics

This is in contrast to earlier decades, whenvarious aspects of a person’s social identity were more homogeneous in termsof their implications for political preferences.

n modern societies peoplederive many identities from their social position, from each of which politicalorientations may arise, not all pointing in the same directio

individual’s attachment to larger social groups is in the process of breakingdown

in which individual citizens relate themselvesincreasingly to small and specialized networks of more direct concern totheir own individual interests and needs rather than to groups defined byphysical proximity

society is in the process of disappearing

The major thrust of Toffler’s thesis is that, even as we move into an era ofworld politics and growing economic and political interdependence betweendifferent countries, the specifics of political concerns are becoming lessglobal.

Even though the linkages they posited havedeclined almost everywhere, the record of past linkages is clear to read.

breakdown of traditional linkages involves nothing less than the disintegration of cleavage politics, which, in turn, makes it possible for otherfactors to play an increasing role in influencing voter choice

the politicalemancipation of individual citizens who can now choose, rather than bepredestined by social position

the most frequently found cleavages concerned social differencesin terms of class and religion, whose impact on party choice was both strongand enduring.

linkages ensuredthat deeply rooted social distinctions existing at this formative period weremirrored in the divisions between parties.

that the interests and preferencesof core party constituencies predispose Left governmentsto pursue relatively expansive policies intended to raisegrowth and lower unemployment and Right governmentsto pursue relatively restrictive policies designed to containinflation

partisan effects on macroeconomicvariables are commonplace, whereas election calendareffects are sporadic

ess concernedwith measuring power precisely than with understanding howstrategic disadvantage is perpetuated, but might neverthelessbe overcome.

By treating inequality as a centralproblem, Bachrach and Baratz asked not only “who getswhat and how” but also “who gets left out and how”

Bachrach and Baratz treat politics as a dramain which no foregone conclusion is played out and a richmixture of elements is manipulated by the players

Actors not only expend energy promot-ing and opposing discrete policy decisions (the first face ofpower) but also invest resources in arrangements throughwhich strategic advantages are secured (the second face ofpower).

heyurge scholars to step back and assess the flow of the deci-sion process in order to fathom the constraints within whichdecisions are made.

international attitudes in general still did notregard war as an absolute evil

Bethmann Hollweg remained set in his habitual pessimism and held suddenlyto a single idea: to do everything to convince the Social Democrats and thenation that Germany was in a defensive situation

‘There had been no “loss ofcontrol”, only an abdication of control.’

nce he had been informed of theRussian decision to proceed to general mobilisation, Bethmann Hollweg hadno further cards to play, and that he was completely resigned to the situation.

It was thatGermany depended entirely on such an inflexible military plan and had givenpriority to strictly military considerations

uccess of the Schlieffen Plan, as is known, dependedon Russian tardiness in mobilisation, which explains very well the anxiety ofthe German generals.

For this reason, our militarysituation can be seen day by day in a less advantageous light, which couldhave harmful consequences if our potential enemies are in a position to maketheir preparations in tranquillity.

If Germany mobilised,however, Russia would mobilise completely, alleging its own defence, whichwould bring in French support.

ussia had chosen ‘to take the part of this criminalnation’, which had disturbed the situation in Europe

theTsar then cancelled the order – and reconfirmed it on 30 July. At this point,Headquarters acted to cut communications, to avoid any possible furtherchange.

The leaders of these armies were warriors by trade, forthis was still the period when making war was in the natural order of things,and from the moment when they felt it was their turn to speak, they leaned onthe civilian governments as heavily as possible.

not to be left behind by any potential adver-sary.

‘Again and again, in the crisis of July 1914, we are confronted bymen who suddenly felt themselves caught in a trap and from it called for adestiny that they were incapable of controlling.’4

this did not apply to German opinion: in taking the initiative,Germany felt, it was simply acting in self-defence, and indeed young Germansoldiers set off for the war with the conviction that they were defending theircountry.

the idea of the inevitable war developed in Germany’

There would have beengeneral stupefaction if the Belgians had been told that they would soon bedrawn into a European war, and the same applies to the British

no statesmen energetic or capable enough to find the means toblock or delay the mechanism which led to the war, not least because theorigin of the crisis seemed marginal.

Great War had no Hitler figure; virtually none of theEuropean leaders, monarchs or civil governments wished to go to war

after 28 July the behaviour of the British government was less equivocal: on29 July it refused to accept Bethmann Hollweg’s demand that Britain shouldremain neutral in the case of war if Germany promised not to touch Frenchpossessions

firmer attitude from Britain could have led Germany towards negotiation

In reality it was not,properly speaking, for Belgium that Britain was to go to war, but because aGerman victory in Western Europe implied a disturbance in the Europeanequilibrium which would be unacceptable to the British, and because such avictory would put Germany in control of the Channel ports

general mobilisation in France began at approximately the same timeas in Germany; the German ‘aggression’ had left France no option

n 2 August, German troops crossedthe frontier into Luxembourg, while Belgium was summoned to allow themfree passage. On 3 August, Germany declared war on France.

t has by nomeans been shown that Germany would indeed have mobilised if Russia hadnot made the first move, if only because Bethmann Hollweg was convinced ofthe importance of national consensus for ‘national defence’.

for general mobilisation to take place immediatelyin Austria-Hungary – a move which would force the German government tofollow suit.3

Undoubtedly at this moment Moltke wished to impose the military pointof view. On 30 July he demanded urgently to proceed to mobilisation, whileBethmann Hollweg wanted at any price to wait for the Russian generalmobilisation.

Wilhelm II and the civil powers, still hesitant, were insistently driven by thegenerals who had hitherto remained reserved. The generals considered –rightly – that in order to carry out the Schlieffen Plan, this very bold planwhich was designed to finish with France before turning to deal with Russia,every day counted.

Didthe Russian general mobilisation render war inevitable? Certainly, yes.’3

t was of course known that in the case of war the German plans were basedon the Russian army mobilising slowly, and that Germany could not acceptbeing caught out by speed of action.

what would have been felt as a new national humiliation would be unaccept-able to the army leaders and public opinion alike (urban opinion at least – thevast mass of peasants remained indifferent to all of this)

The effects of the defeat againstJapan and the events of 1905 were fading, and Raymond Poincaré, France’sPrésident du Conseil at the time of the Balkan wars and now President of theRepublic, had held back from restraining Russia’s action out of fear of losingthe alliance.

localisation was a test of whatRussia and its allies wanted. The conviction of Russian aggressive intent, andthe prospect of its military superiority within a few years was such thatthis fear had overwhelmed calmer and more balanced political reasoning.

deliberately high-risk ‘all or nothing’ scheme – but with the genuine riskof plunging into major catastrophe.

Because of the rigidity of the system of alliances, and purely through theiroperation, the risk would exist in the continuing situation of being led into aEuropean war.

Overall, the German rulers were convinced that rapid action would preventthe other powers from intervening in the conflict between Serbia and Austria-Hungary.

if war comes, it will be the consequenceof a Russian mobilisation undertaken in the heat of the moment, that is, aheadof any preliminary negotiations. In that case negotiations would hardly bepossible, because we would have to attack immediately

Russia’s military strength was growingrapidly; Austria was increasingly weakened by pressures from north andsouth, and would be incapable of following Germany into a war.

Before July 1914 Bethmann Hollweg wasincreasingly convinced that the encirclement so much feared by the Germanssince the Franco-British treaty of 1904, the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911, theexchange of letters of support between Grey (the British Minister for ForeignAffairs) and Paul Cambon (French ambassador in the United Kingdom) at theend of 1912, had now become reality.2

maintaining European peace, he consid-ered that it would be useful, and possible, to ‘localise’ the conflict – to preventit from spreading beyond the single point at issue between Austria-Hungaryand Serbia

Austria-Hungary would be supported by Germany in whatever actionthey decided on; but he also repeated the advice to take action quicklyagainst Serbia.

demanded a response from thedouble monarchy, to achieve a decisive break in the threads which theadversaries were in the course of ‘weaving into a web around them’

nterest of the two powers to strike down agitations ‘system-atically conceived and nourished by Russia’.

What is striking about the“blank cheque” is not that it was issued but that it was indeed blank.’16Certainly what happened at this moment was an unexpected ‘extraordinaryabdication of responsibility’17 on the part of the German government.

If Austria-Hungry were to remain an important ally it must not be weakened.

the opportunity offered by the assassination attack must beused to tame Serbia – the affair must also remain the work of the doublemonarchy alone and, if the Austro-Hungarian action were to fail, Germanymust not be held responsible for this fresh setback suffered by its Austrianallies.

Austria-Hungary must finish with Serbia, and finish soon

The eventual outcome of events therefore depended on Germany

Austria-Hungary would have liked to take further advant-age of these circumstances to eliminate the Serb danger once and for all, butGermany had restrained them from acting to do so.

success of a purely diplomatic naturewould be without value, even if it led to dazzling humiliation for Serbia. Itwould thus be necessary to bring Serbia face to face with claims so consid-erable that rejection could be expected and a radical military intervention canbe undertaken.

eize the occasion to settle thequestion of Serbia once and for all.

incident must be put to gooduse to tame Serbia, whose aggressive behaviour, and indeed its very existence,were a danger to the stability of the ‘multi-national’ Empire.

thevery different attitude taken by other members of the government wasechoed in the press, which represented the nationalist and pan-Serb oppo-sition. It exulted whole-heartedly and congratulated Princip and his com-panions, who were raised to hero status, even martyrs, in the ‘Yugoslav’cause

was above all a means ofapplying pressure to the Prime Minister, Nikola Pašic ́; having personifiedthe Serb nationalist current, Pašic ́ was now accused of passivity and com-plaisancy towards Austria-Hungary

Russia, protector of the Slavs, was unable to respond to this situation: ithad been weakened by the combination of its defeat against Japan in 1905and the revolutionary movements of 1905

Hadnot Conrad demanded, at least three times since December 1912, that thisdisturbing neighbour be disposed of by means of a preventive war?

Using all the documentation known at that time, he accused theGerman government of having intended and prepared for this war since 1912 as aconflict from which Germany was to emerge as a world power – in other words,a power of world supremacy.

when historians of thedifferent nationalities agreed that none of the Great Powers could be consid-ered entirely free from some degree of responsibility.

need to justify to public opinion thedeaths of the 10 million soldiers who were killed in the war.

From the very beginning of a European war such as had not been seen fornearly a century, it was impossible to compare it to any other conflict: byreason of the general mobilisations at its outbreak, and the call for massvolunteers in Britain, this time millions of men would be involved in thewar.

On 28 July 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. On 30 July, Russiaordered general mobilisation. During the night of 30–31 July, Austria-Hungarydecided to mobilise, followed on 1 August by Germany and France atapproximately the same time. Also on 1 August, Germany declared waron Russia, and on France on 3 August. On 4 August the United Kingdomdeclared war on Germany, and on 6 August Austria-Hungary declared waron Russia

these shares will be secondary in comparison to the aggressivediplomacy and armament policies that the German monarchy, with Viennaincreasingly in its wake, pursued from the turn of the century, and that forthe reasons examined here, culminated in the idea of the Central Powerslaunching a preventive war in 1914.

Only when it became absolutely clear that the main thrust ofthe German invasion was head on through Belgium and not further southagainst France, was he able to sway his Cabinet colleagues. Like London,Paris similarly took a more ‘attentiste’ position and not the proactive one ofthe decision-makers in Berlin and Vienna

it seems that for their own profession’s sakethey wanted to make great wars fightable and winnable again. Hence theyadopted Schlieffen’s idea of annihilation and added to it the notion of alightning war.

Pondering in his years of retirement the lessons of the Franco-Prussian Warin which he had led Prussia to victory against Napoleon III, he came to theconclusion that a future war could no longer be fought among the GreatPowers of Europe. Such a war, he was convinced, would be a Volkskrieg, apeople’s war, that no belligerent could hope to win. Everything shouldtherefore be done to avoid a major European war.3

Brilliant mood. The government has succeeded very well inmaking us appear as the attacked.’

These demonstrations made Reich Chancellor Theobald von BethmannHollweg realise that Germany could not possibly join an Austro-Hungarianwar, unless the population could be convinced that they were being calledup to defend the fatherland against the autocratic tsarist juggernau

The prospects of the future seriously worried him [Moltke]. Russia will havecompleted her armaments in 2 to 3 years. The military superiority of ourenemies would be so great then that he did not know how we might copewith them.

oltke was by now firmly convinced that ‘to waitany longer meant a diminishing of our chances; as far as manpower wasconcerned, one cannot enter into a competition with Russia

Having summarised his worries, in particular about the size of the Russianarmament programme

e inclined to hit before it was too late and while victory stillseemed possible.

he country’s enemies ‘were arming more rapidly than we do, aswe were short of money’.