commanders were protective of their subordinates, including in respect of investigationsand inquiries. Again, that is an inherent responsibility of command. However, the desireto protect subordinates from what was seen as over-enthusiastic scrutiny fuelled a ‘waragainst higher command’, in which reporting was manipulated so that incidents wouldnot attract the interest or scrutiny of higher command.The staff officers did not knowthat they were concealing unlawful conduct, but they did proactively take steps toportray events in a way which would minimise the likelihood of attracting appropriatecommand scrutiny. This became so routine that operational reporting had a ‘boilerplate’flavour, and was routinely embellished, and sometimes outright fabricated, although theauthors of the reports didnot necessarily know that to be so,

It is evident that fear of the consequences of reporting misconduct to the chain of commandhas deterred some from doing so.In most cases this is fear for career prospects, although in somethere has been fear of physical reprisals.In any event, experience shows that where a complaint orreport is adverse to a member’s chain of command, there are powerful practical constraints onmaking it.To enable members to feel safe and secure in reporting concerns about their chain ofcommand, units need to have an alternative reporting line.Traditionally, this has been providedinformally by the Chaplain and the Regimental Medical Officer, but a more clearly authorised formaland confidential system, to which members can report concerns without fear of retribution, isrequired to overcome the inherent constraints on reporting about the chain of command throughthe chain of command. This needs to be embedded at unit level, so that it is not remote andunfamiliar from those who may wish to resort to it, and so that doing so is not perceived as ‘goingoutside the unit’.As a suggestion only, it might be based on the XO network

Theintroduction of a second officer into a troop as Executive Officer (XO) would reinforce theofficer influence, provide a sounding board, and enable oneofficer to be ‘on the ground’’withanother in an overwatch position.The troop sergeant, with equivalent rank to the patrolcommanders, has limited authority over them.The Inquiry has been attracted by the BritishSpecialBoat Service model, in which the troop sergeant equivalent has the rank of Colour Sergeant –superior to the sergeant patrol commanders, while still inferior to theSquadron Sergeant Major(SSM, Warrant Officer Class Two). While the requirement is less obvious in the CommandoRegiments, a similar approach could be adopted there

Junior officersin SASR, at troop command level,were not well-served by mentoring andsupport, and were able to be sidelined by the dominant patrol commander clique.Operationalfactors contributed to this, enabling the troop commander to be dislocated for plausible reasons inan overwatch position.The empower of junior officers requires the support -previously lackingbecause of the ‘rite of passage’ and ‘sink or swim philosophy’ –of Commanding Officers andSquadron Officers Commanding, and of Warrant Officers

were routinely embellished, often using boilerplate language, in order to proactively demonstrate apparent compliance with ROE, and to minimise the risk of attracting the interest of higher headquarters. This had upstream and downstream effects: upstream, higher headquarters received a misleading impression of operations, and downstream, operators and patrol commanders knew how to describe an incident in order to satisfy the perceived reporting requirements.

42.Professor Whetham has observed, in his Recommendation 1 (Deliver education to all SOCOMDpersonnel on the causes of war crimes), that educating military personnel about the causes of warcrimes so that they understand how such crimes can come to be seen as almost required andtherefore justified,is vital, but not easy.He suggests that military ethics training should employ casestudies drawn from military personnel ‘from the same services and country as themselves’,so thatthey understand that they too could become torturers or murderers –thatthe ‘good guys’ can alsodo bad things. He recommends that every member of SOCOMD should receive education on thecauses of war crimes, tobe delivered by SOCOMD soldiers themselves and reviewed by appropriateexternal (ie, non-SOCOMD) reviewers who can act as critical friends; and that members of theSOCMD community should be recorded talking candidly, and on the record, about the ethical driftthat took place over a period of time, how hard itwas to resist the prevailing organisational cultureand the missed opportunities that could and should have been taken to address the failures that somany people appeared to recognise at the time,but felt powerless to change.The Inquiry adoptsthese recommendations.43.In particular, the Inquiry believes that in high stress situations, soldiers will default to theirpractical training experience, rather thanto theory learnt in a classroom. They will respond as theyhave practised responding in exercises.This can be addressed by embedding in continuationtraining, as well as in the selection process, practical ethical decision-making scenarios, based onthe types of incidents described in Part 2, in which trainees are under pressure to make unethicaldecisions

As operations in Afghanistan evolved, SOTG were, at least to a substantial degree, notconducting ‘special operations’, but missions that could have been conducted by properly-enabledand supported conventional forces. In particular, FE was predominantly involvedin kill/capture and disruption type missions, which were a form of cordon and search; whileForceElement (FE)was predominantly engaged in company-strength attacks and clearances

, the devolution of operational command to the extent that thenational command has no real oversight of the conduct of Special Forcesoperations not only hasthe potential to result in the national interest and mission being overlooked or subordinated, butdeprives national command of oversight of those operations.What is ‘special’ about Special Forcesis the operations they conduct. If anything, the secretive nature of their operations makes effectiveoversight by National command all the more important. That they conduct ‘special’ operations doesnot mean that they should be excepted from ordinary command and oversight arrangements

Moreover, ISAF SOF, under the operational command of which the SOTG sat, were stronglyinfluenced by a predominantly ISAF SOF attitude and strategy which was focussedon killing or capturing insurgent leaders and disrupting insurgent lines of communications

When soldiers are exposed to that environment repeatedly, over a decade, without lengthydwell times between deployments, it is unsurprising that the moral compass of some may shift.It isno coincidence that it was in the later years of Operation (OP) SLIPPER – in particular –thatthe problems reached their nadir

All this occurred in a foreign and different environment, isolated from the norms of Australiansociety, and out of sight of those whose supervisionor presence would ordinarily impose restraintson behaviour.Those are conditions which are fertile for a ‘Lord of the Flies’ syndrome to prosper,and there are strong signs of that afoot on Rotation , Rotation and Rotation

Catch and release,and the kill count

Typically, the troop commanders were ontheir first SOTG deployment. Their patrol commanders were vastly more experienced.Of itselfthat is not unusual.However, in a carry-over from domestic counter-terrorism tactics,techniques, and procedures, the patrol commanders became the lead planners for operations.The operational control and influence of troop commanders was diminished, if notmarginalised.

Those who did try to wrestle back some controlwere ostracised, and often did not receive the support of superior officers. Indeed, this wasnot confined to troop level: a squadron commander who insisted on proper standards (andduring whose command of Force Element [FE]no relevant impropriety has emerged)was permitted to be nominated by NCOs as ‘Cock of the Year’.

The officers who might have counter-balanced this were disempowered. This commencedfrom selection, where non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were effectively the gatekeepers.There is a perception in many quarters that officers were selected on the basis that they wouldbe compliant.Junior officers were poorly supported. They were not well-mentored, but wererather left to swim or sink.

rom 2010, rotary wing assets became increasingly available to support SOTG operations, anda pattern developed by which there would be alternating four day windows during which rotarywing assets would be available. As a result, a cycle was established of four days planning and targetdevelopment (during which the Force Element remained positioned to conduct vehicle-mountedoperations if necessary), followed by a four day ‘rotary wing period’ (during which operations wereconducted).

FE-A – Force Element Alpha , based on a SASR troop, or troop plus

Composition

The deployment pattern was structured around the Afghan fighting season, whichtraditionally begins in April as snow melts in the mountains and slows in November as winter setsin. Generally, there was a rotation from February to July, a rotation from July to November, and awinter rotation from November to February

For East Timor it is about 20 per cent; for Afghanistan it is higher than that at about 40 per cent. These are volunteers and, in most cases, very enthusiastic volunteers. For those who are on a second tour in a specific theatre— and I am still talking about Special Operations Command—about 20 per cent are on a second tour of East Timor, and because Afghanistan is more topical, about 30 per cent are on their second tour. For Special Operations Command, because they do tend to be more specialised and because they are not so great in number, we are inside the respite period for a number of them

Special Operations Task Group Rotations

Commandos are very well equipped. They have very heavy firepower

May 2006 - October 2008 (four rotations)

May 2007 - December 2013 (17 rotations)

August/September 2005 - September 2006 (three rotations)

October 2001-November 2002 (three rotations)