Reviewer #1 (Public review):
This paper presents a computational model of the evolution of two different kinds of helping ("work," presumably denoting provisioning, and defense tasks) in a model inspired by cooperatively breeding vertebrates. The helpers in this model are a mix of previous offspring of the breeder and floaters that might have joined the group, and can either transition between the tasks as they age or not. The two types of help have differential costs: "work" reduces "dominance value," (DV), a measure of competitiveness for breeding spots, which otherwise goes up linearly with age, but defense reduces survival probability. Both eventually might preclude the helper from becoming a breeder and reproducing. How much the helpers help, and which tasks (and whether they transition or not), as well as their propensity to disperse, are all evolving quantities. The authors consider three main scenarios: one where relatedness emerges from the model, but there is no benefit to living in groups, one where there is no relatedness, but living in larger groups gives a survival benefit (group augmentation, GA), and one where both effects operate. The main claim is that evolving defensive help or division of labor requires the group augmentation; it doesn't evolve through kin selection alone in the authors' simulations.
This is an interesting model, and there is much to like about the complexity that is built in. Individual-based simulations like this can be a valuable tool to explore the complex interaction of life history and social traits. Yet, models like this also have to take care of both being very clear on their construction and exploring how some of the ancillary but potentially consequential assumptions affect the results, including robust exploration of the parameter space. I think the current manuscript falls short in these areas, and therefore, I am not yet convinced of the results. Much of this is a matter of clearer and more complete writing: the Materials and Methods section in particular is incomplete or vague in some important junctions. However, there are also some issues with the assumptions that are described clearly.
Below, I describe my main issues, mostly having to do with model features that are unclear, poorly motivated (as they stand), or potentially unrealistic or underexplored.
One of the main issues I have is that there is almost no information on what happens to dispersers in the model. Line 369-67 states dispersers might join another group or remain as floaters, but gives no further information on how this is determined. Poring through the notation table also comes up empty as there is no apparent parameter affecting this consequential life history event. At some point, I convinced myself that dispersers remain floaters until they die or become breeders, but several points in the text contradict this directly (e.g., l 107). Clearly this is a hugely important model feature since it determines fitness cost and benefits of dispersal and group size (which also affects relatedness and/or fitness depending on the model). There just isn't enough information to understand this crucial component of the model, and without it, it is hard to make sense of the model output.
Related to that, it seems to be implied (but never stated explicitly) that floaters do no work, and therefore their DV increases linearly with age (H_work in eq.2 is zero). That means any floaters that manage to stick around long enough would have higher success in competition for breeding spots relative to existing group members. How realistic is this? I think this might be driving the kin selection-only results that defense doesn't evolve without group augmentation (one of the two main ways). Any subordinates (which are mainly zero in the no GA, according to the SI tables; this assumes N=breeder+subordinates, but this isn't explicit anywhere) would be outcompeted by floaters after a short time (since they evolve high H and floaters don't), which in turn increases the benefit of dispersal, explaining why it is so high. Is this parameter regime reasonable? My understanding is that floaters often aren't usually high resource holding potential individuals (either b/c high RHP ones would get selected out of the floater population by establishing territories or b/c floating isn't typically a thriving strategy, given that many resources are tied to territories). In this case, the assumption seems to bias things towards the floaters and against subordinates to inherit territories. This should be explored either with a higher mortality rate for floaters and/or a lower DV increase, or both.
When it comes to floaters replacing dead breeders, the authors say a bit more, but again, the actual equation for the scramble competition (which only appears as "scramble context" in the notation table) is not given. Is it simply proportional to R_i/\sum_j R_j ? Or is there some other function used? What are the actual numbers of floaters per breeding territory that emerge under different parameter values? These are all very important quantities that have to be described clearly.
I also think the asexual reproduction with small mutations assumption is a fairly strong one that also seems to bias the model outcomes in a particular way. I appreciate that the authors actually measured relatedness within groups (though if most groups under KS have no subordinates, that relatedness becomes a bit moot), and also eliminated it with their ingenious swapping-out-subordinates procedure. The fact remains that unless they eliminate relatedness completely, average relatedness, by design, will be very high. (Again, this is also affected by how the fate of the dispersers is determined, but clearly there isn't a lot of joining happening, just judging from mean group sizes under KS only.) This is, of course, why there is so much helping evolving (even if it's not defensive) unless they completely cut out relatedness.
Finally, the "need for division of labor" section is also unclear, and its construction also would seem to bias things against division of labor evolving. For starters, I don't understand the rationale for the convoluted way the authors create an incentive for division of labor. Why not implement something much simpler, like a law of minimum (i.e., the total effect of helping is whatever the help amount for the lowest value task is) or more intuitively: the fecundity is simply a function of "work" help (draw Poisson number of offspring) and survival of offspring (draw binomial from the fecundity) is a function of the "defense" help. As it is, even though the authors say they require division of labor, in fact, they only make a single type of help marginally less beneficial (basically by half) if it is done more than the other. That's a fairly weak selection for division of labor, and to me it seems hard to justify. I suspect either of the alternative assumptions above would actually impose enough selection to make division of labor evolve even without group augmentation.
Overall, this is an interesting model, but the simulation is not adequately described or explored to have confidence in the main conclusions yet. Better exposition and more exploration of alternative assumptions and parameter space are needed.