Rancièrecallsbringingthesetwoaspectsofrightstogetherasdissensus.Itisdissensusratherthanconsensusbecausepoliticsisalwaysacontestationoverwhoiscountedandwhatcounts.ForRancière,apoliticalsubjectinvolvesthecapacityforstagingsuchscenesofdissensus.Thus,‘politicalsubjectsarenotdefinitecollectivities.Theyaresurplusnames,namesthatsetoutaquestionoradisputeaboutwhoisincludedintheircount.’
Conceiving the enactment of rights as dissensus is more powerful than understanding dissent as civil disobedience. For all its illustrative history, civil disobedience still evokes a reactionary politics, whereas dissensus is creative and affirmative. Although significant as a specific act, civil disobedience is rather too narrow to understand political acts in general. Staging dissensus brings into play the imaginary, performative, and legality of rights all at once and constitutes subjects as citizen subjects of power. Julian Assange, Edward Snowden, Anonymous, Aaron Swartz, and Open Rights are not only definite individuals or collectives of civil disobedience but stand for a political subjectivity enacting rights as the staging of dissensus. This is what we gather from their acts. When they enact rights that they do not have and the rights that they should have, they bring into being political subjects who cannot be known in advance. Their acts are contestations over who is counted as political and what counts as politics. To put it slightly differently, the performative and imaginary force of rights lies in the double movement between their inscription and enactment.
Acá estaría el derecho a scrappear como una forma de reapropiación de los bienes comunes y de repolitización de lo publico.