27 Matching Annotations
  1. Sep 2023
  2. Aug 2023
  3. Jul 2023
  4. May 2023
  5. Feb 2023
  6. Dec 2022
  7. Oct 2022
  8. Sep 2022
  9. Nov 2021
    1. Once it becomes clear that attention and praise can be garnered from organizing an attack on someone’s reputation, plenty of people discover that they have an interest in doing so.

      This is a whole new sort of "attention economy".

      This genre of problem is also one of the most common defenses given by the accused as sort of "boogeyman" meant to silence accusers. How could we better balance the ills against each of the sides in these cases to mitigate the broader harms in both directions?

  10. Sep 2021
  11. Aug 2021
  12. Jul 2021
  13. Jun 2021
  14. May 2021
  15. Mar 2021
    1. <small><cite class='h-cite via'> <span class='p-author h-card'>Jeremy Cherfas</span> in IndieWeb chat (<time class='dt-published'>03/11/2021 14:46:39</time>)</cite></small>

  16. Dec 2020
  17. Nov 2020
  18. Sep 2020
  19. Feb 2020
    1. The rational expectation and thelearning-from-price literatures argue that equilibrium prices are accurate becausethey reveal and aggregate the information of all market participants. The MarketSelection Hypothesis,MSH, proposes instead that prices become accurate becausethey eventually reflect only the beliefs of the most accurate agent. The Wisdomof the Crowd argument,WOC, however suggests that market prices are accuratebecause individual, idiosyncratic errors are averaged out by the price formationmechanism

      Three models (arguments for) drivers of market efficiency