By contrast, any positive or negative effects that intellectual property rights have on the wider populace are diffused, and any individual member of the wider populace has little motive (and potentially insufficient means) to overco me the significant barriers to active political lobbying. As a result, the intrinsic trend is for intellectual INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLICY FOR INNOVATION 11   property holders to actively lobby, largely unopposed, for greater rights protections. (Fisher, 1999, Sect. II. C.)

In addition to broad economic trends affecting domestic politics evenly, Fisher also notes the uneven distribution of effects stemming from intellectual property rights (1999, Sect. II. C.). The positive effects of intellectual property rights accrue strongl y to a small number of rights - holders (the paper assumes that there are no significant negative effects to rights - holders); for this reason, rights - holders have significant motive (and potentially greater means) to overcome the significant barriers to acti ve political lobbying.