35 Matching Annotations
  1. Apr 2025
    1. Finally, a Master Password Hash is generated using PBKDF-SHA256 with a payload of the Master Key and with a salt of the master password. The Master Password Hash is sent to the Bitwarden server upon account creation and login, and used to authenticate the user account.

      Bitwarden claim:

      Never transmitted over the internet to Bitwarden servers.

      This claim is misleading because it implies that master passwords in any form are never transmitted over the Internet to a server, despite the fact that Master Password Hash is basically just master passwords in another form.

      Unless Bitwarden implements zero-knowledge password proof, which isn't mentioned in their white paper.

  2. May 2024
  3. Mar 2023
  4. Apr 2020
    1. Take a moment to consider the alternative. No, not the IT department's fantasy world, that never-gonna-happen scenario where you create a strong, unique password for every account, memorize each one, and refresh them every few months. We both know it's not like that. The reality is that in your attempts to handle all those passwords yourself, you will commit the cardinal sin of reusing some. That is actually far more risky than using a password manager. If a single site that uses this password falls, every account that uses it is compromised.
    2. This cache of passwords is, of course, protected by a super-password of its own—one you obviously need to choose wisely. More from Popular Mechanics Handmade whistles from England Video Player is loading.Play VideoPrevious VideoPlayNext VideoMuteCurrent Time 0:00/Duration 3:52Loaded: 2.59%0:00Stream Type LIVESeek to live, currently playing liveLIVERemaining Time -3:52 1xPlayback RateChaptersChaptersDescriptionsdescriptions off, selectedCaptionscaptions settings, opens captions settings dialogcaptions off, selectedEnglishAudio Trackdefault, selectedQuality1080p540p720p360p270pauto, selectedPicture-in-PictureFullscreenThis is a modal window.Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window.TextColorWhiteBlackRedGreenBlueYellowMagentaCyanTransparencyOpaqueSemi-TransparentBackgroundColorBlackWhiteRedGreenBlueYellowMagentaCyanTransparencyOpaqueSemi-TransparentTransparentWindowColorBlackWhiteRedGreenBlueYellowMagentaCyanTransparencyTransparentSemi-TransparentOpaqueFont Size50%75%100%125%150%175%200%300%400%Text Edge StyleNoneRaisedDepressedUniformDropshadowFont FamilyProportional Sans-SerifMonospace Sans-SerifProportional SerifMonospace SerifCasualScriptSmall CapsReset restore all settings to the default valuesDoneClose Modal DialogEnd of dialog window. Replay "ACME Whistles | MADE HERE | Popular Mechanics" Up Next 01:29 First Look: 2020 iPhone SE 01:29 04:05 Clean your dishes in seconds 04:05 03:04 Easy Car Roof Access 03:04 Yes, this does pose a risk of its own, as you might already be screaming at your screen.
    1. If you are concerned about privacy and looking for a bullet-proof solution then the only way to go is open-source software. For example, there was another incident with a proprietary file "encrypter" for Android/iOS which used the simplest possible "encryption" on earth: XORing of data that is as easy to crack a monkey could do that. Would not happen to an open-source software. If you're worried about the mobile app not being as reliable (backdoors etc.) as the desktop app: compile it yourself from sources. https/github.com/MiniKeePass/MiniKeePass You can also compile the desktop version yourself. Honestly, I doubt most people, including you and me, will bother.
    1. By default: no. The Auto-Type method in KeePass 2.x works the same as the one in 1.x and consequently is not keylogger-safe. However, KeePass features an alternative method called Two-Channel Auto-Type Obfuscation (TCATO), which renders keyloggers useless. This is an opt-in feature (because it doesn't work with all windows) and must be enabled for entries manually. See the TCATO documentation for details.
  5. Dec 2019