9 Matching Annotations
  1. Feb 2014
    1. The cases on the subject are collected in a footnote to Somerset Bank v. Edmund, 10 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 726; 76 Ohio St. Rep. 396, the head-note to which reads: "Public policy and sound morals alike forbid that a public officer should demand or receive for services performed by him in the discharge of official duty any other or further remuneration or reward than that prescribed or allowed by law." This rule of public policy has been relaxed only in those instances where the legislature for sufficient public reason has seen fit by statute to extend the stimulus of a reward to the public without distinction, as in the case of United States v. Matthews, 173 U.S. 381, where the attorney-general, under an act for "the detection and prosecution of crimes against the United States," made a public offer of reward sufficiently liberal and generic to comprehend the services of a federal deputy marshal. Exceptions of that character upon familiar principles serve to emphasize the correctness of the rule, as one based upon sound public policy.

      1) A public officer cannot demand or receive remuneration or a reward for carrying out the duty of his job as a matter of public policy and morality

      2) However, it is not against public policy for a police officer to receive a reward in performance of his legal duty if the legislature passes a statute giving the reward to the public at large in furtherance of some public policy - such as preventing treason against the US.

    2. MINTURN, J. The plaintiff occupied the position of a special police officer, in Atlantic City, and incidentally was identified with the work of the prosecutor of the pleas of the county. He possessed knowledge concerning the theft of certain diamonds and jewelry from the possession of the defendant, who had advertised a reward for the recovery of the property. In this situation he claims to have entered into a verbal contract with defendant, whereby she agreed to pay him $500 if he could procure for her the names and addresses of the thieves. As a result of his meditation with the police authorities the diamonds and jewelry were recovered, and plaintiff brought this suit to recover the promised reward.
      • Plaintiff makes a verbal contract with defendant. In return for $500, plaintiff will find defendant's stolen jewels.
      • Plaintiff had knowledge of whereabouts of jewels at contract formation.
      • Plaintiff is a special police officer and has dealings with prosecutor's office.
      • Defendant published advertisement for reward.
      • Plaintiff finds stolen goods and arranges return.
    3. The judgment below for that reason must be reversed.

      Court reverses decision of lower court in favor of the plaintiff since he was characterized as a public official.

    4. The testimony makes it manifest that he was a special police officer to some extent identified with the work of the prosecutor's office, and that position, upon well-settled grounds of public policy, required him to assist, at least, in the prosecution of offenders against the law. The services he rendered, in this instance, must be presumed to have been rendered in pursuance of that public duty, and for its performance he was not entitled to receive a special quid pro quo.
      • Court finds sufficient evidence to characterize this fellow as a public official.

      • His interaction with the prosecutor's office weighed in as a factor in suggesting he had a legal duty.

      • Since he is characterized within the rule as a public official, he cannot, as a matter of law, receive a reward for the performance of his duties.

    5. The District Court, sitting without a jury, awarded plaintiff a judgment for the amount of the reward, and hence this appeal.
      • Cop sues for reward money.
      • District court awards money to the cop.
      • Defendant appeals.
    6. Various points are discussed in the briefs, but to us the dominant and conspicuous inquiry in the case is, was the plaintiff, during the period of this transaction, a public officer, charged with the enforcement of the law?
    7. STEPHEN GRAY, RESPONDENT, v. THERESA D. MARTINO, APPELLANT Supreme Court of New Jersey 91 N.J.L. 462; 103 A. 24 February 2, 1918, Decided

      Gray (cop) v. Martino (crime victim)

      type: respondent

      • role: cop
      • abbrev: Gray
      • name: Stephen Gray

      type: appellant

      • role: crime victim
      • abbrev: Martino
      • name: Theresa D. Martino