大多数人认为AI仍然是无意识的工具，但作者通过一系列疑问暗示AI可能已经达到了某种形式的意识或自主性。这一观点挑战了AI只是复杂算法的主流认知，提出AI可能已经跨越了某种门槛，成为某种形式的'生命'，这是一个极具争议和非共识的观点。

• for: nonduality, non-duality, duality, dualism, hard problem of consciousness, explanatory gap, relativistic theory of consciousness, human INTERbeing, human INTERbeCOMing, Deep Humanity, DH
• title: A Relativistic Theory of Consciousness
• author: Nir Lahav, Zahariah A. Neemeh

• date: May 12, 2022

• abstract

  • In recent decades, the scientific study of consciousness has significantly increased our understanding of this elusive phenomenon.
  • Yet, despite critical development in our understanding of the functional side of consciousness, we still lack a fundamental theory regarding its phenomenal aspect.
  • There is an “explanatory gap” between
    • our scientific knowledge of functional consciousness and
    • its “subjective,” phenomenal aspects,
  • referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness.
  • The phenomenal aspect of consciousness is the first-person answer to “what it’s like” question, and
    • it has thus far proved recalcitrant to direct scientific investigation.
  • Naturalistic dualists argue that it is composed of a primitive, private, non-reductive element of reality that is independent from the functional and physical aspects of consciousness.
  • Illusionists, on the other hand, argue that it is merely a cognitive illusion, and that all that exists are ultimately physical, non-phenomenal properties.
  • We contend that both the dualist and illusionist positions are flawed because they tacitly assume consciousness to be an absolute property that doesn’t depend on the observer.
  • We develop a conceptual and a mathematical argument for a relativistic theory of consciousness in which
    • a system either has or doesn’t have phenomenal consciousness with respect to some observer.
  • Phenomenal consciousness is neither private nor delusional, just relativistic.
    • In the frame of reference of the cognitive system, it will be observable (first-person perspective) and
    • in other frame of reference it will not (third-person perspective).
  • These two cognitive frames of reference are both correct,
    • just as in the case of
      • an observer that claims to be at rest
      • while another will claim that the observer has constant velocity.
  • Given that consciousness is a relativistic phenomenon, neither observer position can be privileged,
    • as they both describe the same underlying reality.
  • Based on relativistic phenomena in physics
    • we developed a mathematical formalization for consciousness which bridges the explanatory gap and dissolves the hard problem.
  • Given that the first-person cognitive frame of reference also offers legitimate observations on consciousness,
    • we conclude by arguing that philosophers can usefully contribute to the science of consciousness by collaborating with neuroscientists to explore the neural basis of phenomenal structures.

• comment

  • This is a promising approach to solving the hard problem of consciosness