Whoisthesubjectofthesedigitalrights?Sinceweareinterestedintheprocessesthroughwhichtheserightsareenactedratherthantheirsubstance,ourquestionof‘who’concernsthatofpoliticalsubjectivitythroughtheInternet.[4]Aswehaveexpresseditinvariousways,‘who’doesnotcorrespondtoanalreadyformedpoliticalsubjectbutafigure:Howisapoliticalsubjectbeingconstitutedasaclaimantofdigitalrights?Wehaveillustratedthroughoutthisbookthatdigitalactstraversemultiplenationalbordersandlegalorders.Yetmakingrightsclaimsthattraversebordersisoftenaddressedthroughsovereignregionalornationallegalordersandtheirparticularunderstandingofrights.
So the question of ‘who’ the subject is of digital rights is both an analytical but also an urgent political question that requires addressing. If we use ‘citizen’ as the subject of these rights, clearly it does not capture how both the enactment of the political subject and of cyberspace cut across national borders and legal orders. Today, the citizen functions as a member of a nation-state, and there are no corresponding rights and obligations beyond the nation-state that can govern subjects whose acts traverse international spaces. [...] What we gather from Rancière and Derrida is the importance of refusing to make a choice between the citizen and the human as the subject of digital rights. Instead, we anticipate a new figure of a citizen yet to come as the subject of digital rights.