According toLacan, then, neither psychoanalytic orthodoxy nor academicpsychology recognizes a difference in principle between knowl-edge (psychic life) and the truth by which it is driven onward(the reality to which psychic life must adapt itself)
Thus Lacan introduces the divide between the real and reality. Hegel and ego psychoanalysis assume that knowledge (the consciousness) and truth can always coincide and have an affinity for each other
Truth and knowledgeare not related to each other externally here,
Lacan states that knowledge is the way consciousness understands itself, and it has to adapt to truth.
ave they in fact shakenthe self-conception of the subject as fundamentally as Freudwould have it? Thus has Darwinism, for example, really freedhumanity from its belief that it holds a central position in real-ity? How could it, when Darwin places man at the top of theevolutionary pyramid?)
This is the challenge: Lacan challenges the claim that the third part of the Copernican revolution, the claim that the subject is self-consciousness is more believed now than before or even at the same -- that the self continues to think so?
si je me mets à la place de l'autre l'autre ou est-ce 02:16:31 qui se mettra
original recordings of the theorists at that 1966 structuralism conference.“For years, everyone had said ‘there’s got to be recordings of those lectures.’ Well, we finally found the recordings of those lectures. They were hidden in a cabinet behind a bookshelf behind a couch,” said Liz Mengel, associate director of collections and academic services for the Sheridan Libraries at Johns Hopkins.
Have these been transferred? Can we get them?
Jacques Lacan’s account of what he calls ‘the mirror stage’ locatesthe beginnings of identity in the moment when the infantidentifies with his or her image in the mirror, perceiving himselfor herself as whole, as what he or she wants to be.
Does Lacan's theory only account for the modern identity? What about before mirrors?
And a theory of "multilayered social worlds", when fully developed, can be a helpful tool in understanding why, in modern Europe, certain phenomena became common enough to catch the attention of physicians, scientists, artists and philosophers. In a current unpublished work, STP suggests that, if the logic of affinity is properly conceptualized, both in terms of its essentially paraconsistent properties as a social logic and in terms of its historical presentation throughout very different societies, one arrives at the conclusion that modern families – in the sense of nuclear familiar units composed of heterossexual parents and their children – do not logically form a basic "atom of kinship" in Levi-Strauss' sense. That is, in modern capitalist societies, the logic of affinity is not composed in such a way as to form a world of its own, it has little synthetic power. In fact, the logic of affinity is most consistent within capitalist worlds at the points where it is tasked with "stitching together" dynamics dominated by property and value – at the point of contact between family and the production of independent adult workers, or at the intersection between affinity and the State, where the nation-form is born, etc. Because capitalist structures do not respect the internal logic of kinship – which would allow people to socially map not only those that are part of their families and those who are not, but also those that occupy strangely indeterminate positions in this social fabric – it is up to individuals themselves, as they grow up, to develop ways to supplement to this fractured logic. This is what Lacan called the "individual myth of the neurotic": how, in order to become persons , we must supplement our social existence before other people with an invisible partnership with an "Other", a figure that helps us determine how to distinguish these indeterminate elements of affinity logic and that capitalist sociality does not help to propagate in a consistent and shared way.
Posits the necessity, imposed by capitalism, of an individual myth of the neurotic (Lacan) as a problem that psychoanalysis was created to solve.
Enrollment was small, around twenty, but a number of future intellectual luminaries, like Hannah Arendt and Jacques Lacan, either took the class or sat in on it.
« J’aurais aimé que Lacan publiât ses chiffres : c’est fou ce qu’on se suicidait chez lui ! Pour sa part, il avait horriblement peur de la mort. Une anecdote est restée célèbre : il avait foutu à la porte Diatkine, parce que ce dernier fantasmait sur la mort. Ça aussi, c’est très grave. Si Lacan a tué tout son monde, c’est parce que seul le cheminement de la pensée l’intéressait. Les êtres humains, il s’en foutait. Et la séduction qu’il exerçait sur eux dépouillait ses malades et ses clients de toute capacité d’autodéfense, ou peu s’en faut [37] ».
Lacan et le suicide
Psychotic, hysteric, obsessive, pervert ― which are we?
Funny, easy to read, lay description of Lacan's different personality configurations. From a Malaysian news source, so some of the examples might seem obscure to some.