22 Matching Annotations
  1. Feb 2019
    1. docs not grow a little less concern'd for her Body that she may at­tenc.J her Mind

      Again, Gorgias' "craft" vs. "knack." One need not only direct attention toward surface-level endeavors (cosmetics), but must also pursue those endeavors geared at the pursuit of knowledge (gymnastics).

    2. make us swallow any thing, and lead us where he pleases? such an one seems to have an Intention to reduce us 10 the vilest Slavery, I 2 the Captivation of our u nderstanda ings,

      Echoes of Gorgias's Encomium of Helen again, where rhetoric is force of untold power, to the point where will is overtaken

    3. You know very well 'tii-inlinitcly better lo be good than to .�eem so.�

      I'm immediately drawn the notion of a "craft" vs. "knack" in the "Gorgias." Whereas a craft is genuinely good and involves the pursuit of real knowledge, a knack merely imitates a craft as a surface-level endeavor.

  2. Jan 2019
    1. power

      This claim is articulated pretty strongly in Gorgias's Encomium of Helen. The piece is a kind of thought experiment where Gorgias attempts to defend Helen. He points out that language (or speech) is "a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest works: it can stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nature pity" (sec. 8). Part of his defense, then, is that Helen almost didn't have a choice; the speech was too powerful, god-like even. I found a .pdf copy of it here: http://myweb.fsu.edu/jjm09f/RhetoricSpring2012/Gorgias%20Encomium%20of%20Helen.pdf

    1. power

      This claim is articulated pretty strongly in Gorgias's Encomium of Helen. The piece is a kind of thought experiment where Gorgias attempts to defend Helen. He points out that language (or speech) is "a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest works: it can stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nature pity" (sec. 8). Part of his defense, then, is that Helen almost didn't have a choice; the speech was too powerful, god-like even. I found a .pdf copy of it here: http://myweb.fsu.edu/jjm09f/RhetoricSpring2012/Gorgias%20Encomium%20of%20Helen.pdf

  3. Sep 2018
    1. e. Rhetoric is the counterpart of cookery, Socrates says, for just as cookery provides pleasure for the body with no regard for what truly benefits it, rhetoric gratifies the soul without considering its good. Consequently, rhetoric is ignoble flattery rather than art, both because it aims at the pleasant and also because it cannot give a rational account of its own activity.

      Rhetoric as bad.

  4. Mar 2017
    1. o field of study seemed for-eign to him, and his many books and articles are marked by his continuing enthusi-asm for psychology, linguistics, anthropology, information theory, and philosophy.

      Gor. Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that I can be as short as any one.

      Soc. That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and the longer one at some other time.

      Gor. Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a man use fewer words.

      Soc. Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the making of garments?

      Gor. Yes.

      Soc. And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?

      Gor. It is.

      Soc. By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers.

      Gor. Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.

      Soc. I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?

      Gor. With discourse.

      Soc. What sort of discourse, Gorgias?-such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?

      Gor. No.

      Soc. Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?

      Gor. Certainly not.

      Soc. And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?

      Gor. Yes.

      Soc. And to understand that about which they speak?

      Gor. Of course.

      Soc. But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?

      Gor. Certainly.

      Soc. Then medicine also treats of discourse?

      Gor. Yes.

      Soc. Of discourse concerning diseases?

      Gor. Just so.

      Soc. And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body?

      Gor. Very true.

      Soc. And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:-all of them treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to do.

      Gor. Clearly.

      Soc. Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?

      Gor. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.

      Soc. I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:-you would allow that there are arts?

      Gor. Yes.

      Soc. As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned with doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, and statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and of such arts I suppose you would say that they do not come within the province of rhetoric.

      Gor. You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.

  5. Oct 2013
    1. The metrical form destroys the hearer's trust by its artificial appearance, and at the same time it diverts his attention

      Interesting. This reminds me of a previous comment I had made on Gorgias' style in Econium of Helen. I made mention that his word choice had aroused suspicion. I wonder also if it was 'metrical', lending to its artificial appearance.

    1. Appetite is the cause of all actions that appear pleasant. Habit, whether acquired by mere familiarity or by effort, belongs to the class of pleasant things, for there are many actions not naturally pleasant which men perform with pleasure, once they have become used to them. To sum up then, all actions due to ourselves either are or seem to be either good or pleasant. Moreover, as all actions due to ourselves are done voluntarily and actions not due to ourselves are done involuntarily, it follows that all voluntary actions must either be or seem to be either good or pleasant; for I reckon among goods escape from evils or apparent evils and the exchange of a greater evil for a less (since these things are in a sense positively desirable), and likewise I count among pleasures escape from painful or apparently painful things and the exchange of a greater pain for a less.

      At odds with Socrates (Plato's "Gorgias") again, however Aristotle's view of things sounds much more realistic.

    1. For all advice to do things or not to do them is concerned with happiness and with the things that make for or against it; whatever creates or increases happiness or some part of happiness, we ought to do; whatever destroys or hampers happiness, or gives rise to its opposite, we ought not to do.

      This reminds me of Socrates in Plato's "Gorgias." Except that he advised people to only partake in things that make them happy because they are good or beneficial and not to partake in things good/beneficial because they make the person happy (or something along those lines).

  6. Sep 2013
    1. Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly.

      Coincides with what Gorgias was presumably attempting to say to Socrates.

    1. but undertake to transmit the science of discourse as simply as they would teach the letters of the alphabet, not having taken trouble to examine into the nature of each kind of knowledge, but thinking that because of the extravagance of their promises they themselves will command admiration and the teaching of discourse will be held in higher esteem

      Reminiscent of Gorgias versus Socrates

    1. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter;—let us make an end of it.

      Socrates is willing to accept when he is wrong, he just wants to understand what Gorgias is saying. He thinks Gorgias is inconsistent and wants clarity.

    2. GORGIAS: I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric.

      Socrates asks leading questions. Gorgias shows his skills as a rhetorician and addresses the concerns of his audiencel

    3. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.
    4. Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which he professes and teaches

      Socrates wants ask Gorgias questions about rhetoric.

    5. And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive art, not against everybody,—the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of fence;—because he has powers which are more than a match either for friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends.

      the ethics of rhetoric, sportsmanship, and conduct

    6. Clearly not

      Alright, this is a total slippery slope here, but is Gorgias proclaiming an inability to be unjust now or ever? Quite the bold statement. Not knowing anything about Gorgias, did he have anything to say about objectivity within the personal narrative (sorry that sounds like an egg-head phrase, it's the best I can think of) or did he believe in absolutism? If so, he could be best friends with Ayn Rand.

    7. and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ

      Not to the human brain. If you believe Strawberry Pop-Tarts are better than Blue Berry Pop-Tarts and you know that 1 + 1 = 2 your brain processes the information in the exact same way. This is what can make persuasion difficult: how to you get someone to view an idea they see as true in a different way? This is a little off topic, but still relevant in the way Gorgias explains his views.