129 Matching Annotations
  1. Dec 2016
    1. Here, as before, the notion of competence can stand in the way of productive engagement: instead of aiming for (individual) mastery of these disciplines as traditionally conceived, we might instead aim at collaborating with those in these other fields for the benefit of all rather than attempting to either poach from or instruct and correct those in these other fields.

      Seminar discussion of "competency"

  2. Sep 2016
    1. Photographs are no different. We look at them. They are nothing more than silver halide crystals arranged on paper or with digital photography, nothing more than a concatenation of 1’s and 0’s resident on a hard-drive. Yet we believe they have captured something of our essence – something of the stuff that is in our heads. I, too, look at the two Fenton photographs and try to imagine what Fenton’s intentions might have been. It’s unavoidable. We have been programmed to do so by natural selection – to project ourselves into the world – and to imagine his world as we imagine ours. I try to figure out which photograph was taken first and to develop theories about Fenton’s motivations, but these are just theories, nothing more.


  3. Feb 2015
    1. discipline, built, as Foucault tells us: by groups of objects, methods, their corpus of propositions considered to be true, the interplay of rules and definitions, of techniques and tools: all these constitut[ing] a sort of anonymous system, freely available to whoever wishes, or whoever is able to make use of them, without there being any question of their meaning or their validity being derived from whoever happened to invent them.
  4. Mar 2014
  5. www.tandfonline.com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu www.tandfonline.com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu
    1. material chronotope—a spatio-temporal user orientation produced and stabilized through users' routinized and embodied performances.

      material chronotope

  6. Nov 2013
    1. I have decided not to use up the greater part of my discourse against these by teaching that they are stupid and false

      Good Lord, this guy is arrogant!

    2. Yet at this point Quintilian has proposed that he should give instructions about one certain art and virtue, not about perfection in every art and vir-tue. He thinks rhetoric is one of the liberal arts, not in fact a common art, and yet at the same time he deems rhetoric to be an art, a science, and a virtue.

      Quintilian's definition: too far reaching.

    3. And so, all you dialecticians - that is, whoever can form a judgment about this question with truth and constancy - come here, pay at-tention, sharpen your wits, drive far away from you (in case passions of this kind have been ready to seize your minds), drive far away, I say, love, hate, prejudice, levity, fickleness, and rashness

      Denouncing pathos, embracing logos

    4. I do not make evil use of the testimonies of men who can lie, but I establish my argument by the truth-fulness of unwavering, natural usage, the usage, I repeat, which I have been following for so many years with the greatest effort through daily practice and by experience in the subject.

      He is the authority on this subject because of the duration he has spent studying it.

    5. Yet I add the observation that if they had applied as many months as I have years to judg-ing these precepts accurately and to arranging them in order, I certainly do not doubt that they would have left us arts that are far truer and more distinct.

      A few things going on here: qualifying himself while being charitable to those who made err in their remarks about rhetoric and dialectic.

    6. Such then were the qualities of Aristo-tle, Cicero, and Quintilian, and such was their stature.

      Aristotle: brilliant in many deductions. Cicero: the most eloquent. Quintilian: yeah, he was pretty good, but not nearly as eloquent as Cicero.

    7. we shall rely on the supreme help of unwavering reason in our attempt to establish the true description and practice of the arts

      Implying that his reason is superior to the others (aristotle, cicero, quintilian) who have attempted to define this art. Bold claim.

  7. Oct 2013
    1. Such is undoubtedly the case unless we suppose, perchance, that a regular structure and smooth combination of words is requisite only in poems and songs, and is superfluous in making a speech; or that composition and modulation are not to be varied in speaking, as in music, according to the nature of the subject.

      Interesting use of vocal music as an exercise or means of training an orator. When I consider any number of vocalists, a commonality among them is the ability to speak well (and pleasantly). I'm having a hard time recalling any vocalist with a flat, monotone voice (among other unpleasant speaking qualities).

    2. In oratory, accordingly, the raising, lowering, or other inflection of the voice tends to move the feelings of the bearers. We try to excite the indignation of the judges in one modulation of phrase and voice (that I may again use the same term), and their pity in another, for we see that minds are affected in different ways even by musical instruments, though no words cannot be uttered by them.

      Ok, this is all fascinating stuff. Even when we speak it tends to be in some sort of music scale, or at the very least we don't speak in dissonant tones.

    3. this part of learning, which, after being neglected by orators, has been taken up by the philosophers, was a portion of our business,

      Distinction between philosophers and orators (us and them)

    4. music is united with the knowledge of divine things


    5. "People have been eloquent," some one may say, "without these arts"; but I want a perfect orator. "They contribute little assistance," another may observe, but that to which even little shall be wanting will not be a whole, and it will be agreed that perfection is a whole

      Why should perfection be perceived as something "whole"?

    6. We see an antidote, for example, and other medicines to heal diseases and wounds, compounded of many and sometimes opposite ingredients, from the various qualities of which results that single compound, which resembles none of them, yet takes its peculiar virtues from them all.

      Analogy of what makes a perfect orator.

    7. For when the philosophers would form their wise man, who is to be perfect in every respect, and, as they say, a kind of mortal god, they not only believe that he should be instructed in a general knowledge of divine and human things, but conduct him through a course of questions which are certainly little, if you consider them merely in themselves (as, sometimes, through studied subtleties of argument) not because questions about horns or crocodiles can form a wise man, but because a wise man ought never to be in error even in the least matters.

      Claim on the "ideal" or "wise" man: must be versed in all things.

    8. 2

      This lengthy paragraph discusses recommended study prior to learning rhetoric.

    1. why may we not divide the hours of the day among different kinds of study, especially as variety itself refreshes and recruits the mind, while on the contrary, nothing is more annoying than to continue at one uniform labor? Accordingly writing is relieved by reading, and the tedium of reading itself is relieved by changes of subject.

      Interesting to consider how much of anything we can put our attention on before you become bored. Interest is what keeps our attention and allows us to commit things to memory with greater ease. Hurray for prescription amphetamines!

    2. Do not players on the harp, for example, exert their memory and attend to the sound of their voice and the various inflections of it, while at the same time they strike part of the strings with their right hand and pull, stop, or let loose others with their left, while not even their foot is idle, but beats time to their playing, all these acts being done simultaneously

      Example of our what our busy, flexible minds are capable of.

    3. IT is a common question whether, supposing all these things are to be learned, they can all be taught and acquired at the same time, for some deny that this is possible, as the mind must be confused and wearied by so many studies of different tendency for which neither the understanding, nor the body, nor time itself, can suffice

      Still a concern in education.

    1. Nor is it sufficient to have read the poets only; every class of writers must be studied, not simply for matter, but for words, which often receive their authority from writers. Nor can grammar be complete without a knowledge of music, since the grammarian has to speak of meter and rhythm; nor, if he is ignorant of astronomy, can he understand the poets, who, to say nothing of other matters, so often allude to the rising and setting of the stars in marking the seasons; nor must he be unacquainted with philosophy, both on account of numbers of passages, in almost all poems, drawn from the most abstruse subtleties of physical investigation, and also on account of Empedocles among the Greeks, and Varro and Lucretius among the Latins, who have committed the precepts of philosophy to verse

      Many subjects interwoven into grammar

    1. first, because it is a disgrace and a punishment for slaves, and in reality (as will be evident if you imagine the age changed) an affront; secondly, because, if a boy's disposition be so abject as not to be amended by reproof, he will be hardened, like the worst of slaves, even to stripes; and lastly, because, if one who regularly exacts his tasks be with him, there will not be the least need of any such chastisement.

      products of corporal punishment

    2. Let the boy be given to me whom praise stimulates, whom honor delights, who weeps when he is unsuccessful. His powers must be cultivated under the influence of ambition; reproach will sting him to the quick; honor will incite him; and in such a boy I shall never be apprehensive of indifference.

      Quintiles preferred dispositions in pupils

    3. When a tutor has observed these indications, let him next consider how the mind of his pupil is to be managed. Some boys are indolent unless you stimulate them; some are indignant at being commanded; fear restrains some and unnerves others; continued labor forms some; with others, hasty efforts succeed better

      Recall that Quintiles prefers classroom settings over tutors. It seems to be a daunting or even implausible task to personalize a lesson plan to each students dispositions.

    4. Such a pupil as I would have will easily learn what is taught him and will ask questions about some things, but will still rather follow than run on before. That precocious sort of talent scarcely ever comes to good fruit

      Those who are apt or motivated to discover things (constructivist) on their own stand to be better students (orators?) than those who simply follow and excel in guided instruction.

    1. 19. Besides, when his acquirements are to be displayed in public, he is blinded at the light of the sun and stumbles at every new object, as having learned in solitude that which is to be done in public. 20. I say nothing of friendships formed at school, which remain in full force even to old age, as if cemented with a certain religious obligation, for to have been initiated in the same studies is a not less sacred bond than to have been initiated in the same sacred rites. That sense, too, which is called common sense, where shall a young man learn when he has separated himself from society, which is natural not to men only, but even to dumb animals?

      Has strong feelings against people who are either introverted or prefer to be alone.

    2. since he who compares himself to no one else will necessarily attribute too much to his own powers

      Interesting claim on human psychology. The hermit thinks he's more clever than he actually is. From a weak empirical standpoint, I am inclined to agree with him.

    3. People think that morals are corrupted in schools; indeed they are at times corrupted, but such may be the case even at home. Many proofs of this fact may be adduced; proofs of character having been vitiated, as well as preserved, with the utmost purity under both modes of education. It is the disposition of the individual pupil, and the care taken of him, that make the whole difference

      Here's the thing: there is compelling contemporary psychological evidence that shows that our moral behaviors are, in fact, greatly influenced by our environment. Even those of us who are steadfast in our moral convictions are influenced. So it makes sense to place the even more susceptible youth in suitable environment to at least aid in proper moral development.

    4. I am convinced that no one can be an orator who is not a good man

      Erm, not so fast.

    1. It is incredible how much retardation is caused to reading by haste; for hence arise hesitation, interruption, and repetition, as children attempt more than they can manage; and then, after making mistakes, they become distrustful even of what they know


    2. if he is unwilling to learn, let another be taught before him, of whom he may be envious.

      This aligns with Confucius thinker Xunzi's attitude on properly cultivating morality in others. We are guided by our desires: whatever we feel a sense of lack in, we desire that object. It is the role of those with cultivated morality (gentlemen, sages) to act as an exemplar of moral goods, so that others who have yet to be cultivated desire what they have.

    3. For it will be necessary, above all things, to take care lest the child should conceive a dislike to the application which he cannot yet love, and continue to dread the bitterness which he has once tasted, even beyond the years of infancy

      Wise caution

    4. For certainly, small as may be the proficiency which an earlier age exhibits, the child will yet learn something greater during the very year in which he would have been learning something less.

      Unless (for whatever reason) learning particular things at an early age somehow impedes on learning other things at a later age.

    5. I prefer that a boy should begin with the Greek language, because he will acquire the Latin in general use, even though we tried to prevent him, and because, at the same time, he ought first to be instructed in Greek learning, from which ours is derived

      I know I'm being a bit repetitious (Alex), but a lot of what he suggests for child learning correlates with some contemporary theory.

    6. If, however, it should not be the good fortune of children to have such nurses as I should wish, let them at least have one attentive paedagogus, not unskilled in language, who, if anything is spoken incorrectly by the nurse in the presence of his pupil, may at once correct it and not let it settle in his mind. But let it be understood that what I prescribed at first is the right course, and this only a remedy

      Quintilian places heavy emphasis on the importance of learning at a very young age. I wonder how he would have felt about Baby Einstein...

    7. We are by nature most tenacious of what we have imbibed in our infant years, as the flavor with which you scent vessels when new remains in them, nor can the colors of wool, for which its plain whiteness has been exchanged, be effaced. Those very habits, which are of a more objectionable nature, adhere with the greater tenacity, for good ones are easily changed for the worse, but when will you change bad ones into good? Let the child not be accustomed, therefore, even while he is yet an infant, to phraseology which must be unlearned.

      Claim on early development (and an accurate one, by contemporary standards).

    8. there is no one who has not gained something by study.

      Strong, interesting, and probable.

    9. As birds are born to fly, horses to run, and wild beasts to show fierceness, so to us peculiarly belong activity and sagacity of understanding

      This little diddy here smacks of Aristotle: what distinguishes humans from all other creatures are their cognitive faculties.

    10. On the contrary, you will find the greater number of men both ready in conceiving and quick in learning, since such quickness is natural to man.

      I may be misremembering, but it seems like most of the authors prior to Quintilian had a more reserved attitude when it came to the masses and they're general intellectual aptitudes.

    1. Now strange words simply puzzle us; ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh. When the poet calls "old age a withered stalk," he conveys a new idea, a new fact, to us by means of the general notion of bloom, which is common to both things

      Interesting observation. The impact and usefulness of metaphor vs ordinary and unfamiliar words.

    1. but in a speech we need dignity and the power of taking the hearer out of his ordinary self.

      A right balance in rhythm to gain this effect.

    2. The metrical form destroys the hearer's trust by its artificial appearance, and at the same time it diverts his attention

      Interesting. This reminds me of a previous comment I had made on Gorgias' style in Econium of Helen. I made mention that his word choice had aroused suspicion. I wonder also if it was 'metrical', lending to its artificial appearance.

    1. Diviners use these vague generalities about the matter in hand because their predictions are thus, as a rule, less likely to be falsified. We are more likely to be right, in the game of "odd and even," if we simply guess "even" or "odd" than if we guess at the actual number; and the oracle-monger is more likely to be right if he simply says that a thing will happen than if he says when it will happen, and therefore he refuses to add a definite date

      A premise or argument is meaningless if it is unfalsifiable; ex. It's either going to rain, or it isn't.

    1. The way all these words are compounded makes them, we feel, fit for verse only. This, then, is one form in which bad taste is shown.

      Do we agree with Aristotle here? Are these only fit for poetry or could they be used in rhetoric also?

    1. The right thing in speaking really is that we should be satisfied not to annoy our hearers, without trying to delight them: we ought in fairness to fight our case with no help beyond the bare facts: nothing, therefore, should matter except the proof of those facts

      I like this. While the truth of things is what should be aimed for, we should still seek to address our audience in a pleasing manner. Not annoy, not overly delight, but find a sweet spot somewhere between.

    2. Besides, delivery is -- very properly -- not regarded as an elevated subject of inquiry. [1404a] Still, the whole business of rhetoric being concerned with appearances, we must pay attention to the subject of delivery, unworthy though it is, because we cannot do without it

      Aristotle is one of the first during his time (in philosophy) to give weight to style, he gives it a low ranking compared to other subjects (ex. logic). But he still recognizes it as necessary.

    3. A third would be the proper method of delivery; this is a thing that affects the success of a speech greatly; but hitherto the subject has been neglected. Indeed, it was long before it found a way into the arts of tragic drama and epic recitation: at first poets acted their tragedies themselves. It is plain that delivery has just as much to do with oratory as with poetry

      Comparing speech with poetry: both concerned with delivery (style)

    4. three things -- volume of sound, modulation of pitch, and rhythm

      Three stlyistic elements to be conscious of in speech

    5. various rhythms that suit various subjects

      Interesting. What are some examples of this?

    6. For it is not enough to know what we ought to say; we must also say it as we ought; much help is thus afforded towards producing the right impression of a speech.

      Style is concerned not with what but how (presentation). This aids our rapport with our audience

    7. In making a speech one must study three points: first, the means of producing persuasion; second, the style, or language, to be used; third, the proper arrangement of the various parts of the speech.

      Three areas of study (speech)

    1. Enthymemes, genuine and apparent, have now been described; the next subject is their Refutation.

      (Aristotle's Rhetoric: Book II - Chapter 25) Proper form of rebuttals, counter-arguments, counter-syllogism, etc

    1. Besides genuine syllogisms, there may be syllogisms that look genuine but are not; and since an enthymeme is merely a syllogism of a particular kind, it follows that, besides genuine enthymemes, there may be those that look genuine but are not

      This entire chapter (Aristotle's Rhetoric: Book II - Chapter 24) is centered on logical fallacies.

    2. or we may argue that, because there is much disgrace in there not being a dog about, there is honour in being a dog. Or that Hermes is readier than any other god to go shares, since we never say "shares all round" except of him. Or that speech is a very excellent thing, since good men are not said to be worth money but to be worthy of esteem -- the phrase "worthy of esteem" also having the meaning of "worth speech."
    3. One variety of this is when -- as in dialectic, without having gone through any reasoning process, we make a final statement as if it were the conclusion of such a process

      Circular reasoning

  8. Sep 2013
    1. It is now plain that when you wish to calm others you must draw upon these lines of argument

      The purpose of this chapter was to inform us of "calmnesses" roots and how we can evoke it in others.

    1. Also those who speak ill of us, and show contempt for us, in connexion with the things we ourselves most care about: thus those who are eager to win fame as philosophers get angry with those who show contempt for their philosophy; those who pride themselves upon their appearance get angry with those who show contempt for their appearance and so on in other cases. We feel particularly angry on this account if we suspect that we are in fact, or that people think we are, lacking completely or to any effective extent in the qualities in question.

      Anger (emotion) in relation to image/success in philosophy. People only feels anger if what has been said about them is something they are unsure of (insecure). Anger thus may be a cue for someone's insecurities or uncertainties.

    1. mind about forty-nine.

      Interstingly enough, studies have shown that one's analytic IQ (so long as they engage in intellectually stimulating activity) reaches its peak at 50. Good on ya, Aristotle.

    2. In regard to each emotion we must consider (a) the states of mind in which it is felt; (b) the people towards whom it is felt; (c) the grounds on which it is felt.

      Detailed attention to the psychology of one's audience.

    1. when he has further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what respects it differs from the syllogism of strict logic. The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities.

      rhetoric differs from strict logic. It appeals to the other modes of persuasion as well (ethos, pathos) and is based more in probability than undisputed facts

    2. Persuasion is clearly a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated.

      Rhetoric = persuasion = demonstration

    3. enthymemes, which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion,

      Premises which aren't explicitly stated are the substance of rhetorical persuasion

    4. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art
    5. Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

      Rhetoric (and Dialectic) as both an art and commonplace function of all.

    1. The Epideictic speaker is concerned with virtue and vice, praising the one and censuring the other. The forms of virtue. Which are the greatest virtues? Some rhetoric devices used by the epideictic speaker: "amplification," especially. Amplification is particularly appropriate to epideictic oratory; examples, to political; enthymemes, to forensic.

      Things the "orator" should be concerned with in speaking.

    2. The political speaker will also appeal to the interest of his hearers, and this involves a knowledge of what is good. Definition and analysis of things "good."
    3. In urging his hearers to take or to avoid a course of action, the political orator must show that he has an eye to their happiness.

      Persuasive technique

    4. The persuasive arguments are (a) the example, corresponding to induction in dialectic; (b) the enthymeme, corresponding to the syllogism; (c) the apparent enthymeme, corresponding to the apparent syllogism. The enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction.


    5. it must adapt itself to an audience of untrained thinkers who cannot follow a long train of reasoning.

      Interesting. Rhetoric must be able to act as a means to persuade those who cannot follow complex arguments, implying that the purest form of persuasion is totally based in logic.

    1. while the teachers of philosophy impart all the forms of discourse in which the mind expresses itself. Then, when they have made them familiar and thoroughly conversant with these lessons, they set them at exercises, habituate them to work, and require them to combine in practice the particular things which they have learned, in order that they may grasp them more firmly and bring their theories into closer touch with the occasions for applying them

      How teachers of philosophy train the minds of their students

    2. physical training for the body, of which gymnastics is a part, and, for the mind, philosophy, which I am going to explain. These are twin arts—parallel and complementary—by which their masters prepare the mind to become more intelligent and the body to become more serviceable, not separating sharply the two kinds of education, but using similar methods of instruction, exercise, and other forms of discipline.


    3. I were to agree with my accuser and concede his claim that I am the “cleverest” of men and that I have never had an equal as a writer of the kind of speeches which are offensive to you, it would be much more just to give me credit for being an honest man than to punish me;

      antistrephon: an argument that turns one's opponent's argument or proofs to one's own purpose

    4. for if any man had been wronged by me, even though he might have held his tongue up till now, he would not have neglected the present opportunity, but would have come forward to denounce me or bear witness against me

      First defensive point

    5. while my alleged activities in the law-courts would stir up your anger and hate

      or indignatio (arousing the audiences scorn and indignation)

    6. charging that I corrupt young men

      Similar to Socrates. Funny.

    7. if you will only hear me with good will, I am very confident that those who have been misled as to my pursuits and have been won over by my would-be slanderers will promptly change their views, while those who think of me as I really am will be still more confirmed in their opinion.

      He has artfully built up to this statement.

    8. I who have lived to this advanced age without complaint from anyone could not be in greater jeopardy if I had wronged all the world.

      Reoccuring theme: referencing his age and (up till now) his innocent dealings throughout his life.

    9. while we take our solemn oath at the beginning of each year that we will hear impartially both accusers and accused, we depart so far from this in practice, that when the accuser makes his charges we give ear to whatever he may say; but when the accused endeavors to refute them, we sometimes do not endure even to hear his voice.2

      An observation on human behavior. A cry for the importance of impartialness in the court.

    10. ou should remember this and not trust too hastily the assertions of the accuser nor hear the defendant in uproar and anger.19 Ours is a shameful state of inconsistency; for while it is acknowledged that in our life in general we are the most merciful20 and gentle of all the Hellenes, yet in the conduct of our trials here we manifestly give the lie to this reputation


    11. it smothers truth, and pouring false ideas into our ears, it leaves no man among our citizens secure from an unjust death
    12. I beg you, then, neither to credit nor to discredit what has been said to you until you have heard to the end what I also have to say

      Ethos appeal.

    13. lastly, not to seek to run through the whole of it at the first sitting, but only so much of it as will not fatigue the audience.

      My God! It's just as Casey said!

    14. For this informer, himself delivering a composed speech, has said more in complaint of my compositions than upon all other points

      argumentum ad hominem

    15. But I urge all who intend to acquaint themselves with my speech, first, to make allowance, as they listen to it, for the fact that it is a mixed discourse, composed with an eye to all these subjects; next, to fix their attention even more on what is about to be said than on what has been said before; and, lastly, not to seek to run through the whole of it at the first sitting, but only so much of it as will not fatigue the audience.

      Guidelines for approaching this writing.

    16. It is, at any rate, written with devotion to the truth

      Key point. His aim is Truth with a capital T.

    17. being frank discussions about philosophy and expositions of its power.

      Topic of discussion

    18. nevertheless I have never deigned to defend myself against their attempts to belittle me, because I considered that their foolish babble had no influence whatever and that I had, myself, made it manifest to all that I had elected to speak and write, not on petty disputes, but on subjects so important and so elevated9 that no one would attempt them except those who had studied with me, and their would-be imitators.
  9. caseyboyle.net caseyboyle.net
    1. and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of human character in general

      There isn't a direct connection, but it seems like he's an ethical egoist, i.e. that one ought to be concerned only about herself.

    2. I mean to say, does he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than some one else who knows?

      Dangers of persuasive rhetoric

    3. GORGIAS: I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we should consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do something else.

      Evasive maneuver?

    4. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another.

      Socrates again showing concern with ascertaining truth (love of truth/knowledge). Interested in a dialectic, not a debate concerned with being right.

    5. Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful boxer,—he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the trainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from the city;—surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame

      An interesting argument in defense of rhetoric.

    6. SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion? GORGIAS: True.

      Whammy! Socrates leading Gorgias into a contradiction.

    7. Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the truth

      Philosophy = love of knowledge = rhetoric? (as per Socrates)

    8. SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end.

      Restating Gorigas' definition of rhetoric

    9. GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

      One definition of rhetoric

    10. That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which are the greatest and best of human things?

      Socrates calling Gorgias out on his weak answer.

    11. GORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.

      General, unspecified answer

    12. Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric

      Socrates was known for his mistrust of so-called "experts". He would ask someone a series of questions that would eventually lead them into a contradiction.

    13. By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers
    14. Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the making of garments?

      Socrates making his question as explicit and specific as possible. He may be anticipating some indirect answer.

    15. That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and the longer one at some other time

      Direct speech = athenian spirit?

    16. Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best to make them as short as possible

      I'm wondering if his preferred strategy is generally the opposite: long-winded answers to make the answer more obscure but partially visible.

    17. you praised it as if you were answering some one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.

      Answered his question indirectly, didn't come outright and say it. Rhetorical strategy, sophist in nature?

    1. And let no one suppose that I claim that just living can be taught;(25) for, in a word, I hold that there does not exist an art of the kind which can implant sobriety and justice in depraved natures

      Again, Isocrates held that somethings cannot be taught.

    2. Now as for the sophists who have lately sprung up and have very recently embraced these pretensions,(20) even though they flourish at the moment, they will all, I am sure, come round to this position

      Ignorance will always be displaced (eventually) by truth).

    3. he must in himself set such an example of oratorythat the students who have taken form under his instruction and are able to pattern after him will, from the outset, show in their speaking a degree of grace and charm which is not found in others.

      Very interesting. This correlates with the Confucian thinker Xunzi's thought on how knowledge regarding "The Way" (truth) cannot be taught, but must be exemplified by a "sage" or "gentleman" (those who grasp the Way). Another interesting discussion point: does all kinds of knowledge have the potential to be understood through language, or are there somethings that cannot?

    4. for this, the student must not only have the requisite aptitude but he must learn the different kinds of discourse and practice himself in their use

      Claim that good rhetoricians must not only have instruction and practice, but must also have the aptitude for it. This makes for an interesting discussion point: can most people excel at discourse (if one studied hard enough) or must one have a natural ability for it?

    5. However, if it is my duty not only to rebuke others, but also to set forth my own views

      Positive/negative view. Good strategy in philosophizing/arguing/rhetoric/whatever-we-are-calling-it

    6. For, excepting these teachers, who does not know that the art of using letters remains fixed and unchanged, so that we continually and invariably use the same letters for the same purposes, while exactly the reverse is true of the art of discourse?

      Rhetoric as an art form: fluid and creative; it is not analogous to something as rigid as learning the alphabet.

    7. oblivious of the fact that the arts are made great, not by those who are without scruple in boasting about them, but by those who are able to discover all of the resources which each art affords.

      Another argument for "true" knowledge (referred to as 'art' here). There is a recurring theme here about in order for someone to graduate from memorizing information to true knowledge, one must think critically about their subject at hand (admittedly, I may be reading too much into this)

    8. More than that, they do not attribute any of this power either to the practical experience or to the native ability of the student, but undertake to transmit the science of discourse as simply as they would teach the letters of the alphabet,

      Arguing for a deeper understanding of a subject, rather than merely memorizing it.

    9. most ridiculous of all is that they distrust those from whom they are to get this money--they distrust, that is to say, the very men to whom they are about to deliver the science of just dealing--and they require that the fees advanced by their students be entrusted for safe keeping

      More (supposed) hypocrisy. Practice what you preach. Does Isocrates statement have merit? If my aim were to teach you how to deal justly (to be trustworthy), does it necessarily follow that I should trust you? I don't think so. If it is that I am to teach you to be just, it may very well be that you aren't just yet.

    10. although they say that they do not want money and speak contemptuously of wealth as filthy lucre, they hold their hands out for a trifling gain and promise to make their disciples all but immortal!

      Claim of hypocrisy against sophists

    1. And if persuasive discourse deceived her soul, it is not on that account difficult to defend her and absolve her of responsibility, thus: discourse is a great potentate

      There seems to be a pattern in his argument; the orator begins to defend Helena against more or less uncontroversial claims and transitions into more disputable ones.

    2. Accordingly the barbarian assailant deserves to meet with barbarous assault, by speech and custom and deed--deserves to be blamed in speech, dishonored by custom, and penalized indeed. She who was forced and bereft of fatherland and orphaned of friends--how is she not to be pitied rather than reviled? For he did terrible things; she was the victim; it is accordingly fair to pity her and hate him.

      Vilifying an imaginary perpetrator and portraying her as (a "possible") victim . Seems to be intending to stir up some pathos and appeal to ethos.

    3. Now in the first case, the responsible party deserves the responsibility. For the will of a god cannot be hindered by human forethought. For it is not natural for the superior to be hindered by the inferior, but for the inferior to be ruled and led by the superior--for the superior to lead and the inferior to follow. And a god is superior to a human being in force, intelligence, etcetera. Accordingly, if one must attribute responsibility to Fortune and the god, one must acquit Helen of infamy.

      Appeal to logos

    4. Having now finished the first section, I shall advance to the beginning of the next section, and I shall set out the causes through which Helen's journey to Troy was likely to come about.

      Interesting the orator (I assume this is a speech) flags the division of sections so directly.

    5. The order proper to a city is being well-manned; to a body, beauty; to a soul, wisdom; to a deed, excellence; and to a discourse, truth--and the opposites of these are disorder. And the praiseworthy man and woman and discourse and work and city-state and deed one must honor with praise, while one must assign blame to the unworthy--for it is equal error and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy and to praise the blameworthy.

      Appeal to ethos

    1. Some of the popular orators say that offices should be assigned by lot

      Question of clarification: to "be assigned by lot" is a kind of pulling-names-out-of-a-hat method of assigning? I'm fairly certain this is what is meant, I just wanted some outside confirmation.

    2. Therefore things both are and are not.

      This comment would make Aristotle roll over in his grave! For Aristotle, the firmest axiom of metaphysics (of everything, really) in the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC).

    3. But there is another argument which says that the good is one thing and the bad another, and that as the name differs, so does the thing named

      Beginning of second argument: the problem of differentiation with respects to good an bad.

    4. but others say that they are the same, and a thing might be good for some persons but bad for others, or at one time good and at another time bad for the same person. (2) I myself side with those who hold the latter opinion

      outline of the first of two arguments in this section: good and bad are relative terms; something good for one may be bad for another.

    5. But to this too an opposite argument is put forward: that the just and the unjust are different things, and that as the name differs, so does the thing named

      2nd opposing argument

    6. And some say that the just is one thing and the unjust another, and others that the just and the unjust are the same. And I shall try to support this latter view

      1st of two arguments in sec. III: just and unjust are relative, interchangeable terms.

    7. (And)

      This entire section arguing for the relativism of good and bad (and most of the entire article) reminds me of sophist philosophies.

    8. To sum up, everything done at the right time is seemly and everything done at the wrong time is disgraceful. What have I then worked out?

      Conclusion: seemliness or disgracefulness is dependent on temporal circumstance. This could also be said about labeling something as good or bad, but perhaps a bit looser.