175 Matching Annotations
  1. Nov 2013
    1. He is then just as irrational in sorrow as he is in happiness: he cries aloud and will not be consoled. How differently the stoical man who learns from experience and governs himself by concepts is affected by the same misfortunes! This man, who at other times seeks nothing but sincerity, truth, freedom from deception, and protection against ensnaring surprise attacks, now executes a masterpiece of deception: he executes his masterpiece of deception in misfortune, as the other type of man executes his in times of happiness.

      a man can control his happiness or sorrow by deceiving himself in different ways

    2. There exists no word for these intuitions; when man sees them he grows dumb, or else he speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard-of combinations of concepts.
    3. it will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts.

      intuition vs. concepts

    4. The intellect has now thrown the token of bondage from itself. At other times it endeavors, with gloomy officiousness, to show the way and to demonstrate the tools to a poor individual who covets existence; it is like a servant who goes in search of booty and prey for his master. But now it has become the master and it dares to wipe from its face the expression of indigence.

      This drive controls us.

    5. it is we who impress ourselves in this way. In conjunction with this, it of course follows that the artistic process of metaphor formation with which every sensation begins in us already presupposes these forms and thus occurs within them. The only way in which the possibility of subsequently constructing a new conceptual edifice from metaphors themselves can be explained is by the firm persistence of these original forms That is to say, this conceptual edifice is an imitation of temporal, spatial, and numerical relationships in the domain of metaphor.

      Because a belief exists within us it is already present in a sensation when we feel it.

      Hmmmm...the beliefs we build is a copy of the metaphorical realm of the world, space and numbers.

    6. spider

      more spider webs

    7. We don't understand the laws of nature but only how we can relate to them

    8. Bees construct a physical world and man constructs a conceptual world.

    9. In the same way that the sound appears as a sand figure, so the mysterious X of the thing in itself first appears as a nerve stimulus, then as an image, and finally as a sound. Thus the genesis of language does not proceed logically in any case, and all the material within and with which the man of truth, the scientist, and the philosopher later work and build, if not derived from never-never land, is a least not derived from the essence of things.

      I'm not sure exactly what he is trying to say here. Is he saying that while language is not pulled from out of know where, words and language are built upon connections to other words instead of the intrinsic nature of a thing?

    10. A concept becomes a word based on its relationship to other cases.

    11. as if "hard" were something otherwise familiar to us, and not merely a totally subjective stimulation!

      Truth is subjective

    12. It is only by means of forgetfulness that man can ever reach the point of fancying himself to possess a "truth" of the grade just indicated. If he will not be satisfied with truth in the form of tautology, that is to say, if he will not be content with empty husks, then he will always exchange truths for illusions. What is a word? It is the copy in sound of a nerve stimulus.

      Truth is an illusion, an imitation of a previously known idea.

    13. And besides, what about these linguistic conventions themselves? Are they perhaps products of knowledge, that is, of the sense of truth? Are designations congruent with things? I

      I wanted to highlight "Is language the adequate expression of all realities?"

      Without language, what exists?

      If deception is only deception because of a negative result, is deception without a negative result still deception?

    14. What men avoid by excluding the liar is not so much being defrauded as it is being harmed by means of fraud. Thus, even at this stage, what they hate is basically not deception itself, but rather the unpleasant, hated consequences of certain sorts of deception.

      Men don't dislike the act of deception, but rather the consequences of deception.

    15. His moral sentiment does not even make an attempt to prevent this, whereas there are supposed to be men who have stopped snoring through sheer will power.

      A man's morals do not prevent him from the illusion and deceptions of the world, is it possible that will power alone will wake his desire for truth.

    16. They are deeply immersed in illusions and in dream images; their eyes merely glide over the surface of things and see "forms."

      This reminds me of Plato, and illusion of what is real but not the real knowledge.

    17. The pride connected with knowing and sensing lies like a blinding fog over the eyes and senses of men, thus deceiving them concerning the value of existence. For this pride contains within itself the most flattering estimation of the value of knowing. Deception is the most general effect of such pride, but even its most particular effects contain within themselves something of the same deceitful character.

      Is ignorance better than knowledge?

    18. And just as every porter wants to have an admirer, so even the proudest of men, the philosopher, supposes that he sees on all sides the eyes of the universe telescopically focused upon his action and thought.

      Wow! He has a thing against the philosopher.

    1. Next, Quintilian's greater weakness concerns effects. For he put these forward in the topics of persons, yet here once again he repeats them as if they were now different.
    2. "If signs are infallible," he says, "they are not arguments, because where they exist there is no room for question; even if they are doubtful, they are not arguments because they themselves need the support of arguments."

      Signs vs. arguments

    3. Thus Quin-tilian here concludes nothing, solves nothing, but confuses himself.

      I hate it when that happens!

    4. Here Quintilian says that the dialecti-cians lay claim to invention and judgment (which contains a large part of arrangement in the con-clusions of each argument and in syllogisms). And finally in the second chapter of the eleventh book he says that if memory belongs to any art, then it belongs completely to arrangement and order. Therefore he should say that the dialecticians could rightly claim this part also, because in dialectic that has been rightly described, one should teach the truest theory of order and ar-rangement according to the precepts of the syl-logism and method.
    5. What then, 0 Quintilian? is he who knows what is honest and just, himself honest and just?

      Knowledge verses action

    6. seperating the art of rhetoric from the individual.

    7. I propose to under-take against Quintilian, for I shall undertake to teach that his instructions on oratory were not correctly ordered, organized, described - es-pecially so since he seems to define an orator brilliantly at the start, then to divide elegantly the parts of the subjects covered by the definition and finally to delineate the property and nature of each part with extreme care and accuracy.
    8. Cicero seems to have spoken in an age of gold, Quin-tilian in an age of iron. But nevertheless, com-pared to the eloquent men of that time, he was without doubt counted among the eloquent.

      Cicero mastered eloquence but Quintilian was also eloquent.

    9. each man should practice the art which he knows.
  2. Oct 2013
    1. There are, indeed, some men who have a good delivery, but cannot compose anything to deliver. Now, if such men take what has been written with wisdom and eloquence by others, and commit it to memory, and deliver it to the people, they cannot be blamed, supposing them to do it without deception

      Composers vs. orators

    2. And assuredly it is preferable, even though what is said should be less intelligible, less pleasing, and less persuasive, that truth be spoken, and that what is just, not what is iniquitous, be listened to with pleasure.
    3. Accordingly a great orator has truly said that "an eloquent man must speak so as to teach, to delight, and to persuade." Then he adds: "To teach is a necessity, to delight is a beauty, to persuade is a triumph."(2) Now of these three, the one first mentioned, the teaching, which is a matter of necessity, depends on what we say; the other two on the way we say it.

      What is said vs. how it is said

    4. 24. Now a strong desire for clearness sometimes leads to neglect of the more polished forms of speech, and indifference about what sounds well, compared with what dearly expresses and conveys the meaning intended.

      Meaning is more important than presentation

    5. These three clauses are best pronounced when the voice is suspended on the first two members of the period, and comes to a pause on the third.
    6. So that it is at the discretion of the speaker whether he finish each clause separately and make six altogether, or whether he suspend his voice at the first, the third, and the fifth, and by joining the second to the first, the fourth to the third, and the sixth to the fifth, make three most elegant periods of two members each: one describing the imminent catastrophe; another, the lascivious couch; and the third, the luxurious table.
    7. These six clauses form three periods of two members each.
    8. see, then, that I must say something about the eloquence of the prophets also, where many things are concealed under a metaphorical style, which the more completely they seem buried under figures of speech, give the greater pleasure when brought to light. In this place, however, it is my duty to select a passage of such a kind that I shall not be compelled to explain the matter, but only to commend the style.
    9. the educated man observes that those sections which the Greeks call kommata, and the clauses and periods of which I spoke a short time ago,

      Is he referring to syntax?

    10. And in those passages where the learned do note its presence, the matters spoken of are such, that the words in which they are put seem not so much to be sought out by the speaker as spontaneously to suggest themselves; as if wisdom were walking out of its house,--that is, the breast of the wise man, and eloquence, like an inseparable attendant, followed it without being called for. (2)
    11. nothing can be called eloquence if it be not suitable to the person of the speaker,
    12. ut what is better than wholesome sweetness or sweet wholesomeness? For the sweeter we try to make such things, the easier it is to make their wholesomeness serviceable. And so there are writers of the Church who have expounded the Holy Scriptures, not only with wisdom, but with eloquence as well; and there is not more time for the reading of these than is sufficient for those who are studious and at leisure to exhaust them.

      rhetoric can be educational and enjoyable

    13. both to teach what is right and to refute what is wrong, and in the performance of this task to conciliate the hostile, to rouse the careless, and to tell the ignorant both what is occurring at present and what is probable in the future. But once that his hearers are friendly, attentive, and ready to learn, whether he has found them so, or has himself made them so the remaining objects are to be carried out in whatever way the case requires. If the hearers need teaching, the matter treated of must be made fully known by means of narrative. On the other hand, to clear up points that are doubtful requires reasoning and the exhibition of proof. If, however, the hearers require to be roused rather than instructed, in order that they may be diligent to do what they already know, and to bring their feelings into harmony with the truths they admit, greater vigor of speech is needed. Here entreaties and reproaches, exhortations and upbraidings, and all the other means of rousing the emotions, are necessary.

      The orator must be able to read the audience and adjust rhetoric accordingly

    14. For without knowing the names of any of the faults, they will, from being accustomed to correct speech, lay hold upon whatever is faulty in the speech of any one they listen to, and avoid it; just as city-bred men, even when illiterate, seize upon the faults of rustics.

      hear no evil see no evil

    15. But only by those who can learn them any one who cannot learn this art quickly can never thoroughly learn it

      Natural talent?


      How will this compare to Quintilian?

    17. What is the difference between searching out the proper meaning and the known meaning?

    1. BUT these precepts of oratory, though necessary to know, are yet insufficient to produce the full power of eloquence unless they are united with a certain efficient readiness that among the Greeks is called hexis, " habit." I know it is an ordinary subject of inquiry whether more is contributed by writing, reading, or speaking. T
    1. But this material of oratory, as we define it, that is, the subjects that come before it, some have at one time stigmatized as indefinite, at another as not belonging to oratory, and have called it, as thus characterized, an ars circumcurrens, an infinitely discursive art, as discoursing on any kind of subject.
    1. But the other sort of speakers call that force which ought rather to be called violence.

      lack of eloquence, art

    2. But there are some things concerning this point that very naturally deceive the unskilful; for division, though it is of great consequence in pleadings, diminishes the appearance of strength; what is rough is imagined more bulky than what is polished; and objects when scattered are thought more numerous than when they are ranged in order.
    1. To beginners should be given matter designed, as it were, beforehand in proportion to the abilities of each. But when they shall appear to have formed themselves sufficiently on their model, a few brief directions may be given them, following which, they may advance by their own strength without any support. 6. It is proper that they should sometimes be left to themselves, lest, from the bad habit of being always led by the efforts of others, they should lose all capacity of attempting and producing anything for themselves. But when they seem to judge pretty accurately of what ought to be said, the labor of the teacher is almost at an end, though should they still commit errors, they must be again put under a guide. 7.

      Autonomy in learning and expression

    1. On such subjects did the ancients, for the most part, exercise the faculty of eloquence, borrowing their mode of argument, however, from the logicians. To speak on fictitious cases, in imitation of pleadings in the forum or in public councils, is generally allowed to have become a practice among the Greeks, about the time of Demetrius Phalereus.
    1. That mere boys should sit mixed with young men, I do not approve; for though such a man as ought to preside over their studies and conduct may keep even the eldest of his pupils under control, yet the more tender ought to be separate from the more mature, and they should all be kept free, not merely from the guilt of licentiousness, but even from the suspicion of it
    2. Of these professors the morals must first be ascertained, a point of which I proceed to treat in this part of my work, not because I do not think that the same examination is to be made, and with the utmost care, in regard also to other teachers (as indeed I have shown in the preceding book), but because the very age of the pupils makes attention to the matter still more necessary. 3. For boys are consigned to these professors when almost grown up and continue their studies under them even after they are become men. Greater care must in consequence be adopted with regard to them in order that the purity of the master may secure their more tender years from corruption and that his authority deter their bolder age from licentiousness. 4. Nor is it enough that he give, in himself, an example of the strictest morality, unless he regulate also, by severity of discipline, the conduct of those who come to receive his instructions.
    1. We make it also a subject of inquiry when a boy may be considered ripe for learning what rhetoric teaches. In which inquiry it is not to be considered of what age a boy is, but what progress he has already made in his studies. That I may not make a long discussion, I think that the question when a boy ought to be sent to the teacher of rhetoric is best decided by the answer, when he shall be qualified.

      Age is less important than ability.

    1. For minds, before they are hardened are more ready to learn, as is proved by the fact that children, within two years after they can fairly pronounce words, speak almost the whole language, though no one incites them to learn; but for how many years does the Latin tongue resist the efforts of our purchased slaves! You may well understand, if you attempt to teach a grown up person to read, that those who do everything in their own art with excellence are not without reason called παιδομαθεῖς (paidomatheis), that is, "instructed from boyhood." 10. The temper of boys is better able to bear labor than that of men, for as neither the falls of children, with which they are so often thrown on the ground, nor their crawling on hands and knees, nor, soon after, constant play and running all day hither and thither, inconvenience their bodies so much as those of adults, because they are of little weight and no burden to themselves, so their minds likewise, I conceive, suffer less from fatigue, because they exert themselves with less effort and do not apply to study by putting any force upon themselves, but merely yield themselves to others to be formed. 11. Moreover, in addition to the other pliancy of that age, they follow their teachers, as it were, with greater confidence and do not set themselves to measure what they have already done. Consideration about labor is as yet unknown to them, and as we ourselves have frequently experienced, toil has less effect upon the powers than thought.

      Interesting thought, pliancy of youth

    1. The teacher will he cautious, likewise, that concluding syllables be not lost; that his pupil's speech be all of a similar character; that whenever he has to raise his voice, the effort may be that of his lungs, and not of his head; and that his gesture may be suited to his voice, and his looks to his gesture. 9

      Speech therapy?

    2. SOME TIME is also to be devoted to the actor, but only so far as the future orator requires the art of delivery, for I do not wish the boy whom I educate for this pursuit either to be broken to the shrillness of a woman's voice or to repeat the tremulous tones of an old man's. 2. Neither let him imitate the vices of the drunkard nor adapt himself to the baseness of the slave; nor let him learn to display the feelings of love, or avarice, or fear: acquirements which are not at all necessary to the orator and which corrupt the mind, especially while it is yet tender and uninformed in early youth, for frequent imitation settles into habit.

      Is a parent supposed to limit a child's exposure to the world?

    1. For, not to mention how the ignorant commonly speak, we know that whole theaters and all the crowd of the circus have frequently uttered barbarous exclamations. Custom in speaking, therefore, I shall call the agreement of the educated, as I call custom in living the agreement of the good.

      accents, vernacular

    2. BY speakers, as well as writers, there are certain rules to be observed. Language is based on reason, antiquity, authority, custom. It is analogy, and sometimes etymology, that affords the chief support to reason. A certain majesty, and, if I may so express myself, religion, graces the antique.
    1. Let boys in the first place learn to decline nouns and conjugate verbs, for otherwise they will never arrive at the understanding of what is to follow. This admonition would be superfluous to give were it not that most teachers, through ostentatious haste, begin where they ought to end, and, while they wish to show off their pupils in matters of greater display, retard their progress by attempting to shorten the road.
    1. At present, the negligence of paedagogi seems to be made amends for in such a way that boys are not obliged to do what is right, but are punished whenever they have not done it. Besides, after you have coerced a boy with stripes, how will you treat him when he becomes a young man, to whom such terror cannot be held out, and by whom more difficult studies must be pursued? 16. Add to these considerations that many things unpleasant to be mentioned, and likely afterwards to cause shame, often happen to boys while being whipped, under the influence of pain or fear. Such shame enervates and depresses the mind, and makes them shun people's sight and feel a constant uneasiness. 17. If, moreover, there has been too little care in choosing governors and tutors of reputable character, I am ashamed to say how scandalously unworthy men may abuse their privilege of punishing, and what opportunity also the terror of the unhappy children may sometimes accord to others. I will not dwell upon this point; what is already understood is more than enough. It will be sufficient, therefore, to intimate that no man should be allowed too much authority over an age so weak and so unable to resist ill treatment.
    1. Would not he seem to be affected with something like madness? There would be no eloquence in the world if we were to speak only with one person at a time.
    2. But supposing that either interest, or friendship, or money, should secure to any parent a domestic tutor of the highest learning, and in every respect unrivalled, will he, however, spend the whole day on one pupil? Or can the application of any pupil be so constant as not to be sometimes wearied, like the sight of the eyes, by continued direction to one object, especially as study requires the far greater portion of time to be solitary.

      No freedom in learning.

    3. People think that morals are corrupted in schools; indeed they are at times corrupted, but such may be the case even at home.

      Morals: home vs school

    1. his may seem a trifling matter to mention, but when it is neglected, many faults of pronunciation, unless they are removed in the years of youth, are fixed by incorrigible ill habit for the rest of life.
    2. I do not disapprove, however, the practice, which is well known, of giving children, for the sake of stimulating them to learn, ivory figures of letters to play with, or whatever else can be invented, in which that infantine age may take delight, and which may be pleasing to handle, look at, or name.

      Learning through play

    3. This advancement, extended through each year, is a profit on the whole, and whatever is gained in infancy is an acquisition to youth. The same rule should be prescribed as to the following years, so that what every boy has to learn, he may not be too late in beginning to learn. Let us not then lose even the earliest period of life, and so much the less, as the elements of learning depend on the memory alone, which not only exists in children, but is at that time of life even most tenacious.

      This is still debated today. Many preschools have differing pedagogies and beliefs on what a child is capable of learning at what age.

    4. Nor let those parents, who have not had the fortune to get learning themselves, bestow the less care on the instruction of their children, but let them, on this very account, be more solicitous as to other particulars.

      Do not let the parents limitations pass on to their children.

    5. et him who is convinced of this truth, bestow, as soon as he becomes a parent, the most vigilant possible care on cherishing the hopes of a future orator.

      Teaching must begin at birth.

    6. ut dull and unteachable persons are no more produced in the course of nature than are persons marked by monstrosity and deformities, such are certainly but few. It will be a proof of this assertion that among boys, good promise is shown in the far greater number; and if it passes off in the progress of time, it is manifest that it was not natural ability, but care, that was wanting.

      nature vs. nuture?

    1. If any statement you make is hard to believe, you must guarantee its truth, and at once offer an explanation, and then furnish it with such particulars as will be expected.
    2. Again, you must make use of the emotions.
    3. The narration should depict character;
    4. Slip in anything else that the judges will enjoy

      I like this line, entertain your audience.

    5. We are not to make long narrations, just as we are not to make long introductions or long arguments. Here, again, rightness does not consist either in rapidity or in conciseness, but in the happy mean; that is, in saying just so much as will make the facts plain, [1417a] or will lead the hearer to believe that the thing has happened, or that the man has caused injury or wrong to some one, or that the facts are really as important as you wish them to be thought: or the opposite facts to establish the opposite arguments.

      Narratives need to be long enough to say what you need to but not too long.

    1. It follows, then, that the only necessary parts of a speech are the Statement and the Argument. These are the essential features of a speech; and it cannot in any case have more than Introduction, Statement, Argument, and Epilogue.

      Parts of speech

    1. and therefore people think that, if his name is mentioned many times, many things have been said about him. So that Homer, by means of this illusion, has made a great deal of though he has mentioned him only in this one passage, and has preserved his memory, though he nowhere says a word about him afterwards.
    2. Compared with those of others, the speeches of professional writers sound thin in actual contests. Those of the orators, on the other hand, are good to hear spoken, but look amateurish enough when they pass into the hands of a reader. This is just because they are so well suited for an actual tussle, and therefore contain many dramatic touches, which, being robbed of all dramatic rendering, fail to do their own proper work, and consequently look silly. Thus strings of unconnected words, and constant repetitions of words and phrases, are very properly condemned in written speeches: but not in spoken speeches -- speakers use them freely, for they have a dramatic effect. In this repetition there must be variety of tone, paving the way, as it were, to dramatic effect;

      Spoken vs written word. They have different applications. Repetition is condemned in written speeches but not in oral.

    1. "It is fitting that Greece should cut off her hair beside the tomb of those who fell at Salamis, since her freedom and their valour are buried in the same grave." Even if the speaker here had only said that it was right to weep when valour was being buried in their grave, it would have been a metaphor, and a graphic one; [1411b] but the coupling of "their valour" and "her freedom" presents a kind of antithesis as well.
    2. It is also good to use metaphorical words; but the metaphors must not be far-fetched, or they will be difficult to grasp, nor obvious, or they will have no effect. The words, too, ought to set the scene before our eyes; for events ought to be seen in progress rather than in prospect. So we must aim at these three points: Antithesis, Metaphor, and Actuality.

      Effective metaphors are easy to understand.

    1. We have now seen that our language must be rhythmical and not destitute of rhythm, and what rhythms, in what particular shape, make it so.

      balanced rhythm

    1. To express emotion, you will employ the language of anger in speaking of outrage; the language of disgust and discreet reluctance to utter a word when speaking of impiety or foulness; the language of exultation for a tale

      Tone of language must match emotions of piece

    1. The foundation of good style is correctness of language, which falls under five heads. (1) First, the proper use of connecting words, and the arrangement of them in the natural sequence which some of them require. For instance, the connective "men" (e.g. ego men) requires the correlative "de" (e.g. o de). The answering word must be brought in before the first has been forgotten, and not be widely separated from it; nor, except in the few cases where this is appropriate, is another connective to be introduced before the one required. Consider the sentence, "But as soon as he told me (for Cleon had come begging and praying), took them along and set out." In this sentence many connecting words are inserted in front of the one required to complete the sense; and if there is a long interval before "set out," the result is obscurity. One merit, then, of good style lies in the right use of connecting words. (2) The second lies in calling things by their own special names and not by vague general ones. (3) The third is to avoid ambiguities; unless, indeed, you definitely desire to be ambiguous, as those do who have nothing to say but are pretending to mean something.

      Use of language in good style.

    1. Good riddles do, in general, provide us with satisfactory metaphors: for metaphors imply riddles, and therefore a good riddle can furnish a good metaphor. Further, the materials of metaphors must be beautiful; and the beauty, like the ugliness, of all words may, as Licymnius says, lie in their sound or in their meaning. Further, there is a third consideration -- one that upsets the fallacious argument of the sophist Bryson, that there is no such thing as foul language, because in whatever words you put a given thing your meaning is the same.

      Types of metaphors

    2. Prose-writers must, however, pay specially careful attention to metaphor, because their other resources are scantier than those of poets. Metaphor, moreover, gives style clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can: and it is not a thing whose use can be taught by one man to another. Metaphors, like epithets, must be fitting, which means that they must fairly correspond to the thing signified: failing this, their inappropriateness will be conspicuous: the want of harmony between two things is emphasized by their being placed side by side

      Metaphors are a powerful tool in prose, they connect ideas for the reader.

    3. Words of ambiguous meaning are chiefly useful to enable the sophist to mislead his hearers.

      Interesting connection, sophist use ambiguous language for false persuasion.

    4. People do not feel towards strangers as they do towards their own countrymen, and the same thing is true of their feeling for language. It is therefore well to give to everyday speech an unfamiliar air: people like what strikes them, and are struck by what is out of the way.

      Style. Use language people recognize and understand.

    1. Even now most uneducated people think that poetical language makes the finest discourses. That is not true: the language of prose is distinct from that of poetry. This is shown by the state of things to-day, when even the language of tragedy has altered its character.

      Poetry does not equal intelligence. Distinct difference between poetry and prose.

    1. The duty of the Arguments is to attempt conclusive proofs.


    2. Three chief features of these clever, pointed sayings are: (1) antithesis, (2) metaphor, and (3) actuality or vividness (i.e. the power of "setting the scene before our eyes").
    3. The simile is a full-blown metaphor. Similes are useful in prose as well as in verse; but they must not be used often, since they are of the nature of poetry.

      Simile=poetic devise

    4. Rare, compound, and invented words must be used sparingly in prose; in which, over and above the regular and proper terms for things, metaphorical terms only can be used with advantage, and even these need care.

      Use common terminology

    5. Upon the subject of delivery (which presents itself here) no systematic treatise has been composed, though this art has much to do with oratory (as with poetry).

      Style; differentiating prose from poetry

    1. Equity must be applied to forgivable actions; and it must make us distinguish between criminal acts on the one hand, and errors of judgement, or misfortunes, on the other. (A "misfortune" is an act, not due to moral badness, that has unexpected results: an "error of judgement" is an act, also not due to moral badness, that has results that might have been expected: a "criminal act" has results that might have been expected, but is due to moral badness, for that is the source of all actions inspired by our appetites.) Equity bids us be merciful to the weakness of human nature; to think less about the laws than about the man who framed them, and less about what he said than about what he meant; not to consider the actions of the accused so much as his intentions, nor this or that detail so much as the whole story; to ask not what a man is now but what he has always or usually been.

      human nature, laws

    1. The things that happen by chance are all those whose cause cannot be determined, that have no purpose, and that happen neither always nor usually nor in any fixed way.
    2. Not all voluntary acts are deliberate, but all deliberate acts are conscious -- no one is ignorant of what he deliberately intends.)
    1. The end of democracy is freedom; of oligarchy, wealth; of aristocracy, the maintenance of education and national institutions; of tyranny, the protection of the tyrant. I

      Practice of government equals end results.

    2. Monarchy, as the word implies, is the constitution in which one man has authority over all.
    3. The forms of government are four -- democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy. The supreme right to judge and decide always rests, therefore, with either a part or the whole of one or other of these governing powers.

      Four forms of government. Judgement lies with government.

    1. What a man wants to be is better than what a man wants to seem, for in aiming at that he is aiming more at reality. Hence men say that justice is of small value, since it is more desirable to seem just than to be just, whereas with health it is not so. That is better than other things which is more useful than they are for a number of different purposes; for example, that which promotes life, good life, pleasure, and noble conduct. For this reason wealth and health are commonly thought to be of the highest value, as possessing all these advantages.

      I think that we still seek health and wealth above all else.

    2. When a man accomplishes something beyond his natural power, or beyond his years, or beyond the measure of people like him, or in a special way, or at a special place or time, his deed will have a high degree of nobleness, goodness, and justice, or of their opposites.
    3. Thus, keenness of sight is more desirable than keenness of smell, sight generally being more desirable than smell generally; [1364b] and similarly, unusually great love of friends being more honourable than unusually great love of money, ordinary love of friends is more honourable than ordinary love of money.

      I can understand this, friends are better than money.

    4. Again, where there are two sets of consequences arising from two different beginnings or causes, the consequences of the more important beginning or cause are themselves the more important; and conversely, that beginning or cause is itself the more important which has the more important consequences.


    5. A thing may be accompanied by another in three ways, either simultaneously, subsequently, or potentially.
    6. For the superiority of class over class is proportionate to the superiority possessed by their largest specimens.
  3. Sep 2013
    1. Again, that is good which has been distinguished by the favour of a discerning or virtuous man or woman, as Odysseus was distinguished by Athena, Helen by Theseus, Paris by the goddesses, and Achilles by Homer. And, generally speaking, all things are good which men deliberately choose to do; this will include the things already mentioned, and also whatever may be bad for their enemies or good for their friends, and at the same time practicable. Things are "practicable" in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2) it is easy to do them.

      Good is virtuous, deliberate, practicable.

    2. We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good; or as that whose presence brings anything into a satisfactory and self-sufficing condition; or as self-sufficiency; or as what produces, maintains, or entails characteristics of this kind, while preventing and destroying their opposites.
    1. "Good luck" means the acquisition or possession of all or most, or the most important, of those good things which are due to luck.
    2. The excellence of the body is health; that is, a condition which allows us, while keeping free from disease, to have the use of our bodies; for many people are "healthy" as we are told Herodicus was; and these no one can congratulate on their "health," for they have to abstain from everything or nearly everything that men do.-- Beauty varies with the time of life.

      Interesting, there is no mention of women in this definition of beauty.

    3. Doing good refers either to the preservation of life and the means of life, or to wealth, or to some other of the good things which it is hard to get either always or at that particular place or time -- for many gain honour for things which seem small, but the place and the occasion account for it. The constituents of honour are: sacrifices; commemoration, in verse or prose; privileges; grants of land; front seats at civic celebrations; state burial; statues; public maintenance; among foreigners, obeisances and giving place; and such presents as are among various bodies of men regarded as marks of honour.
    4. Now good birth in a race or a state means that its members are indigenous or ancient: that its earliest leaders were distinguished men, and that from them have sprung many who were distinguished for qualities that we admire.

      Does this still apply today?

    5. From this definition of happiness it follows that its constituent parts are: -- good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of children, a happy old age, also such bodily excellences as health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers, together with fame, honour, good luck, and virtue. A man cannot fail to be completely independent if he possesses these internal and these external goods; for besides these there are no others to have.

      What is happiness?

    1. He must, therefore, know how many different forms of constitution there are; under what conditions each of these will prosper and by what internal developments or external attacks each of them tends to be destroyed. When I speak of destruction through internal developments I refer to the fact that all constitutions, except the best one of all, are destroyed both by not being pushed far enough and by being pushed too far.
    1. For of the three elements in speech-making -- speaker, subject, and person addressed -- it is the last one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object. [1358b] The hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things past or future, or an observer. A member of the assembly decides about future events, a juryman about past events: while those who merely decide on the orator's skill are observers. From this it follows that there are three divisions of oratory-(1) political, (2) forensic, and (3) the ceremonial oratory of display.

      I like how he divides these categories into past, present, and futures.

    1. Of Signs, one kind bears the same relation to the statement it supports as the particular bears to the universal, the other the same as the universal bears to the particular. The infallible kind is a "complete proof" (tekmerhiou); the fallible kind has no specific name.
    2. The enthymeme must consist of few propositions, fewer often than those which make up the normal syllogism. For if any of these propositions is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it; the hearer adds it himself. Thus, to show that Dorieus has been victor in a contest for which the prize is a crown, it is enough to say "For he has been victor in the Olympic games," without adding "And in the Olympic games the prize is a crown," a fact which everybody knows.

      Avoid redundancy.

    3. The duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or systems to guide us, in the hearing of persons who cannot take in at a glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning.

      Adapt material to audience

    4. The difference between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages in the Topics where induction and syllogism have already been discussed. When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that, certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric. It is plain also that each of these types of oratory has its advantages.


    1. we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this.

      In order to persuade one must address and understand all facts in a situation. Art of opposites.

    2. The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at probabilities.
    3. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

      Art vs. experience

    4. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others

      Is this what constitutes basic conversation?

    1. The honest rhetorician has no separate name to distinguish him from the dishonest.

      What profession does have a name to separate the honest from the dishonest?

    1. I say to them that if they are to excel in oratory or in managing affairs or in any line of work, they must, first of all, have a natural aptitude for that which they have elected to do; secondly, they must submit to training and master the knowledge of their particular subject, whatever it may be in each case; and, finally, they must become versed and practised in the use and application of their art; for only on these conditions can they become fully competent and pre-eminent in any line of endeavor. In this process, master and pupil each has his place; no one but the pupil can furnish the necessary capacity; no one but the master, the ability to impart knowledge while both have a part in the exercises of practical application: for the master must painstakingly direct his pupil, and the latter must rigidly follow the master's instructions.

      Aptitude, training, practice/teacher

    2. For in the other powers which we possess, as I have already said on a former occasion,125 we are in no respect superior to other living creatures; nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other resources; but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish. For this it is which has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things honorable and base; and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with one another. It is by this also that we confute the bad and extol the good. Through this we educate the ignorant and appraise the wise

      Take away from text

    3. Beware, then, lest it make you utterly ridiculous to pronounce a disparaging judgement upon the reputation which you have among the Hellenes even more than I have among you. Manifestly, by such an unjust verdict, you would be passing sentence upon yourselves. It would be as if the Lacedaemonians were to attempt to penalize men for training themselves in preparation for war, or as if the Thessalians154 saw fit to punish men for practicing the art of horsemanship. Take care, therefore, not to do yourselves this wrong and not to lend support to the slanders of the enemies of Athens rather than to the eulogies of her friends.

      Final plea

    4. It is, therefore, the duty of intelligent judges to destroy those who heap infamy upon the city and to reward those who are responsible in some degree for the tributes paid to her, more than you reward the athletes who are crowned in the great games, seeing that they win for the city a greater and more fitting glory than any athlete;157 for in contests of the body we have many rivals; but in the training of the mind everyone would concede that we stand first. And men with even a slight ability to reason ought to show the world that they reward those who excel in those activities for which the city is renowned, and they ought not to envy them nor hold an opinion of them which is the opposite of the esteem in which they are held by the rest of the Hellenes.

      Hmmmmm, I think we are still guilty of rewarding Athletes more than intellectuals.

    5. When I would speak to him in this wise, he would admit that I was right, but he could not change his nature. He was a good man and true, a credit to Athens and to Hellas, but he could not lower himself to the level of people who are intolerant of their natural superiors. So it was that the orators occupied themselves with inventing many false charges against him, and the multitude with drinking them in. I should be glad to refute these slanders, if the occasion permitted me to do so; for I believe that if you could hear me, you would come to loathe the men who have stirred the city to anger against Timotheus and the men who dare to speak evil of him. Now, however, I shall leave this subject and take up again my own defense and the case before us.

      Timotheus worked against Athens hegemony over Hellas because he saw the value in equality. However, his actions went against the will of Athens and he did not create a discourse to defend himself.

    6. For they know that at the beginning of his campaigns, owing to the fact that he received nothing from Athens, he found himself in great extremities, but that, even with this handicap, he was able to bring his fortunes round to the point where he not only prevailed over our enemies but paid his soldiers in full.
    7. For if you suppose that I was their counsellor and teacher, I should deserve from you greater gratitude than those who are maintained in the Prytaneum in recognition of excellence;58 for each of the latter has furnished to the city his own high qualities alone, whereas I have furnished those of all whom I have just now named to you. But if, on the other hand, you suppose that I, myself, had nothing to do with their achievements, but that I merely enjoyed their society and friendship, I consider that even this view is defense enough against the charges on which I am being tried.

      Either Or??

    8. I, however, believe that even the most simple-minded of people recognize that an accusation, to be convincing and to carry great weight, must not be one which may be employed equally well against the innocent, but one which can be applied only to the guilty.

      Saying that his accuser is less than simple-minded

    9. I, you will find, have never invited any person to follow me, but endeavor to persuade the whole state to pursue a policy from which the Athenians will become prosperous themselves, and at the same time deliver the rest of the Hellenes from their present ills.

      Is he a humanitarian?

    10. there are not many who can discourse upon questions of public welfare in a spirit worthy both of Athens and of Hellas.

      This shows limited communication of the time. However, even though we live in a global community I cannot say that we are able to determine discourse that can apply to the public welfare of differing where hegemony is present.

    11. nd since in addressing a king I have spoken for his subjects, surely I would urge upon men who live under a democracy to pay court to the people.
    12. in order that it may become even more evident to you that all my writings tend toward virtue and justice.
    13. After having dwelt upon this subject, deplored the misfortunes of Hellas, and urged Athens not to allow herself to remain in her present state, finally I summon her to a career of justice, I condemn the mistakes she is now making, and I counsel her as to her future policy.

      Criticizes Athens hegemony, seeks justice for Hellas, and has the audience thinking of the future--future policy

    14. As to the hegemony, then, it is easy enough for you to make up your minds from what has been read to you that it should by right belong to Athens

      Athens has power, control

    15. For I think, now that the charge under which I formerly labored has been disproved, you are anxious to change your attitude and want to hear from me what sort of eloquence it is which has occupied me and given me so great a reputation.

      Ending his first argument against charges. Again I am thinking of the future, what makes him so awesome??

    16. Yet how can anyone think that people who are so far apart in their ways of life are engaged in the same occupations?

      creates distance between himself and lawyers

    17. Moreover, you will find that these men are able to carry on a profitable business in alone; if they were to sail to any other place they would starve to death; while my resources, which this fellow has exaggerated, have all come to me from abroad.38

      He weaves in a positive spin to receiving resources from abroad.

    18. He has made his accusation in this manner, thinking that his extravagant assertions about me and my wealth and the great number of my pupils would arouse the envy of all his hearers, while my alleged activities in the law-courts would stir up your anger and hate; and when judges are affected by these very passions, they are most severe upon those who are on trial.

      Isocrates states his opponents tactics and rhetorical choices. It does have me thinking into the future...

    19. But it occurred to me that if I were to adopt the fiction of a trial and of a suit brought against me—if I were to suppose that a sycophant13 had brought an indictment and was threatening me with trouble14and that he was using the calumnies which had been urged against me in the suit about the exchange of property, while I, for my part, cast my speech in the form of a defense in court—in this way it would be possible to discuss to the best advantage all the points which I wanted to make.

      Setting the frame for the piece.

    20. They betrayed their sentiments at the trial; for, although my opponent made no argument whatever on the merits of the case, and did nothing but decry my “cleverness” of speech11 and indulge in extravagant nonsense about my wealth and the number of my pupils, they imposed the trierarchy upon me.

      I am confused as to the meaning of trierarchy in this sentence. Does it mean a tax?

    1. But in order that I may not appear to be breaking down the pretensions of others while myself making greater claims than are within my powers, I believe that the very arguments by which I myself was convinced will make it clear to others also that these things are true.

      He calls on his own studies, calling them the "very arguments by which I myself was convinced" and relies on his knowledge to deem his words true.

    2. For I hold that to obtain a knowledge of the elements out of which we make and compose all discourses is not so very difficult if anyone entrusts himself, not to those who make rash promises, but to those who have some knowledge of these things.

      Does this go back to the knowledge verses experience debate?

    3. I think all intelligent people will agree with me

      I like how he liked intelligence with himself, this has to be a rhetorical device of some sort?

    4. More than that, they do not attribute any of this power either to the practical experience or to the native ability of the student, but undertake to transmit the science of discourse as simply as they would teach the letters of the alphabet, not having taken trouble to examine into the nature of each kind of knowledge, but thinking that because of the extravagance of their promises they themselves will command admiration and the teaching of discourse will be held in higher esteem--oblivious of the fact that the arts are made great, not by those who are without scruple in boasting about them, but by those who are able to discover all of the resources which each art affords.

      Is this saying that the teachers lack ethos, or credibility, to teach discourses more complicated than the alphabet?

    5. When, therefore, the layman puts all these things together and observes that the teachers of wisdom and dispensers of happiness are themselves in great want but exact only a small fee from their students, that they are on the watch for contradictions in words(10) but are blind to inconsistencies in deeds, and that, further , they pretend to have knowledge of the future" but are incapable either of saying anything pertinent or of giving any counsel regarding the present, and when he observes that those who follow their judgements are more consistent and more successful4 than those who profess to have exact knowledge, then he has, I think, good reason to contemn such studies and regard them as stuff and nonsense, and not as a true discipline of the soul.

      Wow! Is that the longest sentence ever??

      When the students observe the sophists living in "great want" (poverty?) but charging little for their services the student recognizes that the sophist is contradictory in nature. When students are more successful than the teachers the teachers are considered to be teaching nonsense.

      I disagree, at least from a modern perspective. Isn't a good thing if a student passes a teacher in success. Isn't it possible for a law teacher to teach a student who goes on to become president or a judge?

    6. Indeed, who can fail to abhor, yes to contemn, those teachers, in the first place, who devote themselves to disputation,(2) since they pretend to search for truth, but straightway at the beginning of their professions attempt to deceive us with lies?(3) For I think it is manifest to all that foreknowledge of future events is not vouchsafed to our human nature, but that we are so far removed from this prescience(4) that Homer, who has been conceded the highest reputation for wisdom, has pictured even the gods as at times debating among themselves about the future(5) --not that he knew their minds but that he desired to show us that for mankind this power lies in the realms of the impossible.

      I think this is saying that teachers who debate or discuss are regarded with disgust because while they act like they are searching for truth the are really deceiving because no one can predict the future.

      Homer's texts were used as educational material at the time and was considered a reliable source of information. The gods could not predict the future and there was the Fates.

    7. the teachers who do not scruple to vaunt their powers with utter disregard of the truth have created the impression that those who choose a life of careless indolence are better advised than those who devote themselves to serious study.

      Is this stating that traditional teachers that hesitate to boast their knowledge without regard to the truth (possibly meaning the same thing as plato's "experience") inadvertently seem less educated than those who choose a life of careless indolence (sophists?)?

  4. caseyboyle.net caseyboyle.net
    1. Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument.


    2. Are the superior and better and stronger the same or different? CALLICLES: I say unequivocally that they are the same. SOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you were saying, they make the laws? CALLICLES: Certainly. SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior? CALLICLES: Very true. SOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class are far better, as you were saying? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them are by nature good?

      Is this diallage?

    3. And therefore when you and I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of perfect truth.

      Socrates considers Callicles to be an equal.

    4. Why, their modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one and then the other of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the highest moment

      This goes back to the idea of caring about what the world thinks of you causing self conflict in inopportune moments.

    5. when I see a youth thus engaged,—the study appears to me to be in character, and becoming a man of liberal education, and him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later life, and not leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates; for, as I was saying, such a one, even though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate.

      Studying philosophy should be done in adolescence, and should not be carried on by adults.

    6. Nay, but these are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and according to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young lions,—charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them, that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honourable and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this; he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws which are against nature: the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would shine forth

      Men who act according to nature would be free of socially imposed restrictions and true justice would be present. The "best and strongest" are pacified by society with the promise of honor through equality and justice.

    7. But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is miserable in any case,—more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and men.

      Justice equals happiness

    8. Socrates defines good and evil: just and unjust.

    9. An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification.

      Rhetoric is an experience that produces delight and gratification.

    10. POLUS:

      Polus enters the discussion, if he is brief

    11. For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass.
    12. Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion?

      Address the audience

    13. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter;—let us make an end of it.

      Socrates is willing to accept when he is wrong, he just wants to understand what Gorgias is saying. He thinks Gorgias is inconsistent and wants clarity.

    14. in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric!

      Rhetoric is about being able to present material in a way the audience can understand, a skill that is not found in other discourses or arts.

    15. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men and upon any subject,—in short, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers.

      Ethics of rhetoric.

    16. GORGIAS: I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric.

      Socrates asks leading questions. Gorgias shows his skills as a rhetorician and addresses the concerns of his audiencel

    17. GORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.

      Rhetoric is persuasion

    18. GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

      Rhetoric can give freedom and create slavery, give power and wealth.

    19. SOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words? GORGIAS: True.

      Rhetoric alway uses words.

    20. But I do not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by you.
    21. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.
    22. SOCRATES: By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers.

      Socrates set Gorgias up to answer his question in a short and direct answer.

    23. Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that I can be as short as any one.

      Rhetoric does not require lengthy answers.

    24. SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men rhetoricians? GORGIAS: Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at Athens, but in all places.

      Gorgias claims not only to be a rhetorician but also teacher of rhetoric.

    25. Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which he professes and teaches

      Socrates wants ask Gorgias questions about rhetoric.