2 Matching Annotations
  1. Aug 2022
    1. The greatestdefect of classical philosophy of mind, both rationalist and empiricist, seems tome to be its unquestioned assumption that the properties and content of the mindare accessible to introspection;
  2. Nov 2020
    1. first-personal thought and language is irreducible to non-first-personal thought and language, and is essential to the explanation of action

      Is the author implying that, on a 'Referent' and 'Thought and Language' Grid, 'Referent" ("I" as Subject) as a content of the 'Thought and Language' ("My pants are on fire") calls for action enablement. Whereas 'Referent' ("Smith" as Subject) as content of the 'Thought and Language' ("Smith's pants are on fire") is not self-locating, for being non-first personal thought?

      == Two Lines of Thinking == (1) Smith's pants are on fire. He should put it out. (2) Smith's pants are on fire. He should put it out. I am Smith. Therefore, my pants are on fire. Therefore, I should put it out.

      == unless, I come to believe 'I = Smith', only then it calls for action. Unless and until, 'Smith' becomes first-personal in the mind, it is unable to self-locate.